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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the trade and revenue impact of trade liberalization. The 
purpose is to address the following issues: to examine the effect of trade liberalization 
on the volume of imports and exports, taxation, and its association with the 
enhancement of the performance of overall tax system. An empirical analysis is 
conducted by, first, adding liberalization factors to the import and export demand 
functions to assess their impact on imports and exports. The results indicate that, for 
Thailand, trade liberalization does not lead to the deterioration in the trade balance. 
Instead, it helps improve export performance. However, trade deficit may still occur 
due to a high income elasticity of demand for imports, rooted from its import 
structure. Although trade liberalization is not found to be associated with the problem 
of trade imbalance, the fiscal imbalance may still persist due to the mechanism of 
tariff reduction. In order to deal with the fiscal problem, the government needs to 
implement domestic tax reform. The consequence of reform may vary since 
liberalization impacts on taxation differ greatly depending on various factors. The 
study examines its effect on taxation, by applying a tax effort model and employing a 
two-way fixed effect approach. The results suggest that tax reform in less developed 
and developing countries, by moving away from trade tax to domestic taxes, may be 
inapplicable since domestic taxes may also severely suffer from liberalization. 
However, tax reform is still necessary and thus the study applies the concept of tax 
buoyancy and elasticity to evaluate the ability of Thailand’s tax system to mobilize its 
revenue after the reform. The results reveal that the tax system as a whole is buoyant 
and elastic due to the high tax-to-base buoyancy of corporate income tax, especially in 
the post-AFTA period. The main findings from empirical studies have important 
policy implications for tax strategies of Thailand and other developing countries. 
Acknowledgements 
I am very grateful to my principal supervisor, Professor Somnath Sen, who provided 
not only invaluable comments and constructive suggestions on my work, but also 
constant encouragement during the course of this research. In particular, I am 
extremely grateful for his effort to read through different drafts of this thesis. I would 
also like to express my gratitude to my second supervisor, Mr. Nicholas Horsewood 
for his very helpful comments and constructive suggestions on econometric analysis. 
What I learned from him is beyond econometric techniques, particularly his attitude to 
research. My indebtedness also goes to Professor Anindya Banerjee and Professor 
Indrajit Ray who provided invaluable assistance and support. 
I am also grateful to all members of secretarial team in the Department of Economics 
of The University of Birmingham, including Ms Julie W Tomkinson, Ms Emma 
Steadman, Ms Jackie Gough, Ms Wendy Rose and Ms Maureen Hyde, for all their 
help. 
I am also thankful to Mr. Akarapong Unthong for providing his statistical software 
and guidance, which is so valuable for this thesis. Many thanks to my dear friends and 
colleagues Visanu Vongsinsirikul, Duangkamol Prompitak, Puyang Sun, Jiale Cen, 
Vimal Thakoor and Fanfan He, for having always been kind, patient and supportive. 
My deepest gratitude, however, goes to my parents, my sister, my little tiger and my 
little tiger’s parents for the tremendous encouragement and support that they have 
offered during my study in the United Kingdom. 
Finally, financial support from the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance, Royal 
Thai Government is gratefully acknowledged.  
Contents 
Chapter 1. Introduction 1 
1.1.General Introduction and Motivation 2 
1.2.Various Issues Related to Trade Liberalization 11 
 1.2.1.Trade Liberalization and Structural Adjustment 11 
 1.2.2.Trade Liberalization, Economic Growth, and National Welfare 13 
 1.2.3.Trade Liberalization and “Contractionary” Devaluation 17 
 1.2.4.Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction 19 
 1.2.5.Trade Liberalization and External Shocks 22 
1.2.Outline of the Thesis 24 
Chapter 2. A Survey of the Theory of Trade Liberalization 30 
2.1.Introduction 31 
2.2.The Strategy to Offset Revenue Shortfall 
      from The loss of Foreign Trade Tax by Using Domestic Indirect Tax 32 
2.3.The Strategy to Offset Revenue Shortfall 
      from The loss of Foreign Trade Tax by Using Domestic Direct Tax 36 
2.4.Summary and Conclusion 50 
Chapter 3. Trade Liberalization and Trade Performance  
   in Thailand 53 
3.1.Introduction 54 
3.2.Thailand’s Import and Export and Trade Policies 57 
 
3.3.General Review: Empirical Studies on the Relationship 
      between Trade Liberalization, Imports, and Exports 68 
3.4.The Model and Methodology 74 
 3.4.1.The Model Specification and Equations 75 
 3.4.2.The Data 79 
 3.4.3.The Methodology 82 
3.5.Empirical Analysis 90 
 3.5.1.Import Demand 90 
  3.5.1.1.The Analysis of the Long-run Total Import Demand 90 
 3.5.2.Export Demand 106 
  3.5.2.1.The Analysis of the Long-run Total Export Demand 106 
 3.5.3.Comparison 119 
3.6.Conclusion 126 
Chapter 4. Estimating the Impact of Trade Liberalization 
                   on Tax Revenue 129 
4.1.Introduction 130 
4.2.General Review: Theoretical and Empirical Background on 
 the Relationship between Trade Liberalization, International Trade Tax, 
 and Domestic Taxes 134 
 4.2.1.The Failure of Revenue Source Substitution 134 
 4.2.2.Characteristics of Developing and Less Developed Countries: 
     Self Constraints 136 
 4.2.3.The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Tax Revenues 142 
4.3.The Basic Model of Tax Effort 153 
4.4.The Extended Model, Data, and Empirical Methodology 156 
4.5.Empirical Results 163 
4.6.Conclusions 177 
Appendix 4A: Summary of Previous Studies in Tax Effort 181 
Appendix 4B: Panel Unit Root Test 182 
Chapter 5. The Impact of Trade Liberalization 
                   on Revenue Mobilization and Tax Performance 183 
5.1.Introduction 184 
5.2.The Reform of Taxation in Developing Countries 187 
 5.2.1.The Choice between Income and Consumption Taxes: 
     Theoretical Considerations 188 
 5.2.2.Overview of Fiscal Profile 195 
 5.2.3.Summary of Fiscal Policies 214 
  5.2.3.1.Thailand’s Tax Reform 214 
  5.2.3.2.Malaysia’s Tax Reform 219 
  5.2.3.3.Indonesia’s Tax Reform 220 
  5.2.3.4.Philippines’s Tax Reform 222 
5.3.General Review: Buoyancy and Elasticity of Tax Revenue 
      and Empirical works on Revenue Productivity of the Tax System 224 
5.4.Framework of the Study 232 
 5.4.1.Methodology and the Regression Models 232 
 5.4.2.Variables, Data and Sources 241 
5.5.Empirical Results 243 
5.6.Conclusion 259 
Appendix 5A: Tests for Stationarity 264 
Appendix 5B: Regression Results – Tax Buoyancy and Tax Elasticity 265 
Appendix 5C: Regression Results – The Decomposition of Tax Buoyancy 272 
Appendix 5D: Cointegration Test – Tax Buoyancy and Tax Elasticity 279 
Chapter 6. General Conclusion 289 
6.1.Summary and Conclusions 290 
 6.1.1.Qualifications 290 
 6.1.2.The Main Findings 291 
6.2.Clarifications and Conclusions Derived from the Econometrics 305 
 6.2.1.The Impact of Trade Liberalization 
      on the Tariff Structure of Thailand 305 
 6.2.2.The Composition of Thailand GDP 309 
 6.2.3.The Problem Associated With Quantifying the Impact 
      of Trade Liberalization on Tax Revenues 313 
 6.2.4.The Issue of Income Distribution and Profitability 
      of Corporations in Thailand 315 
6.3.Policy Implications 316 
6.4.Option for Further Study 318 
Bibliography 320 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lists of Figures 
Figure 2.1. Partial Equilibrium of Coordinated Tax-tariff Reform 34 
Figure 3.1. Trade as a Percentage of GDP 57 
Figure 3.2. Trade in Goods and Services as a Percentage of GDP 58 
Figure 3.3. Share of Agricultural and Manufactures Exports in 
   Merchandise Exports 59 
Figure 3.4. Share of Agricultural and Manufactures Imports in 
   Merchandise Imports 60 
Figure 3.5. Imports and Exports of Goods and Services 61 
Figure 3.6. Trends in Average Tariff Rates 63 
Figure 3.7. Thailand’s Import Share of GDP and Thailand’s Average 
   Tariff Rate 64 
Figure 3.8. Thailand’s Export Share of GDP and World’s Average 
   Tariff Rate 64 
Figure 4.1. Laffer Curve 144 
Figure 5.1. Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in Thailand, 
   1972 to 2006 196 
Figure 5.2. Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in Indonesia, 
   1972 to 2006 196 
Figure 5.3. Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in Malaysia, 
   1972 to 2006 197 
Figure 5.4. Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in the Philippines, 
   1972 to 2006 197 
Figure 5.5. Share of Tax and Non-Tax Revenue in Total Revenue 
   (US Dollar; Millions); Thailand, 1972-2006 198 
 
Figure 5.6. Share of Tax and Non-Tax Revenue in Total Revenue 
   (US Dollar; Millions); Indonesia, 1972-2006 198 
Figure 5.7. Share of Tax and Non-Tax Revenue in Total Revenue 
   (US Dollar; Millions); Malaysia, 1972-2006 199 
Figure 5.8. Share of Tax and Non-Tax Revenue in Total Revenue 
   (US Dollar; Millions); Philippines, 1972-2006 199 
Figure 5.9. Trends of Thailand’s Major Taxes 200 
Figure 5.10. Trends of Indonesia’s Major Taxes 201 
Figure 5.11. Trends of Malaysia’s Major Taxes 202 
Figure 5.12. Trends of Philippines’s Major Taxes 203 
Figure 5.13. Thailand’s Reliance on International Trade Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 204 
Figure 5.14. Thailand’s Reliance on Personal Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 205 
Figure 5.15. Thailand’s Reliance on Corporate Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 205 
Figure 5.16. Thailand’s Reliance on Goods and Services Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 206 
Figure 5.17. Indonesia’s Reliance on International Trade Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 207 
Figure 5.18. Indonesia’s Reliance on Personal Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 207 
Figure 5.19. Indonesia’s Reliance on Corporate Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 208 
Figure 5.20. Indonesia’s Reliance on Goods and Services Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 208 
 
Figure 5.21. Malaysia’s Reliance on International Trade Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 209 
Figure 5.22. Malaysia’s Reliance on Personal Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 210 
Figure 5.23. Malaysia’s Reliance on Corporate Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 210 
Figure 5.24. Malaysia’s Reliance on Goods and Services Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 211 
Figure 5.25. Philippines’s Reliance on International Trade Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 212 
Figure 5.26. Philippines’s Reliance on Personal Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 212 
Figure 5.27. Philippines’s Reliance on Corporate Income Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 213 
Figure 5.28. Philippines’s Reliance on Goods and Services Tax 
   Measured against Income Levels, 1972-2006 213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lists of Tables 
Table 3.1. Details in Current Account of Thailand, 1975-2007 62 
Table 3.2. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests for Stationarity (Import Model) 91 
Table 3.3. Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: 
   Standard Import Model 95 
Table 3.4. Cointegration Vector: Standard Import Model 95 
Table 3.5. Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: 
   Augmented Import Model by Including Thailand’s 
   Average Tariff Rates 96 
Table 3.6. Cointegration Vector: Augmented Import Model by 
   Including Thailand’s Average Tariff Rates 96 
Table 3.7. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; 
   Standard Import Model 98 
Table 3.8. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; 
   Augmented Import Model 99 
Table 3.9. Error-Correction Model for Import Demand (ΔLogM) 104 
Table 3.10. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests for Stationarity (Export Model) 107 
Table 3.11. Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: 
   Standard Export Model 110 
Table 3.12. Cointegration Vector: Standard Export Model 110 
Table 3.13. Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: 
   Augmented Export Model by Including World’s 
   Average Tariff Rates 111 
Table 3.14. Cointegration Vector: Augmented Export Model by Including 
   the World’s Average Tariff Rates 111 
 
Table 3.15. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; 
   Standard Export Model 112 
Table 3.16. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; 
   Augmented Export Model 113 
Table 3.17. Error-Correction Model for Export Demand (ΔLogX) 117 
Table 3.18. Short-Run and Long-Run Elasticities 120 
Table 4.1. Determinants of Tax Revenue; Full Sample 165 
Table 4.2. Determinants of Tax Revenues; Low Income Countries 170 
Table 4.3. Determinants of Tax Revenues; Lower-Middle Income 
   Countries 173 
Table 4.4. Determinants of Tax Revenues; Upper-Middle Income 
   Countries 175 
Table 4.5. Determinants of Tax Revenues; High Income Countries 177 
Table 4A1. Summary Table of Previous Studies in Tax Effort 181 
Table 4B1. The Panel Unit Root Test 182 
Table 5.1. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Thailand) 244 
Table 5.2. Tax Buoyancy and Tax Elasticity Estimates; 
   Combined Period (1972-2006) 246 
Table 5.3. Tax Buoyancy Estimates; Pre- and Post-AFTA Period 251 
Table 5.4. Decomposition of Tax Buoyancy 253 
Table 5A1. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Indonesia) 264 
Table 5A2. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Malaysia) 264 
Table 5A3. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Philippines) 264 
Table 5B1. Thailand Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 265 
Table 5B2. Indonesia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 266 
Table 5B3. Malaysia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 266 
Table 5B4. Philippines Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 266 
Table 5B5. Thailand Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 267 
Table 5B6. Indonesia Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 267 
Table 5B7. Malaysia Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 268 
Table 5B8. Philippines Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-2006 268 
Table 5B9. Thailand Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-1991 268 
Table 5B10. Indonesia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-1991 269 
Table 5B11. Malaysia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-1991 269 
Table 5B12. Philippines Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1972-1991 269 
Table 5B13. Thailand Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1992-2006 270 
Table 5B14. Indonesia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1992-2006 270 
Table 5B15. Malaysia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1992-2006 270 
 
Table 5B16. Philippines Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 
   1992-2006 271 
Table 5C1. Thailand – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 273 
Table 5C2. Thailand – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 273 
Table 5C3. Indonesia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 273 
Table 5C4. Indonesia – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 273 
Table 5C5. Malaysia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 274 
Table 5C6. Malaysia – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 274 
Table 5C7. Philippines – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 274 
Table 5C8. Philippines – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 274 
Table 5C9. Thailand – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 275 
Table 5C10. Thailand – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 275 
Table 5C11. Indonesia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 275 
Table 5C12. Indonesia – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 275 
Table 5C13. Malaysia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 276 
Table 5C14. Malaysia – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 276 
Table 5C15. Philippines – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 276 
Table 5C16. Philippines – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 276 
Table 5C17. Thailand – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 277 
Table 5C18. Thailand – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 277 
Table 5C19. Indonesia – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 277 
Table 5C20. Indonesia – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 277 
Table 5C21. Malaysia – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 278 
Table 5C22. Malaysia – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 278 
Table 5C23. Philippines – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 278 
Table 5C24. Philippines – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 278 
 
Table 5D1. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Thailand 280 
Table 5D2. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Indonesia 280 
Table 5D3. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Malaysia 280 
Table 5D4. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Philippines 281 
Table 5D5. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax elasticity: Thailand 281 
Table 5D6. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax elasticity: Indonesia 282 
Table 5D7. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax elasticity: Malaysia 282 
Table 5D8. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax elasticity: Philippines 282 
Table 5D9. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Pre- and Post-AFTA periods: Thailand 283 
Table 5D10. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Pre- and Post-AFTA periods: Indonesia 283 
Table 5D11. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Pre- and Post-AFTA periods: Malaysia 284 
Table 5D12. Cointegration test for variables used for computing 
   tax buoyancy; Pre- and Post-AFTA periods: Philippines 284 
Table 5D13. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Thailand 285 
 
Table 5D14. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Indonesia 285 
Table 5D15. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Malaysia 285 
Table 5D16. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Combined period (1972-2006): Philippines 285 
Table 5D17. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Pre-AFTA period (1972-1991): Thailand 286 
Table 5D18. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Pre-AFTA period (1972-1991): Indonesia 286 
Table 5D19. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Pre-AFTA period (1972-1991): Malaysia 286 
Table 5D20. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Pre-AFTA period (1972-1991): Philippines 287 
Table 5D21. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Post-AFTA period (1992-2006): Thailand 287 
Table 5D22. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Post-AFTA period (1992-2006): Indonesia 287 
Table 5D23. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Post-AFTA period (1992-2006): Malaysia 288 
Table 5D24. Cointegration test for variables used for the decomposition 
   of tax buoyancy; Post-AFTA period (1992-2006): Philippines 288 
Table 6.1. Average Tariff of Top 10 Items Under Tariff Restructuring 
   in Thailand, 2002 – 2005 307 
Table 6.2. Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection 
   in Thailand 1908-2003 (percent) 308 
Table 6.3. Thailand GDP by Sector, 2000 - 2008 (percent) 311 
Table 6.4. Revenue from Tourism, 2000 – 2008 312 
Table 6.5. Tax on Consumption and Tax Refund, 2000 – 2008 313 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1.1. General Introduction and Motivation 
Since World War II, most countries have experienced a rapid pace of the integration 
of domestic economies into the international economy through the intensification of 
the process of globalization. Globalization is a phenomenon which involves increases 
in the flows of trade, capital, information and technology, as well as the mobility of 
labour across borders. This period of rapidly increased globalization is associated with 
a substantial expansion in international trade, world production, and consequently, a 
rise in world economic welfare. In general, globalization encourages a free flow of 
trade and investment across countries via the process of trade liberalization. Trade 
liberalization is normally associated with the reduction, removal and elimination of 
taxes on goods and services (including tariffs and import duties), and other trade 
barriers such as quotas on imports, subsidies, and non-tariff barriers to trade. It also 
includes the removal of trade-distorting policies, free access to market, free access to 
market information, the reduction of monopoly or oligopoly power, free movement of 
capital and labour between and within countries, and the creation of free trade zones. 
Trade liberalization may also take many forms such as free trade zones, free trade 
area, trade blocs, and free trade agreements at bilateral, multilateral, or regional 
agreements. 
The spread of trade liberalization over the world in the last decade has been driven by 
its numerous benefits. The most outstanding advantage of free trade, which induces 
most countries to walk toward free trade regime, is that open trade policies lead to a 
better economic performance. In fact, the possible gains from trade have long been 
pointed out by the early classical theorists; David Ricardo and Eli Heckscher. They 
suggest that these gains result from specialization in production due to international 
trade. If a country specializes according to its comparative advantage, the allocation 
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of domestic resource can be enhanced. This achievement improves the efficiency of 
production because resources which have formerly been employed in the production 
of other goods are now shifted to the production of the goods which a country 
produces best. Consequently, the income and welfare of all trading partners will be 
improved. Although an economy grows over time as a result of increases in its 
productive resources and technology innovation, most of the economic literature 
suggests that trade liberalization potentially improves the allocation of domestic 
resources and consequently leads to an increase in economic welfare. According to 
Dornbusch (1992), Salehezadeh and Henneberry (2002), and Dennis (2006), every 
kind of import restrictions raises the price of import goods relative to export goods. 
The removal of trade restrictions through the process of trade liberalization 
encourages a shift of domestic resources from the production of import substitutes to 
the production of export-oriented goods. Thus, the new allocation of resources due to 
trade based on comparative advantage provides large benefits to domestic production 
and generates growth in the medium to long term. On contrary, trade liberalization 
may also have a negative effect on economic growth since it exposes a country to 
volatility of output and terms of trade. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Srinivasan 
(2001) have developed endogenous growth models in the study of trade liberalization 
and suggested that free trade may be growth-hindering since it leads to more volatility 
in some specific sectors. Trade liberalization is also often followed by financial 
liberalization with the later associates with more financial fragility. Through these 
channels, trade liberalization is considered as a potential source of macroeconomic 
volatility which is an important determinant of a wide variety of adverse outcomes 
including fluctuation in GDP growth. There are many recent studies which suggest 
important adverse impacts of trade liberalization, for example, Ramey and Ramey 
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(1995) point out that higher macroeconomic volatility tends to lead to lower growth; 
Pallage and Robe (2003) and Barlevy (2004) suggest that if output and consumption 
smoothing is an issue for the government to stabilize the domestic economy, output 
and consumption volatility will finally lead to the reduction of economic welfare; 
Gavin and Hausmann (1998) and Laursen and Mahajan (2005) indicate that trade 
liberalization induces inequality and poverty in developing countries. These studies 
are supported by Harrison (1996), Harrison and Hanson (1999), Rodríguez and 
Rodrik (1999), which suggest that the positive association between trade liberalization 
and economic growth found in many previous studies is flawed, particularly due to 
the chosen measures of trade openness and model specification. They conclude that 
those results are not robust and they fail to establish the relationship between more 
open trade regimes and long-run economic growth. However, Greenaway, Morgan, 
and Wright (1998) and Bolaky and Freund (2004) suggest that trade liberalization 
may result in either an increase or a decrease in economic growth, depending on the 
country’s characteristic and condition. 
However, there are many examples which strongly support the argument that 
openness to international trade brings more rapid growth to the country. According to 
the World Bank (2002), almost half of developing countries which have lowered their 
average tariffs by about 30 percentage points, are associated with an increase in trade 
relative to income by over 80 percent in the post-1980 period, and experienced growth 
of per capita income by 4 percent per annum in the 1980s, and 6 percent in the 1990s. 
By contrast, the remaining developing countries, which have lowered average tariffs 
by only 10 percentage points, are experienced very little or even no growth in GDP 
per capita in the post-1980 period. From this evidence, many authors suggest that the 
channel through which trade liberalization results in economic growth is by increasing 
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the volume of trade between countries.1 Since the empirical evidence suggests that 
policies to promote trade openness, supported by sound domestic policies, leads to 
faster growth, and, in line with the experience that the earlier strategy of attempting to 
achieve growth through import substitution has been conclusively proved to have 
failed, most developing countries have switched their trade policies from import 
substitution to export promotion by implementing trade liberalization policy since 
1980s. 
Generally, there are three routes for trade to generate growth; the increase in domestic 
demand, import substitution, and export promotion. An increase in domestic demand 
is associated with the stimulation of expenditures inside the country, while import 
substitution and export promotion are related to international trade effects. In general, 
most developing and less developed countries have begun their economic 
development by inducing an import substitution strategy in the first phase. Import 
substitution is a strategy which reduces the country’s foreign dependency and 
appreciates the domestic production by substituting the imported goods with the 
locally produced goods. This strategy aims to protect domestic industries, i.e. infant 
industries, until they are able to compete with the foreign industries. However, it 
appears that the country that can benefit from an import substitution strategy is 
generally rich and must have a large economy and huge internal market. 
Unfortunately, most of the less developed and developing countries appear to have 
smaller economies with lower per capita income. These countries are less likely to 
succeed with an import substitution strategy. Therefore, in practice, the majority of 
less developed and developing countries have shifted their policies from import 
substitution in the first phase to serve for an export promotion strategy in the next 
                                                            
1 See Sengupta and Espana (1994) and Ramos (2001), for example. 
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phase, by hoping that an export promotion strategy will stimulate growth more 
rapidly. On the other hand, an export promotion strategy, instead of promoting 
industries which produce import substituted goods and protect infant industries, 
particularly promotes the industries that have the potential for developing and 
competing with foreign rivals in the world market. In order to gain an access to a 
foreign market, liberalization policy is implemented to assist an export promotion 
strategy. According to Edwards (1993), more liberalized economies have faster 
growth of exports and in turn, this results in more rapidly growing country’s income. 
Thus, over the past few decades, liberalizing the external trade regime has been one of 
the central and most visible elements of many less developed and developing 
countries to achieve accelerated exports, and consequently economic growth.  
However, not all countries have benefited from the gains of trade liberalization. From 
a trade perspective, while trade liberalization is generally associated with a substantial 
increase in the volume of imports, there is nothing to guarantee that every country 
participating in free trade will experience a considerable increase in the volume of 
exports. Furthermore, if, after trade is liberalized, exports do not increase 
proportionately as an increase in imports, the trade balance will be worsened further 
and further. High imports without corresponding increases in exports leads to a trade 
deficit and further results in a current account problem. On the fiscal side, trade 
liberalization is likely to lead to a substantial decrease in international trade tax 
revenue through the reduction of tariffs. The fiscal problem is more serious if a 
country is highly dependent on international trade tax and if it places this tax as a 
major source of government revenue. Usually, this fiscal problem is found in less 
developed and developing countries. Thus, trade liberalization may in turn potentially 
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lead the country to a profound problem of deficits which includes both trade deficit 
and fiscal deficit, at least in its transition period. 
Generally, countries’ reliance on international trade tax is inversely related to their 
income levels. This is because most of less developed and developing countries 
usually lack administrative capacity which in turn reduces the efficiency of tax 
collection. In addition, these countries also have large informal and subsistence 
sectors which mean that a considerable amount of transactions cannot be taxed. 
Furthermore, the influence of powerful lobbies creates a limitation for the tax 
authorities to collect revenue in some sectors. Since domestic tax bases are limited, 
the government has to meet its fiscal need by charging high rates on such an easy-to-
tax source as trade taxes and placing high dependence on international trade taxes. 
With governments operating under a liberalization regime, revenue-declining 
concerns are often considered as a serious issue for governments in implementing 
trade and tax reform. 
Although the revenue from an international trade tax has become less important over 
the past few decades, it still continues to be a major source of government finance in 
many less developed and developing countries. According to the WTO (2002), 
international trade tax has generated on average 24.3 percent of total current revenues 
over the last decade; for less developed and developing countries the share goes up to 
36.2 and 28.7 percent, respectively. This compares to 1.3 percent for high-income 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and 3.7 
percent for developed countries. Thus, while the data show a decreasing trend 
worldwide, less developed and developing countries are still highly dependent on this 
tax source. As a consequence, even countries that are persuaded to enjoy substantial 
economic growth and to reap other benefits from trade liberalization, most of less 
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developed and developing countries may fear of the very high cost of trade 
liberalization in terms of the loss of tax revenue. 
Certainly, domestic taxation is the first option for a government to manage with fiscal 
problem rooted from trade liberalization since it is the most important instrument for 
augmenting revenue, especially for less developed and developing countries. 
Economists suggest that, in order to mitigate the loss of international trade tax 
revenue, one strategy is to raise both domestic direct and indirect taxes, particularly 
increasing revenue from goods and services tax, by implementing domestic tax 
reform. By substituting revenue sources from international trade tax to broad-based 
domestic taxes, economists believe that the negative impact of trade liberalization can 
be offset or reduced. However, the suggestion that the fiscal problem can be 
eliminated if trade liberalization is coordinated with domestic direct and indirect tax 
may not be able to efficiently follow since trade liberalization may not only have a 
directly negative impact on international trade tax, but it may possibly have an 
indirectly adverse impact on various individual tax revenues. For example, trade 
liberalization is always accompanied with other processes including privatization, 
restructuration, and automation, which potentially cause tremendous job losses. These 
processes may also link with cuts in wages and wage dumping. Consequently, the 
process of trade liberalization may result in the contraction of the personal income tax 
base, and thus the decline in personal income tax revenue. However, it is difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions on the impact of trade liberalization on employment since 
it is highly dependent on the growth effect of trade liberalization, country-specific 
effect, and other contingent factors. Trade liberalization may also have an impact on 
corporate income tax through changes in the exchange rate. Normally, exchange rate 
depreciation occurs after trade is liberalized, while the price of imports is usually low 
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relative to price of domestic goods. This will possibly lead to a decline in the real 
exchange rate, a rise in the relative price of imported inputs used by corporations in 
production, and finally lower profitability of firms. However, in the currency 
depreciation situation, exporters might benefit through stronger sales, but whether it 
can be offset by higher input costs is still questioned. Thus, the impact of trade 
liberalization on the corporate income tax base is still ambiguous. Trade liberalization 
may be harmful to the tax on goods and services, mainly through changes in its tax 
base. Generally, tariffs are applied to the import value. Then, excise tax is levied on 
the base inclusive of tariffs. When imported goods enter into the domestic market, 
such a goods and services tax as VAT is levied on the base inclusive of tariffs and 
excise duties. Normally, trade liberalization is associated with the reduction or 
elimination of tariffs. This possibly leads to a fall in the tax base since tariffs 
constitute an element of the goods and services tax base. However, a high reduction of 
tariffs may lead to a drastically increase in the volume of imports, offsetting the 
decline in the value of imports. In addition, goods and services tax revenue may also 
decline if there is a decrease of the output of import-substituted goods. However, in 
the long term, if trade liberalization leads to economic growth, the growth of the 
economy is likely to expand the consumption tax base, and consequently results in an 
increase in the goods and services tax. Thus, again, the firm conclusion of how trade 
liberalization affects the goods and services tax cannot be drawn. 
Another strategy to mitigate the loss of international trade tax revenue is to strengthen 
tax administration and collection and to improve the effectiveness of the tax system. 
However, as discussed above that trade liberalization may have various adverse 
impacts on many tax types, as a result, the performance of overall tax system would 
be deteriorated. Until recently, many less developed and developing countries still 
9 
 
have experienced the difficulty in raising tax revenue to the level which is required to 
promote the growth of their economies. A poor tax performance, in terms of raising 
tax revenue, can mean either deficiency in the capability of tax administration, an 
inadequate effort to collect or the deterioration of tax bases, or both. In order to 
improve the performance of the overall tax system, domestic tax reform is a necessary 
process. Tax reform is usually a basic component of trade liberalization. The key 
objective of tax reform under the trade liberalization regime is to ensure that the tax 
system is productive enough to mitigate the fiscal imbalance. In general, countries 
which embark on the liberalization path also perform domestic tax reform at the same 
time, in order to modernize their tax systems, with the hope that tax reform will 
reduce compliance and collection costs, improve tax administration, and consequently 
enhance revenue collection. Therefore, it is important to review tax revenue 
performance as well as tax design and administration changes during the liberalization 
period. 
Thus, the following questions are addresses in this thesis: 
1. What are the factors determining imports and exports? How does trade 
liberalization affect the volume of imports and exports in both the short run 
and the long run? 
2. What is the impact of trade liberalization on domestic and international trade 
taxes? How does the impact differ among countries with different level of 
development? 
3. How is trade liberalization associated with the enhancement of the 
performance of the overall tax system? Which components of tax structure 
have been the most responsive or rigid? 
 
10 
 
1.2.Various Issues Related to Trade Liberalization 
1.2.1. Trade Liberalization and Structural Adjustment 
During the 1980s and 1990s, there has been significant trade liberalization by 
developing countries under the aegis of structural adjustment programs suggested by 
the World Bank and the IMF. According to the original Washington Consensus, a 
term attributed to Williamson (2003), the components of structural adjustment 
reforms, in addition to trade liberalization, are; 
1) Fiscal discipline; government budget deficits must be reduced. 
2) Reorientation of public expenditures; public expenditures must be 
reprioritized, especially to education, health care, and infrastructure 
investment. 
3) Tax reform; tax structure must be reformed by broadening the tax base and 
adopting moderate marginal tax rates. 
4) Financial market liberalization; lower interest rates must be set and subsidies 
on interest rates must be eliminated. Financial markets must be deregulated. 
5) Unified and competitive exchange rates; since international debt and trade 
deficits are the major problems which lead to structural adjustment programs, 
exchange rate devaluation is necessary because it solves the overvaluation of 
exchange rates. 
6) Openness to foreign direct investment; it is necessary to increase the rate of 
the investment in developing countries and bring resources which would 
otherwise be unavailable for economic growth. 
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7) Privatization; the ownership of a business, enterprise, agency, and public 
service must be transferred from public sector to private sector in order to 
reduce the role of inefficient and corrupt government. 
8) Deregulation; any government rules and regulations that impede market entry 
or restrict competition must be removed or simplified. 
9) Secure property rights; property rights must be clearly established in legal 
frameworks so that the incentives under structural adjustment programs could 
be pursued. 
Because structural adjustment programs have usually been imposed on developing 
countries governments rather than on those of developed economies, and because they 
imposed substantial hardship on populations, these programs have not always been 
embraced nor pursued fully. Incomplete adoption of the Washington consensus has 
led to some controversy concerning its effectiveness. Some critics have argued that 
the failure of structural adjustment to work in many countries is not only due to too 
little or too much reform, but also due to the reform is too soon for a country to 
prepare, and also there are wrong sorts of reforms. Among critics with various 
opinion, Rodrik (2006) pointed out a factual paradox; the fact that China and India 
turn out to be successful in stimulating growth while their general economic policies 
have remained opposite to the recommendations of the Washington consensus. And 
since the evidence that the effects of the reform of macroeconomic policies, fiscal 
policies, and trade openness on national growth rates is quite weak, Rodrik (2006) 
suggested that those reforms are ineffective because the reform does not specifically 
focus on the area which has the most binding constraints on economic growth. He 
suggested that, after identifying the most binding constraints, appropriate policy 
responses must be generated and institutional reform must be taken place. A 
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government is needed to ensure appropriate institutions are put in place. Institutions 
are crucial to both the success of structural adjustment programs and to economic 
development. Legal and regulatory frameworks must be established and new market 
structures are needed.  
Considering trade liberalization, the most common policy reform recommended to 
developing countries, Rodrik (2006) indicated that trade liberalization must be 
accompanied by complementary adjustment policies, particularly macroeconomic 
reform, and must go along with a long list of conditions, in order to be effective and 
to be ensured to enhance welfare. One of many conditions is that there must be no 
adverse effects on the fiscal balance, or if there are, there must be alternative and 
expedient ways of making up for the lost fiscal revenues. Although he believes that 
trade policy is overemphasized, and that macroeconomic reform and institutional 
innovations are far more important in fostering economic growth, he agrees that trade 
liberalization accompanies development and that in long run an economy which fails 
to integrate with international markets will grow more slowly. 
1.2.2. Trade Liberalization, Economic Growth, and National Welfare 
Under certain circumstances, a country’s overall welfare is in some sense improved 
by freer trade, which should thus be viewed as desirable. In simplest terms, the 
welfare gains from trade come from the fact that a country that moves from autarky to 
free trade gets to trade at a price ratio different from the autarky price ratio. As a 
result, this must make a country better off. This is the most basic form in which a 
country enjoys welfare benefits in moving from autarky to free trade. Opening up to 
trade offers an opportunity to trade at international prices rather than domestic prices. 
This opportunity in itself offers a gain from exchange, as consumers can buy cheaper 
13 
 
imported goods and producers can export goods at higher foreign prices. Further, 
there is a gain from specialization as the new prices established in free trade 
encourage industries to reallocate production from goods that the closed economy was 
producing at relatively high cost to goods that it was producing at relatively low cost. 
Thus, the static gains from trade arise from shifting the mixed outputs toward goods 
of comparative advantage, by holding fixed the economy’s technology and 
endowments so its production possibility frontier (PPF) remains static, while 
permitting consumers to take advantage of the new price. However, the fact that 
technological change is endogenous means that a move from autarky to free trade has 
additional dynamic welfare effects. The static analysis ignores many dynamic 
consequences of trade liberalization. There are many authors suggesting that a 
dynamic setting free trade is harmful to economic growth. For instances, Findlay 
(1980) presented the use of a dynamic two-region model, each region producing a 
distinctly different product. In order to embody interregional differences, he proposed 
that the labour markets of each region have dissimilar structures. Specifically, the 
North is assumed to manufacture the investment good using the services of all 
available capital and labour. In contrast, labour is in perfectly elastic supply at a 
constant real wage in the South, a primary consumption good producer. By assuming 
these asymmetries between regions, he developed a vigorous formal analysis and 
showed that trade is the engine of growth for the South. The power of the engine is 
determined, however, by the natural growth rate of the North, and in this sense the 
South does not have its own growth engine. Technological improvements also have 
asymmetrical results. Hicks-neutral or Harrod-neutral shifts in the production function 
of the North leave the terms of trade unchanged in the long run and increase its real 
per-capita income. In the South, however, a Solow-neutral shift in the production 
14 
 
function leads to a proportional decline in the terms of trade and brings about a 
decrease in its real per-capita income measured in terms of manufactured goods. 
Another well-recognized dynamic analysis of welfare gains from freer trade is 
Krugman (1981). In order to show that initial discrepancy in capital-labour ratios of 
the two adjacent, competing regions will cumulate over time, and will inevitably lead 
to the division into the capital-rich, industrial region and capital-poor, agricultural 
region, he developed a two region model of uneven regional development and 
examined the effect of international trade upon the world distribution of income when 
there are external economies to physical capital accumulation in the manufacturing 
sector. That is, more-industrialized countries cumulatively accumulate capital than 
less-industrialized countries under the assumption of increasing return of technology. 
In his model, there are two countries, North and South, which have the same amount 
of labour force and produce two goods, a manufacturing good and agricultural 
product. A single world price of manufacturing goods in terms of agricultural 
products was assumed. In other word, a single world price of agricultural products 
was set to unit. Manufacturing production was assumed as a function of capital input 
and labour input, and its technology is increasing return, while agricultural products 
were assumed to be produced by labour alone. In addition, labour forces were 
assumed to consume agricultural goods alone, and their saving ratios are zero which 
means unit labour cost to be one. Under these assumptions, he first investigated the 
North-South relationship by assuming there is international trade but no international 
capital movement. Because the profit rate of the manufacturing sector of the North is 
higher than that of the South, capital accumulation in the North is faster than in the 
South. If North-South relation starts where Northern capital stock is larger than 
Southern capital stock, northern manufacture will grow faster and finally North will 
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become industrial region and South will be specialized in agriculture (or at least less-
industrial region). He then allowed international investment by assuming the 
movement of capital between two regions. With capital mobility, there is a two-stage 
pattern of development which trade is the engine of growth in North through 
increasing exports of manufactures in the first stage and then exports of capital in the 
second stage, suggesting the justification of imperialism. In conclusion, freer trade in 
dynamic aspect might a country (which is initially a “rich” country) to grow faster 
than others (which are mostly “poor” and underdeveloped country) and this is the 
Krugman’s theory of uneven development. 
The concern that freer trade possibly leads to unequal development was also proposed 
by Matsuyama (1992). In general, sectors differ in the degree of increasing returns to 
scale and in growth potential. When freer trade leads to specialization in sectors with 
low growth potential, it may have detrimental effects. Similarly, trade liberalization 
can lead to the agglomeration of industrial increasing returns to scale activities in few 
countries and this may have an adverse effect in the remaining regions of the world. 
Countries which have comparative disadvantage in industrial sectors, especially in 
less developed and developing countries, have a higher risk to suffer from the 
negative impact of trade liberalization and globalization. From this concept, 
Matsuyama (1992) constructed a model of a two-sector economy, agriculture and 
manufacturing, with endogenous growth to demonstrate that a country specializing in 
agriculture may be worse off after trade than in autarky. The key assumption of the 
model is that the industrial sector is the engine of growth because learning by doing. 
He shows that a high agricultural productivity is beneficial in closed economy, as it 
releases resources that can be employed in the industrial. However, it may be 
detrimental for a small open economy, as it may induce specialization in agriculture. 
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For the closed economy case, higher agricultural productivity, which is assumed to be 
exogenous, translate into higher growth by shifting labour to manufacturing. 
However, for the small open economy case, the small open economy will grow faster 
than the world economy if it has a comparative advantage in the productivity in 
manufacturing and vice versa, because growth is proportional to the fraction of labour 
employed in manufacturing. Freer trade expands the sector of comparative advantage 
and then learning by doing amplifies the initial comparative advantage. So, an 
economy with less productive agriculture allocates more labour to manufacturing and 
will grow faster. Thus, in this case, there is a negative link between agricultural 
productivity and growth. 
1.2.3. Trade Liberalization and “Contractionary” Devaluation 
Governments embark on trade liberalization program in the hope to gain long-term 
benefits from competition and comparative advantage. However, whatever long-run 
benefits might be anticipated, the issues of short- and medium-run adjustment costs 
are usually raised by those who oppose free trade since the costs are considerably 
high. One of the most interesting issues related to trade liberalization is the 
contractionary devaluation. Typically, trade liberalization is accompanied by 
devaluation. The major policy objective of devaluation is to generate a readjustment 
in the relative price of tradable and nontradable goods and to improve the external 
position of the country. However, a number of authors recently have questioned the 
effectiveness of devaluation as a policy tool. There is an argument that even though 
nominal devaluation may achieve their goals of generating a relative price 
readjustment and improving trade balance, these goals may be achieved at a very high 
cost. In particular, it has been pointed out that one of such costs is the decline in total 
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output generated by devaluation. This critique has finally considered as the 
contractionary devaluation problem. 
From an analytical point of view, devaluation has an influence on the economy 
through a number of channels. According to the more traditional view, devaluation 
will either have an expansionary effect on aggregate output, or the worst case will 
leave aggregate output unaffected. On one hand, if there is unutilized capacity, 
nominal devaluation will be expansionary and total aggregate output will finally 
increase. On the other hand, if the economy is operating under full employment, 
nominal devaluation will be translated into equiproportional increase in prices, with 
the real exchange rate and aggregate output being unaffected. Contrary to the 
traditional view, there are several theoretical reasons which explain why devaluation 
can be contractionary and how it generates a decline in aggregate real activity, 
including employment. For example, Krugman and Taylor (1978) provided a 
framework following a simple Keynes-Kalecki model of an open economy to analyze 
the potential short-run effects of nominal devaluation. The assumptions underlying 
their model are; i) there are two distinct sectors, one produces the (non-tradable) home 
goods for domestic markets while the other produces the export goods for 
international markets. ii) The price of home goods is determined by a mark-up over 
direct input costs, while that of the imported input is fixed in terms of international 
currency. iii) The nominal wage rate is constant in terms of the domestic currency. iv) 
In the short run, substitution responses of both exports and imports to price changes 
are negligible. v) Interest rates are kept constant by action of the monetary authorities. 
Following these underlying characteristics, Krugman and Taylor (1978) concluded 
that devaluation can lead to short-run contraction through three channels. First, in 
general, a country which devalues its currency is in deficit at the time. In the presence 
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of a trade deficit, the valuation effect of an exchange rate change will be greater on 
imports than on exports because of the greater initial volume of the imports. As a 
consequence, there is the greater valuation effect of devaluation on imports in the 
presence of a trade deficit and when measured in terms of the domestic currency. 
Second, devaluation can generate a redistribution of income from groups with a low 
marginal propensity to save to groups with a high marginal propensity to save, 
resulting in a decline in aggregate demand and output. Third, a redistribution of 
revenues from the private sector to the government sector which reduces demand for 
the home goods, given a fixed level of government spending. Thus, in conclusion, 
trade liberalization, when accompanied by devaluation policy, is likely to have 
undesirable effects on economy by shifting the income distribution against labour and 
reducing output and employment. 
1.2.4. Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction 
Among the most important concerns as trade liberalizes and economy integrates with 
the world economy is the link between economic globalization and poverty. In 
general, global economic integration has complex effects on income, culture, society, 
and environment. However, in the debate over globalization’s merits, its impact on 
poverty is particularly important. If international trade and investment primarily 
benefit the rich, many people will feel that restricting trade to protect jobs, culture, or 
the environment is worth the costs. But if restricting trade imposes further hardship on 
poor people in the developing countries, many of the same people will think 
otherwise. In a recent paper, Dollar and Kraay (2000) provided empirical evidence in 
support of a positive and significant relationship between changes in trade and 
changes in inequality, reaching the conclusion that expansions in trade raised growth 
as well as incomes of the poor. They investigated the link between the income of the 
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poor and overall income (per capita GDP at PPP in 1985 international dollars). The 
analysis was based on a sample of 80 countries over four decades and the poor are 
defined as the bottom one fifth of the income distribution. From their paper, it can be 
concluded that; i) On average across countries and over time, growth is distribution 
neutral. ii) any factor which increases the growth rate is good for the poor. iii) The 
income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall growth and the effect of growth on 
the income of the poor is no different in poor countries than in rich countries. iv) The 
income of the poor do not fall more than proportionately during economic crises. v) 
The poverty-growth relationship has not changed in recent years. vi) Openness to 
foreign trade benefits the poor to the same extent that it benefits the whole economy. 
vii) Good rule of law and fiscal discipline benefit the poor to the same extent that they 
benefit the whole economy. viii) No evidence is found that formal democratic 
institutions or public spending on health and education have systematic effects on the 
income of the poor. ix) World Bank and IMF policy packages increase the growth rate 
and therefore, these policy packages should be the core of poverty reduction 
strategies. 
On the other side, antiglobalization activists are convinced that economic integration 
has been widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Globalization benefits the 
rich but does very little for the poor, perhaps even making them lot harder. There is a 
number of criticisms and argument about the result of the work of Dollar and Kraay 
(2000) placed by many authors such as Weisbrot et al (2001), and Nye, Reddy, and 
Watkins (2002). The main criticisms of Dollar and Kraay (2000) can be concluded as 
follows; i) The policy conclusions inferred by Dollar and Kraay (2000) from their 
regressions are not persuasive as in most cases the results are statistically 
insignificant. ii) The paper has no theoretical underpinnings or foundations. That is, 
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presumed relationships are not derived from any theoretical models. This comes to the 
question of why there should be a one-to-one relationship between increases in per 
capita income and the income of the poor. iii) Instead of using time series data, the 
study is based on cross-country data, although some countries have very small 
observations. This tells us very little about how individual countries will develop over 
time. Although cross-country studies may indicate average trends, individual country 
experiences can differ quite significantly. In fact, the use of a cross country 
regression, based on the variability of income between countries, to infer the likely 
temporal variability as economies grow is a very strong assumption. iv) The work of 
Dollar and Kraay (2000) did not give any insight of how the income of the poor 
changes when there are significant changes in the size distribution of income. In 
addition, the case that the income growth of every quantile is proportionate to the 
overall growth of GDP is not likely to be true. v) The definition of poverty used by 
Dollar and Kraay (2000) is open to question. Taking the bottom quantile of the 
income distribution as an indication of the extent of poverty is inadequate because it is 
neither a measure of absolute poverty, nor is it an appropriate measure of relative 
poverty. It tells us nothing about the relationship between the average income of the 
bottom 20 per cent of income recipients and the poverty line, and it cannot highlight 
changes that may occur in income distribution within the bottom quantile. Even if 
economic growth does benefit the poor on a one-to-one basis, the poor would still fall 
behind the rest of the population in absolute terms. vi) There are critical of the 
openness index used by the work of Dollar and Kraay (2000) and further argue that 
the regressions show no direct relationship between openness and the income of the 
poor. That is, if freer trade is good for poverty reduction, it must have an indirect 
effect through growth rather than a direct effect on poverty per se. vii) The variables 
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in the regressions show little or nothing about the relationships between most of the 
variables examined, except for the correlation between economic growth and the 
income of the poor. However, correlation does not imply causation. Even if there is a 
relationship between the variable on the left hand side of the equation and the 
independent variables on the right hand side, it may run in both directions and the 
postulated regression is then a set of relationships characterizing the interrelationships 
among jointly determined variables. 
In conclusion, although there is strong evidence that economic growth normally 
reduces income poverty, freer trade-led-growth still has many controversies. Since 
there is no firm conclusion that freer trade leads to faster economic growth, there are 
many argument whether freer trade should really reduce poverty, even in the long run. 
In addition, the available cross-country data provide no clear evidence that trade 
liberalization reduces poverty, at least in the short run. Thus, trade liberalization in the 
hope that it will help reduce poverty should be done with care. Countries which 
embark on trade liberalization need to have well-functioning social safety nets in 
order to ease the tension between implementing trade reforms and alleviating poverty. 
They also need to prepare some government budgets for offsetting some adverse 
effects which trade liberalization may potentially lead to. 
1.2.5. Trade Liberalization and External Shocks 
Theoretically, there is only little evidence to support the claim that openness to trade 
is associated with greater volatility. Moreover, even if this were the case, the idea that 
the political system would then optimally deliver more insurance in the form of bigger 
government is doubtful. As a consequence, recently, there has been interest in 
investigating the relationship between trade openness and the size of government. 
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Among a number of papers, Rodrik (1998) demonstrated that a positive correlation 
between trade openness and the size of government exists for a broad sample 
including both developed and developing countries. He presented evidence to support 
the hypothesis that larger governments provide social insurance in more open 
economies facing higher terms of trade risk. If openness is associated with greater 
risk, it is expected that openness is related to greater public expenditure to provide 
greater social insurance. Rodrik (1998) used cross-country data to investigate the 
nature of the relationship between trade openness (measured by the ratio of imports 
plus exports to GDP) and government size (measured by the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP) and found that there is a strong positive causation from the 
former to the latter. Challenging the view that regards market and government as 
substitutes, Rodrik (1998) took this evidence to suggest that there may be a degree of 
complementary between them. Particularly, he argued that the causal relationship 
between openness to trade and government size can be explained by compensation 
hypothesis – that is the increased volatility brought about by growing exposure to, and 
dependence on developments in the rest of the world creates incentives for 
governments to provide social insurance against internationally generated risk. Since 
trade openness raises exposure to risk, this reflects an increase in consumption 
volatility and uneven income distribution, which is then reduced by a larger 
government size. 
From the suggestion that trade liberalization brings with it the necessity for larger 
government to mitigate the volatility and external shocks, the capacity to tax for the 
government in order to meet higher expenditure is of concern, especially for the 
government in less developed and developing countries. In fact, the influence of 
government in an economy goes beyond its spending and tax collection. State 
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ownership of enterprises, price control, mandate, and restrictions on competition are 
examples of government intervention that can have profound effect on an economy. 
All of these raise concerns that trade liberalization may have led to fiscal difficulties 
and even inefficiently large government. 
1.3. Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of three main chapters, all devoted to investigate the various 
impacts of trade liberalization on trade and tax performance. In order to address the 
first question, an empirical analysis is presented in Chapter 3 and investigates whether 
there exists a long-run relationship between trade and its major determinants. It also 
examines the impact of trade liberalization on the volume of imports and exports. In 
the analysis of trade liberalization and the formation of trade policy, one of the major 
concerns of policy makers is the responsiveness of trade flow to change in income and 
relative price. The impact of trade liberalization policy is highly dependent on the size 
of income, import price, and export price elasticities. As far as the analysis of import 
price, export price, and income elasticities is concerned, the empirical investigation of 
import and export demand functions is one of the most interesting research areas of 
international economics. International economists have dedicated a substantial 
amount of effort to the estimation of import and export demand functions, both at the 
aggregate and disaggregated levels. Estimated elasticities are very important for 
policy makers since they represent a crucial link between trade policies and changes 
in trade flow, the degree to which trade policies affect the balance of payments and a 
country’s economic performance. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 highlights one of the key issues which currently has a wide 
academic and political controversy by focusing on the question whether trade 
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liberalization really brings about an increase in international trade. This chapter seeks 
to estimate the likely impact of trade liberalization policies on the volume of imports 
and exports using aggregated import and export demand functions in Thailand for the 
period 1960 to 2007. Thailand is one of the developing countries that grew rapidly 
during the past two decades. Thailand, like many other developing countries, has 
switched from a closed economy to a more open economy by inducing free trade 
policies in the hope that trade liberalization will bring an improvement in its overall 
economic performance and address balance of payments difficulties. Thailand has 
formally introduced trade liberalization policy with its membership of AFTA in 1992 
and the WTO in 1995, though its tariffs have been gradually reduced over time. By 
opening the country, Thailand primarily hopes to achieve better export performance 
and hence alleviate the ongoing trade deficit problem. Although, there is still a 
concern that trade liberalization is generally found to be positively associated with the 
volume of imports, while it may not lead to an increase in the volume of exports in the 
same proportion, it is found that, for Thailand, the volume of exports has exceeded the 
volume of imports for almost all years in the post-liberalization period. 
Thus, in Chapter 3, we put an effort to assess empirically the major determinants of 
import and export demand functions in Thailand using the cointegration technique to 
estimate the long-run relationship and error-correction mechanism to examine the 
dynamic behaviour. We, then, estimate the income and price elasticities from both 
import and export demand functions by using an Autoregressive Distributed Lagged 
(ARDL) model. We also compare these estimates with the estimates obtained using 
cointegration techniques and an ECM. Finally, we analyze the impact of trade 
liberalization on the volume of imports and exports in both the short run and long run. 
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When compared with the studies of free trade related growth, employment, or trade 
creation and diversion, there have been a relatively small number of both theoretical 
and empirical studies on the revenue impact of trade liberalization. This is an equally 
important area of inquiry, because if trade liberalization leads to a reduction in tax 
revenues, this can have serious implications for fiscal reform of countries that have a 
budget constraint. Hence, after we investigate the impact of trade liberalization on 
trade performance, we turn our focus to its impact on tax revenues, in order to shed 
light on a controversy whether trade liberalization is a potential source of fiscal 
instability, especially for countries which have high dependency on trade tax for their 
public revenue. Although some authors suggest that trade liberalization could proceed 
while adverse consequences can be avoided by coordinating liberalization with 
potential government budget spending, sound macroeconomic policies, and effective 
measures on the revenue; including raising domestic direct and indirect taxes, 
widening and developing new tax bases, improving effectiveness of public spending, 
raising public saving, and strengthening tax collection and administration, many 
countries find that it is very difficult in practice to prevent the adverse effects on the 
fiscal revenues.2 The problem is due to various restrictions such as the level of 
development, the political instability, the constrained institutional capacities, and the 
limitation of country’s geography. 
Therefore, Chapter 4 is devoted to examine the effect on both international trade tax 
and domestic taxes after trade is liberalized. As discussed above, although trade 
liberalization is usually associated with the reduction of trade restrictions including 
tariffs, and hence tends to lower international trade tax revenue, the relationship 
between trade liberalization and other domestic tax revenues is still ambiguous, or 
                                                            
2 See Glenday (2002) and Keen and Ligthart (2004), for example. 
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even the impact on trade tax revenue itself is an empirical matter. In addition, tax 
reform, in practice, is a very difficult task for many less developed and developing 
countries to pursue. If trade liberalization is found to have a negative impact on 
domestic tax revenues, domestic tax reform by using those instruments may be 
inapplicable. This raises the further question of whether these countries should 
implement the reform in the same way as it did in developed countries. 
As stated earlier, the impact of trade liberalization on tax revenues may vary 
depending on the level of development. Chapter 4 uses panel data of 134 countries 
over 24 years covering the period 1980-2003 and divides countries into four groups; 
low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high income countries. 
However, the study concentrates on the impact of trade liberalization on tax revenues 
of low and middle income countries since the sufferings from the loss of tax revenues, 
if exist, are much higher for countries that have constrained government’s income 
sources. Chapter 4 employs the traditional and extended tax effort model, using a 
fixed-effects approach, with a two-way estimate, incorporating time and individual 
country effects in order to obtain reliable results. 
The impact of trade liberalization on tax revenue is investigated in more detail in 
terms of the performance of the overall tax system. Domestic tax reform, which 
usually is implemented at the same time as trade is liberalized, is an important 
instrument for raising tax yield. In general, the productivity of the overall tax system 
should be improved after the tax reform takes place. However, as mentioned earlier, 
the effect of trade liberalization on the overall tax system is ambiguity. Trade 
liberalization may either improve or deteriorate tax bases, depending on many 
different factors. On one hand, fiscal revenue can be improved if trade liberalization is 
accompanied by such supportive situations as a large expansion in international trade 
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volume, economic growth, employment, a rise in income level, and devaluation of 
exchange rate. On the other hand, fiscal revenue can be deteriorated if trade 
liberalization is associated with a shrink in trade volume, job losses, and deterioration 
in corporate profit. Although it is difficult to determine accurately the direction of 
change in overall tax revenue as a result of trade liberalization, changes in tax revenue 
can be measured by applying the concept of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity since tax 
revenue depends crucially on revenue productivity and tax structure (Suliman, 2005).  
Growth in tax revenues may occur through automatic responses of the tax yield 
through changes in national income and/or through the imposition of new taxes, 
revision of the rate-structure of existing taxes, expansion of the tax bases, tax 
amnesties, and tougher compliance and enforcement measures. Changes in tax yield 
resulting from the modification of tax parameters (i.e., rates, base) are called 
“discretionary changes” which stem from legislative action. Generally, tax buoyancy 
and tax elasticity are the measures used to evaluate the ability of country’s tax system 
to mobilize its revenue (Asher, 1989). Tax buoyancy measures the change in the 
overall tax yield from changes in GDP whereas tax elasticity measures the change in 
tax yield resulting from variations in national income with tax parameters held 
constant (i.e., discretionary changes being removed). In Chapter 5, a measure of 
revenue productivity of the tax system is used to determine whether the 
responsiveness of tax revenues is high or low in Thailand relative to the other three 
founding countries of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (including Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Philippines). By using the buoyancy and elasticity framework, Chapter 5 applies 
the concept of tax buoyancy and elasticity to evaluate the implications of the process 
of trade liberalization on revenue mobilization. The main objective of Chapter 5 is to 
estimate tax buoyancy and tax elasticity of the Thailand tax system, compared to 
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those of its three neighbour countries. The evaluation is done to measure the response 
of the tax system to trade liberalization by AFTA in 1992. By estimating tax 
buoyancy and tax elasticity, this chapter addresses the question of whether Thailand’s 
major trade liberalization by becoming AFTA members results in the enhancement of 
the flexibility of the tax system. In addition, Chapter 5 decomposes tax buoyancy to 
obtain the buoyancy of tax revenue with respect to its tax base and the buoyancy of 
tax base with respect to income. The decomposition of tax buoyancy is beneficial 
since it gives us capability of identifying factors which are responsible for rapid or 
lagged revenue growth. 
Finally, Chapter 6 reports the main findings, and draws policy implications. Possible 
extensions for future research are also presented. 
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Chapter 2 
 
A SURVEY OF THE THEORY OF TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION 
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2.1. Introduction 
When developing countries have reduced tariffs on tradable goods to improve the 
allocation of their productive resources, these tariff cuts almost always lead to a loss 
of government revenue. In most developed economies where their domestic tax bases 
are well developed, the revenue loss can easily be offset by raising tax on 
consumption. However, in most less developed and developing countries where the 
international trade tax is the major source of tax revenue and the domestic tax bases 
are not well developed, how to make up the shortfall in trade tax revenue, if there is 
any, through other compensatory domestic taxes is still a major concern. With such a 
heavy dependence on international trade tax as a major source of revenue, a key 
concern for these countries is how to recover, from other tax sources, the revenue loss 
that trade liberalization potentially entails.  
In addition to widening the tax base and improving tax administration, a country 
which undertakes a reduction in a tariff rate usually seek alternative domestic taxes to 
substitute for the lost trade tax revenue. There are generally two strategies to offset 
the revenue shortfall following a reduction in the tariff rate. The first is the strategy 
using a domestic indirect tax, more specifically, a consumption tax. This strategy is 
widely supported since using a broad-based consumption tax for revenue 
compensation seems to be the most applicable approach in practice. The other 
strategy is to use a domestic direct tax, more specifically a profit tax, to offset the 
revenue shortfall. The rationale to use a profit tax as compensation is that the 
producers are those who reap the profit from tariff reduction by reducing the price at a 
very small proportion of tariff reduction to consumers. Therefore, producers are the 
group who should receive this tax burden and a profit tax should be applied as a 
compensatory measure.   
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This chapter provides theoretical underpinnings for the strategies to offset the revenue 
shortfall from the loss of a tariff revenue due to tariff cut in order to provide a bird’s 
eye view of the major theoretical contributions to the revenue implication of trade 
liberalization. Section 2 is devoted to the strategy to offset the revenue shortfall as a 
result of tariff reduction by using a broad-based consumption tax. Section 3 examines 
the strategy to compensate the revenue shortfall by using a profit tax, a relative 
narrow-based direct tax. The conclusion is contained in Section 4 of this chapter. 
2.2. The Strategy to Offset Revenue Shortfall from The loss of Foreign Trade 
Tax by Using Domestic Indirect Tax 
Conventional models of trade liberalization typically assume that a fall in tariff 
revenue in the post-liberalization period is offset by increasing consumption tax. Keen 
and Ligthart (1999, 2004) suggest that, although the issue of trade tax revenue 
reduction in many less developed and developing countries is very acute because tax 
on international trade is their large source of revenue and their tax administration 
capability is generally poor, there is still room for enhancing revenue in the period of 
tariff reduction by coordinating a cut of tariff with a point-for-point increase in 
domestic consumption taxes. With some rigorous conditions, this strategy ensures that 
countries liberalizing their trade will end up with increases in both tax revenues and 
welfare. 
The following gives a brief summary of the model. The model considers a small open 
economy and comprises three sectors; a representative household, a perfectly 
competitive production sector, and a government. There are T tradable commodities. 
World prices are denoted by . Taxes include tariffs p ( )τ and consumption taxes . 
Thus producer prices are 
( )t
p τ+ and consumer prices (q are ) p tτ+ + . 
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The expenditure function of the representative household is defined as 
, where q is consumer prices and u is utility. ( , ) ; 0q qE q u E >
0The revenue function of the representative firm is defined as ( ) ; p pR p Rτ+ > , 
where p τ+ is producer prices. 
It is assumed that public revenue from tariffs and consumption taxes ( ) will be 
returned to consumers in the form of a lump-sum transfer. Thus, the income-
expenditure identity can be represented as: 
G
Market Clearing Condition : ( , ) = ( ) + E q u R p Gτ+  (2.1) 
Where = ( , ) + ( , ) ( )q q pG t E q u E q u R pτ τ⎡ ⎤⋅ ⋅ − +⎣ ⎦  (2.2) 
The revenue from consumption taxation is denoted by the first term of equation (2.2), 
while the revenue from tariffs is denoted by the second term of equation (2.2). 
Consider a simultaneous tax reform by reducing tariffs by = 0n oτ τ τΔ − < (where nτ
and oτ r resent the “new” and “old” tariffs, respectively) and increasing consumption 
taxes by an exactly offsetting amount = nt t
ep
0otΔ − > , (that is tτ−Δ = is 
simultaneous reform results in the change of producer prices and so the domestic 
production (as a reflection of tariff reduction), while consumer prices are entirely 
unaffected (as a reflection of a point-for-point increase in consumption taxes). Tarff 
reduction will result in an improvement in production efficiency and the 
rearrangement of domestic production will consequently induces increases in the 
value of output at world price. Since the value of output at world price increases, 
welfare increases. Consider an increase in tax revenue. Initially, the government 
collects revenue from a narrow-based tariff on imported commodities. The use of the 
Δ ). Th
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consumption tax will expand the tax base in which tax will be collected not only on 
imported goods, but also on import substitutes produced domestically. As a 
consequence, a coordinated tariff reduction with a point-for-point increase in 
consumption taxes which maintain consumer prices unchanged will lead to an 
increase in both government revenue and welfare.  
Alternatively, this can be shown by using a simple diagrammatic interpretation as 
presented in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Partial Equilibrium of Coordinated Tax-tariff Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For simplicity, we suppose that there are initially no consumption taxes. The only tax 
that is collected by the government is the tariff and is set at 0τ . Initially, consumption 
is at point t (line zt), domestic production is at point u (line zu), the amount of imports 
is ut, and the public revenue is the area tuvw. After implemented a coordinated tax-
tariff reform by replacing the tariff 0( )τ with a consumption tax at exactly the 
same rate 
1( )t
0 1( )tτ = , the consumption still remains at point t but the domestic 
production drops to point x (line yx), while the amount of imports increase from ut to 
S
0 1p p tτ+ = +  
y  x
z  tu
vw
D 
p 
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xv. The initial (domestic) producer surplus (uxyz) disappears. However, public 
revenue rises from tuvw to tvyz, with the additional revenue uwyz exceeding the 
reduction in initial producer surplus (uxyz) by the amount of the improvement in 
production efficiency (uwx). Thus, in summary, a reduction in tariffs accompanied by 
an increase in consumption taxes that leaves consumer prices unchanged obviously 
increases both tax revenue and welfare. 
The main importance of this model is that it makes a first attempt to offer a formal 
theory of policy reform to offset the loss of revenue caused by the tariff reduction. 
While the advantage of this model is its ease of use, the assumption underlying the 
model that it is base on perfect competition may be far from the real economy. In 
addition, the result cannot be extended to deal with the reduction of tariffs on 
intermediate goods used to produce tradable goods since it is not possible to offset a 
tariff reduction by increasing consumption tax without affecting consumer price. 
Following Keen and Ligthart (1999, 2004), many other economists have developed a 
variety of models by changing the assumption from perfect completion to imperfect 
competition in order to get closer to the real economy. Some models concentrate on 
tariff reduction on intermediate inputs since these goods tend to be a major import in 
most of less developed and developing countries. Other strategies besides using 
consumption taxes to offset the loss of revenue are also proposed. In the following 
section, we discuss a theoretical model in terms of imperfect competition and using 
domestic direct tax to mitigate revenue loss from tariff reduction. 
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2.3. The Strategy to Offset Revenue Shortfall from The loss of Foreign Trade 
Tax by Using Domestic Direct Tax 
While Keen and Ligthart (1999, 2004) focus their study on offsetting the loss of tariff 
revenue by using broad-based consumption taxes, other studies propose a strategy to 
offset this loss by using a relatively narrow-based but less distorted profit tax. 
Mujumdar (2004) gives two rational suggestions why the government should rely 
more on a tax on firm profits instead of a commodity tax in order to achieve the offset 
objective. First, many industries in most of less developed and developing countries 
tend to have a very high oligopolistic power. Suppose that countries liberalize their 
trade and if the price elasticity of demand is very low, which is likely to be, especially 
in the case of the short run. Instead of reducing the price at the same proportion of 
tariff reduction, producers may pass on only a small percentage of tariff reduction to 
consumers by lowering the price by a very little amount and they may reap a 
“windfall” profits of this tariff reduction. Therefore, it is reasonable for government to 
collect tax revenue from such profits. Second, since it is generally perceived that 
firms may make substantial profits from tariff reduction, there may be a very high 
resistance from consumer groups if the government chooses to recover the revenue 
shortfall by placing a higher consumption taxes and this possibly causes further 
political problems. In fact, when the tariff rate of the intermediate input is reduced, 
this will reduce tariff revenue on one hand, and will increase the firm’s profit by 
reducing the cost of production of the final goods on the other hand. The higher 
profits, together with the higher profit tax rate, will increase the profit tax revenue. 
This revenue could be used to offset the shortfall generated by tariff reduction. 
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Tariff Reduction on an Intermediate Input under Imperfect Competition 
Mujumdar (2004) suggests that though intermediate inputs constitute a large share in 
world trade and thus deserves special treatment, very little effort has been made to 
develop a tariff-tax reform strategies for this class of goods. In addition, he argues that 
the model proposed earlier by Keen and Ligthart (1999) can be devised only under the 
condition of a perfectly competitive production sector and hence cannot be extended 
to cover an imperfectly competitive case. Thus Mujumdar (2004) considers the 
question of whether government can make up a shortfall in revenue if it reduces a 
tariff on an intermediate input under imperfect competition, while the make up by 
using profit tax must ensure that both consumers and producers must be better off in 
the post-liberalization period. The assumptions underlying the model are that an 
industry comprises identical firms, importing the same intermediate input, so they 
all have the same cost function. Each firm assembles all inputs to make a final 
tradable product and sells its entire output in the domestic market. 
N
Let denote the import price of the intermediate input. The model adopts the small 
and open economy assumption by further assuming that all firms are price takers with 
respect to the import price and changes in total quantity demanded of 
intermediate inputs do not affect the import price ( . The (ad valorem) tariff 
collected by the government is applied to the intermediate input at the rate t . The cost 
of assembling intermediate input to produce each unit of output is assumed to be 
identical across firms and is equal to c . 
wP
( )wP
)wP
Let denote the output of firm i  here iq 1, 2,...,i N= . Thus, the total cost function of 
firm can be represented as: i
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 (1 )wiC P t c iq⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + + ⋅⎣ ⎦  (2.3) 
The aggregate demand for the industry’s product can be shown as the inverse demand 
function of firms’ output: 
 P a bQ= −  (2.4) 
where is the market price, and P
1
N
i
i
Q
=
= q∑ , is the total industry output. It is also 
assumed that purchasing the product from the domestic market is cheaper than 
importing it. 
Later, the firm profits will be taxed at the rate T (where 0 T 1≤ < ). Since the price of 
output is equal to throughout the market, all firms are assumed to compete in 
quantities. 
P
The objective of any firm i is to maximize its after-tax profit and it can be shown by 
maximizing firm’s profit, that is; 
{ }Max (1 ) (1 )wi iT Pq P t c q⎡ ⎤∏ = − − + +⎣ ⎦ i  
The model assumes that the firms compete like Cournot oligopolists in the product 
market. Thus, for Cournot competition with many firms, the equilibrium output level 
of each individual firm is: 
 (1 )
( 1)
w
c
i
a c P tq
N b
− − += +  (2.5) 
and thus the total equilibrium industry output is: 
 (1 )
1
w
c c
i
N a c P tQ Nq
N b
⎡ ⎤− − +⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
 (2.6) 
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Now, consider the tariff reduction. The reduction of tariff will lower the equilibrium 
price and hence make consumers better off. Although the government raises the profit 
tax rate in order to generate revenue to offset the shortfall, this will not affect the price 
and thus not lower consumers’ welfare. This will leave the government to be 
concerned only with how to raise revenue to exactly match the deficit and how to 
ensure that producers’ welfare will be increased after liberalization. Therefore, there 
are two conditions to be met when a government determines a profit tax rate, the first 
condition focuses on tax revenue, while the second condition focuses on producers’ 
welfare; 
1)  in the post-liberalization period must be equal to total revenue 
from the pre-liberalization period. 
Total revenue
 P w c P w cA A A A B B B BT t P Q T t P∏ + = ∏ + Q B
The industry’
 
 ;  (2.7) At t<
2) s after-tax profit in the post-liberalization period is higher than 
its after-tax profit in the pre-liberalization period. (This can be implied that 
each producer has higher after-tax profit and thus higher welfare). 
(1 ) (1 )P PA A BT T B− ∏ > − ∏  (2.8) 
he subscript,T , attached to any variable is used to denote its value after trade is  A
liberalized (the post-liberalization period) and the subscript, B , is for its value before 
trade is liberalized (the pre-liberalization period). P∏ denotes the equilibrium pre-tax 
profit of the industry. cP is the equilibrium market price. 
Equation (2.8) can be rearranged as; 
 PP P PA B A A BT T B∏ −∏ > ∏ − ∏  (2.9) 
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From equation (2.7), P P W c W cA A B B B B AT T t P Q t P∏ − ∏ = − AQ . Substitute this into the right-
hand-side (R.H.S.) of equation (2.9) and we have; 
 P P W c W cA B B B At P Q t P Q∏ −∏ > − A  (2.10) 
The tariff reduction reduces tariff revenue if; 
  (2.11) (1 )
w
B Aa c P t t> + + +
It is assumed that the condition stated in equation (2.11) holds. If equation (2.11) is 
satisfied, it ensures that firm i  will produce in the market. 
The expression for PA∏  and  in equation (2.10) can be re-written as; PB∏
(1 ) (1 )c w c c w c W c W cA A A B B B B B AP c P t Q P c P t Q t P Q t P Q⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − − + > −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ A   (2.12) 
Re-arranging terms in equation (2.12) and we have; 
c w c c w c
A A BP c P Q P c P Q⎡ ⎤ ⎡− − > − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ B⎤⎦
w
  (2.13) 
Since the terms and c wAP c P⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ cBP c P⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ are both positive, we can rewrite the 
equation as; 
c c
A B
c c
B A
Q P c P
Q P c P
− −> − −
w
w    (2.14) 
Substituting cAQ and  and simplifying equation (2.14), we have; 
c
BQ
(1 )
(1 )
w w
A
w w
B A
a c P t a c P NP t
a c P t a c P NP t
− − + − − +>− − + − − +
w
B
w  (2.15) 
Since the numerator and the denominator on each side of equation (2.15) are positive, 
we can re-arrange them to get; 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( 1)( ) 1 ( 1)( ) 1w wA A A B Bt N a c P t N Nt t N a c P t N Nt− − + − − > − − + − − B  (2.16) 
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If and the tariff is lowered but not eliminated, equation (2.15) gives us that 
, which is true. If 
1N =
A Bt t< 1N = and now the tariff is eliminated ( , instead of 
reduced, equation (2.16) gives us that , which is also true. This can be 
implied that when the industry is a monopoly, the government can determine a profit 
tax rate in order to make up for revenue shortfall and make producers still better 
off. 
0)At =
20 (w BP t> − )
( )AT
Now, consider when and tariff is eliminated 1N > ( 0)At = . The left-hand-side 
(L.H.S) of equation (2.16) turns out to be equal to zero, while the first term on the 
R.H.S of equation (2.16) is positive but the second term is negative. Thus the net 
value of the R.H.S cannot be determined and we cannot say that the L.H.S > the 
R.H.S. We also cannot assert that the L.H.S > the R.H.S when and the tariff is 
only reduced, but not eliminated. Thus, this implies that when there is more than one 
firm in the industry, the government may not be able to determine a profit tax rate 
in order to make up for revenue shortfall and make producers still better off. 
1N >
( )AT
Therefore, from the model, Mujumdar (2004) concludes that only when the industry is 
a monopoly can it be certain that raising the profit tax alone will generate enough 
revenue to make up for the shortfall following a tariff reduction. This strategy can 
also ensure that consumers and producers are better off in the post-liberalization 
period as a result of an increase in welfare. However, the larger number of firms in the 
industry lowers the probability that raising the profit tax alone is able to achieve the 
purpose of the revenue offset and increasing welfare. This, consequently, leads the 
government to use the more distortionary form of taxation, such as the consumption 
tax, in order to meet the shortfall of tax revenue. 
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Tariff Reduction under the Condition of Product Differentiation 
Haque and Mukherjee (2004) argue that the results proposed by Mujumdar (2004), 
which indicate that only if the industry is a monopoly can we be certain that the 
government could use the profit tax to make up any shortfall in tariff revenue and also 
make both consumers and producers better off, are not robust when the products are 
differentiated. When product differentiation is taken into the analysis, their model 
shows that there always exists a degree of product differentiation such that the 
government can achieve these objectives for any finite number of firms in the 
industry. Thus, their results are more supportive for the government to reduce import 
tariffs than those of Mujumdar (2004). 
Following Mujumdar’s (2004) model, Haque and Mukherjee (2004) make 
assumptions very similar to those used in Mujumdar’s (2002) work. The model 
assumes a small open economy with an industry with symmetric firms so that the 
input price remains constant irrespective of the imports by the firms. The assumption 
of symmetric firms means that all firms have the same cost function and import a 
certain key input. It is also assumed that one unit of output requires one unit of input 
and the assembling cost of each unit is identical across firms. Unlike Mujumdar’s 
(2004) model, they assume zero cost of assembly for simplicity since this does not 
affect the qualitative results. They also assume no any other costs of production. For 
each unit of import input, the ad valorem tariff t  is imposed so the total cost of the 
firm is; 
N
thi
  (2.17) (1 )wiC P t q= + i
The model assumes that the firm faces the inverse demand function as; thi
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1
1
N
i i
j
P a q qθ −
=
= − − j∑  (2.18) 
where and . 1, 2,...,i N= i j≠ θ  denotes the degree of product differentiation and 
ranges from 0 to 1. The value of 0θ = implies isolated goods, while 1θ = implies 
homogeneous products which corresponds to Mujumdar (2004). 
The objective of the firm is to maximize profit which can be expressed as; thi
{ }Max (1 ) (1 )wi i iT Pq P t q⎡ ⎤∏ = − − +⎣ ⎦ i  
The equilibrium output of the firm, thi 1, 2,...,i N=  is: 
 (1 )
2 ( 1)
w
c
i
a P tq
Nθ
− += + −  (2.19) 
and thus the total equilibrium industry output is: 
 
(1 )
2 ( 1)
w
c c
i
N a P t
Q Nq
Nθ
⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦= = + −  (2.20) 
and the equilibrium price charged by the firm is: thi
 [ ]1 ( 1) (1
2 ( 1)
w
c
i
a N P
P
N
θ
θ
)t+ + − += + −  (2.21)  
Consider when a tariff is reduced, equations (2.19) and (2.21) obviously show that 
output of each firm has been increased while the price has been decreased, and thus 
make the consumers better off. Again, the government has two objectives left to be 
achieved; the revenue and producers’ welfare objectives. 
In order for the government to be able to determine the profit tax in a way to make up 
the shortfall in revenue, the increase in the industry’s pre-tax profit must be greater 
than the shortfall in tariff revenue. Referring to equation (2.12), the only difference in 
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the following equation is that it assumes no cost of assembly. Thus, this case can be 
written as; 
(1 ) (1 )c w c c w c W c W cA A A B B B B B A AP P t Q P P t Q t P Q t P Q⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − − + > −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (2.22) 
and equation (2.14) can be re-written as; 
c c
A B
c c
B A
Q P P
Q P P
−> −
w
w    (2.23) 
Substituting cAQ ,  and 
c
BQ
c
AP ,  by using equations (2.20) and (2.21) and simplifying 
equation (2.23), then we have; 
c
BP
(1 ) (1 ( 1))
(1 ) (1 ( 1))
w w
A
w w
B A
a P t a P N P t
a P t a P N P t
θ
θ
− + − + + −>− + − + + −
w
B
w  (2.24) 
and then we can re-arrange equation (2.24) to get; 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( 1) 1 1 1 ( 1)
1 1 1
w
A A A
w
B B
a N t P t N N t a N t
P t N N t
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
⎡ ⎤− − − + + − > −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − + + −⎣ ⎦
B
 (2.25) 
or 
*( )
( 1) (1 )
w
A B
w
A B
P t t
N a P t t
θ θ+< ≡⎡ ⎤− − + +⎣ ⎦
  (2.26) 
From equation (2.26), since for any finite number of firms (as from equation 
(2.11),  ), the government can always find a profit tax to 
achieve the revenue-welfare objective when the products are sufficiently 
differentiated. This implies that for any given finite number of firms, there always 
exists a degree of product differentiation such that the government can achieve this 
goal. This result is in contrast to that of Mujumdar (2004). Haque and Mukherjee 
(2004) suggest that because outputs and profits are continuous with respect to the 
* 0θ >
0>(1 )w B Aa c P t t− + + +
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degree of product differentiation, each firm becomes a near monopolist for its 
products when the products are sufficiently differentiated. Therefore, the government 
can use higher profit tax revenue to offset the shortfall of tariff revenue when the 
degree of product differentiation is sufficiently high. However, if the products are not 
very much differentiated, this will generate higher competition between the producers 
as products become more substitutes. The higher competition between the final goods 
producers, after the tariff rate is reduced, will not significantly increase their profits 
and thus profit tax revenue may not be high enough to compensate the loss of tariff 
revenue. 
Equation (2.26) also presents the negative relationship between and N *θ . As the 
number of firms increase, the competition between the final goods producers 
increases. 
( )N
*θ has been reduced, meaning that the product differentiation may not be 
high enough to increase profits significantly, and hence the likelihood that the 
government can use a profit tax to cover the loss of tariff revenue has been decreased. 
Tariff Reduction under the Condition of Free Entry with a Certain Entry Cost 
Haque and Mukherjee (2005) extend the analysis from their previous study by 
examining whether the market under free entry with a certain entry cost can recover 
the revenue loss as a result of tariff reduction on an intermediate input. Although the 
analysis is on the intermediate goods in an imperfectly competitive product market so 
the firms have significant market power, they allow for free entry with a certain entry 
cost and find different revenue implications depending on the cost of entry. From their 
findings, they suggest that, in the long run, a sufficiently large entry cost will generate 
higher tariff revenue and profit tax revenue due to the entry of new firms into the 
industry, and hence the market itself will compensate for any shortfall in revenue as a 
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consequence of the tariff reduction and the government does not need to depend on 
any other forms of taxation to maintain its total tax revenue while making both 
consumers and producers better-off in the post-liberalization period. 
Following the same assumption used in their previous work; a small open economy 
with an industry with large number of symmetric firms (firms have the same cost 
function and import a certain key input), one unit of intermediate input is used for the 
production of one unit of output, and the cost of assembling each unit is identical 
across firms and assumed to be zero, they assume that the aggregate demand for the 
industry’s product is represented by the inverse demand function; 
 P a Q= −  (2.27) 
Now, it is assumed that firms produce in a market with free entry and incur certain 
cost of entry and their profit is taxed at a rate 2( )k (0,1)T ∈ . Firms will continue to 
enter into the industry until the profit-after-tax equals the entry cost, and thus the free-
entry equilibrium can be shown by the following zero-profit condition; 
 2(1 ) iT k− ∏ =  (2.28) 
The optimum output and gross profit of each firm 1, 2,...,i N= can be represented as; 
 (1 )
1
w
c
i
a P tq
N
− += +  (2.29) 
 
2
(1 )
1
w
c
i
a P t
N
⎛ − +∏ = ⎜ +⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  (2.30) 
Using the free entry equilibrium in (2.28), the equilibrium number of firms, total 
industry output, and industry profit can be represented as; 
1 (1 )
1
wT a P t
N
k
⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦  (2.31) = −
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T a P t k
Q Nq
T
⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣= = −
⎦  (2.32) 
 
( )1 (1 )
(1 )
w
c c
i
T a P t k k
N
T
⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦∏ = ∏ = −  (2.33) 
From (2.29) and (2.30), it is obvious that tariff reduction will increase both output and 
profit of individual firm and will consequently reduce the price of the product if the 
number of firms remains fixed. With the assumption of free entry, new firms will 
continue to enter into the industry until their profit-after-tax is equal to the entry cost, 
. This will finally increase the equilibrium number of firms in the industry, total 
industry output, and the gross industry profit as stated in equation (2.31) to (2.33). 
2k
First, Haque and Mukherjee (2005) establish the condition under which the 
government needs to use non-distortionary taxation (profit tax) to recover the revenue 
loss, if there is any, as a result of tariff reduction. Thus, equation (2.34) presents the 
condition whether there is any possibility that tariff revenue might increase or stay the 
same after the tariff is reduced, without any change in the profit tax, T . Tariff 
reduction means that . A Bt t<
 w c w cA A BP t Q P t Q≥ B  (2.34) 
In previous work, the number of firms remains unchanged . Referring to 
equation (2.11), tariff reduction reduces tariff revenue if and only if; 
( )A BN N=
 (1 )w A Ba P t t> + +  (2.35) 
If equation (2.35) is assumed to be satisfied, following equation (2.29), it ensures a 
positive output of the entering firms. Using the expressions for c cA A iAQ N q=  and 
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c
B BQ N q= ciB , and utilizing equation (2.31), (2.32), and (2.35) into equation (2.34), we 
can re-arrange equation (2.34) to get a critical level of entry cost, , as follows; tk
 ( )1 1w A Bk T a P t t t⎡ ⎤≥ − − + + ≡⎣ ⎦ k  (2.36) 
Equation (2.36) proposes that, for any given profit tax rate, there always exists a level 
of entry cost, such that tariff revenue will always increase following a reduction 
in tariff rate. The reason underlying the above result is that tariff reduction reduces the 
marginal cost of each firm and leads to an increase in profit. Higher profit attracts 
more firms to enter into the industry and they continue entering until profit-after-tax 
equals to the entry cost. This will lead to increase in import demand of intermediate 
input and will consequently increase tariff revenue. However, tariff revenue would 
fall for all 
tk k≥
( )0, tk k∈ . 
Second, Haque and Mukherjee (2005) establish the condition under which the 
reduction in tariff revenue can be compensated for by an automatic increase in 
industry profit for all entry costs ( )0, tk k∈ and leaving the profit tax rate, T , 
unchanged. From equation (2.33), for a given profit tax, when tariff is reduced, gross 
industry profit will increase and finally lead to an increase in profit tax revenue. Thus, 
if an increase in profit tax revenue (while keeping T fixed) dominates the reduction in 
tariff revenue for , the total revenue will increase. This can be shown by the 
following equation. 
(0, tk k∈ )
c w c c w cA A A B BP t Q T P t Q T B+ ∏ ≥ + ∏   
 or, ( ) ( )c c w c cA B B B AT P t Q t Q∏ −∏ ≥ − A   (2.37) 
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Using the expressions for c cA A iAN π∏ =  and cB B iN cBπ∏ =  and utilizing equation (2.35), 
we can re-arrange equation (2.37) to get a critical level of the entry cost in 
which, for any value beyond this critical level, the government does not need to take 
any compensatory measure by raising profit tax. This can be shown by the following 
equation; 
( )TRk
 
( )1 1
1
w
A B TR
T a P t t
k
T T
⎡ ⎤− − + +⎣≥ + − k
⎦ ≡  (2.38) 
where . TR tk k<
Equation (2.38) proposes that, for any given profit tax rate, T , there always exists a 
level of entry cost, , such that tariff revenue will decline but total revenue 
will increase following a reduction in the tariff rate because an increase in profit tax 
revenue dominates the reduction in tariff revenue. 
[ , )TR tk k k∈
Last, Haque and Mukherjee (2005) consider the case where . From 
equation (2.38), it is very obvious that for any , total revenue decreases since 
an increase in profit tax revenue cannot offset the reduction in tariff revenue as a 
result of the reduction of the tariff rate. In this case, the government can make up the 
shortfall in its revenue by raising the profit tax rate from  to . The revenue 
recovered can be achieved only if an increase in the industry’s profit tax revenue is 
higher than the shortfall in tariff revenue. This can be presented as; 
[0, )TRk k∈
AT
TRk k<
BT
 ( )c c w c cA A B B B B A AT T P t Q t Q∏ − ∏ ≥ −  (2.39) 
Using the expressions for c cA A iAQ N q=  , ,  c cB BQ N q= iB c cA A iAN π∏ =  and c cB BN iBπ∏ =  
and substituting them into equation (2.39), and assuming 0k = , equation (2.39) can 
be re-arranged as; 
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 1 1 ( ) (1 )w wA B B A A BT T P t t a P t t⎡− − − − + + ≤⎣ 0⎤⎦  (2.40) 
Equation (2.40) proposes that if the entry cost is zero, the condition would never hold 
since all the terms in the L.H.S. of (2.40) are positive. This means that if , the 
government would never be able to compensate for the reduction in tariff revenue by 
imposing a higher profit tax. By continuity assumption, it can be argued that there 
exists an entry cost, say , such that for , government can compensate 
for the reduction in tariff revenue by imposing higher profit tax. 
0k =
TAk [ , )TA TRk k k∈
Thus, it can be concluded that for entry cost , the government can never 
compensate revenue loss by imposing a higher non-distortionary profit tax. For entry 
cost , the reduction in tariff revenue following a reduction in the tariff 
rate can be compensated for by an increasing rate of profit tax. For entry cost 
, tariff revenue decreases but total revenue increases as an increase in 
profit tax revenue dominates the reduction in tariff revenue. For entry cost , 
both tariff revenue and profit tax revenue increase without raising the rate of profit 
tax. 
[0, )TAk k∈
[ , )TA TRk k k∈
[ , )TR tk k k∈
tk k≥
2.4. Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have surveyed the literature relating to the strategies to offset 
revenue shortfall from trade tax revenue loss following the reduction of a tariff which 
provides a useful framework to analyze revenue implication of trade liberalization. 
Generally, there are two types of models dealing with this issue. The first type of 
model develops a more practicable strategy to combine a tariff cut with the reform of 
a broad-based consumption tax, which will consequently leave consumer price 
unchanged and increase both welfare and public revenue. With this model, a small 
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open economy is considered with three related sectors including a representative 
household, a perfectly competitive production sector, and a government. The model 
considers the reduction of tariff in tradable commodities which is combined with a 
point-for-point increase in the domestic consumption tax. A point-for-point 
adjustment of the consumption tax is needed to exactly offset the impact of the tariff 
reduction on the consumer price. The model does not only make a first attempt to 
offer a formal theory of policy reform to offset the loss of revenue caused by tariff 
reduction, but it also provides a remarkably simple and practicable way to reap the 
efficiency gain from tariff reduction while improve the government’s revenue 
position. However, the assumption underlying the model is perfect competition which 
is far from the real economy. In addition, the model cannot be extended to deal with 
the reduction of tariffs on intermediate goods used to produce tradable goods since it 
is not possible to offset the tariff reduction by increasing consumption tax without 
affecting the consumer price. 
The second type of model examines the reduction of a tariff on an intermediate input 
because trading in intermediate inputs accounts for a large share in world trade. The 
model investigates whether the government can make up a shortfall in revenue if the 
government reduces the tariff on an intermediate input under imperfect competition, 
while the make up by using profit tax must ensure that both consumers and producers 
must be better off in the post-liberalization period. The model shows that only when 
the industry is a monopoly can it be certain that raising the profit tax alone will 
generate enough revenue to make up for the shortfall following the tariff reduction. 
This strategy can also ensure that consumers and producers are better off in the post-
liberalization period as a result of an increase in welfare. However, a model dealing 
with product differentiation shows that there always exists degree of product 
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differentiation such that the government can achieve these objectives for any finite 
number of firms in the industry. The model suggests that when the products are 
sufficiently differentiated, each firm becomes a near monopolist for its products and 
the government can use higher profit tax revenue to offset the shortfall of tariff 
revenue. A further developed model dealing with the entry costs shows that the 
possibility that the government can use a profit tax as a compensatory measure for the 
loss of tariff revenue may alter depending on the range of entry cost, from high to 
low. The model shows that a sufficiently large entry cost will generate higher tariff 
revenue and profit tax revenue due to the entry of new firms into the industry, and 
hence the market itself will compensate for any shortfall in revenue as a consequence 
of the tariff reduction and the government does not need to depend on any other forms 
of taxation to maintain its total tax revenue while making both consumers and 
producers better-off in the post-liberalization period. However, with a low entry cost, 
the government would never be able to compensate the reduction in tariff revenue by 
imposing higher profit tax. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The impact of trade liberalization on the volume of trade in developing countries 
remains an unsettled question in economics, although a number of related literatures 
have been recently studied (see, for example, Mouna and Ahmad Reza (2001); 
Thomakos and A. Ulubasoglu (2002); Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004); Pacheco-
Lopez (2005); Pacheco-Lopez and Thirlwall (2006); Wu and Zeng (2008)). Within 
this body of knowledge, numerous effort has been gone into estimate the import and 
export demand functions for many developing countries and the results have been 
mixed. This is unfortunate since import and export elasticities are generally highly 
dependent on income, relative prices, and trade policy in particular. The analysis of 
import demand and export demand is necessary to understand the effects of trade 
liberalization may have a wide range of effects on a country’s economy. For example, 
if trade liberalization policies induce a higher volume of imports than exports, then 
this may adversely affect the balance of payments of the country in question. Given 
such an adverse influence, it is thus important to establish import and export demand 
functions. This chapter seeks to estimate the likely impact of trade liberalization 
policies on the volume of imports and exports using aggregated import and export 
demand functions in Thailand for the period 1960 to 2007. 
This chapter has two main purposes. In the first place, within the international trade 
literature, it is generally found that trade relationships fluctuate over time because 
many macroeconomic variables, which determine trade relations, are non-stationary 
in nature. In addition, trade relationships are subject to both gradual and sudden 
changes over time (Goldstein and Khan, 1985). Gradual changes are regarded as 
changes in the macroeconomic environments which potentially have an impact on 
international trade in long term, such as the process of economic development, the 
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growth of the country, and the consequences of changes in government trade policies. 
Sudden changes are regarded as changes in macroeconomic variables which have an 
immediate effect on international trade, such as fluctuations in exchange rates and a 
substantial increase in oil price. Considering these concerns, our interest is to 
investigate whether there exists a long-run relationship between trade and its major 
determinants. A thorough understanding of the determinants behind imports and 
exports is necessary for policy makers to formulate appropriate trade policy. 
The second aim of this chapter is to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on the 
volume of imports and exports in Thailand. Since 1960, many developing countries 
have switched from a closed economy to a more opened economy by inducing free 
trade policies in the hope that liberalization will bring an improvement on overall 
economic performance and address balance of payments difficulties.3 In line with this 
general trend, Thailand has formally introduced trade liberalization policy since its 
accession to the AFTA in 1992 and the WTO in 1995, though its tariffs have been 
gradually reduced over the time. By opening the country, Thailand primarily hopes to 
achieve better export performance and hence alleviate the ongoing trade deficit 
problem. Theoretically and empirically, trade liberalization is generally found to be 
positively associated with the volume of imports, while it does not lead to an increase 
in the volume of exports in the same proportion. From the UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Report 1999, trade liberalization has often contributed to a widening of 
the trade deficit in developing countries in general. For most developing countries, the 
average trade deficit in the 1990s was higher than in the 1960s-1970s by 
approximately 3-5 percentage of GDP. However, in the case of Thailand, it is found 
                                                            
3 This is based on the history of the GATT in which its second phase (lasted from 1959 to 1979) and 
third phase (lasted from 1986 to 1993) and the replacement of the WTO, have focuses on the 
reduction and elimination of tariffs. 
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that the trade balance in the post-liberalization era has improved rather than worsened. 
For almost all years in the post-liberalization period, the volume of exports has 
exceeded the volume of imports. Still, a substantial increase in the volume of exports 
since the mid 1990s, which overwhelms an increase in the volume of imports, is 
mainly due to the currency depreciation after Asian financial crisis. Accordingly, in 
this chapter we examine whether trade liberalization has had any impact on the import 
and export performance of the Thailand economy. 
Thus, with this background, the aims of this chapter are to assess empirically the 
major determinants of import and export demand functions in Thailand using 
cointegration technique to estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship and error-
correction model to examine the dynamic behaviour. We, then, aim to estimate the 
income and price elasticities from both import and export demand functions. Finally, 
we need to ascertain the impact of trade liberalization on the volume of imports and 
exports in both the short run and the long run. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 2 provides a 
comprehensive description of Thailand’s trade profile and its trade policies as well as 
background information on the characteristics of Thailand’s imports and exports over 
the studying period. Section 3 briefly reviews the related theoretical literature, and 
outlines the empirical studies on import and export demand function. Section 4 deals 
with model specification, data sources, and methodology used in this study. Section 5 
discusses the results of the estimation procedures. The chapter ends with some brief 
summaries and concluding remarks in section 6. 
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3.2. Thailand’s Import and Export and Trade Policies 
Thailand’s International Trade Sector 
Since 1960, international trade has become more substantial in terms of its share of 
Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As shown in Figure 3.1, trade (defined as 
the summation of imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP has steadily increased 
over time. From only 33 percent of GDP in 1960, trade accounted for almost 150 
percent of GDP in 2005, though it went down to approximately 130 percent of GDP 
in 2007. Obviously, the international trade sector has become increasingly important 
for Thailand. 
Figure 3.1: Trade as a Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators (December 2008) 
From Figure 3.2, trade in both goods and services have shown impressive rates of 
growth. The proportion of trade in goods to GDP rose from only about 30 percent in 
1960 to approximately 105% in 2007, reaching its peak about 122% in 2005. The 
proportion of trade in services to GDP also rose gradually from only 3 percent in 1960 
to 27% in 2007. 
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Figure 3.2: Trade in Goods and Services as a Percentage of GDP  
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Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators (December 2008) 
Over the studying period, the structure of Thailand’s exports has considerably 
changed. From Figure 3.3, agricultural exports began to decrease in the early 1960s 
and have declined substantially for the whole period, while manufactured exports 
began to increase in the late 1960s and have dramatically risen since then. In 1960, 
agricultural exports accounted for almost 40 percent of merchandise exports, while 
manufactured exports only made up 2 percent. Thailand started promoting export-
oriented industries in the early 1970s. Exports of manufactures goods have turned out 
to be higher than exports of agricultural goods since 1975. In 2007, manufactured 
exports reached the highest point, accounting for about 80 percent of merchandise 
exports, while agricultural raw materials exports, decreasing over the period, 
computed only 5 percent. This sharp rise in manufactured exports and fall in 
agricultural exports is another remarkable feature of Thailand’s exports. 
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Figure 3.3: Share of Agricultural and Manufactures exports in Merchandise exports 
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Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators (December 2008) 
Considering imports, from Figure 3.4, it is found that imports of manufactured goods 
are much higher than imports of agricultural products. Although Thailand adopted an 
import-substitution policy in 1958 and switched from import-substitution 
industrialization to export-oriented industrialization in later years, imports of inputs, 
materials, and capital goods show no obvious sign of declining. In average, 
manufactured imports accounted for approximately 70 percent of merchandise 
imports, whereas agricultural imports made up only 3 percent of merchandise imports. 
This reflects the fact that Thailand is a big importer of manufactured products in 
which these products are needed in the production process of medium to high-
technological goods. It also reflects the fact that Thailand has a high consumption in 
imported luxury goods. 
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Figure 3.4: Share of Agricultural and Manufactures imports in Merchandise imports 
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Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators (December 2008) 
Figure 3.5 provides the picture of Thailand’s imports and exports from 1960 to 2007. 
Before 1997, imports exceeded exports in almost all years. The main reason is that 
Thailand’s exports are highly dependent on the imports of raw materials, machinery, 
and crude oil. In addition, the high consumption of imported luxury goods, when the 
economy was booming, resulted in the high demand for imported goods.4 However, it 
is very obvious that exports substantially increased during 1997 and 1998, while 
imports slightly declined in 1998. Exports jumped from 39 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
48 percent of GDP in 1997 and 59 percent of GDP in 1998. A substantial increase in 
exports was mainly due to the currency depreciation after the financial crisis in 1997. 
The majority of the growth in exports over the past decade was in manufactured 
goods, particularly high-tech products and the major source countries being Japan and 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) countries, especially United States 
                                                            
4 According to Siamwalla (1999) and Warr (2005), we can divided Thai economy into 4 sub periods 
including; 
I. 1960‐1985 (Pre‐boom); is the period that Thai economy got its foundation right by investing in 
physical infrastructure which later help made economic growth high and stable. However, there 
was still high macroeconomic uncertainty. 
II. 1986‐1996 (Boom); is the period that Thailand had an extraordinary high economic growth. 
III. 1997‐1998 (Crisis); is the period that Thailand and Many ASEAN countries encountered with 
economic and financial crisis. 
IV. 1999‐Present (Post‐crisis); is the period that Thailand has recovered and challenged with world 
economic fluctuation.  
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of America. Due to the export jump in 1997, imports have turned out to be lower than 
exports from that year. However, the impact of currency depreciation on imports 
seems to be only one year after the crisis. Since 1999, imports have risen continually, 
as usual. Much of the increase in imports is in raw materials, intermediate goods, and 
capital goods, such as mineral and metal products, chemicals and plastic materials, 
electronic parts, and industrial machinery, industrial tools and parts, which are 
required in the production process of exports, rather than consumer goods and a 
substitution for domestic production. The main import sources of countries are Japan, 
United States, and China. 
Figure 3.5: Imports and Exports of Goods and Services 
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Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators (December 2008) 
From Table 3.1, it can be seen that the balance of trade has made the greater 
contribution to the current account position. This, again, reflects the importance of the 
international trade sector in Thailand. From 1975 to 1996, Thailand suffered from a 
trade deficit, and hence a current account deficit in almost all years. The impact of 
currency depreciation was immediately seen in the trade balance and the current 
account. In 1997, trade balance turned out to have a surplus after ten years of a deficit. 
In 1998, net trade surplus jumped to over 16,000 million US dollars, accounting for 
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approximately a 10-fold increase from previous year. After 1996, Thailand has a trade 
surplus, although the surplus has dropped in some years.  
Table 3.1: Details in Current Account of Thailand, 1975-2007 
Year Million US$ 
Net current 
transfers 
Net income Net trade in goods 
1975 80.67 10.99 -672.69 
1976 46.86 -53.68 -193.14 
1977 39.51 -38.14 -783.97 
1978 40.13 -148.22 -858.37 
1979 58.86 -277.87 -1,550.34 
1980 210.14 -229.31 -1,902.47 
1981 167.52 -502.43 -2,028.95 
1982 183.09 -514.56 -730.56 
1983 277.78 -227.09 -2,861.12 
1984 174.97 -440.24 -1,897.74 
1985 165.24 -597.13 -1,332.14 
1986 224.73 -816.71 388.38 
1987 223.77 -829.67 -424.46 
1988 236.28 -894.37 -2,074.42 
1989 246.25 -780.52 -2,916.11 
1990 213.30 -853.39 -6,750.84 
1991 260.90 -1,075.39 -5,989.18 
1992 645.60 -1,707.72 -4,161.02 
1993 749.64 -1,406.25 -4,288.13 
1994 1,127.56 -1,730.80 -3,699.83 
1995 486.51 -2,113.63 -7,968.06 
1996 759.72 -3,385.33 -9,488.17 
1997 478.81 -3,480.24 1,571.58 
1998 414.39 -3,567.14 16,237.90 
1999 353.18 -2,990.96 14,013.30 
2000 585.86 -1,381.30 11,700.61 
2001 600.73 -2,457.16 8,543.46 
2002 603.42 -3,663.36 9,043.92 
2003 940.93 -4,973.24 11,174.59 
2004 2,131.49 -6,120.42 10,785.24 
2005 3,003.63 -7,173.50 3,387.69 
2006 3,368.01 -6,843.50 13,843.67 
2007 3,938.05 -5,709.98 25,959.75 
Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators (December 2008) 
Figure 3.6 shows the declining trend in both Thailand and the world’s average tariff 
rates. In 1960, Thailand’s average tariff rate was initially very high, approximately 
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70%, while the world’s tariff rate was about 55%. From Figure 3.6, the average tariff 
rates of both Thailand and the world have gradually decreased over time. During the 
mid 1980s to the early 1990s, the gap between Thailand’s average tariff rate and the 
world’s tariff rate was very high because the country implemented the protection 
policies for the domestic substitutes industries. However, in 1994, there was a steep 
decline in Thailand’s average tariff rate, from approximately 46% in 1993 to 23% in 
1994. This is mainly due to an agreement made with ASEAN and GATT for the 
country to become a member of AFTA in 1992 and the WTO in 1995. Since then, 
Thailand’s average tariff rate has been only little higher than that of the world. In 
2007, Thailand’s average tariff rate was reduced to only 10%, while the world’s 
average tariff rate was recorded at 8%. 
Figure 3.6: Trends in Average Tariff Rates 
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Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2007 
In order to investigate the trend between imports and the tariff rate, we plot the graph 
of the share of imports in GDP against Thailand’s average tariff rate. Figure 3.7 
shows that there is a linkage between the country’s average tariff rate and the share of 
imports in GDP. By looking at the diagram, there is evidence of a negative 
relationship between the two variables. 
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Figure 3.7: Thailand’s Import Share of GDP and Thailand’s Average Tariff Rate 
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Trade liberalization was not only associated with the country’s import share, but there 
also seemed to be a relationship with Thailand’s export share. Similarly, we plot the 
graph of the share of exports in GDP against world’s average tariff rate. Figure 3.8 
shows that world’s tariff reductions seemed to be associated with an increase in the 
share of export in GDP. 
Figure 3.8: Thailand’s Export Share of GDP and World’s Average Tariff Rate 
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Having described the trade characteristics of Thailand, we now give a brief outline of 
Thailand’s trade policy. 
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Thailand’s Trade Liberalization Policy 
By implementing an open trade regime in its international trade, Thailand has been 
recognized as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. With the global 
trend, Thailand has used many trade measures as instruments to strengthen the 
competitiveness of domestic industries to compete in the world market. By pursuing 
the policy of freer trade-led-development, Thailand has participated in many 
international forums such as the Uruguay Round of GATT, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
Another important step to free trade was its accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on 1 January 1995. Since then, Thailand has implemented 
various measures in compliance with its commitments in the WTO. The tariff system 
has been restructured while many laws have been enacted in accordance with the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. Most of the 
goods and services sectors are going through the liberalization process. Many 
quantitative restrictions on various types of agricultural products have been eliminated 
and replaced by tariff measures in line with the procedure prescribed in the agriculture 
agreement. In short, Thailand has attempted to open its economy by implementing 
many laws and regulations as its part of commitment to the WTO. As stated earlier, 
Thailand is also participating in many regional cooperation schemes. As one of the 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Thailand has closely followed development in 
APEC and tried to ensure that this forum is consistent with multilateralism, the 
concept created by the WTO. As one of the leading nations in ASEAN, Thailand has 
played an important role in the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
which encourages free trade and cooperation among neighbouring countries in this 
region. 
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a) The Uruguay Round and the WTO 
With the success of the Uruguay Round negotiation, Thailand believed that 
trade negotiations under GATT, the establishment of the WTO and the 
improvement of international trade rules and negotiations would create a more 
stable economic environment, greater economic development, and higher 
income from trade. By being involved in the Uruguay Round and the creation 
of the WTO, the main objectives are to assure greater trade liberalization 
through the reduction and elimination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers, to 
improve the effectiveness of the rules and regulations governing international 
trade, to bring about fairness and transparency in the market, and to prevent 
new trade barriers that may obstruct international trade. With these beliefs, 
Thailand became a member of GATT in October 1982 and the 59th founding 
member of the WTO on 28 December 1994. 
Under the WTO agreements, Thailand has to reduce an average of 24 percent 
of tariffs on agricultural products. The country also needs to eliminate non-
tariff barriers for 23 agricultural products and convert these NTBs into tariff 
measures in accordance with the tariffication process. In addition, tariffs of 
over 4,000 items of industrial and fisheries products have to be reduced during 
this process and this results in an average of 28 percent of tariff reduction. 
b) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Created in 1989, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is aim to 
improve cooperation, trade, and investment in the region. In the context of 
APEC, liberalization, trade and investment facilitation, and technical 
cooperation in the APEC region are considered as a priority. Under APEC, the 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific Region (FTAAP) has been proposed by 
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the member nations in which its scope is not only focusing on the reduction of 
tariffs and other trade restrictions, but also the creation of a free trade zone. 
The development of FTAAP is now under study and may take many years to 
reach the conclusion. Considering Thailand, its policies toward APEC are 
made compatible with its commitment under the WTO. Under the 1994 Bogor 
declaration, Thailand has to reduce its tariffs to below 5 percent by 2020. 
c)  The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
Thailand is one of the founding members of ASEAN, which later established 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The agreement was signed in Singapore 
on 28 January 1992. The main objective in the establishment of AFTA is to 
reduce and eliminate intra-regional tariffs on all manufactured items including 
capital goods and processed agricultural products to 0-5 percent and remove 
non-tariff barriers over 15 years, starting from the beginning of 1992 and 
finalizing by the end of 2008. As for Thailand, there are two packages of tariff 
reductions under AFTA which have been commenced on 15 February 1992. 
For the first package, from 1992, Thailand has reduced the tariff rates up to 30 
percent on all manufactured items imported from ASEAN, except for certain 
sensitive products such as petrochemical, plastic products, and televisions. For 
the second package, from the end of 1994, Thailand has to reduce further tariff 
rates of products under the Fast Track Programme in accordance with the tariff 
reduction schedule as follows; 
From 26-30 percent to 25 percent 
From 21-25 percent to 20 percent 
From 15-20 percent to 15 percent 
From 11-14 percent to 10 percent 
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From 6-10 percent to 5 percent 
However, under the meeting held in September 1994 in Chiang Mai, in view 
of the present economic challenges and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
multilateral negotiations, ASEAN has agreed to shorten the time frame that 
was initially set from 15 to 10 years. That is all reduction, elimination and 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers must be accomplished by 1 January 
2003 instead of 2008. 
In summary, as Thailand’s economic performance has become more increasingly 
dependent on international trade, the country has joined a number of trade agreements 
with other countries. With the hope to achieve the benefit of attaining economic 
prosperity, Thailand has realized the importance of liberalization and open trade to the 
country’s development. 
3.3. General Review: Empirical Studies on the Relationship between Trade 
Liberalization, Imports, and Exports 
For several decades, the determinants of trade, the behaviour of import and export 
demand functions have been analyzed in many different studies. Among an 
impressive range of empirical studies, the most important works include Houthakker 
and Magee (1969), Khan (1974), Murray and Ginman (1976), Salas (1982), Melo and 
Vogt (1984), Goldstein and Khan (1985), Bahmani-Oskooee (1986), Sarmad (1989), 
Clarida (1994), Carone (1996), Sinha (1997), Senhadji (1998), Thomakos and 
Ulubasoglu (2002), Aydin et al (2004), Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004), Dutta 
and Ahmed (2004), Pacheco-Lopez (2005), Dash (2006), Huseyin (2006), and Aliyu 
(2007). For instance, Houthakker and Magee (1969) investigate demand elasticities 
for both imports and exports with respect to income (GNP in constant prices) and 
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prices for the United States comparing with a number of developed countries. Using 
the ordinary least-squares (OLS) method and annual data over the period 1951-1966, 
they found that the income elasticity of demand for imports for the U.S. and other 
developed countries is about the same, while the income elasticity of demand for 
exports for the U.S. is relatively low, resulting in trade balance problem as the world 
grows. The price elasticities estimated for all countries appeared to be very low. Khan 
(1974) examined the effect of prices on trade flow by estimating import and export 
demand functions using annual data for 15 developing countries over the period 1951-
1969. By using two-stage least-squares method, he found that prices have a significant 
and substantial impact on both import and export demand for all countries used in his 
study. Murray and Ginman (1976) estimated the traditional aggregate import demand 
for the U.S. over the period 1950 to 1964 by using quarterly data. They found that the 
income elasticity varied from 0.96 to 1.94 whereas the import price elasticity was 
approximately equal to one. Salas (1982) investigated the structure of Mexican 
imports for the period 1961 to 1979 by focusing on private sector imports. He also 
determined the possibility of a structural break in the import demand functions for the 
period 1961-1977 and 1961-1979, since Mexico has changed its trade policies from 
traditionally protective international trade policies from 1976. He found that imports 
of Mexico were highly dependent on relative import price but had a very low response 
to income changes. The price elasticity was improved when the country adopted 
liberalization policies, while the income elasticity was dropped in the liberalized 
period. Melo and Vogt (1984) estimated real income and relative price elasticities of 
demand for imports of Venezuela by using disaggregated annual data covering the 
period 1962 to 1979. At the aggregate level, the price elasticity was very high (-
2.086), comparing with other studies. The income elasticity was also found to be 
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higher than unity (1.879). At the disaggregated level, income and price elasticities for 
most goods were higher than unity, except for manufacturing imports which both 
price and income were highly inelastic. Goldstein and Khan (1985) provided a 
comprehensive survey of the literature on the determinants of trade focusing on the 
role of income and prices and estimated import demand function for 14 developed 
countries. They found that income seemed to have higher impact on import demand 
than prices. Bahmani-Oskooee (1986) used quarterly data from 1973 to 1980 period 
and provided the estimates of aggregate import and export demand functions for 
seven developing countries. He also provided estimates of price and exchange rates 
response patterns by introducing a distributed lag structure on the relative prices and 
on the effective exchange rate. After estimating import and export demand functions 
using the Almon procedure, it is found that developing countries generally were price 
inelastic, but income elastic concerning demand for imported goods. However, both 
income and price appeared to be highly inelastic for all countries under study. Sarmad 
(1989) estimated import demand functions for total imports of Pakistan for the period 
1959 to 1986 at both the aggregate and disaggregate levels. He found that the 
aggregate elasticities for both income and relative price were lower than unity (0.923 
for income elasticity and -0.415 for price elasticity). At the disaggregate level, the 
income elasticities ranged from 1.4 to as low as 0.45, depending on the type of import 
goods. Similarly, the disaggregate price elasticities ranged from -1.2 to -0.42.  
More recent studies have applied cointegration and error-correction technique in the 
study of import and export demand functions. For example, Clarida (1994) derived an 
econometric equation used for estimating the parameters of the demand for imported 
nondurable consumer goods of the U.S. by using quarterly data covering the period 
1967 to 1982. He estimated a long-run equilibrium relationship between consumer 
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goods imported, relative price of imports, and consumption of domestically produced 
goods and found that all these variables are cointegrated. The long-run price elasticity 
of import demand was estimated to average -0.95, while the elasticity of import 
demand with respect to a permanent increase in real spending was equal to 2.15. 
Carone (1996) estimated aggregate import demand for total and non-oil merchandise 
imports of the U.S. over the period 1970 to 1992 using cointegration and error-
correction approaches. He found a statistically significant long-run relationship 
between the volume of imports and real income and relative prices. Sinha (1997) 
estimated import demand function for Thailand by using annual data covering the 
period 1953 to 1990 and applying cointegration  and ECM approaches. He found that 
both price and income were inelastic in the short run. Relative import price was still 
inelastic in the long run while income turned out to be very elastic in the long run. 
Senhadji (1998) estimated a structural import demand function for 77 developing and 
industrial countries from 1960 to 1993 by using cointegration and the fully modified 
ordinary least squares estimator (FMOLS). He found that imports seem to be inelastic 
in the short run but are more responsive to relative prices in the long run (average 
short-run price elasticity is -0.26, while average long-run price elasticity is -1.08). 
Similarly, he found that imports respond more to income in the long run than in the 
short run (average long-run income elasticity is equal to 1.45, whereas average short-
run income elasticity is equal to 0.45). He also found that industrial countries tend to 
have higher income elasticities and lower price elasticities than developing countries. 
Aydin et al (2004) developed a single equation and a vector auto-regression 
framework and used quarterly data covering the period 1987 to 2003 to estimate 
import demand for the Turkish economy. They found that both long-run and short-run 
income elasticities were higher than unity (1.999 and 1.188 for long-run and short-
71 
 
run, respectively), while both long-run and short-run price elasticities were lower than 
unity (-0.402 for long-run and -0.527 for short-run). Dash (2006) investigated the 
behaviour of the import demand function for India using annual data from 1975 to 
2003. Economic activity (GDP), import price, foreign exchange reserves, and price of 
domestically produced goods were included as determinants of aggregate import 
demand. It is found that the aggregated import volume was cointegrated with all 
variables stated earlier and the import demand of India was largely explained by price 
of domestically produced goods, GDP, lag of import and foreign exchange reserves. 
Huseyin (2006) estimated an aggregate demand function for Turkey using monthly 
data during the period 1994 to 2003 and applied cointegration and error correction 
modeling approaches to investigate the long-run relationship and the dynamics of 
short-run adjustment process. It is found that there was a unique equilibrium 
relationship existing among the real quantity of imports, relative prices, and real GNP. 
The value of income elasticity of import demand was lower than price elasticity, 
suggesting that Turkey’s imports were sensitive more to import price changes than to 
income changes. In addition, the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium was not 
very high. Aliyu (2007) examined the determinants of import and export demand 
functions for Nigerian economy using data covering the period of 1970 to 2004. It is 
found that current income had very little influence on both imports and exports while 
lag income highly affected both, especially on export demand. Nigeria’s exports 
expanded substantially because of very high income elasticity. In addition, the price 
elasticity of imports appeared to be higher than price elasticity of exports. 
There are many studies investigating the role of trade liberalization on trade flow. The 
analysis was generally done by including the measures of trade liberalization into both 
import and export demand functions. For example, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) 
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analyzed the impact of trade liberalization on import demand of Turkish economy by 
using annual disaggregated data for the period 1970 to 1995 covering 26 industries. In 
order to analyze the impact of trade liberalization, they tested for different elasticities 
over “closed” and “open” economy periods, and found that the effects of the trade 
reforms of the 1980s were significant for a number of industries. The elasticities 
estimated from many types of products were found to have changed notably as a 
result of liberalization. Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) used panel data analysis 
to examine the impact of trade liberalization on exports, imports, and the balance of 
payments for 22 developing countries that have adopted trade liberalization policies 
since the mid-1970s. Using different techniques such as the fixed effects and 
generalized method of moments (GMM) for panel data analysis, they found that 
reductions in export and import duties had significantly affected the growth of exports 
and imports, with the impact on import growth greater. The impact of a more 
liberalized trade regime raised import growth by more than exports. They also found 
that liberalization increased income and price elasticities of both the demand for 
imports and for exports. However, trade liberalization increased the price elasticity of 
demand for imports greater than for exports, and hence the balance of trade was 
possibly deteriorated after trade liberalization. They also suggested that the impact of 
liberalization differed depending on the level of initial protection of the country. Dutta 
and Ahmed (2004) investigated the behaviour of Indian aggregate imports during the 
period 1971 to 1995. In order to capture the effect of the import liberalization policy 
on import demand, they included a dummy variable with a value 1 for 1992-1995, the 
liberalization period. They found that aggregate import volume was cointegrated with 
relative import prices and real GDP. In the estimated ECM, import prices, lags of real 
GDP and a liberalization dummy were found to be important determinants of import 
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demand function for India, with quite a slow speed of adjustment to equilibrium. 
Import demand in India was largely explained by real GDP but appeared to be less 
sensitive to import price changes, implying the noncompetitive nature of India’s 
imports. An estimate of liberalization dummy was equal to only 0.14, showing little 
effect of import liberalization policy on aggregate import volume. Pacheco-Lopez 
(2005) investigated the impact of trade liberalization, during the mid 1980s from the 
participation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on exports, 
imports, the balance of payments and growth in Mexico using annual data covering 
the period 1970 to 2000. In order to identify the long-run relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables, an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
estimation technique were adopted in his study. He used a liberalization dummy to 
capture the impact of trade liberalization. On export side, he found that export growth 
responded substantially to the growth of the U.S. economy, but the price elasticity of 
Mexican exports is quite low. NAFTA was found to have no impact on Mexican 
export performance. On the import side, he found that import growth responded 
substantially to both income and price changes. It is found that NAFTA had a 
significant positive impact on import growth. 
3.4. The Model and Methodology 
In this study, we firstly apply the traditional import (export) demand functions and 
then use the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to estimate the short-run 
and long-run elasticities in Thailand’s import (export) demand over the period 1960-
2007. We also compare these estimates with the estimates obtained using 
cointegration techniques and an ECM. 
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3.4.1. The Model Specification and Equations 
Although there is a large amount of literature on the import and export demand 
modelling in general, the question how import and export models are appropriately 
specified is still of interests. Although the specification of the models depend on a 
number of factors, Goldstein and Khan (1985) suggested that the most important 
things should be considered  are the purpose of modelling exercise, the type of the 
good being trade, institutional framework under which trade takes place, and the 
availability of data. From trade theory, there are two basic models often used in the 
studies of international trade; model of perfect substitutes and model of imperfect 
substitutes. On one hand, perfect substitution model assumes perfect substitutability 
between domestic and foreign goods. Thus, under the key assumption of perfect 
substitution, a country could only be either an exporter or an importer of a traded 
good, but not both. Since this is not observed in the real world, the perfect substitution 
model is less popular in the empirical studies than the imperfect substitution model. 
However, the perfect substitution model is typically used in the case of highly 
disaggregate data set. On the other hand, the fundamental assumption underlying the 
imperfect substitution model is that neither imports nor exports can be considered 
perfect substitutes for the domestic products. This model is thus more realistic and is 
more suitable for the case of aggregate data.5 
Regarding the demand-supply relationships in the export and import equations, theory 
suggests that one should emphasize the simultaneous relations between quantities and 
prices, and hence demand and supply of import (export) equations should be 
simultaneously solved in the system in order to avoid any possible biased results.6 
                                                            
5 See Goldstein and Khan (1985) 
6 See Stern, Francis and Schumacher (1976) 
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However, like many other studies, since we concentrate on the estimation of import 
and export demand equation, another important assumption must be applied to the 
supply relationships. Typically, it is assumed that the import and export supply price 
elasticities facing any individual country are infinite. The important advantage of this 
assumption is that it allows the estimation of the import and export demand equations 
by using single-equation method, in which the price variables are treated as 
exogenous variables. However, Goldstein and Khan (1978) pointed out the drawback 
of this assumption that although infinite price elasticity of supply may be justified in 
the case of import supply, it seems to be unreasonable in the case of the supply of 
exports of a small open economy. They argued that if the world demand for the goods 
from a certain small individual country substantially increases, the country will not be 
able to meet the demand without changing in price of exports (unless there exist large 
idle resources). Still, the assumption of infinite price elasticity is necessary for our 
analysis and must be hold in this study. 
Following the relevant literature (see, for example, Houthakker and Magee (1969); 
Leamer and Stern (1970); Khan (1974); Goldstein and Khan (1985); Carone (1996); 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Niroomand (1998); and Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004)), 
we use the standard import and export demand functions to analyze the impact of 
trade liberalization on the volume of imports and exports for Thailand. The standard 
specification of the import and export demand models is similar to any other demand 
model. The quantity of imports and exports demanded will be treated as endogenous 
variables while the relative price of imports (price of imported goods relative to the 
price of domestic goods), the relative price of exports (price of exported goods 
relative to the world export price), world’s real income and country’s real income will 
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be considered as exogenous variables. By assuming the price and income elasticities 
of demand are constant over time, the import function can be specified as follows: 
1
2
a
aM
t
D t
P
tM A P
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Y  (3.1) 
where tM is the volume of imports at time t; A is a constant; ( )M D tP P denotes 
relative import prices at time t; is the level of country’s income at time t. tY
There are still other assumptions underlying the imperfect substitute model. We 
assume that the import demand is always equal to the level of imports ( )dM M= so 
that we are able to apply the demand function in our study. Another basic assumption 
is that, by using the relative price as a determinant, we assume that there is no money 
illusion, homogeneity implying in prices.7 
Regarding the appropriate specification of import demand, there is no theory 
providing a specific functional form for this demand function. However, Thursby and 
Thursby (1984) tested specifications of import demand and concluded that the log-
linear form is more desirable than the linear form. Other advantages of the logarithmic 
form are their convenience and the ease of interpretation.8 Thus, following previous 
studies9, taking the logs of the above function, the import function can be transformed 
into logarithmic form as follow: 
0 1 2ln ln lnt t t tM a a Y a RPM u= + + +  (3.2) 
where is the relative price. However, Goldstein and Khan (1976) have argued 
that if imports of the country are considered as the difference between consumption 
RPM
                                                            
7 See Carone (1996) for more details 
8 See Carone (1996) 
9 See Khan and Ross (1977) and Boylan et al. (1980) for example 
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and production of domestically produced import substitutes, production may rise 
faster (slower) than consumption in response to a rise (fall) in real income. Therefore, 
imports could fall (rise) as real income increase, resulting in a negative (positive) sign 
for income elasticity. 
In order to capture the impact of trade liberalization on the import demand function, 
we modify the basic model by including Thailand’s average tariff rates and a 
liberalization dummy variable 
(TT )
)(LIB . The dummy variable takes the value 1 from 
1992 and 0 otherwise; this is based on Thailand joining the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) from 1992 and a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 
1995. We expect a negative coefficient for TT and a positive coefficient for the 
liberalization dummy. Thus, the augmented import demand function can be written as 
equation (3.3): 
0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln lnt t t t t tM a a Y a RPM a TT a LIB u= + + + + +  (3.3) 
As for the export demand model, again following the literature, we assume that the 
main determinants of a country’s exports are relative export prices and world income. 
Thus, we assume that the export demand function for each country can be represented 
as follows: 
1
2
b
bX
t
XW t
P
tX B P
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
W  (3.4) 
where is the volume of exports at time t; is a constant; tX B ( X XW tP P ) is export price 
relative to world export price at time t; is the level of world’s income at time t. tW
Following the same approach used for the import demand function, the export 
demand function takes the following form after taking logs: 
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0 1 2ln ln lnt tX b b W b RPX u= + + +t t
)
)
 (3.5) 
where is the relative (export) price (to world export price). Generally, an 
increase in export prices relative to that of the rest of the world is expected to be 
harmful for a country’s exports, resulting in a negative export price elasticity . 
Economic theory also suggests that an increase in the world income is related to 
increase in a country’s exports, yielding a positive income elasticity . 
RPX
1( )b
2( )b
Then, we modify the traditional export demand model by introducing our measures of 
trade liberalization; World’s average tariff rates on one hand and a 
liberalization dummy variable 
(TW
(LIB taking the value 1 from 1992 onwards on the 
other. Since trade liberalization is expected to be associated with a devaluation of the 
exchange rate, exports should increase after trade has been liberalized. Thus, we 
expect a positive coefficient for the liberalization dummy and a negative coefficient 
for TW . Thus, the augmented estimating equation can be written as equation (3.6) 
0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln lnt t t tX b b W b RPX b TW b LIB u= + + + + +t t  (3.6) 
3.4.2. The Data 
In order to avoid any misinterpretation of the empirical results, this section provides 
the description of all variables appearing in the estimated equation. We have 
estimated our trade models using annual data covering the period from 1960 to 2007. 
Data are obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI). The data set consists of the following 
items: 
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Imports ( )M : 
Imports of Goods and Services; constant 2000 US$. Source; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), December 2008. 
Exports ( )X : 
Exports of Goods and Services; constant 2000 US$. Source; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), December 2008. 
Domestic Income : ( )Y
Thailand GDP; constant 2000 US$. Source; World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (WDI), December 2008. 
World Income : ( )W
World GDP; constant 2000 US$. Source; World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI), December 2008. 
Relative Import Price ( )RPM : 
Relative Import Price used in the import demand function is the ratio of import price 
to domestic price ( )M DP P , where MP (Thailand’s import price index) is defined as 
import unit values; and DP (Thailand’s domestic price index) is defined as consumer 
price indice. Both import unit values and consumer price indices are measured in 
index number form and the selected base year is 2000. The source of international 
price index data is IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), January 2009. IFS 
publishes these series (having the interpretation of implicit price deflators) for a wide 
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selection of countries all expressed in US dollars. The most recent base used in IFS 
for various countries is 2000 and is the base used in this study. 
Relative Export Price ( )RPX : 
Relative Export Price used in the export demand function is the ratio of export price 
to world export price ( )P where X XWP , XP ( ailand’s export price index) and Th XWP
(the world’s export price index) are defined as export unit values of Thailand and the 
world, respectively. Both indices are measured in index number form and the selected 
base year is 2000. The source of export price index data is IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), January 2009. 
Thailand’s Average Applied Tariff Rates ( ) : TT
Thailand’s average tariff rates (unit; unweighted in percent) are calculated by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The calculation 
is based on unweighted averages for all goods in ad valorem rates, or applied rates, or 
MFN rates whichever data are available. Source; UNCTAD TRAINS database, 2007. 
World’s Average Applied Tariff Rates ( ) : TW
World’s average tariff rates (unit; unweighted in percent) are calculated by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The calculation is based 
on unweighted averages for all goods in ad valorem rates, or applied rates, or MFN 
rates whatever data are available for 169 countries. Source; UNCTAD TRAINS 
database, 2007. 
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Trade Liberalization Dummy ( )LIB : 
The dummy variable takes value of 1 from 1992 onward, the year which Thailand 
joined AFTA and later in 1995 becomes a member of WTO, and 0 otherwise. 
3.4.3. The Methodology 
The findings in the early cointegration literature that in regression models containing 
non-stationary I(1) variables, standard statistical inference is in general not valid, led 
to the widespread use of cointegration methods and ECMs in estimating short-run and 
long-run elasticities, instead of the traditional ARDL approach. However, in this 
study, in order to investigate the empirical relationship between imports (exports), 
domestic (world) real income, and relative import (export) prices and to examine the 
constancy of their relationship, especially in the light of trade liberalization, in terms 
of tariff reduction and the AFTA and WTO membership, we apply one of the 
traditional and the most widely used methods, known as the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to study both long-run and short-run relationship 
between them. Unfortunately, there is a major limitation of applying the ARDL model 
when variables concerned are non-stationary. Regressions among such variables are 
often spurious unless the variables are cointegrated. In order to test for stationarity of 
time series data and the order of integration of variables, we apply two formal unit 
root tests. The details are described below. 
a) Unit Root Tests 
In a time series model, the presence of a unit root causes a violation of the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression model. A unit root means that the 
observed time series is not stationary. When non-stationary time series are used in a 
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regression model, one may obtain apparently significant relationships from unrelated 
variables. This phenomenon is called the spurious regression problem. 
The first stage involves testing for stationarity of each time series variable. A test of 
stationarity of time series data that has become the most popular in econometric 
analysis is the unit root test. Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) provide a formal 
procedure to test for the presence of a unit root. In the DF test, it is assumed that the 
error term is uncorrelated. However, the DF test is only valid for an AR(1) process. In 
the case that the time series is correlated at higher lags, Dickey and Fuller have 
developed a test by adding lag differences of the time series, known as the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The ADF test provides the appropriate tests 
statistics to determine whether a series contains a unit root, unit root plus drift, and/or 
unit root plus drift plus a time trend. In order to choose the optimum lag length for 
ADF test, Akaike and Schwartz Information Criteria (AIC and SIC, respectively) is 
normally considered. In this study, we consider only the lowest value of SIC. 
Phillips and Perron (1988) have developed a more comprehensive theory of unit root 
nonstationarity by using nonparametric statistical methods to take care of the 
autocorrelation in the error terms without adding lagged difference terms. The test is 
similar to an ADF test, but it incorporates an automatic correction to the DF 
procedure to allow for autocorrelated residuals. The Phillips-Perron (PP) test usually 
gives similar conclusions as the ADF test but the calculation of the PP test statistics is 
more complex. 
In this study, we test variables for their order of integration using both the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (1981) and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests for unit roots. 
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Next, since the ARDL model assumes the existence of a unique long-run relationship 
among the variables, cointegration analysis should be used to establish the existence 
of such a relationship. Thus, we test for the existence of a long-run relationship 
between the volume of imports (exports), domestic (world) real income, and relative 
import (export) prices for the standard import (export) model. Later in the study, we 
add Thailand (World) average tariff rates for the augmented import (export) model as 
a measure for trade liberalization. 
b) Cointegration Analysis 
Although there is a number of methods for testing cointegration proposed in the 
literature, two methods including the Two-Step Approach proposed by Engle and 
Granger (1987) and the Full Information Maximum Likelihood Approach proposed 
by Johansen and Juselius (1990) are the most popular and widely used in time series 
analysis. 
Engle-Granger (EG) Cointegration Test 
Engle and Granger (1987) have proposed that if a linear relationship genuinely exists 
between two non-stationary variables, the error term should be stationary over time. 
However, if the error term is not bounded, the variables are not related - they are not 
cointegrated. The first step of the EG cointegration test is to run a standard OLS 
regression on the variables, which are assumed to be I(1), and obtain the residuals. 
The second step is to perform an ADF test on the residuals to see if they have a unit 
root. If a unit root is not present, the residuals are stationary and the variables are 
cointegrated. The ADF test conducted in this step is similar to that used to test 
variables for a unit root. 
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Johansen-Juselius (JJ) Cointegration Test 
When there are more than two variables used in the equation, the maximum likelihood 
approach of Johansen and Juselius provides more robust results than other 
cointegrating methods (Asteriou, 2006). In order to avoid the use of two-step 
estimators, Johansen and Juselius (1990) have applied the maximum likelihood 
procedure, then estimated and tested for the presence of multiple cointegrating 
vectors. The JJ procedure relies heavily on the relationship between the rank of a 
matrix and its characteristic roots. This method sets up the non-stationary time series 
as a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the form; 
1
1
p
t i t i t p
i
X X X tε
−
− −
=
Δ = ∏ Δ +∏ +∑  (3.7) 
where is a vector of non-stationary (in levels) variables. tX 1 ...i iI A A∏ = − + + + with 
 1,...,= .i p
Before the JJ procedure is conducted to find the number of cointegrating vectors, the 
optimum lag is needed to be determined. Sims (1980) has recommended utilizing 
likelihood ratio tests to select an optimum lag length. Alternatively, Enders (1995) has 
suggested that the optimum lag length can be selected by using Akaike AIC 
information criterion or Schwarz SIC information criterion. Cheung and Lai (1993) 
study supported this point, that for autoregressive processes, standard lag selection 
criteria such as the AIC and the SIC can be useful for choosing the right lag order for 
the JJ test. Thus, in this study, we determine the optimum lag length used in equation 
(3.7) by SIC. 
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The rank of the matrix is determinant in finding the number of cointegrating 
vectors. The rank of the matrix 
∏
∏ is equal to the number of independent cointegrating 
vectors. There are three possible ways; 
- If the matrix ∏ has rank , then is stationary and all the components are 
I(0) – time series at level can be used in the estimation. 
n tX
- If the matrix ∏ has rank 0, the matrix is null, and it represents nonstationarity 
and no long-run equilibrium relationship. Hence, equation (3.7) can be 
estimated as a usual VAR model only after first differencing. 
- If the matrix ∏ has rank r and 0 r n< < , then there are unit roots in the 
system and linear combinations which are stationary. In other words, there 
are cointegrating relationships and time series in level can be used in the 
estimation. 
n r−
r
r
Johansen and Juselius (1990) have provided two different test statistics that can be 
used for the hypothesis of the existence of r cointegrating vectors; the trace test and 
the maximum eigenvalue test. The two statistics take the following forms; 
Trace Test; 
1
( ) ln(1 )
n
trace i
i r
r Tλ λ
= +
= − −∑  (3.8) 
The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is 
less than or equal to r against a general alternative. 
Maximum Eigenvalue Test; max 1( , 1) ln(1 )rr r Tλ λ ++ = − −  (3.9) 
The maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis that the number of 
cointegrating vectors is exactly equal to r against the alternative of r+1 cointegrating 
vectors. 
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As stated earlier, since ARDL presumes the existence of a unique long-run 
relationship, the JJ analysis seems to be the most appropriate approach because it is 
able to test for the number of cointegrating relationships among a set of non-
stationary variables. However, if the number of cointegrating vector is larger than 
one, we have to impose different identification restrictions on each of the vector in 
order to interpret them economically. In this study, the investigation of long-run 
equilibrium relationship is conducted by means of the Johansen and Juselius method 
of cointegration test. 
c) Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model 
In this study, an ARDL(p,q) model for imports (exports) is constructed in order to 
estimate a dynamic relationship for Thailand’s import (export) demand. The standard 
model can be written as; 
0 1 2
0 0 0
ln ln ln ln
p q q
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
Imports; M M Y RPM uα α α α− − −
= = =
+ + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (3.10) =
Exports; 0 1 2
0 0 0
ln ln ln ln
p q q
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
X X W RPXβ β β β− −
= = =
u−= + + +∑ ∑ ∑ +
i t
 (3.11) 
And the augmented import (export) can be written as;  
Imports; 
0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0
ln ln ln ln ln
p q q q
t i t i i t i i t i i t
i i i i
M M Y RPM TT uα α α α α− − −
= = = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ −
 (3.12)
 
Exports; 
0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0
ln ln ln ln ln
p q q q
t i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i
X X W RPX TW uβ β β β β− − −
= = = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ −
 (3.13) 
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d) Error-Correction Model (ECM) 
The concepts of vector autoregression (VAR) model, error correction models, and 
cointegration are closely related in time series analysis and often used together to 
characterize the relationships between the series being studied. In essence, it can be 
shown that, with re-parameterization, the error-correction model is a standard VAR in 
first differences augmented by error-correction terms. Moreover, according to the 
Granger Representation theorem, a vector error correction (VEC) represents for a set 
of variables that are integrated of order one I(1), and implies cointegration among 
variables and vice versa (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
An Error-Correction Mechanism (ECM) model is a way of combining the long run, 
cointegrating relationship between the levels variables and the short-run relationship 
between the first differences of the variables. The principle behind the error-
correction model is that there often exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between 
two economic variables. In the short run, however, there may be disequilibrium. With 
the error-correction mechanism, a proportion of the disequilibrium is corrected in the 
next period. The error-correction process is thus a means to reconcile short-run and 
long-run behaviour. 
Consider the following bivariate model; 
0 1 1
1 1
n n
t i t i i t i t t
i i
Y Y X Zβ α β δ ε− − −
= =
Δ = + Δ + Δ + +∑ ∑
i
 (3.14) 
In the error-correction model, the right-hand side contains the short-run dynamic 
coefficients (i.e., 1,iα β ) as well as the long-run coefficient (i.e., δ ). The long-run 
coefficient δ is expected to be negative and significant, and, less than one (in absolute 
value), which is required for the error to bring the system back to the equilibrium. The 
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absolute value of δ decides how quickly the equilibrium is restored. Before 
performing ECM, we also perform weak exogeneity test. Details are shown in the 
next section.  
In summary, the estimation of the demand for imports and exports in Thailand is 
made up of five steps: 
1. Detect the order of integration of the variables comprising our dataset using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. 
2. Run OLS static regression (Engle-Granger approach) and then apply ADF test 
on the estimated error term in order to test for cointegration (We also provide 
Johansen’s Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) approach for 
comparison purpose). 
3. Estimate Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models for imports 
(equation (3.10) and (3.12)) and exports (equation (3.11) and (3.13)). 
4. Test for the weak exogeneity for variables used in the study. 
5. Investigate the dynamic behaviour by 
5.1 Apply Engle and Granger procedure to obtain restricted Error Correction 
Mechanism (ECM) models. 
Estimate unrestricted Error-Correction Mechanism (ECM) models based on the 
previous ARDL(p,q). 
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3.5. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we use the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model to estimate a 
dynamic relationship for Thailand’s import and export demand and to investigate the 
impact of trade liberalization on imports and exports. The analysis employs annual 
data for the period 1960-2007. 
3.5.1. Import Demand 
3.5.1.1. The Analysis of the Long-run Total Import Demand 
1) Stationary Test: Unit Root Analysis 
We start the investigation of import demand by evaluating the time series properties 
of the variables. To this end, we first establish the variables’ orders of integration. 
Briefly stated, a variable is integrated of order d, written I(d), if it requires 
differencing d times before it achieves stationary. To test for the integration properties 
of the variables concerned, we employ standard unit root tests by applying two 
asymptotically equivalent tests: the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test. Our observed time series include aggregate import volume 
( )M , real domestic GDP ( , relative import prices ()Y / )RPM PM PD= , and 
Thailand’s average tariff rates ( . All variables have been transformed by taking 
natural logarithms. The results from these tests for each variable are provided in the 
table below can be seen that the ADF and PP tests suggest that each variable is non-
stationary when expressed in levels. 
)TT
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Table 3.2: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests for Stationarity (Import Model) 
 Test for I(0) Test for I(1) 
ln(M) ln(Y) ln(RPM) ln(TT) Δln(M) Δln(Y) Δln(RPM) Δln(TT) 
ADF   
without trend -1.00 -1.61 -2.48 -0.16 -5.35 -3.86 -4.49 -7.02 
with trend -2.84 -1.62 -2.46 -1.29 -5.34 -4.15 -4.44 -5.88 
PP   
without trend -1.00 -1.68 -1.92 -0.03 -5.19 -3.92 -4.28 -7.04 
with trend -2.35 -1.04 -1.92 -1.12 -5.22 -4.15 -4.22 -7.11 
Note: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test assumes that the series follows an AR(p) process and adding 
p lagged difference terms of the dependent variable to the right-hand side of the test regression: 
y
y
 
1 1 1 2 2 . . .t t t t t p t pd y y x d y d y d y tα δ β β β υ− − −′= + + + + + +−  
The test reported is a t-ratio which it is used to test the null hypothesis that the variable employed in the study has a 
unit root. 95% critical values are -2.93 (for the case without trend) and -3.51 (for the case with trend). 
 The Phillips-Perron (PP) test modifies the t-ratio of the α coefficient so that serial correlation does not 
affect asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. The PP test is based on the statistic: 
 
1 / 2
0 0 0
1 / 2
0 0
ˆ( ) ( (
2
T f s et t
f f sα α
) )γ γ α⎛ ⎞ −= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
%  
Testing the same null hypothesis that the series are not stationary, 95% critical values are also the same as those 
for ADF test. 
Source; Eviews 6 
From Table 3.2, the tests indicate that the variables under consideration are stationary 
in their first differences. From the results we conclude that the variables are integrated 
of order 1. 
If the time series are non-stationary in their levels, they are integrated with integration 
of order 1, when their first differences are stationary. These variables can also be 
cointegrated if there are one or more linear combinations among the variables that are 
stationary. If these variables are cointegrated, then there is a constant long-run linear 
relationship among them. In the next section, a formal test of cointegration is 
performed following the Engle-Granger method and the Johansen (1988) and 
Johansen-Juselius (1990) maximum likelihood technique. Both approaches are 
applied to investigate whether there is a long-run stationary steady state between 
Thailand’s real imports, real GDP, and relative import prices. Besides these main 
determinants, Thailand’s average tariff rates series is included as an additional 
determinant for import demand. 
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2) Cointegration Analysis 
Since it has been determined that the variables are integrated of order 1, cointegration 
analysis is performed. In this section, the cointegration test, using the two-step 
estimation suggested by Engle and Granger, is employed. In the first step, the OLS 
regression is performed in order to obtain the long-run equilibrium relationship 
among variables of interest. In this step, the standard import model is estimated by 
regressing the volume of import on real GDP and relative import price. Then, the 
augmented import model, which includes Thailand’s average rate as an independent 
variable, is estimated. The result is as follows; 
Standard Import Model 
ln 7.94 1.29ln 0.52 lnt t tM Y RPM= − + −  (3.15) 
            [-15.37   [6.10]         [-3.76] 
R2 = 0.98 SER = 0.13 DW = 0.63 
Cointegration Tests 
CRDW; 0.511, 0.386, 0.322 (1, 5 and 10 percent critical values) 
ADF = -2.90 [-1.95] PP = -2.94 [-1.95] 
where the numbers in parentheses below the estimated parameters are t statistics. 
From the cointegrating equation shown above, an economic interpretation of the 
results can be presented as follows; the long-run income elasticity of demand for 
imports is quite high (one percent increase in GDP increases imports by 1.29 percent), 
while the long-run price elasticity of demand for imports is rather low (one percent 
decrease in relative import price increases imports by only 0.52 percent). 
In the second step, we test whether the residuals obtained from equation (3.15) are 
I(0). If it appears that the series of residuals obtained in the first step is stationary, it 
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can be included as the error-correction term in the estimation of the short-run 
dynamics of imports in the ECM model. First, we employ the ADF test to check the 
stationary of residuals. The result shows that the t-statistic is -2.90, while the 95% 
critical value for the test is -1.95. We are then inclined to reject the null hypothesis of 
unit root in the residuals at 5% significance level. The PP test also supports the result 
obtained from the ADF test. The test statistic is equal to -2.94, which is greater than 
the PP (-1.95) in absolute value at 5% critical level. Both results obtained from the 
ADF and PP tests infer about cointegration between variables. 
Next, we perform the Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test as 
Gujarati (2003) suggested. The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root in the 
residuals. The DW statistic obtained from equation (3.15) is 0.63 which is greater than 
the critical values (0.511, 0.386, 0.322 for 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively), and thus we can reject the hypothesis that the residuals are non-
stationary and confirm the hypothesis of cointegration. 
Now, we include Thailand’s average tariff rate as our liberalization measure. The 
results are presented as follows; 
Augmented Import Model 
ln 5.67 1.22ln 0.39ln 0.17 lnt t t tM Y RPM= − + − − TT  (3.16) 
            [-5.43]     [35.03]       [-2.74]            [-2.47] 
R2 = 0.98 SER = 0.13 DW = 0.61 
Cointegration Tests 
CRDW; 0.511, 0.386, 0.322 (1, 5 and 10 percent critical values) 
ADF = -2.87 [-1.95] PP = -2.95 [-1.95] 
where the numbers in parentheses below the estimated parameters are t statistics. 
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The income and price elasticities in the augmented import model are similar to those 
found in standard model. The long-run income elasticity is higher than unity (1.22), 
while the long-run price elasticity is low (-0.39). Imports also do not highly respond 
to changes in the country’s average tariff rate since one percent decrease in Thailand’s 
average tariff rate is associated with only 0.17 percent increase in imports. 
We then perform the unit root test for the series of residuals obtained from equation 
(3.16). The ADF test shows that the t-statistic is -2.87, which is over than the ADF 
95% critical value (-1.95). Likewise, the t-statistic obtained from the PP test is -2.95, 
higher than the PP (-1.95) at 5% critical level. The CRDW test also points out in the 
same way. The DW statistic obtained from equation (3.16) is 0.61 which is greater 
than the critical values (0.511, 0.386, 0.322 for 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance respectively). Thus, we can then reject the null hypothesis of unit root in 
the residuals at 5% significance level and it can be concluded that there is 
cointegration between variables. 
Another test for cointegration, Johansen-Jusellius (JJ) method, also known as Full-
Information Maximum Likelihood Approach: FIML Estimation, is conducted to 
determine whether any combinations of the variables are cointegrated. The approach 
is essentially a vector autoregression based test, treating all variables as potentially 
endogenous. The test is also capable of identifying multiple cointegrating vectors. 
Accordingly, it overcomes the inherent weaknesses of the traditional two-step Engle-
Granger test. Before undertaking the cointegration test, we first specify the relevant 
order of lags (p) of the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. The lag order is 
determined using the Schwarz criterion. By doing this, we find that the optimum lag 
length is equal to 1. 
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After the optimum lag length is found, we now can perform the cointegration test. 
According to Johansen and Juselius (1990), there are two statistics testing the number 
of cointegrating relations. The first method is based on the maximum eigenvalue, and 
thus it is called maximum eigenvalue test. The second test statistic is based on 
likelihood ratio test about the trace of matrix, and hence it is called the trace test. 
Table 3.3 reports the results of these tests. 
Table 3.3: Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: Standard Import 
Model 
  Tests 
  Maximal eigenvalues Eigenvalue Trace 
Null Alternative Statistics 95% critical 
value 
Statistics 95% critical 
value 
0r =  1r =  25.91 21.13 34.62 29.80 
1r ≤  2r =  16.04 18.73 19.48 22.14 
2r ≤  3r =  5.86 14.26 8.71 15.49 
3r ≤  4r =  3.63 9.18 5.92 10.57 
4r ≤  5r =  2.85 3.84 2.85 3.84 
Note: r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. 
Table 3.4: Cointegration Vector: Standard Import Model 
Cointegration vector: 
ln(M) ln(Y) ln(RPM) 
-1.00 1.31 -0.61 
 [3.28] [-4.42] 
Note:   t ratio is shown in parentheses [  ] 
For the standard import model, the results indicate the presence of a unique 
integrating vector (the cointegration vector is reported in Table 3.4). The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration (r = 0) is rejected at the 5 percent significance level 
while the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector cannot be rejected. 
Similarly, when we add Thailand’s average tariff rates, both maximal eigenvalue and 
trace statistics at the 5 percent significance level indicate the presence of a unique 
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cointegrating vector. Results of the test are reported in Table 3.5 and the cointegration 
vector is reported in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.5: Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: Augmented 
Import Model by Including Thailand’s Average Tariff Rates 
  Tests 
  Maximal eigenvalues Eigenvalue Trace 
Null Alternative Statistics 95% critical 
value 
Statistics 95% critical 
value 
0r =  1r =  31.90 28.59 58.91 54.08 
1r ≤  2r =  18.05 22.30 27.01 35.19 
2r ≤  3r =  15.16 18.14 21.48 27.83 
3r ≤  4r =  6.28 15.89 8.96 20.26 
4r ≤  5r =  2.68 9.16 2.68 9.16 
Note: r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. 
Table 3.6: Cointegration Vector: Augmented Import Model by Including Thailand’s 
Average Tariff Rates 
Cointegration vector: 
ln(M) ln(Y) ln(RPM) ln(TT) 
-1.00 1.25 -0.50 -0.18 
 [2.50] [-3.16] [-1.96] 
Note:   t ratio is shown in parentheses [  ] 
It is worth noting that the coefficients estimated obtained from the JJ method are very 
similar to those obtained from the two-step EG method. In addition, our estimated 
long-run income and price elasticities are consistent with those often found in other 
studies which concentrate on developing countries.10 Those results usually present 
income elastic and price inelastic.  
 
 
                                                            
10 See Sinha (1997) for example 
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3) Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model 
The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model has been a widely used model for 
estimating demand relationships in a time-series context. In an import model, the level 
of imports is explained by lags of itself and current and lagged values of a number of 
explanatory variables (income, relative import prices, openness, tariffs, etc.), and 
hence the ADRL model has an appealing separation of short- and long-run effects. 
For ARDL model, it is assumed the existence of a unique long-run relationship among 
variables. Cointegration analysis can be used to establish the existence of such a 
relationship. The JJ analysis seems to be particularly well-suited in this respect since 
it makes it possible to test for the number of cointegrating relationships among a set 
of non-stationary variables. However, if the number of cointegrating vectors is larger 
than one, the ARDL approach will be failed because it can only estimate one long-run 
relationship and it might be that the estimated relationship is a linear combination of 
the true underlying relationships. Thus, the ARDL approach is considered as a 
supplement to the cointegration approach which is useful when it has been established 
that there is only one long-run relationship among the considered variables.  
In this section, we use the ARDL approach to estimate a dynamic relationship for 
Thailand’s import demand 1960-2007. As shown above, ADF and PP tests confirm 
that I(1) hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% level of significance. Then, the JJ test for 
the number of cointegrating relationships among variables indicates the presence of a 
unique long-run relationship. Thus we can now proceed to estimate the ARDL model. 
In estimating the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand’s import 
demand, we pick the lag-lengths (p,q) using the Schwarz’s criterion. This results for 
the lag length are (1,1) which is reasonable since we are dealing with annual data. 
Thus, the ARDL model for Thailand’s import demand can be presented as follow; 
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0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5 1ln ln ln ln ln lnt t t t t t tM M Y Y RPM RPM uα α α α α α− −= + + + + + +−  (3.17) 
The estimated model is shown is Table 3.7: 
Table 3.7: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; Standard Import 
Model 
Estimated Model 
1 1ln 2.77 0.71ln 2.41ln 2.02 ln 0.19 ln 0.07 lnt t t t t 1tM M Y Y RPM RPM− − −= − + + − − −  
                                         [-3.41]        [7.54]             [6.39]           [-5.01]               [-0.91]                    [-0.31]   
Long-run Solution 
* *ln 9.47 1.34 ln 0.86 lnt t
*
tM Y R= − + − PM  
 
2 0.99R =  SER = 0.08  JB NORM = 4.22 HET F(6,40); 2.04 
Adjusted  2 0.99R = DW = 1.94  ARCH F(1,44); 2.23 RESET F(1,42); 1.87 
Note: Figures in parentheses below coefficient estimates are t values. SER is the standard error of the regression. 
JB NORM is the Jarque-Bera statistic for testing normality. HET is the White’s test for heteroscedasticity. ARCH 
is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. RESET is Regression 
Specification Error Test, proposed by Ramsey (1969) for testing functional form misspecification. 
From the estimated model, we can obtain an estimate for the adjustment coefficient 
( )λ by using the fact that 1 1α λ= − . So, we have that 1-0.707809 = 0.292. This tells 
us that a 100% deviation from equilibrium will be corrected by an adjustment of 
29.2% each year. The coefficients of lnYt and lnRPMt in Table 3.7 represent the 
short-run income and price elasticities, respectively. The short-run income elasticity is 
2.41 and the short-run price elasticity is -0.19. Because of the non-stationarity in the 
independent variables, inference based on the standard errors is not valid. However, 
the results of this model can be rearranged in order to derive long-run elasticities by 
using the following equation. 
* *0 2 3 4 5( ) ( )ln ln lnt t
*
tM Y RPM
α α α α α
λ λ λ
+ += + +  (3.18) 
where 2 3( )α α λ+  = long-run elasticity of imports with respect to income and 
  4 5( )α α λ+  = long-run elasticity of imports with respect to relative import 
price 
So, we have the long-run solution as appeared in Table 3.7. 
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We also estimate the autoregressive distributed lag model for augmented import 
model which now includes Thailand’s average tariff rates as a liberalization measure. 
Again, by using the Schwarz’s criterion, we find that the optimum lag using in the 
estimation is (1,1). The estimated model is as follow and the estimated results are 
reported in Table 3.8. 
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5 1
6 7 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln
t t t t t t
t t t
M M Y Y RPM RPM
TT TT u
α α α α α α
α α
− − −
−
= + + + + +
+ + +  (3.19) 
Table 3.8: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; Augmented Import 
Model 
Estimated Model 
1 1 1ln 2.39 0.70ln 2.21ln 1.82ln 0.11ln 0.08ln 0.23ln 0.21lnt t t t t t t 1tM M Y Y RPM RPM TT TT− − −= − + + − − − − + −
                             [-2.75]      [7.39]               [5.81]           [-4.58]                [-0.53]                [-0.40]                  [-2.51]            [2.18] 
Long-run Solution 
* * *ln 7.96 1.28 ln 0.64 ln 0.07 lnt t t
*
tM Y RPM= − + − − TT  
 
2 0.99R =  SER = 0.08  JB NORM = 2.93 HET F(8,37); 1.69 
Adjusted  2 0.99R = DW = 2.21  ARCH F(1,44); 2.75 RESET F(1,41); 
1.12 
Note: Figures in parentheses below coefficient estimates are t values. SER is the standard error of the regression. 
JB NORM is the Jarque-Bera statistic for testing normality. HET is the White’s test for heteroscedasticity. ARCH 
is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. RESET is Regression 
Specification Error Test, proposed by Ramsey (1969) for testing functional form misspecification. 
After estimating the model, we can obtain an estimate for the adjustment coefficient 
( )λ which is equal to 0.30. In the augmented model, the short-run income elasticity is 
2.21 and the short-run price elasticity is -0.11. The short-run elasticity of imports with 
respect to tariff is -0.23. The long-run demand for import can be calculated as shown 
above in Table 3.8. 
4) Exogeneity; Import Demand Function 
One of the conditions necessary to perform inference in a single-equation framework 
is weak exogeneity of the cointegrating variables. Johansen (1992) shows that, under 
weak exogeneity, single-equation estimation remains efficient in a cointegrated 
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system, whereas if weak exogeneity fails, then system modelling is needed despite the 
super consistency of estimators in I(1) processes.11 In some cases, the failure of weak 
exogeneity can lead to a large loss of efficiency.12 Thus, testing for weak exogeneity 
is as important in non-stationary cointegrated systems as it is in stationary cases.13 
According to Harbo, Johansen, Nielsen, and Rahbek (1998), weak exogeneity can be 
tested by estimating the conditional model with assumed exogeneity and inserting the 
estimated cointegrating vectors back into the marginal model. Weak exogeneity is 
established by statistical insignificance of the cointegrating vectors in the marginal 
model. More specifically, weak exogeneity of Thailand’s real income, relative import 
price, and Thailand’s average tariff rates will be accepted if the error-correction term 
of conditional model for import demand is statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, we start by specify three autoregressive marginal models for domestic 
income , relative import price ( ln )YΔ ( ln )RPMΔ , and Thailand’s average tariff rates 
. In order to obtain well specified marginal processes, an appropriate dummy 
variable is added into each model, including 1) in marginal model for , 
dum1997 for taking into account the Asian financial crisis in 1997; 2) in marginal 
model for , dum1973 for taking into account the oil price shock in 1973 
and; 3) in marginal model for 
( lnTTΔ )
lnΔ
lnYΔ
RPM
lnTTΔ , dum1992 for taking into account the 
membership of AFTA and the WTO membership which Thailand joined since 1992 
and 1995, respectively. The value of the dummies is 1 for the observations indicated 
by their names and 0 elsewhere. Then, we add the error-correction term 
1 3 lnt t 1 5 ln 1t 7 1ln )t(ln M Y RPM TTα α α −+− −− + − into the marginal models of real 
                                                            
11 See Philips (1990), and Philips and Loretan (1991) for example. 
12 See Hendry and Mizon (1991) for example. 
13 See Ericsson (1992) 
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income, relative prices, and average tariff rates, and re-estimate them to investigate 
the significance of the error-correction term. We also provide various diagnostic tests 
and these tests uniformly suggest that, in all case, marginal models for , 
, and do not suffer from problems of non-normality, serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity, and mis-specification. The results are reported below: 
lnYΔ
ln RPMΔ
lnYΔ =
2 0.39R =
lnTTΔ
lnYΔ
0.28 lnt tY+ Δ
Marginal model for augmented by the error-correction term 
1 10.13 0.06 1997 0.04dum ecm− −− − − t  
             [-1.84]     [1.95]              [-2.97]            [-1.55] 
 0.03SER =  1.82DW =  
; 0= .73NORM JB  ; (1, 43) 2.54ARCH F =   ; (5, 40) 0.79HET F =
; (RESET F
ln
1, 41) = 0.20
lnΔ
0.35
 
Marginal model for augmented by the error-correction term RPM
RPM 1 10.20 ln 0.15 1973 0.04t t tRPM dum ecm− −Δ = Δ + −  − +
                     [-1.79]        [2.92]                   [3.86]           [-1.45] 
 0.05SER =  1.92DW =  2 0.38R =
; 0= .78NORM JB  ; (1, 43) 2.57ARCH F =   ; (5, 40) 0.HET F = 68
; (RESET F
lnTTΔ =
2 0.39R =
1, 41) = 0.09
lnTTΔ
0.33 lnTT− Δ
 
Marginal model for augmented by the error-correction term 
1 10.26 0.45 1992 0.06t t dum ecm− −− + t  
               [1.92]      [-2.47]              [-5.16]           [1.04] 
 0.11SER =  1.95DW =  
; 1= .16NORM JB  ; (1, 43) 0.16ARCH F =   ; (5, 40) 0.HET F = 51
; (RESET F 1, 41) = 0.24  
It is clear from the results that the coefficient of the error-correction term is 
insignificant for all three models, confirming that Thailand’s real GDP, relative 
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import price, and Thailand’s average tariff rates can be considered as weakly 
exogenous. 
5) Dynamic Adjustment Estimates 
In this section, we determine how well the dynamic process which generates 
Thailand’s level of imports can be captured by a single-equation error-correction 
model (SEECM). From results presented above, the presence of a cointegrating vector 
together with the evidence of weak exogeneity suggest that we can use a single-
equation error-correction representation without the loss of either efficiency or the 
ability to perform proper inference.14 From our general ARDL model; 
Standard Import Model: 
0 1 2
0 0 0
ln ln ln ln
p q q
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
M Y RPM uα α α α− − −
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑
i t
M  
and Augmented Import Model: 
0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0
ln ln ln ln ln
p q q q
t i t i i t i i t i i t
i i i i
M M Y RPM TT uα α α α α− − −
= = = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ −
1t
 
By differencing the ARDL model and rewriting ARDL to ECM, a re-parameterization 
of the ARDL equation in the form of an error-correction model (SEECM) can be 
written as; 
Standard Import Model: 
*
1 1ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln [ln ln ]t t i t t t tM A L M B L Y C L RPM M Mϕ μ− −Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + − +−
                                                           
 
and Augmented Import Model: 
 
14 See Banerjee et al. (1986, 1993) 
102 
 
*
1 1 2
ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln
[ln ln ]
t t i t t
t t t
tM A L M B L Y C L RPM D L T
M Mϕ μ
−
− −
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ
+ − +
T
 
where A(L), B(L), C(L), and D(L) are finite polynomials, and Δ is the first difference 
operator. The findings of the unit root tests suggest us to transform all variables in the 
dynamic model by taking first differences of logarithms. The term * 1 1[ln ln ]t tM M− −−
or-correction term, that is the deviation of import demand from the 
long-run equilibrium. The SEECM can be estimated in two different ways; 
represents our err
1) By changing the error-correction term from the form  to  * 1 1[ln ln ]t tM M− −−
1 3 1 5 1[ln ln ln ]t t tM Y RPMα α− − −− +  for standard impo
7 1ln ]t
rt model and to 
1 3 1 5 1[ln ln lnt t tM Y RPM TTα α− − α −−− + +  for augmented import 
y using residuals from the estimated coint
model, 
and thus we obtain an unrestricted ECM. 
2) B egration vector as a measure of the 
A dummy variable (
equilibrium error and applying OLS to the resulting restricted model. 
LIB), which is equal to 1 from 1992, the year that Thailand 
embarked on its trade liberalization with membership of AFTA in 1992, is included in 
the augmented import model to take into account formal trade liberalization in 
Thailand. Our final results for both unrestricted ADRL model and restricted model 
applying the EG approach and the JJ Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) 
are reported in Table 3.9. 
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ln MΔTable 3.9: Error-Correction Model for Import Demand ( ) 
el Augmented Model 
(dummy) 
Variable Standard Model Augmented Mod
Unrestricted Restricted Restricted 
JJ 
Unrestricted Restricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted Restricted 
EG EG JJ EG JJ 
ln tY  Δ 2.41**(0.38) *** 7) 2.21(0.38) *  2.35(0.41) *  * 2.26*** (0.36) 2.31(0.3 ***  2.15*** (0.33) 2.13**(0.36) ***  2.37*** (0.39) 2.25**(0.42)
ln tRPMΔ  -0.19 (0.21) -0.10 (0.20) -0.21 (0.22) -0.11 (0.20) -0.08 (0.18) -0.15 (0.21) -0.09 (0.20) -0.12 (0.19) -0.17 (0.21) 
lnTTΔ  t    -0.23*** (0.09) -0.26*** (0.09) -0.22** (0.09) -0.19* (0.10) -0.22** (0.09) -0.20* (0.10) 
1tecm −  
 -0.30*** ** ** *  * 
(0.09) 
-0.31*
(0.12) 
 -0.30*
(0.09) 
-0.28*
(0.11) 
 -0.32***
(0.09) 
-0.28*
(0.11) 
1ln tM −  
-0.29*** 
(0.09) 
*   -0.30*** 
(0.09) 
  -0.34**
(0.10) 
  
1ln tY −  
0.39*** 
(0.12) 
39*** 
(0.12) 
42*** 
(0.12) 
  0.   0.   
1ln tRPM −  
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
  -0.19* 
(0.10) 
  -0.17* 
(0.10) 
  
1ln tTT −  
   -0.02 
(0.05) 
  -0.01 
(0.05) 
  
tLIB  
      0.06 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
02 
(0.03) 
0.
Constant .77*** 
(0.81) 
.06** 
(0.03) 
.06*** 
(0.03) 
** .06*** 
(0.02) 
.06** 
(0.03) 
** .09*** 
(0.03) 
.07** 
(0.03) 
 -2 -0 -0 -2.39*
(0.87) 
-0 -0 -2.31*
(0.87) 
-0 -0
2R  0.59 57 54 0.65 64 0.60 0. 0. 0. 0.65 0.65 0.60 
2R  0.54 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.55 
SER  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
DW  1.94 1.84 2.34 2.22 2.17 2.25 2.18 2.18 2.16 
NORM  JB = 1.14 JB = JB = JB = 2.93 JB = JB = JB = 2.53 JB = JB = 1.22 2.00 2.16 0.01 2.28 0.10 
ARCH  F(1,44) =3.18 
 
  
 
  
 
  
F(1,44) 
= 2.07
F(1,42) 
= 3.34
F(1,44) =
2.75 
F(1,44) 
= 2.31
F(1,42) 
= 1.75
F(1,44) =
2.19 
F(1,44) 
= 2.37
F(1,42) 
= 1.58
HET  F(10,36) = 2.10 
F(6,40
= 1.89
) 
 
) 
 
) 
 
) 
 
) 
 
) 
 
F(6,38
= 0.80
F(14,32) = 
3.93 
F(8,38
= 3.14
F(8,36
= 1.05
F(15,31) = 
3.63 
F(9,37
= 2.45
F(9,35
= 1.01
RESET  F(1,40) = 0.61 
F(1,42) 
= 0.71 
F(1,40) 
= 0.45 
F(1,38) = 
0.44 
F(1,41) 
= 1.04 
F(1,39) 
= 0.01 
F(1,37) = 
0.45 
F(1,40) 
= 1.16 
F(1,38) 
= 0.01 
Note: he aster  (  in tat i t , 5  an  
respect ely. 
Figures in rent w ent es rd
 by Ramsey (1969) for testing 
similar. Although we interpret our results based on comparison purpose, we focus our 
2
higher than those of the general unrestricted autoregressive model (in fact, SER of the 
T
iv
isks (***), **), (*) dicate s istical sign ficance a the 10% %, and 1% signific ce level,
 pa heses belo coeffici estimat  are standa  errors. 
SER is the standard error of the regression. DW is the Durbin-Watson Statistic. NORM is the Jarque-Bera statistic 
for testing normality. ARCH is the test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. HET is the White’s test 
for heteroscedasticity. RESET is Regression Specification Error Test, proposed
functional form misspecification. 
From Table 3.9, the results of the two models (unrestricted and restricted) are very 
economic interpretation on the restricted SEECM using EG approach, since this 
model is more preferable on the ground of goodness-of-fit criteria. First, considering 
both the standard and augmented import model, the R  value can be considered good 
(0.59 to 0.65). The estimated standard error of regression, in all cases (0.08) are not 
restricted model is slightly lower than that of unrestricted model when working to a 
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number of decimal places), suggesting the validity of the parameter-reduction process. 
All the diagnostic tests confirm the appropriateness of the specification which suggest 
to us that all import demand models are appropriately set. 
In both standard and augmented models, the coefficient of the error-correction term, 
which reflects the impact of having 1ln tM −  out of the long-run equilibrium, appears 
highly significant at 1% level and e correct (negative) sign, suggesting the 
significance of the speed of adjustment in response to a deviation from the long run 
equilibrium. The error-correction coefficient of standard model, estimated at -0.30, is 
almost equal to that of augmented models (-0.32 for augmented model with dummy). 
This shows a slow speed of convergence to equilibrium, which is accounted 
approximately 30% each year. 
Next, considering the short-run incom
has th
e elasticity, this estimate for both the standard 
coefficient of the 
and the augmented models is larger than the long-run elasticity (+2.26 for standard 
model, +2.15 for augmented model without liberalization dummy, and +2.37 for 
augmented with liberalization dummy), suggesting that the income change has a 
potentially comtemporaneous effect on the change of the volume of imports. The size 
of the coefficients shows a large and immediate impact of a change in GDP on import 
demand. However, the price elasticity does not appear to be significant in the short-
run, though it is significant in the long run and has an expected sign. 
Considering the measures of trade liberalization, on one hand, the 
average tariff rates is significant with an expected sign, implying that the effect of 
change in tariff rates on the volume of imports is negative. The estimated coefficient 
indicates that a 1 percent change in tariff rates leads to approximately 0.2 percent 
change in the level of imports. It is also found that the short-run elasticity is larger 
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than that of the long run. On the other hand, trade liberalization dummy appears to be 
insignificant both in standard and augmented models. 
The insignificance of relative import price elasticity must be carefully taken care of. 
 import to export demand. Again, we first 
As mentioned in Carone (1996), this may be due to the measurement errors in the data 
coming from the method of calculation of our import price, in which we use the 
import unit value index as a proxy for import price. Carone (1996) has suggested that 
it could possibly lead the estimated coefficient to be biased toward zero. Another 
explanation is on the downward bias which could possibly have arisen from the use of 
a domestic price index. This is because this index is composed of both tradable and 
non-tradable goods. However, these two indices are the only close approximations for 
the calculation of relative import prices now available over a long period of time.  
3.5.2. Export Demand 
3.5.2.1. The Analysis of the Long-run Total Export Demand 
1) Stationary Test: Unit Root Analysis 
Now, we turn our investigation from
conduct tests for the time series properties of the variables concerned. Like for import 
demand, we employ standard unit root tests by applying two asymptotically 
equivalent tests: the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test. Our observed time series include aggregate export volume ( )X , world GDP ( )W
, relative export price ( / )RPX PX PW= , and world’s average tariff rates ( )TW . All 
rithms. The results from these tests for 
each variable are provided in the table below and can be seen that the ADF and PP 
variables have been converted to natural loga
tests suggest non-stationarity of each variable when expressed in levels. 
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Table 3.10: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests for Stationarity (Export Model) 
 Test for I(0) Test for I(1) 
ln(X) ln(W) ln(RPX) ln(TW) Δln(X) Δln(W) Δln(RPX) Δln(TW) 
ADF   
without trend -0.59 -2.49 -2.01 0.60 -6.81 -3.73 -6.72 -5.69 
with trend -1.60 -3.05 -2.22 -1.39 -6.73 -4.39 -6.71 -5.58 
PP   
without trend -0.59 -2.  1.04 -6.81 -3.6  -5.62 51 -1.90 6 -8.70
with trend -1.65 -2.89 -2.21 -1.42 -6.73 -4.29 -11.06 -5.76 
 
e  th ts te t the variables under consideration are 
ationary in their first differences. From the results we conclude that the variables are 
ined that the examined variables are integrated of order 1, 
erformed. First, the cointegration test using the two-step 
estimation, suggested by Engle and Granger, is employed. The results of the OLS 
ln 19.24 1.82ln 0.52lnt t t
From Tabl 3.10, e tes indica hat 
st
integrated of order 1. 
2) Cointegration Analysis 
Since it has been determ
cointegration analysis is p
regression are shown below: 
Standard Export Model 
X W RPX= − + −  (3.20) 
]        [-5.24] 
R2 = 0.99 SER = 0.10 DW = 0.96 
Cointegration Tests 
CRDW; 0.511, 0.386, 0.322 (1, 5 and 10 percent critical values) 
ADF = -2.72 [-1.95] PP = -2.72 [-1.95] 
From the cointegrating equation shown above, an economic interpretation of the 
results can be presented as follows; the long-run income elasticity of demand for 
exports is high (one percent increase in world’s GDP increases exports by 1.82 
            [-18.99]     [32.26
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percent), while the long-run price elasticity of demand for exports is rather low (one 
percent decrease in relative export price increases exports by only 0.52 percent). 
I(0). If it appears that the residuals obtained in the first step is stationary, they can be 
included as error-correction term in the estimation of the short-run dynami
In the second step, we test whether the residuals obtained from equation (3.20) are 
cs of 
Next, we perform the Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test as 
 equation (3.20) is 0.96 which is greater than 
 
exports in ECM model. First, we employ the ADF test to check the stationary of 
residuals. The result shows that the t-statistic is -2.72, while the 95% critical value for 
the test is -1.95. We are then inclined to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the 
residuals at the 5% significance level. The PP test also supports the result obtained 
from the ADF test. The test statistic is equal to -2.72, which is greater than the PP (-
1.95) at 5% critical level. Both results obtained from the ADF and PP tests infer about 
cointegration between variables. 
Gujarati (2003) suggested. The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root in the 
residuals. The DW statistic obtained from
the critical values (0.511, 0.386, 0.322 for 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively), and thus we can reject the hypothesis that the residuals are non-
stationary and confirm the hypothesis of cointegration. 
Now, we include world’s average tariff rate as our liberalization measure. The results 
are presented as follows; 
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Augmented Import Model 
t5.99 1.31ln 0.20ln 0.62lnt t tX W RPX= − + − −ln TW  (3.21) 
   [-2.28]           [-6.20] 
R2 = 0.99 SER = 0.10 DW = 1.14 
Cointegration Tests 
itical values) 
-1.95] 
ce elasticities in augmented export model are lower than those 
er than unity (1.31), 
ice elasticity is quite low (-0.20). Exports moderately respond to 
95% critical value (-1.95). Likewise, the t statistic obtained from the PP test is -2.98, 
rated. Before carrying out the 
cointegration test, we first specify the relevant order of lags (p) of the Vector 
            [-2.64]   [14.16]      
CRDW; 0.511, 0.386, 0.322 (1, 5 and 10 percent cr
ADF = -2.98 [-1.95] PP = -2.98 [
The income and pri
found in standard model. The long-run income elasticity is high
while the long-run pr
changes in the world’s average tariff rate since a one percent decrease in world’s 
average tariff rate is associated with only 0.62 percent increase in exports. 
We then perform the unit root test for the series of residuals obtained from equation 
(3.21). The ADF test shows that the t-statistic is -2.98, which is over than the ADF 
lower than the PP (-1.95) at 5% critical level. The CRDW test also points out in the 
same way. The DW statistic obtained from equation (3.21) is 1.14 which is greater 
than the critical values (0.511, 0.386, 0.322 for 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance respectively). Thus, we can then reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in the residuals at the 5% significance level and it can be concluded that there is 
cointegration between variables. 
Next, the cointegration test using the JJ method is undertaken to determine whether 
any combinations of the variables are cointeg
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Autoregression (VAR) model. The lag order is determined using the Schwarz 
criterion. By doing this, we find that the optimum lag length is equal to 1. 
According to Johansen and Juselius (1990), there are two tests for the number of 
cointegrating relations; the maximum eigenvalue and the trace test. Table 3.11 an
After the optimum lag length is found, we now can perform the cointegration test. 
d 
  Tests 
3.13 report the results of these tests for cointegrating relationship between variables. 
The results indicate that there exists only one cointegrating relationship, both for the 
standard and the augmented export models and the cointegration vectors are presented 
in Table 3.12 and 3.14, respectively. 
Table 3.11: Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: Standard Export 
Model 
  Maximal eigenvalues Eigenvalue Trace 
Null Alternative Statistics 95% critical 
value 
Statistics 95% critical 
value 
0  29.84 21.13 42.16 29.80 r = 1r =  
1r ≤  2r =  10.41 14.26 12.32 15.49 
2r ≤  3r =  0.04 1.91 1.91 3.84 
Note: denotes the numb  of cointegrati
Table 3.12: Cointegration Vector: S
Coi n vec
r er ng vectors. 
tandard Export Model 
ntegratio tor: 
ln(X) ) ln(W ln(RPX) 
-1.00 1.77 -0.52 
 [4.77] [-2.81] 
Note: t ratio is shown in parentheses [  ]
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Table 3.13: Johansen Tests for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors: Augmented 
Export Model by Including the World’s Average Tariff Rates 
  Tests 
  Maximal eigenvalues Eigenvalue Trace 
Null Alternative Statistics 95% critical tics 95% critical 
value 
Statis
value 
0r =  1r  = 36.61 27.58 59.59 47.86 
1r ≤  2r =  13.88 21.13 22.98 29.80 
2r ≤  3r =  8.67 14.26 9.11 15.49 
3r ≤  4r =  0.44 3.84 0.43 3.84 
Note: r denotes the number of cointegratin  
Table 3.14: Cointegration Vector: Augmented rt Model cluding ’s 
tion vector: 
g vectors.
Expo  by In World
Average Tariff Rates 
Cointegra
ln(X) ln(W) ln(RPX) ln(TW) 
-1.00 1.34 -0.27 -0.71 
 [4.76] [-2.42] [-3.78] 
Note: s shown in p s [  ] 
cien ted obtained from the JJ method are very 
timate a dynamic relationship for 
of a unique long-run relationship. Thus we can now proceed to the estimation of the 
 t ratio i arenthese
Again, it is found that the coeffi ts estima
similar to those obtained from the two-step EG method. 
3) Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model 
In this section, we use the ARDL approach to es
Thailand’s export demand over the period 1960-2007. In the export model, the 
volume of exports is explained by lags of itself and the current and lagged values of a 
number of explanatory variables (world income, relative export prices, world tariffs), 
and hence the ADRL model has an appealing separation of short- and long-run 
effects. As shown above, the ADF and PP tests confirm that the I(1) hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for each variable at the 5% level of significance. Then, the JJ test 
for the number of cointegrating relationships among variables indicates the presence 
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ARDL model. In estimating the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand’s 
Import Demand, we pick the lag-lengths (p,q) using Schwarz’s criterion. This results 
in lag length equal to (1,1) which is reasonable since we are dealing with annual data. 
Thus, the ARDL model for Thailand’s import demand can be presented as follow; 
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5 1ln ln ln ln ln lnt t t t t t tX X W W RPX RPX uβ β β β β β− −= + + + + + +−  (3.22) 
The estimated model is shown is Table 3.15: 
Table 3.15: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; Standard Export 
Estimated Model 
Model 
1 1ln 3.82 0.80 ln 0.75 ln 0.39 ln 0.19 ln 0.09 lnt t t t t 1tX X W W RPX RPX− − −= − + + − − +  
                                       [-2.20]       [9.58]                 [2.45]            [-1.18]                [-1.82]                   [0.81]   
Long-run Solution 
* *ln 1 lnt t
*
t9.52 1.85 ln 0.55X W+ − R= −  PX
 
2 0.99R =  SER = 0.07 JB NORM = 1.75 HET F(10,36); 0.48 
Adjusted DW = 2. (1,44); 0.71 RESET F(1,40); 3.24 2 0.99R =  16 ARCH F
 
From the estimated model, we can obtain an dj estimate for the a ustment coefficient 
( ) by using the fact that 1 1β λ= −λ . So, we have that 1-0.804 = 0.196. This tells us 
eac  of lnXt 
that a 100% deviation from equilibrium will be corrected by an adjustment of 19.6% 
h year. The coefficients and lnRPXt in Table 3.15 represent the short-run 
income and price elasticities, respectively. The short-run income elasticity is 0.75 and 
the short-run price elasticity is -0.19. Because of the non-stationarity in the 
independent variables, inference based on the standard errors is not valid. However, 
the results of this model can be rearranged in order to derive long-run elasticities by 
using the following equation. 
* *0 2 3 4 5( ) ( )ln ln ln *tt tX W RPX
β β β β β
λ λ
+ += + + λ  (3.23) 
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where 2 3( )β β λ+  = long-run elasticity of exp
  
orts with respect to world income 
4 5( )β β λ+  = long-run elasticity of exports with respect to relative export 
the augmented export 
model which now includes world’s average tariff rates as a liberalization measure. 
Again, by using the Schwarz’s criterion, we find that the optimum lag using in the 
estimation is (1,1). The estimated model is as follow and the estimated results are 
reported in Table 3.16. 
1t
price 
So, we have the long-run solution as it appeared in Table 3.15. 
We also estimate the autoregressive distributed lag model for 
0 1 1ln lnt t 2 3 1 4 5
6 7 1
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
t t t
t t t
X X W W RPX RP
TW TW u
Xβ β −= + + β β β β
β β
−
−
+ + +
+ +
−  (3.24) 
Table 3.16: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model for Thailand; Augm
Model 
Estimated Model 
ented Export 
1 1 1ln 2.64 0.75 ln 0.66 ln 0.29 ln 0.18 ln 0.11ln 0.49 ln 0.41lnt t t t t t t 1tX X W W RPX RPX TW TW− − −= − + + − − + − + −
                           [-1.46]       [6.88]              [2.24]             [-0.94]                [-1.78]                 [1.13]                 [-2.93]              [2.46] 
Long-run Solution 
* * *ln 10.66 1.48 ln 0.25 ln 0.34 lnt t t
*
tX W RPX TW= − + − −  
 
2 SER = RM = 1.18 HET F(14,32)0.99R =  0.07 JB NO ; 0.81 
Adjusted DW = 2.03 ARCH F(1,44); 0.24 RESET F(1,38); 1.12 2 0.99R =   
 
After estimating the model, we can obtain an estimate for the adjustment coefficient 
( )λ which is equal to 0.25. In the augmented model, the short-run income elasticity is 
0.66 and the short-run price elasticity is -0.18. The short-run elasticity of exports with 
respect to tariff is -0.49. The long-run demand for import can be calculated as shown 
above in Table 3.16. 
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4) Exogeneity; Expo nd Function 
ee autoregressive marginal models for the 
rt Dema
Δ
Following the same step, we specify thr
world’s real income ( ln )W , relative export prices ( ln )RPXΔ , and world’s average 
tariff rate ( ln )TWΔ . We include a dummy variable arginal model and the 
detail is as f ) in marginal model for lnW
for each m
ollows; 1 Δ , dumREC for taking into account 
the world economic recession resulting from , when world economic 
growth was weak between 1973-1975; 2) in marginal model for ln RPXΔ , dum1973 
for taking into account the oil price shock in 1973 and; 3) in m odel for 
lnTWΔ , dumGATT for taking into account the two phases of GATT including 
 The error-correction term
1 3 1 5 1 7 1(ln ln ln ln )t t t tX W RPX TW
 the oil crisis
arginal m
Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round.15
β β β− − − −− + +  is again added into the marginal 
mode and world’s average tariff rate, and 
each model is re-estimated in order to investigate the significance of the error-
correction term. The test results are listed below; 
Marginal model for lnWΔ augmented by the erro
ls of world real income, relative export price, 
r-correction term 
               [-1.18]    [3.86]                 [-1.85)          [-1.33] 
1 1ln 0.13 0.51 0.01 0.01t t tW dumREC ecm− −Δ = − + − −  lnWΔ
2 0.35R =  0.01SER =  1.95DW =  
; 0.0NORM JB =  2 ; (1, 43) 0.01ARCH F =  ; (5, 40) 1.72HET F =  
; (1, 41) 0.05RESET F =  
 
                                                            
15 Tokyo Round is the final round in the second phase, starting from 1973 and covering for 74 months. 
This round focuses on the reduction tariff barriers. This round is considered as a major tariff reduction 
round since tariffs worth more than 300 billion US dollars were reduced between 1973 and 1979.  The 
third phase of GATT consists only of Uruguay Round which starts from 1986 to 1994. In this round, not 
only tariffs were continually reduced, but new areas such as textiles, clothing, and agricultural 
products were also included in trade negotiations. Intellectual property rights were also considered. 
After this round, the GATT becomes the WTO in 1995.   
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Marginal model for augmented by the error-correction term 
t
ln RPXΔ
1 1ln 1.14 0.45 ln 0.30 1973 0.11t tRPX RPX dum ecm− −Δ = − Δ + −  
                    [1.68]        [-2.45]               [6.65]          [-1.41] 
2 0.50R =  0.05SER =  1.83DW =  
; 0.5NORM JB =  6 ; (1, 42) 0.14ARCH F =  ; (5,39) 0.75HET F =  
; (1,39) 0.08RESET F =  
Marginal model for augmented by the error-correction term 
t
lnTWΔ
1 1ln 0.59 0.56 ln 0.58 0.05t tTW TW dumGATT ecm− −Δ = − − Δ − −  
                   [-0.40]      [-4.36]                  [-5.81]          [-0.38] 
2 0.45R =  0.11SER =  1.88DW =  
; 0.NORM JB =  41 ; (1, 42) 0.23ARCH F =  ; (5,39) 0.74HET F =  
; (1,39) 0.39RESET F =  
The results presenting above show that, for all marginal models, the coefficient on the 
error-correction term is insignificant. This is a strong evidence of weak exogeneity. 
Therefore, we can conclude that lnWΔ , ln RPXΔ , and lnTWΔ are weakly 
exogenous and it is possible to condition the short-run model on these variables. 
5) Dynamic Adjustment Estimates 
In this section, we determine how well the dynamic process which generates 
Thailand’s volume of exports can be captured by a single-equation error-correction 
together with the evidence of weak exogeneity suggest that we can construct a single-
model (SEECM). From results presented above, the presence of a cointegrating vector 
equation error-correction model. From our general ARDL model; 
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Standard Export Model: 
0 1 2
0 0 0
ln ln ln ln
p q q
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
X X W RPXβ β β β− −
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  u−
and Augmented Export Model: 
0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0
ln ln ln ln ln
p q q q
t i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i
X X W RPX TW uβ β β β β− − −
= = = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  −
l and rewriting ARDL to ECM, a re-parameterization 
of the ARDL equation in the form of an error-correction model (SEECM) can be 
written as; 
1t
By differencing the ARDL mode
Standard Export Model: 
ln tX A
*
1 1( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln [ln ln ]t i t t t tL X B L W C L RPX X Xϕ μ− −Δ + Δ + Δ + − +  Δ = −
odel: 
t
and Augmented Export M
*
1 1 2
ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln
[ln ln ]
t t i t t
t t t
X A L X B L W C L RPX D L TW
X Xϕ μ
−
− −
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ
+ − +  
where A(L), B(L), C(L), and D(L) are finite polynomials, and Δ is the first difference 
operator. The findings of the unit root tests indicate that transforming the variables by 
taking first differences of logarithms, we can use the statistical inference on the 
dynamic model. The term * 1 1[ln ln ]t tX X− −− represents our error-correction term, that 
1) By changing the error-correction term from the form 1 1[ln ln ]t tX X− −−  to 
1 3 1 5[ln ln lnt tX W
is the deviation of export demand from the long-run equilibrium. The SEECM can be 
estimated in two different ways; 
t
*
1]RPXβ β− − −− +  for standard export model and to 
116 
 
1 3 1 5 1 7 1[ln ln ln ln ]t t t tX W RPX TWβ β β− − − −− + +  for au  mod
 ECM. 
tion vector as a measure of the 
equilibrium error and applying OLS to the resulting restricted m
gmented export el, 
2) 
odel. 
A d  
the libe gmented 
and thus we obtain an unrestricted
By using residuals from the estimated cointegra
ummy variable (LIB), which is equal to 1 from 1992, the year that Thailand started
ralization process with membership of AFTA, is included in the au
export model to take into account formal trade liberalization in Thailand. Our final 
results for both unrestricted ADRL model and restricted model applying JJ Full-
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) are reported in Table 3.17. 
Table 3.17: Error-Correction Model for Export Demand ( ln XΔ ) 
Variable Standard Model Augmented Model Augmented Model 
(dummy) 
Unrestricted Restricted 
EG 
Restricted 
JJ 
Unrestricted Restricted 
EG 
Restricted 
JJ 
Unrestricted Restricted 
EG 
Restricted 
JJ 
ln tWΔ  0.75** (0.31) 0.73*** (0.29) 0.65** (0.29) 0.66** (0.29) 0.71*** (0.27) 0.57** (0.27) 0.58* (0.32) 0.55*** (0.16) 0.45* (0.25) 
ln tRPXΔ  -0.19* (0.11) 5* 8) -0.18*(0.10   -0.18*(0.10    -0.19* (0.10) -0.1(0.0  ) -0.18** (0.09) -0.14*(0.07)  ) -0.18* (0.09) -0.14*(0.08)
ln tTWΔ     -0.49*** -0.52*** -0.43*** -0.51*** -0.46*** (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) -0.55*** (0.16) (0.16) 
1tecm −  
 -0.  -0.1  -0.  -0.1  -0.  -0.120**
(0.08) 
5* 
(0.07) 
26**
(0.11) 
4* 
(0.07) 
24**
(0.11) 
3* 
(0.07) 
1ln tX −  
-0.20**  
(0.08) 
  -0.25**
(0.11) 
  -0.23* 
(0.12) 
  
1ln tW −  
0.36** 
(0.16) 
  0.37** 
(0.16) 
  -0.10 
(0.11) 
  
1ln tRPX −  
-0.11 
7) 
  
.07) .07) (0.0
-0.06 
(0
  -0.06 
(0
  
1ln tTW −  
 -0.09 -0.10   
(0.11) 
  
(0.11) 
  
tLIB  
      0.02 
2) 
0.02 
.02) 
0.03 
(0.05) (0.0 (0
Constant  0.06*** 
.02) 
0.06*** 
.02) 
0.04** 
.02) 
0.05** 
.02) 
0.05** 
2) 
0.06*** 
.02) 
-3.82**
(1.74) (0 (0
-2.64* 
(1.50) (0 (0
-2.36* 
(1.37) (0.0 (0
2R  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.37 
2R  0.13 17 0.13 28 25 28 24 0. 0.25 0. 0. 0.23 0. 0.
SER  0.07 07 0.07 0.07 06 07 0. 0. 0. 0.07 0.06 0.07 
DW  2.16 2.15 2.19 2.03 1.98 2.18 2.09 2.03 2.19 
NORM  JB = 1.75 JB = 2.04 
JB = 
2.62 
JB = 1.18 JB = 
1.18 
JB = 
2.46 
JB = 1.18 JB = 
1.60 
JB = 
3.19 
ARCH  F(1,440.71 
) = ) 
 
) 
 
) = ) 
 
) 
 
) = ) 
 
) 
 
F(1,44
= 0.69
F(1,44
= 0.16
F(1,44
0.24 
F(1,44
= 0.26
F(1,44
= 0.03
F(1,44
0.26 
F(1,44
= 0.06
F(1,44
= 0.01
HET  F(10,36) = )  
) 
 
) = ) 
 
) 
 
) = ) 
 
) 
 0.45 
F(6,40
= 0.53
F(6,40
= 0.69
F(14,32
0.62 
F(8,38
= 1.12
F(8,38
= 1.51
F(15,31
0.73 
F(9,37
= 1.35
F(9,37
= 1.66
RESET  F(1,40) = )  
) 
 
) = ) 
 
) 
 
) = ) 
 
) 
 1.36 
F(1,42
= 1.18
F(1,42
= 2.73
F(1,38
0.14 
F(1,41
= 0.10
F(1,41
= 2.06
F(1,37
0.25 
F(1,40
= 0.01
F(1,40
= 1.49
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As re orted le , ho m  t u e m  
unrestricted  rest ) ery ilar. However, when considering both the 
standard and augmented export model, the R2 values appear to be somewhat lower 
than those of import models (0.19 to 0.37). The estimated standard errors for the 
augmented models, in all cases, are lower general unrestricted 
autoregressive model, suggesting the validity of the parameter-reduction process. All 
the diagnostic tests confirm no evidence of high correlation, no serial correlation, no 
any problem of heteroskedasticity, and no problem of non-normality in the residuals. 
 
for both standard and augmented models, which indicate a slow speed of adjustment 
towards the equilibrium state. The coefficients on the error-correction term can be 
interpreted as the yearly speed of adjustment respect to short-run disequilibria. We 
can read the estimated coefficient as if approximately 20-26% of any disequilibrium 
inherited from the last period is eliminated in the next period. 
 and augmented models 
are lower than unity (+0.73 for standard model, +0.71 for augmented model without 
liberalization dummy, and +0.55 for augmented with liberalization dummy), 
suggesting that world income change has a small immediate impact on change in the 
volume of exports. However, the income impact seems to be larger in the long run 
than in the short run. 
n export price elasticity is negatively significant, showing an 
p  in Tab  3.17 like t se of i ports, he res lts of th  two odels
(  and ricted are v  sim
than those of the 
The estimated coefficient of error-correction term has a negative sign which is 
consistent with the theory. However, the estimated values of the parameters are low
Considering the short-run income elasticity, the coefficients, in all cases, are 
significant with correct sign. The estimates for both standard
For the short-run price elasticity, while the import price elasticity is insignificant in 
short run, the short-ru
118 
 
immediate effect on export demand. However, the values are all approximately equal 
to 0.2, which indicate a low short-run inelastic response of the quantity of exports to 
relative export price change. 
The short-run elasticities of the world’s average tariff rate are -0.52 and -0.55. The 
estimates are highly significant and have a negative sign as expected. This implies 
We have used a battery of tests, and utilized all possible variants of estimation 
run, in analyzing both the import demand 
that world trade liberalization has an immediate impact on export demand. However, 
the trade liberalization dummy appears to be insignificant, implying that trade 
liberalization in Thailand (as becoming a member of AFTA and the WTO) does not 
have any significant impact on export demand in the short run. 
3.5.3. Comparison 
methods for both the short run and the long 
as well as the export demand function for Thailand. The reason for employing so 
many tests, and considering both standard and non-standard estimation methods, is to 
check on the robustness of the results. Since policy makers wish to re-structure policy 
(trade liberalization or tariff reduction or alleviation of the trade deficit or currency 
alignments), on the basis of the import and export demand functions, it is vital that we 
get consistent, sensitive and robust results. Thus, we need to analyse carefully what 
the estimated elasticities are and what implications they may have on trade policy. 
However, simply because of the plethora of results, the variety of consistent estimates 
used, and the many different parameter values of the estimated equations, it is 
imperative to do a comparison and draw appropriate conclusion about the nature and 
range of price/income elasticities in a small and highly open developing economy like 
Thailand. In the following table, the empirical findings as for elasticities are summed 
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up and then these values are discussed carefully later. In what follows, we summarise 
the results in tabular form and then conduct a comparative discussion drawing 
conclusions on the policy implications of our results. 
Table 3.18: Short-Run and Long-Run Elasticities 
 Imports Exports 
 Thailand’s 
GDP 
Relative 
Import Price 
Thailand’s 
Average Tariff 
Rate 
World’s GDP Relative 
Export Price 
World’s 
Average Tariff 
Rate 
 Short 
Run 
Long 
Run 
Short 
Run 
Long 
Run 
Short 
Run 
Long 
Run 
Short 
Run 
Long 
Run 
Short 
Run 
Long 
Run 
Short 
Run 
Long 
Run 
Long Run 
) 
 1.22 0.17  1.31 0.62 
OLS (EG
 -0.39  -  -0.20  -
Cointegrating 
Vector (JJ) 
1.25  1.34   -0.50  -0.18  -0.27  -0.71 
ARDL(1,1) 2.21 1.28 -0.11 -0.64 -0.23 -0.07 0.66 1.48 -0.18 -0.25 -0.49 -0.34 
Unrestricted 
ECM 
2.21  -0.11  -0.23  0.66  -0.18  -0.49  
Restricted 
ECM (EG) 
2.  -0 0 0.  -0. 0.15  .08  - .26  71  18  - 52  
Restricted 
ECM (JJ) 
2.13  -0.15  -0.22  0.57  -0.14  -0.43  
 
From Table 3.18, it is shown that the results are close to each other and, in some 
ases, identical. The coefficients on short-run income and price elasticities obtained 
pact in the short run always greater than the long 
c
from the unrestricted ECM appear to be identical to those derived in ARDL(1,1). As a 
matter of fact, the unrestricted ECM is nothing more than a re-parameterization of the 
standard ARDL; therefore they give similar results. However, the other methods of 
estimation also have similar values of the elasticity parameters. We interpret this as an 
example of robustness. 
Considering first the import model, it appears that domestic income has a very high 
influence on imports, with the im
run. The empirical result shows that imports to Thailand are found to be income 
elastic (greater than unity), which suggests that, as Thailand’s economy grows, the 
demand for imports will grow at a faster rate. The implication is that this high income 
elasticity of import demand will lead to an automatic worsening in trade balance, 
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ceteris paribus. The problem is particularly serious in the short run since it is found 
that the income elasticity of import demand is greater than 2 i.e. extremely high 
elasticity. Any increase in the growth rate will increase the trade deficit and generate a 
large current account deficit both in short and long run.  
The high income elasticity of import demand also reflects many trade and production 
aspects of Thailand. First, it can be implied that economic growth does not necessarily 
lead to an increase in the production of import substituted goods, given that imports 
are equal to domestic demand minus domestic production of import substitutes. Since 
the early 1970s, when Thailand has switched its trade policy from import-substitution 
industrialization to export-oriented industrialization, import substitution industries 
have no longer been subsidized nor protected; since then Thailand has been a big 
importer of manufactures products since these products are needed in the production 
process of medium to high-technological goods which are a main component of Thai 
exports. Most parts of Thailand’s import composition include raw materials, 
intermediate products, and capital goods such as metal and mineral products, 
chemical and plastic materials, electronic parts, and industrial machinery, industrial 
tools and parts, which are required in the production process of export goods rather 
than consumer goods and a substitution for domestic production. Second, this fact is 
in line with the suggestion given by Goldstein and Khan (1985) who mentioned that 
income elasticity of import demand is not homogeneous across all product categories. 
They suggested that the income elasticity of demand for imports tends to be high for a 
country which has a high proportion of manufacture good in its import composition, 
while the country which imports a high proportion of non-manufactured goods tends 
to have a lower income elasticity of import demand. Third, this further implies that, 
for most developing countries which have experienced a substantial change in their 
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economic structure and the composition of imports, the improvement in the level of 
economic development tends to be associated with an increase in the income elasticity 
of import demand. This view is supported by the study of Lo et al (2007), which 
investigated the link between economic development and the income elasticity of 
demand for imports. They proposed that a rising level of economic development of a 
country tends to generate a higher income elasticity of its import demand because in 
the process of economic development, there is a tendency for the percentage of 
manufacturing import in total imports to rise. As the composition of imports changes 
to manufactured, intermediate, and capital goods, there is a tendency for a developing 
country to grow to be an industrialized country, and thus this economic development 
reflects in a high income elasticity of demand for imports. Finally, in addition, 
Thailand is not only a big importer of manufactured and intermediate goods, but it 
also is a big importer of luxury goods. A high income elasticity of import demand 
reflects the fact that the bulk of the imports to Thailand are luxury goods, rather than 
essential goods. Thailand is one of the most outstanding Asian countries, which 
experienced a transition from underdeveloped status to become a more industrialized 
export base country following export promotion policy. This generates a rapid 
economic growth rate and substantially changes the structure of its economy during 
the process of economic development. This growth phenomenon results in the high 
consumption of imported luxury goods, when economy was booming, the high 
demand for import luxury goods and consequently, the high income elasticity of 
demand for imports. 
Although the income elasticities in the short and long run are both greater than unity, 
implying that imports are a superior good, it is interesting to note that the long run 
elasticities are relatively smaller. Both the cointegrating long run equations with 
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stable elasticities (the first two rows of Table 3.18) show that income elasticity is of 
the order of 1.25 substantially lower than the short run easticities greater than 2. Thus 
it is clear that although imports are a superior good and tend to form an increasing 
share of rising GDP, it is not excessively high. Ultimately, a level of unity would 
mean that the long run share of import in national output remains constant. An 
elasticity of around 1.2to 1.25 is therefore indicative of relatively stable import shares. 
Change in relative import price seems to have very little effect on imports in the short 
run but the magnitude of the impact is considerably higher in the long run. The low 
price elasticity of import demand reflects the fact that, despite having a good resource 
base, Thailand’s strategy to pursue export-led economic growth since the 1970s has 
placed emphasis on the manufacturing sector, and hence this has pushed the country 
to rely heavily on the imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods to enhance the 
production capacity. In other words, Thailand’s export structure is highly dependent 
on the imports of intermediate inputs, materials, and capital goods, which are used in 
the production process of medium and high technology products. Thus, the change in 
price has a little effect on imports of these manufactured goods. In addition, many 
types of manufacturing imports, especially intermediate inputs and capital goods, are 
not manufactured in Thailand. This means that an increasing proportion of imports of 
these intermediate inputs and semi-finished components is complimentary to, rather 
than competitive with, Thailand production. Since the range of import substitutes are 
relatively low, a change in price is not expected to affect the volume of imports. Its 
level is based on input-output needs of the final product industries rather than on price 
measures. Of course, in the long run, the impact of prices is higher since the economy 
has managed to adjust to these changes and have found substitutes for imports within 
the domestic economy. A fast growing economy, allows product diversification and 
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import demand can be reduced, with higher prices, because import substituting 
industries have managed to develop. 
run and long run, but the impact is quite small. As stated earlier, Thailand’s import 
structure comprises the imports of interm
The reduction of Thailand’s average tariff rate seems to increase imports in both short 
ediate inputs and capital goods in a high 
For the export model, although the change in the world’s income appears not to have 
ple, Houthakker and 
proportion. In order to promote an export-led growth policy, the government 
generally does not impose a tariff, or if there is one the rate is low, on these types of 
products because the low input tariff makes it less costly to produce the final goods, 
and thus improves the competitiveness of the country’s export goods. Instead, many 
types of tariffs are imposed on final goods. Since raw materials, intermediate inputs, 
and capital goods are imported at zero or low tariff rates, as a result, tariff reduction 
does not have a substantial impact on Thailand’s import pattern. 
a large immediate impact on exports, its impact is considerably high in the long run. 
This evidence is consistent with other studies (see, for exam
Magee (1969)), that, in general, fast-growing countries seem to face a high income 
elasticity of demand for exports. The empirical evidence of high income elasticity of 
demand for exports has an important implication for exports of Thailand and other 
developing countries in general. That is, the export growth of Thailand as well as that 
of most developing countries is highly dependent on the economic performance of 
developed countries. With reference to the high long-run income elasticity of demand 
for exports, this can be implied that Thailand’s manufactured exports have a high 
degree of exposure to its traditional export markets such as the U.S., Japan, and 
among ASEAN countries. However, the effect of change in relative export price on 
exports is very low in both short run and long run. On one hand, the low price 
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elasticity of export demand can be implied that the developing countries, including 
Thailand, are not capable of using price competition to maintain or increase exports. 
On the other hand, it can be implied that Thailand’s export markets are fairly 
established. However, the high income elasticity of demand for exports could also be 
viewed as an upward bias since there is an argument obtained from Krugman (1989), 
that in the case of a high proportion of manufactured exports, the absence of a 
variable to capture product quality improvements or product diversification will tend 
to bias the estimated income elasticity of demand for exports upwards. 
An interesting empirical observation from Table 3.18 is that the long run world 
income elasticity of exports is similar to the long run domestic income elasticity of 
imports (the former being somewhat higher). If for example, world income grew at a 
economy as a result of the continued liberalization of trade and investment, the 
similar rate as Thailand GDP, the impact on the trade balance would be negligible 
since exports and imports would grow at a similar rate. In fact, because Thailand has 
consistently grown faster than the rest of the world that there has been an enduring 
issue about trade deficits. 
Unlike the import model, world’s tariff reduction seems to improve exports of the 
country in both short and longer terms. Through the increased integration of the world 
manufacturing industries of Thailand have expanded significantly in terms of exports, 
employment, and output. Manufactured exports have contributed significantly to the 
growth and the economic development of the country. Currently, the bulk of 
manufactured exports, which make up the largest share of the country’s total exports, 
comprise the exports of computer and computer parts, transformer, generator and 
motor, electrical appliances and electronic products, telecommunication equipments, 
and integrated circuit. From the empirical result, Thailand seems to be successful in 
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gaining from the global tariff reduction since it is able to diversify its exports into 
more manufactured goods and boost manufacturing through technology upgrading, 
research and development, education and training, and these in turn strengthen the 
country’s supply capacity. 
To summarize, when comparing income effect between imports and exports, although 
the magnitude of impact in long run is almost the same, the impact of change in 
domestic GDP on imports seems to overwhelm that of a change in the world’s GDP 
country. This can be inferred that global trade liberalization through the reduction of 
he volume of imports 
and exports in Thailand by means of the reduction of tariffs and joining AFTA and 
itional import (export) demand functions 
on exports in the short run. This may finally result in the problem in trade balance in 
the short run, as stated above. However, this should not be a problem in the long run. 
Thus policy makers need not be overly concerned about trade deficit unless it creates 
a sort of currency and financial crisis of the past. Under ‘normal’ circumstances, the 
trade negative balance will correct itself over time. The price effect on both imports 
and exports is obviously very low in the short-run. However, in the long-run, it 
appears that the impact of relative import price on imports is higher than the impact of 
relative export price on exports. 
Considering tariff reduction, the impact of world’s tariff reduction on exports seems 
to be higher than the impact of Thailand’s tariff reduction on imports of its own 
international tariff structures is beneficial for the country. It is clear that the various 
WTO negotiations have overall benefited Thailand much more. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this study, we analyze the impact of trade liberalization on t
the WTO membership by applying the trad
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and then using the Autoregressive Distributed Lagged (ARDL) model to estimate the 
short-run and long-run elasticities in Thailand’s import (export) demand over the 
period 1960-2007. We also compared these estimates with the estimates obtained 
using the cointegration techniques and an ECM. It turns out that the ARDL approach 
and the cointegration and ECM approach give very similar results. 
On one hand, in the aggregate import demand function for Thailand, the aggregate 
import volume is cointegrated with Thailand’s GDP, Thailand’s relative import price, 
and Thailand’s average tariff rate. On the other hand, in aggregate export demand 
function for Thailand, the aggregate export volume is cointegrated with the world’s 
GDP, Thailand’s relative export price, and the world’s average tariff rate. Results of 
the estimated dynamic specification of the functions show that Thailand’s import 
demand is largely explained by the country’s GDP, while Thailand’s export demand 
is largely influenced by world’s GDP. As domestic income increases, Thailand’s 
import expands more than proportionately. However, prices seem to have very little 
effect on imports. This reflects the pattern of imports of the country that the country is 
highly dependent on the imports of raw materials, intermediate goods, and capital 
goods, such as mineral and metal products, chemicals and plastic materials, electronic 
parts, and industrial machinery, industrial tools and parts, which are required in most 
of the production process (also the production for exports), rather than consumer 
goods and a substitution for domestic production. As for exports, it is found that 
exports react moderately fast to a change in world income but relatively slowly to 
movement in their relative price. The results of both import and export demand 
functions are consistent with other studies, which generally find that developing and 
industrial countries tend to have significantly higher income elasticities and lower 
price elasticities. 
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In general, a country liberalizes its trade because it hopes that it will gain special 
access to the market of its trading partner. More specific, a country agrees to reduce 
or eliminate its trade barriers when it reaches agreement that other trading partners 
at the expenses of other countries. In a world of tariff reductions, Thai imports will 
 
will also reduce or eliminate their trade barriers. By this means, a country expects that 
the loss from opening its market is overwhelmed by the gain from freer trade. 
However, there is nothing to guarantee that every country participating in free trade 
will experience a considerable increase in the volume of exports. Furthermore, if, 
after trade is liberalized, exports do not increase proportionately as an increase in 
imports, the trade balance will be worsened. High imports without a corresponding 
increase in exports increase the trade deficit and further lead to current account 
problem. Our results provide strong evidence that trade liberalization in terms of tariff 
reduction promotes both imports and exports, with the impact of world’s tariff 
reduction on exports is much higher than the impact of Thailand’s tariff reduction on 
its imports. Thus, it can be concluded that, for Thailand, trade liberalization through 
tariff reduction does not ultimately lead to the deterioration in trade balance per se. In 
addition, liberalization in Thailand could be construed as a beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy, in which Thailand can seek benefit from trade liberalization all over the world 
rise but its exports will rise far more. However, we find no evidence of a statistically 
significant effect of institutionalized trade liberalization, in terms of joining AFTA 
and the WTO, on both imports and exports. 
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ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON TAX REVENUE 
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4.1. Introduction 
While trade liberalization has long been investigated by a number of studies and 
believed to provide benefits for those countries which promote freer trade by inducing 
trade creation, lowering consumer prices, raising countries’ welfare and increasing 
h
                                                           
competition for the domestic economy which finally may help domestic markets 
reach higher efficiency16, very few studies paid attention to issues concerning the 
consequence of trade liberalization decreasing tax revenues, not only on international 
trade taxes as a result of tariff reduction, but also on domestic taxes as a result of 
erosion of tax bases. T is leads to a controversy whether trade liberalization is a 
potential source of fiscal instability, especially for countries which have high 
dependency on trade tax for their public revenue. Each step in liberalizing trade for 
many developing and less developed countries is now very sensitive because it raises 
the issue of revenue losses which may continue to be a very big problem for any 
budget-constrained government where trade tax is the major revenue source of the 
country. Although it is found that trade taxes are not a significant source of revenue in 
OECD countries since they are accounted for only 0.5 percent of total tax revenues, 
the dependency on trade taxes is much higher in middle income countries; around 16 
percent in average. The fear of the impact of trade liberalization seems to be 
substantial in low income countries because the percentage of trade tax in total tax 
revenues is as high as 26 percent on average.17 Because of such a high dependence on 
trade tax for revenue, any country which has that tax structure and commits itself to 
any form of trade liberalization must be concerned about how to mitigate the revenue 
loss, a serious problem that trade liberalization potentially entails. 
 
16 See Viner (1950), Lipsey (1957), Kemp and Wan (1976), Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Krugman 
(1991) and Summers (1991) for example.  
17 See Pelzman (2004). 
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There are some studies suggesting that the revenue problem can be solved if trade 
liberalization is co-ordinated with potential government budget spending, sound 
macroeconomic policies, and effective measures on tax revenue, including raising 
18
complicated than that of trade tax, so the replacement from these alternative sources 
through the liberalization process, the trade tax continues to be a major source of 
                                                           
domestic direct and indirect taxes, widening and developing new tax bases, improving 
effectiveness of public spending, raising public saving, and strengthening tax 
collection and administration.  However, what is good in theory may not be 
applicable in practice. Many countries find it is very difficult to implement these 
responses in order to prevent the adverse effects on fiscal revenues. The reason that 
most developing and less developed countries usually rely heavily on trade tax is not 
only because of the ease of collection, but also because they have some constraints. 
Their restrictions may have various explanations such as the political instability, the 
constrained institutional capacities, and the limitation of a country’s geography. 
Generally, countries, which have a small geographical area, tend to have small 
domestic market, small population size, and un-diversified production. These 
attributes result in narrow tax bases, leading to the difficulty in switching revenue 
sources from trade tax to other domestic taxes. In addition, the structure of income 
and consumption taxes, especially for Value Added Taxes (VAT) is much more 
requires a good design of country’s tax practice reform. Developing and less 
developed countries always face the problem of domestic tax reform because of their 
relative lack of skillful authorities and efficient tax system. Moreover, the empirical 
work constructed by Pelzman (2004) suggests that, although countries may be going 
revenue, especially for budget-constrained countries. Increases in domestic taxes, in 
 
18 See Peters (2002), Mujumdar (2004), Keen and Ligthart (2004), and Glenday (2000) for example.  
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order for countries to compensate for the loss in tariff revenue, yield diminishing 
returns. He also finds that as domestic taxes increase, more and more economic 
activities are pushed into the informal sector. Hence, he concludes that trade 
liberalization tends to have a negative impact on the domestic revenue for developing 
countries. The level of countries’ economic development also has a significant 
influence since developing and less developed countries generally have relatively low 
institutional quality, corrupt governments, and low technology, causing a problem in 
the improvement of tax collection and administration. Cutting down the government 
expenditure as a consequence of the decrease in revenue seems not to be feasible 
since it directly reduces welfare. In addition, government spending on the social 
sector, infrastructure, national defense, and poverty reduction cannot easily be cut 
because it may also raise political issues. If it chooses to do this, the government may 
easily be pressured by affected groups and those who oppose free trade. 
Although some countries are able to cope with the negative fiscal effects of trade 
liberalization by using a mix of tax and non-tax policy, the non-tax policy seems to 
play a limited role. The results of non-tax policies such as improving macroeconomic 
performance, controlling inflation, controlling public spending, and increasing the 
reliance on non-tax revenues are likely to be uncertain and these policies are able to 
be accomplished only in the long term. The most possible efficient alternative to deal 
with fiscal difficulties in the short and medium term is to use the tax policy response 
by introducing domestic tax reforms, for both income and consumption taxes. 
However, since trade liberalization could possibly lead to a reduction in output, 
corporate profits, and employment in certain sectors that face greater competition 
from lower-cost foreign products, this impact on domestic tax bases could finally 
result in the reduction of domestic taxes. Although the net outcome depends crucially 
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on many factors such as the flexibility of wages and prices to allow the full 
adjustment of relative prices after trade is liberalized, the ability of domestic firms to 
face higher competition, the structure of economy, and the structure of country’s tax 
system, the adverse effect of trade liberalization on domestic tax revenues is an 
important issue to be taken care of when a country walks along the liberalization path. 
For many developing and less developed countries, the loss of trade tax revenue is 
itself a very big problem. If trade liberalization is also associated with the reduction in 
other domestic tax revenues, it will be a much hard work for governments in these 
countries to pursue domestic tax reform by substituting their sources of revenue from 
trade taxes to income and consumption taxes which may consequently end up with 
unsuccessful replacement, and hence the failure of tax reform. 
Although a large number of studies have tried to investigate the net impact of trade 
liberalization on trade tax revenue, very little attention has been devoted to examining 
the impact of trade liberalization on domestic taxes. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine the effect on both trade taxes and domestic taxes after trade is liberalized, 
focusing particularly on low and middle income countries. This chapter attempts to 
investigate this issue by adopting the traditional tax effort model, using a panel data 
approach for 134 countries over 24 years covering the period 1980-2003 and 
employing the two-way fixed effects approach. 
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section is devoted to a brief literature 
review. Section 3 provides a background for the traditional tax effort model. Section 4 
describes the extended model, data, and estimating procedure. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the results for full sample and each income group. Section 6 concludes the 
chapter. 
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4.2. General Review: Theoretical and Empirical Background on the Relationship 
Between Trade Liberalization, International Trade Tax, and Domestic Taxes 
ile 
ces 
s to lower trade tax revenue. 
developing and less developed countries which decide to liberalize trade. Aizenman 
trade openness and financial integration by taking them as exogenous factors. From 
In this section, the literature survey starts with some notable works pointing that it is 
possible for countries to be unsuccessful in implementing domestic tax reform wh
they are in the process of trade liberalization. Some restrictions are revealed since 
they possibly account for the failure of tax reform. Then, some related studies are 
reviewed to highlight how trade liberalization may affect each type of taxes. 
4.2.1. The Failure of Revenue Source Substitution 
The most obvious way of how trade liberalization affects tax revenue is that it redu
trade restrictions including tariffs, and hence tend
However, the relationship between trade liberalization and other domestic tax 
revenues is still ambiguous, or even the impact on trade tax revenue itself is an 
empirical matter. Compared with the studies of free trade related growth, 
employment, or trade creation and diversion, there have been a relatively small 
number of both theoretical and empirical studies on the revenue impact of trade 
liberalization. Among the studies, there is an attempt to investigate the possibility of 
mitigating the decrease in trade tax revenue since this is the major concern of most 
and Jinjarak (2006) study the relationship between globalization and the changes in 
the “easy to collect” and “hard to collect” taxes; defining the “easy to collect” taxes 
are the revenues from tariff and seigniorage, while the “hard to collect” taxes are the 
revenues from Value Added Tax (VAT), and using two measures of globalization; 
the hypothesis that globalization may lead to a reduction of the countries’ tax 
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revenues, especially for most developing countries, by shifting tax base from “easy to 
collect” to “hard to collect” taxes, they show that the revenue of “easy to collect” 
taxes declined by about 20%, while the revenue of “hard to collect” taxes increased 
only 9% between the period 1980-1999. 
The results of Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006) seem to be supported by the work of 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005). They examine whether countries can recover their loss 
taxes and they may not be able to recover their loss of trade tax 
of trade tax revenue, as a result of trade liberalization, from increasing domestic tax 
revenues by running regressions on both full sample and three separate groups; low, 
middle, and high income countries. The results show that, for the full sample, 
although openness is significantly positively related to domestic tax revenues, its 
impact is quite small. The degree of revenue recovery is only 20 to 50 cents per 
dollar. For low income countries, openness is positively significant with a stronger 
impact than that of full sample. However, the recovery rate is the lowest; less than 30 
cents per dollar. For middle income countries, openness is still positively significant. 
The recovery rate is a bit higher, from 45 to 65 cents per dollar. For high income 
countries, openness is insignificant in all specifications. However, the recovery rate is 
more than offset since domestic tax increases from 1.5 to 3 dollar, especially for those 
which adopt VAT. 
In addition to the evidence that countries may fail to shift their tax bases from trade 
tax to other domestic 
by raising domestic tax revenues, there is also evidence that trade liberalization itself 
is likely to hinder the substitution of tax revenues. Agbeyegbe, Stotsky, and 
WoldeMariam (2004) construct an empirical study using panel data of 22 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa over 1980-1996 to address the question whether trade 
liberalization leads to a reduction in total tax revenues through its effect on 
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international trade tax and other domestic taxes. The results strongly support the 
uncertain effect of trade liberalization. Although the results suggest that trade 
liberalization leads to stronger total tax revenues and trade tax revenue, there is 
evidence that trade liberalization is associated with weaker income tax and goods and 
services tax. A reduction in domestic taxes may potentially result in the difficulty of 
replacing sources of revenue. 
Even if trade liberalization has no effect on domestic taxes, tax reform is a very 
difficult task for many less developed and developing countries to pursue. Now, if 
ese countries tend to be highly dependent 
trade liberalization has a negative impact on domestic tax revenues, reform by using 
these sources may be inapplicable. This raises the question whether these countries 
should implement the reform in the same way as developed countries. What is the 
difference between these countries and most developed countries? In the next section, 
the exploration of some unique features of developing and less developed countries is 
provided in order to investigate their restriction which may cause the failure of tax 
reform. 
4.2.2. Characteristics of Developing and Less Developed Countries: Self 
Constraints 
The impact of trade liberalization seems to be substantial in developing and less 
developed countries since the revenue of th
on international trade tax. Actually, these countries have long used trade tax and 
subsidies, import and export quotas, and other non-tariff barriers to adjust their 
international trade. The traditional trade tax has been used to achieve two major 
purposes; increasing revenue for the public sector and protecting their infant and local 
industries. However, since the beginning of the liberalization period, many industrial 
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nations have attempted to promote the high and sustainable growth to the global 
economy. One of their policies is to pursue global trade liberalization through the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). No matter how 
well the economic structures of developing and less developed countries are prepared 
or no matter how willing they are to liberalize their trade, they have already and 
automatically been forced to walk along the path of globalization and liberalizing 
programme. 
As stated in Khattry and Rao (2002), policy options which are developed for 
advanced economies are not appropriate and cannot be implemented in low and 
1. Geographical constraints 
The size disadvantages have widely and obviously been observed in standard 
mall country has a small domestic market which results in 
middle income countries since they possess unique features which are the important 
constraints and cause the transition problematic. Those limited features can be 
categorized into three groups. 
economic theories. First, a s
industries being unable to obtain economies of scale. Second, a small nation tends to 
have less domestic competition within its internal market which leads to an inefficient 
allocation. Third, as it is pointed by Helpman and Krugman (1985) about the lack of 
strategic trade policy, a small nation has less potential in preparing their domestic 
firms to enter the world market and it also has limited potential to use import-
substitution policy. Fourth, many small nations have poor domestic resources, leading 
to a narrow range of domestic output. As a result, these countries are highly 
dependent on imports and exports which make them quite vulnerable to external 
economic shocks. 
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Smallness does not only have an impact on production, allocation, and competition as 
stated above, size also affects a country’s tax receipt. Since small and less developed 
nsumption tax such as VAT. For instance, while a trade tax imposes 
predominant arguments is that the tax base of a consumption tax is generally much 
countries tend to have high dependence on trade tax for their revenue, trade 
liberalization, especially by the reduction of tariffs, severely seems to decrease trade 
tax revenue, and hence causes fiscal problems. According to Peters (2002), he 
explores the fiscal effects of trade liberalization for the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), as the case of small open economies, by using descriptive analysis and 
concludes that because CARICOM possesses two restrictive characteristics; small 
size and low level of development, these countries usually have small domestic 
markets and un-diversified or even mono-production. These features force this 
community to be highly dependent on external trade and have narrow tax bases. He 
also points that although the magnitude of the impact of trade liberalization is difficult 
to assess, there could be a shortfall in the short-run trade tax revenue as much as 45 
percent. The mitigation of the decline in revenue by introducing broad based 
consumption taxes (i.e. VAT) seems to be difficult due to the many countries’ 
restrictions such as the size of domestic markets and the level of economic 
development. 
There are several traditional arguments for substituting trade-based tax to more a 
broad-based co
distortions on both consumption side and production side, consumption taxes distort 
only consumption, hence a trade tax generates more distortion and a consumption tax 
is more preferable than a trade tax. Among those reasons, one of the most 
larger than that of a trade tax so a consumption tax could potentially be used to 
mitigate the loss of trade tax receipts or even to raise overall tax revenues. However, 
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this argument is likely to be practicable only for large size countries because in order 
to gain the revenue from the consumption tax, a large consumption base is needed. It 
is very difficult for small countries to raise a considerable amount of consumption tax 
revenue since they have only a small domestic market and hence limited 
consumption. In addition, there is some evidence that poverty levels and income 
distribution tend to be more uneven in smaller than in larger countries. This may also 
push the level of consumption in small countries down and as a result reduce the 
amount of consumption tax collection. 
However, the problem of fiscal compensation for lost revenue from trade 
liberalization is not likely to be limited in small countries. Rajaraman (2003) attempts 
 
                                                           
to investigate where the fiscal compensation can be sourced by using descriptive 
analysis and reviewing the literature since he finds that the loss in tariff revenues in 
India have resulted in diminishing aggregate tax revenue. Although the theoretical 
results from Keen and Ligthart (1999) suggest that the loss in tariff revenues can be 
replaced by domestic indirect taxes, more specifically a price-neutral VAT and 
conclude that VAT could enhance both revenue and welfare, the empirical work using 
cross-country regressions for 183 countries of Ebrill et al (2001) shows the 
contradictory results that VAT is not significant in raising tax revenues.19 Together 
with the lack of empirical evidence on revenue enhancement by VAT adoption, 
Rajaraman (2003) concludes that there is not enough evidence to ensure that India’s 
loss in trade tax revenue can be compensated by a consumption tax. 
 
 
19 Note that openness is also included in the regression as one of tax revenues determinant and it is 
found that openness has a significant positive impact on tax revenues.   
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2. Structural constraints 
 “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”, Lewis (1954) 
odel and demonstrates that a country becomes more 
urbanized as its economy grows. As countries develop, it has been observed that tax 
 because they compose 
dispersed, small-scale firms and produce primary products which are associated with 
In
constructs a two-sector m
bases grow more than proportionately to the growth of income. That is the capacity to 
tax grows with the growth of GDP (Musgrave, 1969). Supported by later work, Tanzi 
(1987) studies the relationship between tax levels and economic development and 
conclude in the same way that, as countries grow, they become urbanized. 
Urbanization leads to an increase in both the need for tax revenue and the capacity to 
tax. On the demand side, urbanization leads to higher demand for public services and 
hence the government needs to raise more income from tax revenue in order to 
support its public activities. On the supply side, urbanization leads to larger tax bases 
and higher development in public services facilitating tax collection which in turn 
improves the capacity to tax of the government. 
Unlike developed economies, low and middle income countries tend to be more rural. 
Rural economic activities are much more difficult to tax
the subsistent economy rather than commercial economy. Even if there is a surplus for 
commerce, these firms often escape tax collection. In addition, because these firms 
are informal in their nature, their income is very difficult to assess and hence it is hard 
to include them in the income tax base. As a result, the government usually levies 
taxes on agricultural exports which is much easier instead of attempts to assess their 
income. This is one of the reasons why low and middle income countries tend to have 
a high proportion of trade tax in their total tax revenues. Moreover, most population in 
less developed and developing countries tend to be children and elders, falling in the 
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age-dependency group. With a high age-dependency ratio, the income tax bases in 
less developed and developing countries are much narrower than income tax bases in 
developed countries. These aspects limit the possibility to substitute sources of tax 
revenues from trade tax to income tax when tax reform is preceded after trade 
liberalization. 
3. Institutional and political constraints 
Institutional quality has a direct effect on a country’s tax collection. In less developed 
and developing countries, there is weak management, with poor information, auditing 
ith inefficient and high corruption tax and supervision of staff, in line w
administrations, leading to the difficulty in assessing taxes. These factors, when 
combined with high tax evasion as a result of the weakness of the rule of law and the 
lack of administrative capacity, result in low level of tax revenues in low and middle 
income countries. These features contribute to the use of trade tax in these countries 
because, when compared with income base tax or consumption base tax, trade tax is 
relatively easy to assess and monitor and has less problems of tax evasion. 
In low and middle income countries, there is also political obstruction which impedes 
the domestic tax reform and domestic tax base expansion. The influence of powerful 
lobbies makes some sectors be exempted from taxation. It is demonstrated by 
Ndikumana (2001) that political power used by some interest groups results in 
lobbying and tax exemption. This results in the limited use of both personal income 
and corporate income taxes. In addition, it is found that low quality institution and 
political instability have a negative influence on goods and services tax collection 
(Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2006). Thus, it can be concluded that low quality of 
institutional factors is an obstruction to the mitigation of the loss in trade tax. 
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So far, we have investigated the reasons why a country may fail to recover the loss in 
trade tax revenue and be unsuccessful in reforming its domestic taxes by using the 
explanation of country’s attributes and excluding the effect of trade liberalization on 
Trade liberalization may have a different impact on different kinds of tax revenue. 
e revenue impact of trade liberalization 
nal trade tax, personal 
 in import tariffs, 
ralization, often leads to a drop in trade tax revenue, 
case of countries in the Caribbean community which are constrained by having a 
leads to a reduction in trade tax receipt and finally a decrease in total tax revenues. 
tax revenues from the frame. In the next section, we introduce trade liberalization into 
the picture and review the studies which show how trade liberalization may affect 
each tax type. 
4.2.3. The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Tax Revenues 
This section reviews the literature studying th
by dividing tax revenues into 4 categories, including internatio
income tax, corporate income tax, and goods and services tax. 
1. International Trade Tax 
Generally, international trade tax revenue is thought to decrease after countries 
liberalize their trade. Many studies point out that the reduction
associated with trade libe
especially for small open economies which their tax revenues tend to be more heavily 
dependent on international trade. Peters (2002) investigates this issue by taking the 
small size and lower level of development. Although the trade tax revenue effect of 
trade liberalization is generally uncertain depending on many factors such as 
countries’ conditions, initial position of tariffs, and the level of import elasticities of 
substitution, he finds the evidence that trade liberalization in these countries usually 
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Ebrill et al. (1999) provide a clear-cut explanation of the effect of trade liberalization 
on trade tax. They state that the revenue implications depend largely on the volume of 
imports after trade is liberalized. Generally, trade restrictions are composed of two 
 
restrictions (Figure 4.1). When the initial tariff rate is prohibitively high, trade 
reduction after trade is fairly liberalized at the revenue maximizing rate, the increase 
major components, tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers. Although the main aim of 
trade liberalization is to reduce or eliminate both restrictions, most liberalization 
usually considers the removal of quantitative restrictions at the first phase and then 
the continual reduction of tariff rates in the second stage. They reason that goods, 
which are restricted by quotas, usually are tariff imposed. If quotas of these goods are 
removed, it is possible that trade tax revenue may increase at least in the very first 
stage of liberalization as the volume of imports is likely to increase. This may also be 
true in the case of the replacement of quantitative restriction such as quotas by tariffs. 
The initial tariff levels, their coverage, and the extent to which they are reduced, play 
a significant role in determining the impact on international trade tax revenue. Ebrill 
et al (1999) reason that if the initial tariff rates are high, tariff reduction may lead to
an increase in trade tax revenue since price elasticities of demand and supply are not 
constant over the entire range of prices. This effect can be illustrated by a Laffer 
curve, which demonstrates the relationship between trade tax revenue and trade 
volumes are likely to be severely compressed and trade tax revenue will be very low. 
Reducing tariffs will lead to a substantial increase in trade volumes and a decrease in 
the incentive to evade taxes. These combinations are more than compensating for the 
lower tariff rate, which results in higher tariff revenue. However, if there is a further 
in trade volume will not be large enough to offset the lower tariffs and now the direct 
effect of tariff reduction will result in the loss of revenue. As a result, overall tariff 
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revenue will therefore decrease (Ebrill et al, 1999; Khattry and Rao, 2002; and 
Agbeyegbe et al, 2004). 
Figure 4.1: Laffer Curve 
 
Ebrill et al (1999) also mention that if the liberalization is accompanied with the 
reduction in tariff dispersion, trade tax revenue may increase. The rationale is that a 
reduction in the dispersion of tariffs is often done by lowering the higher tariffs and 
increasing the lower ones in order to reduce them to average value and usually, highly 
elastic demanded goods such as final consumption goods stated above are also high 
tax levied. As a result, a reduction in tariff dispersion may lead to an increase in trade 
tax revenue. In addition, the reduction in tariffs is often associated with the reduction 
of tax evasion and tariff exemptions. It is intuition that the higher the tariffs, the 
higher the tax evasion since evasion leads to high marginal benefit for importers. 
Many works find that there is a positive relationship between tariff rates and tax 
Tariff Rate 
Tr
ad
e 
Ta
x 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Revenue Maximizing Rate 
144 
 
evasion.20 Recent research shows empirical evidence that a one percent increase in 
tariff rates is associated with a three percent increase in tax evasion (Fisman and Wei, 
2001). The tariff reduction, of course, raises the costs for tax evaders and hence 
lowers the level of tax evasion, thus it may bring an increase in trade tax revenue. For 
tariff exemptions, Pritchett and Sethi (1993) find that high tariff rates do not necessary 
lead to high trade tax revenue. Very similar to the case of tax evasion, they argue that 
higher tariff rates lead to higher incentives for importers to attempt to seek 
exemptions. The reverse relationship is also true. The lower tariff rates may not bring 
a decrease in trade tax revenue since the temptations for abuse of any system of 
exemptions will decrease with the lower level of tariffs. 
Trade tax revenue may also depend on the price elasticity of demand for imports and 
                                                           
the price elasticity of supply of import substitutes. According to Ebrill et al (1999) 
and Agbeyegbe et al (2004), if either the price elasticity of demand for imports or the 
price elasticity of supply of import substitutes is high enough, there may be revenue 
gain in later stage of liberalization if the new value of imports (higher volume of 
imports multiplied by lower tariff rates) exceeds the value of imports before 
liberalization take places. The volume of imports can be increased in two ways. On 
one hand, since the prices of imported goods are cheaper after the restrictions are 
removed, if the price elasticity of demand for imports is elastic enough, the volume of 
imports may increase to the point which import values offset the loss from tariff 
reduction. On the other hand, the prices of import substitutes domestically producing 
are forced to be lowered when imported goods increase due to competition. As a 
result, domestic output decreases and thus imports increase. However, the elasticity 
issue might be very complicated because it depends on the timing and characteristic 
 
20 See Clotfelter (1983), Fisman and Wei (2001) for example. 
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of each good. Generally, imported consumer durable goods respond to the price 
changes more than do intermediate goods and raw materials (Clarida, 1996). In 
addition, most countries always reduce their restrictions from raw materials, 
intermediate goods to final consumption goods which are usually import competing 
goods, consecutively, in order to avoid political contention (Ebrill et al, 1999). In this 
case, an increase in trade tax revenue may occur only in later stage when tariffs of 
final consumption goods, which are often taxed at high rates, are eliminated. 
Trade liberalization does not only involve the reduction or removal of tariffs and 
quantitative restriction, but it may also involve the reduction or elimination of an 
export tax. Similar to the case of tariff cut, if the reduction of the export tax leads to a 
substantial increase in a country’s export volume, a country may be able to collect 
more trade taxes. However, if the reduction of an export tax does not bring about a 
significant increase in export volume, trade tax revenue will be decreased. 
However, countries may have a revenue problem due to the deterioration of their 
terms of trade.21 It is possible that when many developing and less developed 
countries liberalize their trade simultaneously, there will be an excess supply of 
similar products which could lower the export prices and finally could exacerbate 
their terms of trade. This could directly affect a country’s export sector and severely 
worsen export tax revenue. 
In conclusion, it is very difficult to determine precisely the effect of trade 
                                                           
liberalization on international trade tax revenue since trade liberalization may either 
decrease or even increase trade tax revenue, depending on the form, the level of 
liberalization and countries’ environmental liberalization conditions. The net impact 
 
21 See Devereux and Chen (1999) for example. 
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of trade liberalization on trade tax is an empirical matter. Trade tax revenue may also 
be affected by other important variables such as the level of economic development, 
the exchange rate, the macroeconomic environment, and the effectiveness of tax and 
customs administrations (Ebrill et al, 1999).22 
2. Personal Income Tax 
There seems to be no direct effect of trade liberalization on personal income tax. 
                                                           
Trade liberalization, however, is likely to transmit its contribution to personal income 
tax revenue through economic growth. Ebrill et al (1999) point out that there is now 
considerable empirical evidence that trade liberalization is related to the higher level 
of economic growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) construct an empirical study to 
investigate the effect of trade on income by applying the gravity model and using 
geographic factors as an alternative instrument for trade. They find that trade 
substantially raises income since a one percent increase in the shares of imports and 
exports in GDP leads to a one-half to two percent increase in income per person. This 
means that trade liberalization which induces higher volume of trade is associate with 
higher income growth. Frankel and Rose (2000) estimate the consequences of 
currency unions that have on the long-run level and rate of growth of real income, via 
trade. The most interesting part of their study is the substantial impact of free trade 
agreements, a form of trade liberalization, on international trade in which they find 
that free trade agreements roughly triple the trade between countries. They suggest 
that the contribution of currency unions to an economy comes from the higher volume 
of trade which occurs as a result of trade encouragement after countries join the 
 
22 The effect of exchange rate on tax revenue  is still ambiguous as the results from different studies 
are mixed.  For  example,  using  the  same  data  set  and  similar  approach,  Adam  et  al  (2001)  find  a 
significant relationship between exchange rate and tax revenue, while Agbeyegbe et al (2004) find no 
evidence supporting the relationship between them. 
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union, rather than macroeconomic or financial influences. The benefit to a country’s 
economy from being a member of a currency union comes through the promotion of 
trade, rather than through the benefit from any monetary policy as proponents of 
currency unions advertise. A more recent study, Baier and Bergstrand (2005) 
construct a gravity framework using differenced panel data and find that the effect of 
free trade agreements on trade flows is almost quintupled, again supporting the 
hypothesis that free trade agreements lead to an increase in trade volume which 
stimulates economic growth. 
Economic growth is likely to have a direct impact on both personal income tax and 
uch less 
total tax revenues. Higher per capita income leads to a wider personal income tax 
base. Many previous literatures reached a conclusion that there is a significant 
positive relationship between economic development and personal income tax 
revenue. For instance, Musgrave (1984) provides a solid theory supporting a causal 
relationship between per capita income and tax level in his tax base and tax handle 
theory. He states that an increase in per capita income raises the size of public sector 
which in turn increases a country’s tax base and taxable capacity. Tanzi (1987) 
demonstrates the association between economic growth and tax by using regression 
analysis and found in the same way that overall tax revenue is positively influenced 
by the level of per capita income. Although the correlation is not strong, he also finds 
that per capita income growth has a positive impact on personal income tax. 
However, it is pointed out by Tanzi (1987) that personal income tax is m
important in developing and less developed countries than it is in developed countries 
(in terms of actual collection). This may be due to the difficulty in assessing personal 
income, high administrative costs and other structural constraints. As stated in 
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006), most developing and less developed countries have 
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low level of investment in their tax capacity, leading to poor ability of auditing. In 
addition, personal income tax, in those countries, is relatively easy to be evaded 
because most developing and less developed countries generally have weak penalty 
on tax evasion and structural factors that increase the ease of tax evasion. Moreover, 
in developing and less developed countries, personal income tax is usually levied on 
wages of public sector employees and the employees of the large, and often foreign, 
corporations (Tanzi, 1987). All of these depress the personal income tax base, 
resulting in a narrower base in developing and less developed countries than in 
developed countries, and hence lower revenue from this tax. 
Inflation is another factor which may affect personal income tax. There is large a 
                                                           
literature on the effect of inflation on taxation, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s 
when inflation was high. Most studies suggest that the impact of inflation on personal 
income tax could be considerably large. Inflation may affect personal income tax, 
especially for capital gain tax, by leading to an increase in effective tax rates because 
this tax is computed as a fraction of changes in nominal value.23 Theoretically, 
inflation affects income tax in three ways; altering real factor incomes, affecting the 
measurement of taxable income, and changing the real value of deductions, 
exemptions, credits, ceilings and floors, bracket widths, and all other tax provisions 
legally fixed in nominal terms (Aaron, 1976). There are also many empirical studies 
which prove their relationship, for example, Greytak and McHugh (1978) point that 
there is a substantial increase in personal income tax revenue, occurring as a result of 
purely a nominal increase in income which appears during inflationary periods. The 
large increase of tax receipts is due to the progressive nature of this type of tax. 
 
 
23 See Aaron (1976), Bailey (1976), and Tanzi (1980) for example. 
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3. Corporate Income Tax 
und to be more important to less developed and developing 
rade liberalization on corporate income tax is also very difficult to 
income tax. 
Corporate income tax is fo
countries. In these countries, corporate income tax is usually collected from a few 
large corporations which have sizable profits. In addition, taxing a few large firms is 
administratively easy for government in less developed and developing countries 
(Tanzi, 1987). 
The effect of t
estimate. Like international trade taxes, how trade liberalization affects corporate 
income tax depends on many factors such as the volume of trade, the price elasticity 
of demand for imports and the price elasticity of supply of import substitutes, and the 
initial domestic prices. If trade liberalization leads to a higher volume of imports or 
exports, import and export companies, which generally have a large share of output in 
most less developed and developing countries, may benefit from increasing volume of 
trade and consequently result in higher corporate income tax. After trade is 
liberalized, there is the price adjustment of import goods and domestic goods. If the 
initial prices of domestic goods are lower than the prices of import goods, the 
domestic production of import substitutes is likely to be increased because domestic 
prices are higher after a country liberalized its trade. Consequently, a tax on corporate 
income which is derived from the increase in production of import substitutes should 
increase. However, if the relative prices of import substitutes are higher before trade 
is liberalized, trade liberalization tends to lower domestic prices and decrease the 
production of domestic goods, and hence lower corporate profits and corporate 
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The deterioration in terms of trade, which possibly occurs when countries that export 
the same or similar items liberalize simultaneously, could potentially affect corporate 
income tax revenue. Because exporters now export less, income earned from exports 
decreases, and hence corporate income tax collected from export companies tend to 
be diminished. 
Like personal income tax, trade liberalization influences corporate income tax through 
the growth effect. Generally, firm’s profits grow with the growth of the economy. 
Tanzi (1987) finds a significant positive relationship between economic growth and 
corporate income tax. He also points out that the impact of economic development on 
corporate income tax is greater than on personal income tax. 
4. Goods and Services Tax 
Tax on consumption is usually considered as a good solution for offsetting the 
decrease in fiscal revenue since a consumption tax has broader base and distorts the 
economy less than a trade tax (e.g., Keen and Ligthart, 1999; Peters, 2002; Mujumdar, 
2004; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005).24 However, the impact of trade liberalization and 
other physical constraints may make the domestic tax reform a lot harder for 
developing and less developed countries. The impact of trade liberalization on goods 
and services tax is more complicated to assess since the effect is indirect and also 
depends on many factors such as the price elasticity of demand for imports and the 
price elasticity of supply of import substitutes. For example, when tariffs are reduced, 
the relative price of imports to import substitutes produced domestically decreases, 
                                                            
24 Although the substitution from trade tax to consumption tax is acceptable, an increase in domestic 
consumption tax as a strategy of offsetting reductions  in tariffs  is  later refused by Keen and Ligthart 
(2004). They reproduce model under imperfect competition and find that an increase in consumption 
tax  rate potentially  reduces overall domestic welfare,  contrary  to  the model  formed under perfect 
competition in Keen and Ligthart (1999) in which they find umambiguous benefit. 
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and hence domestic consumers tend to switch their consumption from domestically 
produced import substitutes to imports. This leads to a decrease in tax revenue 
collected from domestically produced import substitutes and an increase in tax 
revenue obtained from imports. However, the net change in tax revenues cannot be 
generally predicted. 
The domestic tax reform itself by switching the reliance of taxes from international 
trade tax to consumption tax may also affect the revenue. If the domestic consumption 
tax is levied only on domestically produced goods (import substitutes), trade 
liberalization tends to lowers the revenue from domestic indirect tax. But, if taxes are 
levied on both imports and domestically produced goods, goods and services tax tends 
to be increased. Ebrill et al (1999) state that trade liberalization may affect goods and 
services tax revenue if the imported goods, which their tariffs are reduced, are 
included, at a significant proportion, in the domestic tax base. The direction of its 
impact depends on the volumes of imports after trade is liberalized. If there is no 
significant change in import volumes, leading to an unchanged import values, trade 
liberalization may immediately lower goods and services tax revenue. However, if the 
import volumes increase at a significant level, goods and services tax revenue may 
also increase. 
The indirect effect of trade liberalization on goods and services tax revenue can also 
be viewed through its impact on economic growth, like personal income and 
corporate income taxes as stated above. Because tax bases grow as countries grow, 
this should also be true for the consumption tax base since its base also relates to the 
growth of income. People should have more money in their hand as GDP grows, 
which means that there is higher purchasing power and higher demand for domestic 
consumption. However, surprisingly, the results shown in Tanzi (1987) stated that 
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there is no correlation between the share of domestic tax on goods and services in 
GDP and per capita income. 
Besides economic growth, a country’s size could play an important role in 
determining the domestic consumption tax (Peters, 2002). Generally, a consumption 
tax is a more significant revenue source in the bigger countries than in the smaller 
countries because the amount of tax collection depends directly on the domestic 
consumption. Larger countries tend to have a high population and a large domestic 
market whereas smaller countries seem to have less population and their size of 
domestic market is smaller. As a result, switching sources of revenue from a trade tax 
to a broad-based consumption tax, although applicable for developed countries, may 
cause fiscal problems for developing and less developed countries. 
In conclusion, the empirical literature on trade liberalization and taxation supports the 
claim that the net effect of trade liberalization is uncertain and the net change in tax 
revenue as a result of liberalizing trade is an empirical matter. In addition, the impact 
on each tax type depends on many different factors. The following section applies the 
traditional tax effort model and employs an econometrics approach in order to 
investigate further the relationship between trade liberalization and countries’ tax 
revenue. 
4.3. The Basic Model of Tax Effort 
A considerable number of studies have attempted to find measures of fiscal 
performance. In previous works, the tax ratio has always served as a rough index of a 
country’s tax performance or a measure of the relative effort of a country.25 
Generally, tax ratio analysis aims to explain the main determinants of differences in 
                                                            
25 See Bahl (1971), Ansari (1982), and  Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997) for example. 
153 
 
the tax ratio across countries. Most research concludes that the reason why there are 
such differences is because countries have different “capacities” to tax. Among early 
studies, Musgrave (1969) makes a great contribution to the explanation of why less 
developed countries usually have a low level of tax revenue by presenting a key term, 
“Tax handles”. Tax capacity or tax handle has been introduced as a key to increasing 
tax effort. For low income countries, it is much more difficult to impose and collect 
taxes than in an advanced economy. He reasons that it is not only the skills and 
facilities of tax administration in those countries that are less developed, but also the 
structure of their economies can afford fewer and less adequate “handles” on which to 
collect taxes. Thus, the relative absence of adequate tax handles in less developed 
economies is a main reason in explaining why their tax to GDP ratios is lower than 
those of highly developed economies. 
In the previous studies, a variety of methods have been tried to estimate tax effort. 
However, the most commonly used approach is to regress the tax performance on 
variables that serve as proxies for a country’s tax handles. This means that the 
independent variables used in this approach are represented as the major determinants 
for tax effort. By regressing tax effort, the stochastic model is used where T is the 
total tax revenue, Y is a proxy for income (either GDP or GNP), and T/Y is the tax 
ratio. The independent variables which are expected to influence the tax ratio are 
represented by Xi (i=1, 2,…, n) and u is the error term. This can be expressed in the 
following functional relationship: 
/ ( ,..., , )i nT Y f X X u=  (4.1) 
The most traditional explanatory variables in the conventional tax effort studies are 
those controlling for a country’s economic structure. These variables reflect the idea 
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that the availability of tax handles influences the level of tax effort. The following is 
the list of explanatory variables suggested by economic theory and by many previous 
empirical works. An overview of empirical results from some related literature is 
summarized in Appendix 4A. The independent variables that have been widely used 
by previous research are: 
(1) Level of Economic Development: measured by GDP per capita. Higher income, 
reflecting a higher level of development, is usually associated with higher 
capacity of tax payers to pay taxes as well as a greater capacity of the 
government to collect taxes from them. In addition, rich countries tend to have a 
higher degree of monetization of the economy and better tax administration 
(Agbeyegbe et al., 2004). Moreover, rich countries often tax proportionately 
higher than poor countries. Hence, it is expected that there is a positive 
relationship between the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP and GDP per capita. 
(2) Composition of GDP: measured by the share of the agricultural sector and the 
industrial (including mining) sector in GDP. The share of the agricultural sector 
in GDP is used for reflecting the difficulty of taxing different economic 
components since the agricultural sector is generally the major sector in less 
developed countries and most agricultural activities are related with many small 
firms which organize their activities at the subsistent level. It is relatively 
difficult to assess the income of the agricultural sector for income tax purpose 
and consumption taxes such as VAT are usually exempted for agricultural 
products. In addition, the agricultural sector reflects a possible degree of tax 
evasion in the economic sector. Thus, the share of agriculture in GDP is 
expected to be negatively related with total tax revenue. By contrast, more 
developed economies usually show a large share of industrial sector in their 
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GDP. This sector is relatively easy to tax and, in line with the quality of tax 
administration of developed countries, this sector yields a large amount of tax 
revenue for developed countries. Therefore, the share of the industrial (including 
mining) sector is expected to have a positive impact on total tax revenue. 
(3)  Openness: measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. For a public 
sector and a fiscal policy study, openness has long been considered as an 
important determinant and used for studying the impact on the tax level.26 The 
ratio of trade to GDP has been constructed as a tool for different measurement 
such as the level of trade barriers, the degree of globalization, and the extent of a 
country’s foreign trade sector, depending on the purpose of study. Although it is 
quite difficult to assess the direct impact of openness on tax revenues since 
openness may influence taxation indirectly by affecting many economic 
variables which in turn affect tax revenue, most studies find a strong association 
between the degree of openness and tax revenue.27 Since tax revenues of less 
developed economies, especially from a trade tax perspective, tend to have high 
dependency on the international trade sector, an increase in the degree of trade 
openness is expected to bring higher trade tax. Thus, a positive relationship is 
expected between them. 
4.4. The Extended Model, Data, and Empirical Methodology 
In this study, in addition to the degree of trade openness, two more indices are 
introduced to investigating the impact of trade liberalization, including average tariff 
rates and the number of free trade agreements, which will be discussed later. This 
                                                            
26 See Lotz and Morss (1970), Alícia and Boix (2002), and Wibbels and Arce (2003) for example. 
27 See Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp (1999), Agbeyegbe, Slotsky and WoldeMariam (2004), Baunsgaard and 
Keen (2005), and Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006) for example. 
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study divides samples into four categories (low-income countries, lower-middle 
income countries, upper-middle income countries, and high-income countries) in 
order to investigate how different groups of countries are affected by trade 
liberalization. In order to investigate the effect of trade liberalization on each tax type, 
this study not only investigates the impact of trade liberalization on total tax revenue, 
but also extends the study to four sub-category including international trade tax, 
personal income tax, corporate income tax, and goods and services tax. The model 
specification changes in regard to the difference in the level of economic development 
and types of taxes. 
From the previous section, since the level of economic development is assumed to be 
positively related to total tax revenue, it should also be expected that this variable is 
positively related to every type of tax, except for the trade tax. This is because higher 
level of income means that countries possess a higher quality of tax administration 
which is a necessary condition for them to achieve efficient tax collection.28 
However, the expected negative sign for trade tax is associated with the assumption 
that developed economies have relatively low reliance on trade tax.29 As countries 
grow, they will use trade taxes less, and hence get lower receipt from trade tax 
revenue. Therefore, the level of economic development is expected to be negatively 
related to trade tax. 
In this study, agricultural share is applied to the estimation of low and lower-middle 
income countries, while industrial share is applied to upper-middle income and high 
income countries. Since the share of the agricultural sector in GDP is assumed to have 
a negative relationship with total tax revenue by the reasons stated above, the same 
                                                            
28 See Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006). 
29 See Ebrill et al. (1999), Agbeyegbe et al. (2004), Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), and Aizenman and 
Jinjarak (2006) for example. 
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relationship should also be expected between the share of agricultural in GDP and all 
types of taxes. By contrast, the share of the industrial sector in GDP is expected to 
have a positive relationship with total tax revenue, so it should also be expected to 
have the same relationship with every type of tax. 
The model specification used in this study is drawn from the model which is generally 
used in the tax effort study. However, the traditional literature on tax effort has 
ignored the role of other key variables such as aid and debt, which could possibly be 
important factors influencing total tax revenue. Thus in order to investigate the role of 
these variables on taxation, they are included in the extended model with the 
assumption of their relationship with total tax revenue specified below; 
(1) Transfer of Aid: measured by aid per capita. Aid and grants have been used as 
an important source for financing the development of a number of less 
developed and developing countries for a few decades. Aid dependence could 
potentially erode the quality of institutions by weakening governmental 
accountability and the state bureaucracies, increasing political instability, 
encouraging rent seeking and corruption, raising conflict over control of aid 
funds, and alleviating the incentive to reform inefficient policies and 
institutions, and therefore leads to a decrease in revenues from tax collection.30 
Hence, this variable is expected to have a negative relationship with total tax 
revenue.31 Aid may directly reduce a government’s dependence on domestic tax 
                                                            
30 See Meyer (1992), Maren (1997), Dollar and Pritchett (1998), and Brautigam (2000) for example. 
31 It is worth noting that although aid per capita is generally found to be negatively related with total 
tax revenues (see Franco‐Rodriguez, Morrissey, and McGillivray, 1998, as an example), Gupta et al 
(2003) find that it could possibly related both positively and negatively with the overall level of tax 
revenue.  
158 
 
revenues or even be used for domestic tax reduction.32 A negative relationship 
should also be expected for all types of taxes. 
(2) Public Debt: measured by debt per capita. In many countries, especially for low 
income countries, a high level of public spending leads to large fiscal deficits 
and an increase in public debt.33 The interest on the debt and the debt itself can 
be paid with current tax revenues. This may result in raising tax revenues in 
order for the government to finance its large debt. Hence, it is expected that 
public debt is positively related to total tax revenue. However, for debt payment, 
different countries may raise revenue from different types of taxes. This is an 
empirical matter. 
For personal income tax, inflation should be added in the equation in order to 
investigate the effect of “bracket creep”. Bracket creep is the situation that higher 
inflation leads companies to make a higher payment for their employees in order to 
compensate for the rising of inflation. This automatically pushes more taxable income 
into higher tax bracket and expands the personal income tax base by increasing the 
number of tax payers (pushing those who have never been taxed into tax bracket). 
Hence, higher inflation is possibly related to higher personal income tax. 
(3) Inflation: measured by inflation rate. Since inflation leads to an increase in 
income in nominal term as stated above, it is assumed that inflation is positively 
related to personal income tax. 
For international trade tax, the exchange rate may play an important role in 
determining the receipt of this tax. Since most part of trade tax relies on tariff revenue 
                                                            
32 See Feyzioglu et al. (1998), and Moore (1998) for example. 
33 See Tanzi and Blejer (1988) for further discussion on the association between fiscal deficits and 
public debt. 
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which depends on the volume of imports, a significant change in the exchange rate 
may result in a significant change in import volume and hence trade tax revenue. 
(4) Exchange Rates: measured by national currency per US dollar. Currency 
appreciation could potentially lead to a higher volume of imports and higher 
tariff revenue as a consequence. Hence, a negative relationship is expected 
between exchange rates and trade tax. 
Because trade liberalization can take many forms, this study introduces other proxies 
for trade liberalization including average tariff rates and the number of free trade 
agreements. The former will be applied as a regressor only for the trade tax equation 
because it is assumed that there is “Laffer effect” for trade tax revenue, while the 
latter will be applied for every type of tax. By including the average tariff rate as an 
explanatory variable for trade tax, it helps us investigate whether a further reduction 
in tariff rate results in the decrease in trade tax revenue. 
(5) Average Tariff Rates: The relationship between the average tariff rates and trade 
tax is assumed to be nonlinear since it is expected to capture the existence of 
“Laffer curve”. Hence, a quadratic form is used to estimate the effect of this 
indicator of trade liberalization on international trade tax revenue. The revenue-
maximizing tariff rate is obtained by solving for ATR in the following equation: 
, i.e., 1 22 ( ) 0b b ATR+ = 1
22
bATR
b
−= . 
The most recent form of trade liberalization, free trade agreements, is accounted for in 
the model since there are many concerns about advantages and disadvantages which 
these agreements bring to the country. Hence, the variable FTA is included in every 
tax model to see how FTA may affect each type of tax. 
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(6) Free Trade Agreements: measured by the summation of the number of free trade 
agreement that are signed. Instead of using 0-1 dummy, this study introduces a 
new indicator for trade liberalization by applying the summation of the number 
of agreements which each country has in force. Types of agreements included 
custom unions, preferential arrangement, service agreement, and free trade 
agreement. Trade liberalization is usually assumed to be harmful for less 
developed countries since these countries do not have a good preparation for tax 
reform. In addition, these countries are usually forced by developed countries to 
sign trade agreements even though such agreements are disadvantageous, in 
exchange for avoiding non-trade barriers used by developed countries (e.g. 
environmental concerns or intellectual properties). Free trade agreement may 
not only decrease trade tax by directly reducing tariff revenue, but may also 
affect other types of tax via reducing domestic companies’ profits, leading to job 
loss. By contrast, most FTAs give privilege and opportunities for developed 
economies to enter to new markets, and hence leading to higher profit for 
companies in developed countries. Hence an FTA is expected to be harmful for 
less developed countries but to be beneficial for developed economies. 
Hence, the basic model of tax effort can be extended as: 
( , , , , , , , )TTR f PCGDP AGR IND OPEN PCAID PCDEBT FTA U=
)
 (4.2a) 
( , , , , , , , , ,ITT f PCGDP AGR IND OPEN PCAID PCDEBT EXR ATR FTA U=  (4.2b) 
( , , , , , , , ,PIT f PCGDP AGR IND OPEN PCAID PCDEBT INF FTA U= )
)
)
 (4.2c) 
( , , , , , , ,CIT f PCGDP AGR IND OPEN PCAID PCDEBT FTA U=  (4.2d) 
( , , , , , , ,GST f PCGDP AGR IND OPEN PCAID PCDEBT FTA U=  (4.2e) 
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where TTR is the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP, ITT is the ratio of international 
trade tax revenue to GDP, PIT is the ratio of personal income tax revenue to GDP, 
CIT is the ratio of corporate income tax revenue to GDP, GST is the ratio of goods 
and services tax revenue to GDP, per capita GDP is deducted by PCGDP, AGR and 
IND are the share of agricultural sector and industrial sector in GDP34, OPEN is the 
degree of trade openness measured by imports plus exports divided by GDP, PCAID 
is aid per capita, PCDEBT is debt per capita35, EXR is the exchange rate, INF is 
inflation rate, ATR is average tariff rates, and FTA is the summation of the number of 
free trade agreements. 
The following section explains the data set and methodology used in this study. The 
data set for GDP per capita, share of agricultural and industrial sectors in GDP, aid 
per capita, debt per capita, and inflation rate are obtained from World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Data for exchange rates are obtained from IMF Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS). For trade liberalization indicators, this study uses the 
traditional measure of trade openness; the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP at 
current prices. Data are obtained from Penn World Table 6.2 (PWT 6.2). Average 
tariff rates data are obtained from the WTO, IDB database and trade policy review. 
This study uses data for FTAs which are currently in force and notified to 
GATT/WTO. The FTAs data set are collected by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). For tax revenue, data are obtained from the World Tax Database (WTD) and 
IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS). In total, this study uses data of 134 
countries covering the period 1980-2003. 
                                                            
34 AGR is used as a regressor for low income and lower‐middle income countries, whereas IND is used 
as a regressor for upper‐middle income and high income countries. 
35 Note that PCAID and PCDEBT are not used as regressors in tax models for high income countries. 
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Empirical studies of the effect of trade liberalization on tax revenues are usually either 
cross-country studies using aggregate data, or individual-country studies using 
country of interest’s data. However, this study employs panel data estimation 
technique to estimate their relationship. Using panel data is an attractive alternative 
because it provides greater statistical power and offers greater flexibility in terms of 
explanatory variables. A set of 134 countries is taken and divided into four groups. 
Therefore, the panel data for 30 low income, 39 lower-middle income, 30 upper-
middle income, and 35 high income countries over 24 years for the period 1980 to 
2003 will be used to evaluate the impact of trade liberalization on the taxation of 
countries at different level of economic development. This study employs a fixed-
effects approach, with a two way estimate, incorporating time and individual country 
effects. The fixed effects model is as follow: 
0/it it i t it itT Y Xα α γ β ε= + + + +  (4.3) 
This model has an overall constant term ( 0α ) as well as a group effect for each 
country ( iα ) and a time effect for each period ( tγ ). The ratio of tax to GDP ( ) is 
altered by each tax type stated above. 
/it itT Y
itX  represents a set of control variables which 
vary depending on tax types and the level of economic development. 
4.5. Empirical Results 
Before estimating those equations stated above, a panel unit root test following Levin, 
Lin, and Chu (2002) was conducted in order to test the stationarity of our variables. 
The results of the test, presented in Appendix 4B, indicate that all variables are 
stationary at level. This section reports the results of estimating equation (4.2a) – 
(4.2e), by using the two-way fixed effects model considering both group and time 
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effects for all tax categories. Table 4.1 represents the results for the full sample while 
Tables 4.2-4.5 report results for four sub-samples defined by income level, 
comprising low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high income countries. The 
sequence of specification is different depending on each tax type and the country’s 
income level. Although many independent variables are included, the discussion 
mainly focuses on the key question of interest: the effect of trade liberalization on tax 
revenue.  
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Table 4.1: Determinants of Tax Revenue; Full Sample 
  Dependent Variable: ln of Tax Revenues 
   TTR  ITT  PIT  CIT  GST 
           
ln PCGDP  0.655***  ‐0.382***  1.036***  1.186***  0.664** 
  (0.163)  (0.092)  (0.371)  (0.323)  (0.280) 
AGR  ‐0.007  ‐0.047  ‐0.009  ‐0.021  ‐0.015 
  (0.012)  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.013) 
ln PCAID  ‐0.017  0.006  ‐0.179**  ‐0.028  ‐0.042 
  (0.047)  (0.080)  (0.073)  (0.058)  (0.050) 
ln PCDEBT  0.169***  0.169  0.196**  0.101*  0.257*** 
  (0.042)  (0.150)  (0.090)  (0.060)  (0.052) 
INF  ‐  ‐  0.002**  ‐  ‐ 
      (0.001)     
ln EXR  ‐  ‐0.126***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.030)       
OPEN  0.006**  0.009**  0.006  0.073**  0.043** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.033)  (0.020) 
ATR  ‐  0.027**  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.011)       
ATR‐Squared  ‐  ‐0.0003***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.0001)       
FTA  ‐0.088**  ‐0.089***  ‐0.061  ‐0.063  ‐0.103** 
  (0.041)  (0.017)  (0.053)  (0.040)  (0.043) 
            
           
R‐Squared  0.711  0.791  0.725  0.738  0.713 
Adjusted R‐Squared  0.676  0.746  0.685  0.705  0.678 
Number of Countries  90  87  81  85  90 
Number of Observations  1149  660  928  1040  1144 
Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
           
Source: Author's calculation         
Notes:           
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors       
*** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level     
**  significant at the 5% level         
*   significant at the 10% level         
Table 4.1 contains the results for the whole sample of countries. Many of the 
estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables are in line with the predictions and 
largely coincide with previous findings in the literature. For domestic taxes, the level 
of economic development is positively correlated with the use of more complicated 
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taxes. By contrast, as expected, the negative relationship between per capita GDP and 
trade tax indicates that countries tend to lower their dependency on trade tax as they 
grow. Overall, the higher level of income is associated with a higher total tax ratio. 
The share of agricultural sector in GDP, although shows negative sign, has no 
significant impact on all taxes. Aid per capita has a negative relationship only with 
personal income tax ratio, while debt per capita has a significant positive relationship 
with all domestic taxes but insignificant for trade tax. The positive sign of the 
coefficient for inflation indicates the presence of “bracket creep”; the situation when 
companies compensate their employees for rising inflation by giving them higher 
payment, which in turn push the tax-paying employees into higher income tax 
brackets. The pattern depends on the existence of a progressive tax system, in which 
marginal tax rates increase with higher income. Hence, inflation results in increased 
personal income tax collections by the government without any change to tax 
regulations. The result is in line with that of previous study (see for example, Greytak 
and McHugh, 1978) that higher inflation potentially pushes wages and salaries into 
higher tax brackets. The significant negative relationship between exchange rates and 
trade tax supports the hypothesis that currency appreciation leads to higher volume of 
imports, and hence increases trade tax revenue. 
For trade liberalization indices, the positive relationship between the degree of trade 
openness and trade tax coincides with economic theory as trade liberalization, which 
leads countries to have higher trade volumes, results in an increase in trade tax. The 
positive relationship between openness and other taxes also points out that openness 
has a contribution to the collection of domestic taxes. Opening countries to world 
trade may help boost corporate profit and the flow of goods and services within 
countries. The relationship between average tariff rates and trade tax is significant for 
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the full sample of countries. The positive coefficient of ATR is indicative of a tradeoff 
between reduced international trade tax revenue and reduced protection. The negative 
magnitude of ATR2 suggests that a potential “Laffer effect” exists for trade tax 
revenue. The coefficient for the number of free trade agreements turn out to have 
negative sign and significant for trade tax; supporting the assumption that, since most 
free trade agreements generally aim to reduce and eliminate trade barriers, especially 
tariff on imports, joining a trade agreement directly results in a decrease in trade tax 
revenue. 
Next, the sample is split into four income groups. Table 4.2 presents panel fixed 
effects estimates for 30 low income countries. Overall, the results are more robust 
than those estimated for the full sample. The level of income has a significant positive 
impact on domestic taxes but a negative impact on trade tax, with a remarkable high 
magnitude. The significant negative effect of the agricultural sector, especially on 
corporate income tax, indicates the difficulty in taxing an economy with most parts 
being from the primary sector. There is no evidence supporting the view that aid 
reduces collecting tax in low income countries. However, debt seems to be a tax 
driving force. Higher debt is associated with higher tax collection, especially for all 
domestic taxes. Inflation still significantly leads to “bracket creep”, and hence high 
personal income tax. The coefficient for the exchange rate is statistically significant 
with a negative sign, supporting the hypothesis that the appreciation of a currency 
leads to higher imports, and consequently trade tax revenue. 
Now turn to variables of our interests, the degree of trade openness, average tariff 
rates, and the number of free trade agreements. The coefficients for trade openness are 
positively significant for all tax types with very similar magnitude. An increase in tax 
revenues, especially for trade tax, as a result of an increase in the international trade 
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sector in GDP strongly supports the hypothesis that tax revenues of low income 
countries have a high dependency on trading with other nations. The more the country 
opens itself to trade with the world, the more the benefits for taxation. There is one 
important notice for this positive relationship. Although the development of the tax 
system (e.g. the application of complicated taxes such as VAT) in most of low income 
countries is perceived that it is in the very first stage, the results show that these 
countries, at least, develop their tax system to the level that is able to reap the benefits 
which come with trade liberalization. Trade openness may raise the goods and 
services tax by increasing domestic buying, through an increase in the variety of 
goods and services. It may be associated with an increase in corporate income tax by 
enhancing the corporate profits of imports and exports companies. The association 
between trade liberalization and personal income tax is somewhat complicated. Many 
previous studies find that there is a positive relationship between openness to trade 
and income growth (see for example Frankel and Romer, 1999). As income grows, 
there is a shift in taxable income and taxpayers move into higher tax brackets, and this 
possibly results in higher amount of personal income tax collection. 
For trade tax, the sign of the coefficients for ATR is positive and ATR2 is negative, 
and both are significant, which illustrates the expected “Laffer effect”. The revenue-
maximizing tariff rate of international trade taxation is estimated to be approximately 
43% while, from average tariff rates data, it is clear that the effective rate of tariff has 
already been reduced below this rate in all low income countries. Thus, for countries 
in this group, the further reduction in average tariff rates generally results in a 
decrease in trade tax revenue. 
Trade liberalization via free trade agreements seems not to be the wisest way since the 
results show that the coefficients for free trade agreements are negatively significant 
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for all taxes. The remarkable high magnitude supports the hypothesis that a free trade 
agreement is harmful for less developed economies’ taxation. In addition to a 
decrease in trade tax, a free trade agreement is also associated with a drop in domestic 
taxes both income and consumption taxes. This may cause a problem if these 
countries choose to liberalize their trade by forming an agreement and plan to mitigate 
the loss in trade tax by raising any of their domestic taxes. 
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Table 4.2: Determinants of Tax Revenues; Low Income Countries 
  Dependent Variable: ln of Tax Revenues 
   TTR  ITT  PIT  CIT  GST 
           
ln PCGDP  1.579**  ‐1.154**  1.945**  3.003***  1.743** 
  (0.596)  (0.547)  (0.796)  (0.847)  (0.809) 
AGR  ‐0.005  ‐0.034  ‐0.012  ‐0.054**  ‐0.059** 
  (0.027)  (0.045)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.023) 
ln PCAID  ‐0.063  ‐0.314  0.019  ‐0.157  ‐0.159 
  (0.235)  (0.408)  (0.235)  (0.216)  (0.231) 
ln PCDEBT  0.255**  ‐0.639  0.632**  0.333**  0.277** 
  (0.115)  (0.439)  (0.318)  (0.129)  (0.124) 
INF  ‐  ‐  0.002**  ‐  ‐ 
      (0.001)     
ln EXR  ‐  ‐0.440***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.161)       
OPEN  0.025**  0.031**  0.037***  0.023**  0.026** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
ATR  ‐  0.052**  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.025)       
ATR‐Squared  ‐  ‐0.001**  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.000)       
FTA  ‐0.098***  ‐0.095**  ‐0.048**  ‐0.056**  ‐0.014*** 
  (0.021)  (0.048)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.005) 
            
           
R‐Squared  0.690  0.733  0.773  0.726  0.671 
Adjusted R‐Squared  0.616  0.606  0.705  0.653  0.593 
Number of Countries  24  22  24  23  24 
Number of Observations  301  162  259  271  302 
Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
           
Source: Author's calculation         
Notes:           
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors       
*** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level     
**  significant at the 5% level         
*   significant at the 10% level         
Table 4.3 represents the results of 39 lower-middle income countries. The 
significance and the signs of coefficients for GDP per capita still support the 
hypothesis that as countries develop, they make use of more complicated taxes but 
lower their reliance on trade tax. The significant positive relationship between 
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agricultural share and trade tax indicates the fact that countries which their economic 
structure relies on the primary sector tend to use a trade tax as an important source of 
revenue. Contrary to the results of low income group, the impact of the share of the 
agricultural sector in GDP on the consumption tax is positive and significant, 
indicating the importance of the technological matter. A possible explanation is that, 
in general, most agricultural goods and foodstuffs, which remain in their natural state, 
are exempt from VAT. Although these countries base their economies on the 
agricultural sector, they possess technology which is high enough to transform 
agricultural products into intermediate and final goods, which gives them value 
added, and hence makes them no longer have exempt status. Thus, an increase in the 
flow of domestic agricultural processed products is associated with an increase in 
consumption tax receipts. For countries in this income group, aid tends to reduce tax 
revenue in recipient countries, especially for personal income and corporate income 
taxes. There is also evidence indicating that lower income countries usually raise 
revenue from domestic taxes, both income and consumption taxes, to pay their debt. 
The coefficient for inflation shows the effect of “bracket creep” and the coefficient for 
exchange rates has a significant negative sign, which is the same as for low income 
countries. 
The coefficients for the degree of trade openness are all positive and significant with a 
similar magnitude to those in low income countries, reflecting that tax bases of these 
countries are highly dependent on international trade sector. The coefficients for 
average tariff rates show the existence of “Laffer curve” in which the revenue-
maximizing rate is approximately at 25%. Although the rate is much lower than that 
of the low income group, their current average tariff rates have already been lowered 
below that point since the second half of the 1980s. Thus, again, a reduction in tariff 
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rates generally leads to a fall in trade tax revenue. The sign on the number of free 
trade agreements shows negative and significant coefficients for all tax types. Trade 
liberalization via joining a trade agreement thus appears to lower total taxes, 
obviously through its effect on both trade tax and domestic taxes. 
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Tax Revenues; Lower-Middle Income Countries 
  Dependent Variable: ln of Tax Revenues 
   TTR  ITT  PIT  CIT  GST 
           
ln PCGDP  0.733***  ‐0.643***  0.362***  0.403***  0.304*** 
  (0.123)  (0.157)  (0.129)  (0.135)  (0.112) 
AGR  0.019***  0.034***  0.015  0.001  0.017** 
  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
ln PCAID  0.029  ‐0.040  ‐0.185**  ‐0.173***  ‐0.023 
  (0.027)  (0.055)  (0.077)  (0.054)  (0.040) 
ln PCDEBT  0.256***  0.208  0.369**  0.473***  0.298*** 
  (0.058)  (0.166)  (0.143)  (0.139)  (0.085) 
INF  ‐  ‐  0.003***  ‐  ‐ 
      (0.001)     
ln EXR  ‐  ‐0.028**  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.014)       
OPEN  0.042***  0.034**  0.010***  0.039**  0.036*** 
  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.003)  (0.019)  (0.008) 
ATR  ‐  0.087***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.018)       
ATR‐Squared  ‐  ‐0.002***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.000)       
FTA  ‐0.067***  ‐0.129***  ‐0.186***  ‐0.011***  ‐0.012*** 
  (0.021)  (0.040)  (0.064)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
            
           
R‐Squared  0.933  0.952  0.805  0.859  0.864 
Adjusted R‐Squared  0.922  0.938  0.764  0.833  0.842 
Number of Countries  36  36  30  34  36 
Number of Observations  500  301  374  441  500 
Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
           
Source: Author's calculation         
Notes:           
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors       
*** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level     
**  significant at the 5% level         
*   significant at the 10% level         
In the upper-middle income group of 30 countries (Table 4.4), the level of economic 
development still has a significant positive influence on all domestic taxes but a 
significant negative impact on trade tax. Here, the variable “agricultural share” is 
changed to “industrial share” because it is assumed that the industrial sector plays a 
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more important role in developed economies. The industrial sector is easier to tax than 
the agricultural sector since businesses performing in the industrial sector usually 
keep better accounts and records. In addition, products produced in this sector are 
rarely exempt from the consumption tax. As expected, the coefficients for the share of 
the industrial sector in GDP are statistically significant with a positive sign. Aid per 
capita turns out to be negatively significant not only with income taxes, but also with 
the consumption tax. This means that as these countries receive more aid, they have 
less dependency on tax revenue, and hence there is a possibility that they use aid as a 
domestic tax reduction since tax reduction is a tool that governments use to get more 
vote and supporters for their next term (see for example Moore, 1998). The result is 
inline with other studies such as that of Franco-Rodriguez, Morrissey, and 
McGillivray (1998). The coefficient for debt per capita is positively significant for 
income and goods and services taxes. This illustrates that upper-middle income 
countries may choose to use domestic taxes as a mean of their debt payment. Inflation 
still has a positive impact on personal income tax which illustrates the effect of 
“bracket creep”. The coefficient for the exchange rates is negative and significant, in 
line with the results of the other two income groups. 
Increased trade openness again is observed to have led to an increase in the receipt of 
all tax types, showing the high influence of the international trade sector in 
determining tax collection. A potential “Laffer effect” exists for trade tax and the 
revenue-maximizing rate of trade taxation, estimated to be 25%, is again higher than 
the actual rate. The coefficients for free trade agreements are negative and significant 
for all taxes, once again indicating that there is a harmful effect of trade liberalization 
through trade agreement, not only on trade tax as usual, but also on domestic taxes. 
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Tax Revenues; Upper-Middle Income Countries 
  Dependent Variable: ln of Tax Revenues 
   TTR  ITT  PIT  CIT  GST 
           
ln PCGDP  0.440***  ‐1.251***  0.661***  0.279***  0.763*** 
  (0.139)  (0.160)  (0.119)  (0.085)  (0.140) 
IND  0.014***  0.001  0.058***  0.037***  0.023*** 
  (0.004)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
ln PCAID  ‐0.053***  ‐0.041  ‐0.098**  ‐0.114***  ‐0.040** 
  (0.017)  (0.042)  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.021) 
ln PCDEBT  0.163***  ‐0.165  0.644***  0.093**  0.291*** 
  (0.065)  (0.182)  (0.148)  (0.048)  (0.055) 
INF  ‐  ‐  0.008***  ‐  ‐ 
      (0.002)     
ln EXR  ‐  ‐0.057***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.022)       
OPEN  0.014***  0.036***  0.020***  0.100**  0.047*** 
  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.046)  (0.017) 
ATR  ‐  0.116**  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.053)       
ATR‐Squared  ‐  ‐0.002**  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.001)       
FTA  ‐0.032**  ‐0.098***  ‐0.081**  ‐0.057**  ‐0.016** 
  (0.015)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.029)  (0.008) 
            
           
R‐Squared  0.873  0.910  0.786  0.881  0.922 
Adjusted R‐Squared  0.845  0.871  0.729  0.854  0.904 
Number of Countries  30  29  27  28  30 
Number of Observations  348  197  295  328  342 
Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
           
Source: Author's calculation         
Notes:           
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors       
*** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level     
**  significant at the 5% level         
*   significant at the 10% level         
For high income countries (Table 4.5), the coefficients for per capita GDP support the 
hypothesis that a higher level of economic development is associated with a higher 
use of complicated taxes and lower use of trade tax. The tax ratios, except for the 
trade tax, are positively related to the share of the industrial sector in GDP, which 
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again reflects the greater ease of taxing the profits of industry rather than the income 
from agriculture. The coefficient of inflation indicates that “bracket creep” exists 
when there is higher inflation. Appreciation of currency leads to higher imports, and 
hence higher trade tax. 
For trade openness, although the coefficients are positive and significant for trade tax, 
corporate income tax, and consumption tax, it is insignificant in raising total tax to 
GDP. The level of economic development and the structure of the economy now seem 
to matter. The result confirms Bahl’s (1971) comment that in developed economies, 
trade tends to be less relevant than per capita income in determining the tax ratio. 
Average tariff rates do not have a significant impact on trade tax, although the sign 
shows that “Laffer effect” possibly occurs. Noticeably, while free trade agreements 
have a significant negative impact on trade tax, similarly to the results of other 
income groups, the coefficients for this variable are positive and significant for all 
domestic taxes and total tax. This is interesting since the results indicate that while 
low and middle income countries have to be careful in signing any trade agreement 
because it may end up with the loss of tax revenue, high income countries, which 
usually be the mainstay of urging other less developed countries to sign such 
agreement, may benefit from trade agreement by gaining more tax revenue. 
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Table 4.5: Determinants of Tax Revenues; High Income Countries 
  Dependent Variable: ln of Tax Revenues 
   TTR  ITT  PIT  CIT  GST 
           
ln PCGDP  0.622***  ‐0.706***  0.762***  0.723**  0.978*** 
  (0.222)  (0.268)  (0.308)  (0.346)  (0.367) 
IND  0.013**  ‐0.010  0.052***  0.032***  0.035** 
  (0.006)  (0.026)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
INF  ‐  ‐  0.015**  ‐  ‐ 
      (0.007)     
ln EXR  ‐  ‐0.900***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.262)       
OPEN  0.002  0.021***  0.004  0.110**  0.052** 
  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.054)  (0.022) 
ATR  ‐  0.236***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.070)       
ATR‐Squared  ‐  ‐0.004  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
    (0.003)       
FTA  0.045**  ‐0.022***  0.048**  0.121***  0.091*** 
  (0.020)  (0.008)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
            
           
R‐Squared  0.923  0.982  0.883  0.902  0.927 
Adjusted R‐Squared  0.914  0.973  0.868  0.891  0.919 
Number of Countries  32  14  28  30  32 
Number of Observations  632  129  552  588  629 
Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
           
Source: Author's calculation         
Notes:           
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors       
*** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level     
**  significant at the 5% level         
*   significant at the 10% level         
4.6. Conclusions 
In research of trade liberalization, a lot of attention has been paid to its impact on 
export performance, economic growth, employment, income distribution, and wage 
inequality, but very little to its impact on taxation and government revenue. These are 
equally important areas of inquiry, because if trade liberalization leads to a reduction 
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in tax revenues, this can have serious implications for fiscal reform of countries that 
have a budget constraint. In other words, because trade liberalization is possibly 
associated with a decrease in international trade tax revenue, if its negative impact is 
spread on other domestic taxes, the suggesting solution using tax reform by replacing 
trade tax with income or consumption taxes may be inefficient or even be 
inapplicable. The sufferings from the loss of tax revenue may be much higher for 
countries that have constrained government’s income sources, especially for most of 
low and middle income countries which have a high dependency on trade tax revenue. 
Dividing the estimation into four sub-samples including low, lower-middle, upper-
middle, and high income countries, the results of the analysis undertaken are strong 
and robust to the estimation technique using two-way fixed effects, which means that 
the conclusion can be presented with some confidence. 
First, trade liberalization that leads to higher imports and exports has significantly 
affected all taxes in low and middle income groups. The estimation has revealed the 
important of the international trade sector in low and middle income countries’ 
economies. Openness to international trade obviously helps stimulate the collection of 
income taxes, possibly by increasing employment, wage level, and corporate profits. 
It also has a contribution to the consumption tax, possibly by spurring flows of goods 
within the country. The positive relationship between the degree of trade openness 
and trade tax means that openness possibly is a stimulus to higher volume of trade 
between countries and consequently increases trade tax receipts at the current level of 
the tariff rate. The effect of trade openness on both trade tax and domestic taxes 
emphasizes the fact that, for low and middle income countries, not only is their trade 
sector highly dependent on international sector, but also their entire economic 
structure will be affected if there is any change in countries’ international trade 
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system. A change which leads to an increase in trade volume will consequently 
benefit these countries’ taxation. By contrast, trade tends to be less relevant than per 
capita income in determining tax revenue in high income countries. Thus, although 
overall results suggest that trade liberalization via increasing trade openness generally 
has a contribution to taxation in all countries, the degree of its benefit depends on the 
country’s level of economic development and economic structure. 
Second, there is an existence of the Laffer effect on trade tax in low and middle 
income countries. From the estimated results, the actual tariffs are below the revenue-
maximizing rate, which in turn illustrates that a further reduction of tariff levels could 
actually decrease trade tax revenue. This implies that trade liberalization in the form 
of tariff reduction is harmful to countries where trade tax accounts for a high 
proportion of their tax revenues. 
Third, the impact of trade liberalization in the form of free trade agreements differs 
according to the level of economic development. While free trade agreements have a 
strong negative impact on all kind of taxes in low and middle income countries, they 
seem to have a contribution to taxation in high income countries. The results raise 
issues concerning agreements which are signed between developed and less 
developed countries. Generally, many less developed countries are afraid of joining 
any agreement with developed countries because most parts of their economic sector 
are not well prepared for freer and higher competition, while developed countries, 
which usually initiate such agreements, are believed to have a higher ability to take 
advantages from those agreements. Their fear of trade liberalization is in line with 
studies which suggest that freer trade may potentially lead to the fall in domestic 
corporate profit, job loss, or even business shutdown. The negative impact of FTAs on 
tax revenue may or may not result from the evidence suggested above. However, the 
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present results do suggest that the problem on taxation to be faced when entering free 
trade agreements, especially in low and middle income countries, is a real one. Tax 
reform suggested by economic theory and international experience by moving away 
from international trade taxation and compensating the loss of trade tax by raising 
more revenue from income and consumption taxes may be inapplicable since these 
taxes also severely suffer from FTAs, not to mention the difficulties in improving 
domestic tax administration which requires reorganizing along functional lines, 
modernizing procedures, computerizing systems, and training people. 
In conclusion, it should be stressed that because trade liberalization may take many 
forms, its effects vary greatly in detail of liberalization. The results here do not imply 
that trade liberalization in the form of FTAs is harmful to taxation since each 
agreement differs in its detail. However, its negative impact is worth highlighting. 
One policy conclusion from the results, therefore, would be that countries which need 
to promote trade liberalization, especially for low and middle income countries, need 
to take great care in every step of moving toward freer trade. Balancing the advantage 
and disadvantage of trade liberalization may possibly help countries mitigate their 
loss of trade tax revenue and achieve successful tax reform. 
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Appendix 4A: Summary of Previous Studies in Tax Effort 
Table 4A1: Summary Table of Previous Studies in Tax Effort 
Study 
Lotz and 
Morss 
(1967) 
Shin (1969) Bahl (1971) Tanzi (1992) 
Piancastelli 
(2001) Teera (2002) 
Alm, 
Martinez-
Varquez and 
Schneider 
(2004) 
Bahl (2003) 
Sample Developing 
and 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
and 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developing 
and 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
and Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
and 
Developed 
Countries 
Less 
Developed 
Economies 
and OECD 
Dependent 
Variable 
Ratio of Tax 
Revenue to 
GNP 
Tax Ratio Taxable 
Capacity 
Tax Share Ratio of 
Total Tax 
Revenues to 
GDP 
Tax to GDP 
Ratio 
Ratio of 
Total Tax 
Revenues to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
Tax 
Revenue to 
GDP 
Independent 
Variables 
GNP per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 
Income per 
capita 
Income per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 
 
Sign + + + + + Mixed Results -  
Significance Significant 
for full 
sample and 
low income 
countries, 
insignificant 
for high 
income 
countries 
Significant 
for full 
sample 
Insignificant Generally 
significant 
but 
insignificant 
for some 
years 
Not always 
significant 
Not always 
significant 
Significant  
Independent 
Variables 
Ratio of 
imports plus 
exports to 
GNP 
Foreign 
Trade Ratio 
The Export 
Ratio 
The Share 
of Imports 
in GDP 
Ratio of 
Trade to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
imports plus 
exports to 
GDP 
 Ratio of 
Openness 
Sign + + + + + Both + and -  + 
Significance Significant 
for full 
sample and 
low income 
countries, 
insignificant 
for high 
income 
countries 
Insignificant Not always 
significant 
Significant Significant Positively 
significant for 
low and 
middle income 
countries, 
negative or 
insignificant 
for high 
income 
countries 
 Significant 
Independent 
Variables 
 The 
Agricultural 
Income 
Ratio 
The 
Agricultural 
Share 
The Share 
of 
Agricultural 
sector in 
GDP 
The Share 
of 
Agricultural 
sector in 
GDP 
Ratio of 
Agriculture to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
Agriculture 
to GNP 
 
Sign  - - - - Both + and - -  
Significance  Insignificant Significant Significant Significant Negatively 
significant for 
low income 
countries, 
positive and 
significant in 
some 
estimations for 
middle income 
countries 
Insignificant  
Independent 
Variables 
  The Mining 
Share 
 The Share 
of Industrial 
Sector in 
GDP 
Ratio of 
Manufacturing 
to GDP 
Ratio of 
Mining to 
GDP 
The Non-
Agricultural 
Share of 
GDP 
Sign   +  + - + + 
Significance   Significant  Significant Insignificant Significant Significant 
Independent 
Variables 
   Level of 
Foreign 
Debt in 
GDP 
The Share 
of Service 
Sector in 
GDP 
Shadow 
Economy 
Ratio of 
Shadow 
Economy to 
GDP 
 
Sign    + + + -  
Significance    Not always 
significant 
Not always 
significant 
Not always 
significant 
Significant  
Independent 
Variables 
      Ratio of 
International 
Trade Tax to 
GDP 
 
Sign       -  
Significance       Insignificant  
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Appendix 4B: Panel Unit Root Test 
This study employs the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test which is one of the first unit root 
tests to be developed for panel data. The results in the table below indicate that there 
is no presence of unit root. The LLC test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
showing that all variables used in the study are stationary at level. 
Table 4B1: The Panel Unit Root Test 
Variables Full Sample 
Low 
Income  
Lower-
Middle 
Income 
Upper-
Middle 
Income 
High 
Income 
Taxes 
lnTTR -6.11*** -7.74*** -9.15*** -7.42*** -8.53*** 
lnITT -7.84*** -17.95*** -5.81*** -9.16*** -13.04*** 
lnPIT -8.85*** -7.59*** -3.74*** -10.73*** -13.23*** 
lnCIT -3.96*** -1.97*** -5.07*** -4.50*** -3.31*** 
lnGST -7.87*** -7.02*** -4.75*** -9.71*** -4.35*** 
Independent 
Variables  
lnPCGDP -4.35*** -3.29*** -4.94*** -3.91*** -5.08*** 
AGR -2.51*** -2.93*** -2.26*** - - 
IND -18.12*** - - -18.57*** -17.47*** 
lnPCAID -9.37*** -7.39*** -8.36*** -10.09*** - 
lnPCDEBT -7.23*** -10.03*** -7.36*** -5.93*** - 
INF -2.11*** -2.15*** -2.11*** -2.70*** -2.37*** 
lnEXR -5.10*** -4.62*** -2.47*** -7.27*** -4.71*** 
OPEN -3.69*** -3.57*** -4.41*** -2.03*** -3.63*** 
ATR -4.13*** -3.25*** -9.49*** -3.87*** -5.57*** 
ATR-
Square 
-6.97*** -7.36*** -6.77*** -5.62*** -8.68*** 
FTA -2.28*** -1.87*** -2.54*** -4.17*** -7.32*** 
The number in the table present Levin, Lin and Chu test statistics 
*** indicates the significance at 1% level 
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5.1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization is always considered as a potential source of fiscal instability 
because it is usually associated with the decline in international trade tax revenue. 
One of the critical issues about revenue related trade liberalization is that the boost to 
international trade tax revenue from higher trade volume, as a consequence of tariff 
reduction, will be insufficient to outweigh the revenue-dampening effect of tariff rate 
reduction. Furthermore, in some cases, international trade tax revenue may be driven 
down as a result of the reduction in international trade tax rates combined with the 
weak expansion of it tax base. In order for a government to maintain fiscal stability 
while liberalizing trade, an appropriate domestic tax reform must be performed. In 
fact, in many programmes supported by the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
substantial trade liberalization is suggested to be accompanied by comprehensive 
domestic tax reform. More specifically, the loss of international trade tax revenue 
should be compensated for by higher revenues from the taxation of domestic goods 
and services and from direct taxes on income and profits. 
The decrease in international trade tax revenue can be matched by an increase in 
revenue from domestic indirect taxation. Keen and Ligthart (1999) suggest that a 
combined tariff cut with a point-to-point increase in domestic consumption tax can 
lead to an increase in public revenue. In particular, most countries have increased 
reliance on Value-added tax (VAT), in which the VAT is suggested by many authors 
to reduce the possibility of tax evasion and does not hurt the external competitiveness 
of domestic producers. Value-added tax has been introduced in ASEAN countries, 
with varying degree of success. VAT is introduced as part of an overall tax reform 
during trade liberalization because it is administrated quite effectively and helped 
boost fiscal revenue. However, in practice, the revenue performance of VAT and its 
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distributional effects will depend on the tax’s specific design and on the quality of its 
administration. In addition, VAT tends to be less effective in developing countries 
that have large informal sectors. 
Considering the reform of tax administration itself, in the past, the lack of 
administrative capacity reduces the efficiency of tax collection, while the large size of 
the informal and subsistence sectors means that a large proportion of transactions 
cannot be taxed. In addition, the influence of powerful lobbies makes some sectors 
off-limits to the tax authorities. As a result the domestic tax base is narrow and a 
government tries to meet its fiscal needs by charging high rates on easy-to-tax sectors 
such as international trade (Kubota, 2000). Many recent studies suggest that one of 
the keys to collect higher tax revenue is to improve tax administration. The main 
problems of tax administration which are needed to be addressed include the lack of 
financial and material resources, poorly trained staff, ineffective procedures, the 
absence of effective taxpayer services, and corruption. To resolve these problems, 
some countries has restructured their tax system, for example, by strengthening tax 
administration, establishing tax monitoring units, improving audit practices, and 
computerizing the tax system. Following these reforms, improving tax administration 
could reduce tax evasion and consequently enhance fiscal revenue.  
Generally, tax reform is an important instrument for raising tax yield. Usually, tax 
productivity should be improved after the country reformed its tax system. However, 
the effect of trade liberalization on the overall tax system is ambiguous. A positive 
fiscal effect can arise if trade liberalization is accompanied by 1) a large expansion in 
international trade volume which results in an increase in international trade tax, 2) 
economic growth which later increases production, employment, and income level 
and results in a larger base for personal and corporate income taxes, 3) devaluation of 
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the exchange rate which raises the domestic value of imports and hence stimulates 
people to switch consumption from imports goods to domestic products and thus 
increases goods and services tax base. By contrast, a negative fiscal effect can also 
happen if trade liberalization is accompanied by shrinking trade volumes, job losses, 
and deterioration in corporate profit. In addition, in principle, it is difficult to 
determine the direction of change in tax revenue as a result of trade liberalization 
because it depends crucially on revenue productivity and tax structure (Suliman, 
2005). That is, growth in tax revenues may occur through automatic responses of the 
tax yield through changes in national income and/or through the imposition of new 
taxes, revision of the rate-structure of existing taxes, expansion of the tax bases, tax 
amnesties, and tougher compliance and enforcement measures. Changes in tax yield 
resulting from the modification of tax parameters (i.e., rates, base) are called 
“discretionary changes” which stem from legislative action. Generally, tax buoyancy 
and tax elasticity are the measures used to evaluate the ability of country’s tax system 
to mobilize its revenue (Asher, 1989). Tax buoyancy measures the change in the 
overall tax yield from changes in GDP whereas tax elasticity measures the change in 
tax yield resulting from variations in national income with tax parameters held 
constant (i.e., discretionary changes being removed). 
In this chapter, a measure of revenue productivity of the tax system is used to 
determine whether the responsiveness of tax revenues is high or low in Thailand 
relative to three of the other founding countries of the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines). By using the buoyancy and elasticity 
framework, this chapter applies the concept of tax buoyancy and elasticity to evaluate 
the implications of the process of trade liberalization on revenue mobilization. The 
main objective of this chapter is to estimate tax buoyancy and tax elasticity of the tax 
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system of Thailand, compared to those of its three neighbour countries. The 
evaluation is done to measure the response of the tax system to trade liberalization by 
AFTA in 1992. More specifically, in this chapter we address the question of whether 
Thailand’s major trade liberalization by becoming an AFTA member results in the 
enhancement of the flexibility of the tax system. If there is any change or 
improvement in Thailand’s tax system, which components of the tax structure have 
been the most responsive, and why? If not, which tax sources have been rigid, and 
why? What policy implications can be drawn? The results will be used for 
comparison purpose in order to gain a wider perspective on the impact of AFTA on 
the tax system among big ASEAN nations. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 gives details of taxation 
choices in revenue from reforming income and consumption taxes discussed from a 
theoretical perspective. This section also provides an overview of fiscal profiles of 
Thailand and the other three ASEAN countries as well as the discussion on their fiscal 
policies in order to identify any policy changes which occurred during the 1990s, 
especially when countries joined AFTA. Section 3 reviews theoretical and empirical 
studies on tax buoyancy and tax elasticity. Section 4 summarizes the methodology 
and the data. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis. The final section gives some 
summary and concluding remarks. 
5.2. The Reform of Taxation in Developing Countries 
In most developing countries, the major problem of the fiscal consequences of trade 
liberalization is how to fit the revenue compensation into revenue loss from 
liberalization. This area of concern involves domestic tax reform which is associated 
with broad issues of economic policy, tax administration, and tax structure design. 
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Among the issues concerning tax reform, the most important and interesting point is 
how to design the composition of tax structure. More specifically, the critical issue of 
tax reform is how the government should design the major components of tax 
structure to cooperate with trade liberalization in order to make the whole tax 
structure desirable, administratively practicable, and politically feasible. Thus, 
understanding fiscal backgrounds and fiscal policies of countries is a very necessary 
step before tax reform is performed and evaluated. In addition, knowing which tax 
handles should be used for domestic tax reform is crucial since it helps a government 
to perform the reform efficiently. 
Therefore, this section begins with the discussion on the main types of taxes that are 
generally suggested to be used for tax reform. Then, the fiscal backgrounds and fiscal 
policies in each of the four countries will be discussed to provide an insight of fiscal 
movement of these four countries. 
5.2.1. The Choice between Income and Consumption taxes: Theoretical 
Considerations 
This section begins with the choice between income tax and consumption tax, as a 
tool for offsetting revenue shortfall as a consequence of trade liberalization. Although 
the tax literature has traditionally suggested income tax as a preferred tool in raising 
revenue, many recent works have emphasized a broad-based consumption tax as a 
preferred source to mitigate the loss of revenue.36 The supporters of consumption tax 
propose that the most attractive reason for using this tax source as a tool for revenue 
offsetting is because consumption offers a large tax base for developing countries. 
Moreover, the difficulties that arise with income tax administration are also the cases 
                                                            
36 See Auerbach (1996) and Jorgensen (1996) for example. 
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to avoid income taxes used for mitigation. However, another group has suggested that 
reforming the tax system by focusing on consumption tax also encounters problems. 
The modern concern proposed by Keen (2007) suggests that there is a failure in 
applying the value-added tax (VAT) in some developing countries since the 
administration of such a tax requires accurate accounting for financial transactions. In 
general, central considerations in the debate of the reform focusing on income tax or 
consumption tax are efficiency and equity, especially for developing countries which 
usually have high inequality of income and wealth. For efficiency issue, the 
theoretical literature has pointed out that taxing income is less efficient than taxing 
consumption since it reduces higher welfare. Generally, income tax consists of two 
broad components, a labour tax and a capital tax. On the part of labour tax, theory 
suggests that taxing on labour wages causes additional distortions on savings while 
consumption tax does not. On the part of capital tax, since capital can be divided into 
physical capital and human capital, theory suggests that, although both taxing on 
capital and taxing on consumption may have similar consequence by depressing 
physical capital accumulation, capital tax may also have an additional impact on 
human capital accumulation, which further lowers social welfare. Thus, when 
considering efficiency, consumption tax is believed to be a more preferable tool for 
raising revenue to offset the loss from trade liberalization. Another issue in the choice 
between raising income tax and raising consumption tax involves the impact on 
equity. This concern is particularly important in developing countries since there 
usually is a highly uneven income distribution. The theoretical literature has 
suggested that consumption tax is inherently more regressive than income taxes. 
Taxing consumption is suggested to be ineffective in achieving equity objectives 
because both the rich and the poor consume the same goods that are being taxed at the 
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same rate (though consuming in different proportions). Therefore, from the equity 
point of view, raising revenue using income tax is preferable to raising revenue using 
consumption tax. However, it is found that an application of consumption tax is 
relatively feasible in practice and hence, is widely adopted by many developing 
countries. 
Since developing countries usually rely heavily on such convenient tax handles as 
tariffs and import duties and count on these international trade taxes as an important 
source of government revenue, lowering tariff rates in the process of trade 
liberalization in order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), to participate in 
regional trading agreement such as AFTA or NAFTA, or to reach any bilateral trading 
agreements with developed countries, could have a the significant impact on economy 
and the government revenue of these countries. A significant loss in budgetary 
revenue could possibly occur, at least in the short run before the volume of imports 
respond to the changes in tariffs. As stated earlier, most developing countries have 
decided to mitigate the loss under this circumstance by increasing domestic 
consumption tax rather than increasing income tax since it is the most viable option 
on grounds of both policy and administration. However, in order to determine 
precisely the choice between income and consumption taxes, various aspects of these 
tax handles should be discussed and compared. The following subsection highlights 
some of the most important aspects of major tax handles used for mitigating the 
revenue loss. 
Personal Income Tax 
In most developing countries, personal income tax (PIT) has yielded very little 
revenue and thus is not counted as the most important tax handle in the tax structure 
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as it usually is in developed countries. This is mainly because there is a very small 
number of individuals who are subject to PIT. In addition, administrative capabilities 
are the major concerns in these countries. Cnossen and Bird (1990) provides a 
comprehensive discussion on the PIT which highlights many interesting conceptual 
issues. 
Tax Rate 
In general, the rate structure of the PIT in developing countries is not the primary 
concern since many of these countries have maintained the progressivity of the PIT 
tax rate by applying many rate brackets. Instead, the major concern is on tax 
deduction, exemption, and credit which could severely affect the progression in the 
rate structure. Cnossen and Bird (1990) suggest that in many developing countries, the 
effectiveness of nominal rate progressivity in delivering effective rate progressivity is 
substantial lowered by the high level of personal exemption. In particular, exemptions 
and deductions in most cases are commonly found to benefit individuals with high 
incomes. Such exemptions and deductions include the exemption of capital gain from 
tax, the high deductions for medical and educational expenses, and the low taxation of 
financial income. By reducing the number of rate brackets, exemptions, and 
deductions, the effective rate progressivity of a country could be improved and, 
therefore, the revenue raising objective together with an equity objective could be 
achieved. In developing countries, it is also usually found that political constraints 
impede the restructuring of PIT rates, a substantial improvement in PIT revenue 
mobilization and in equity objective can also be achieved by replacing PIT deductions 
with tax credits, which is equally beneficial for all tax payers in all tax brackets. 
However, the use of tax credits accounts for a very little proportion in developing 
countries. 
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Another important issue relating to PIT rate structure is the level of the top marginal 
PIT rate. In some developing countries, this rate is almost equal or even exceeds the 
corporate income tax (CIT) rate by a significant margin. This could drive taxpayers 
from the PIT structure to the CIT form since various expense deductions in the CIT 
structure provide a strong incentive for those taxpayers, which finally distort the tax 
structure because the change does not generate from doing business purpose but 
solely from tax purpose. Therefore, tax policy makers must be careful when choosing 
to increase the PIT rate to offset the revenue loss from trade liberalization that the top 
marginal PIT rate must be significantly lower than the CIT rate. 
Tax Base 
In addition to the problems of the high levels of exemptions and deductions that tend 
to deteriorate the effective progressivity of a progressive nominal rate structure and 
narrow the PIT base, most developing countries often encounter the problem of taxing 
certain groups that have deficiency in coverage. Generally, these hard-to-tax groups 
include small and medium enterprises, small and medium retail establishments, small 
traders, professionals, and farmers, which are particularly important compositions in 
developing countries. There are substantial difficulties in obtaining information on 
their income. While data on earnings of employees in the public sector and in larger 
private establishments are widely available, data for these hard-to-tax groups are not. 
The computation of income tax based on their earnings or profit margins is very 
difficult and hence requires other treatments than those provided by refined methods 
of tax administration and provisions in the revenue code. However, the governments 
of many developing countries are often reluctant to push these hard-to-tax groups into 
the PIT structure since they do not want to lose political supports, as these groups are 
accounted for a substantial proportion of the country’s population. 
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Corporate Income Tax 
In developing countries, the issues which are related to tax reform by using CIT are 
numerous and complex. Some of those issues are similar to those found in many 
developed countries. However, this section focuses on two problematic issues which 
are still prevalent in most developing countries; multiple CIT rates based on a sectoral 
differentiation and tax incentives to promote investment. 
Tax Rate 
Generally, developing countries have a higher tendency to have multiple CIT rates 
which are differentiated among sectors than that of developed countries. This includes 
the exemption and deduction from tax of certain sectors. CIT rate differentiation in 
most of developing countries is a result of past economic regimes which emphasize 
the state’s role in resource allocation. There is an argument that multiple CIT rates 
may distort the proper function of the market force. To address the distortion in the 
sectoral allocation of resources, unifying multiple CIT rates across sectors is 
suggested as an important tax policy in developing countries. However, unifying 
multiple CIT rates may encounter a serious problem if the government chooses the 
strategy to offset the revenue shortfall from trade liberalization by raising CIT rates 
from sectors which reap benefit from the lower tariffs. This difficulty does not include 
those sectors which have some kind of political power which may impede the strategy 
to offset revenue shortfalls by using corporate income tax. 
Tax Incentives 
Although granting tax incentives to promote investment is quite common in countries 
around the world, evidence suggests that it is particularly high for developing 
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countries. Investment incentives in developing countries are frequently given to both 
domestic and foreign-owned businesses. Investment incentives may take various 
forms, but among all the different forms of tax incentives, tax holidays and reduced 
tax rates are the most popular among developing countries. There is an argument that 
the revenue cost of tax incentives in the forms of tax holidays and reduced tax rates 
are very high. In particular, tax incentives will be very costly if they are given to 
businesses or sectors which benefit from lower import price as a result of tariff 
reduction. 
Goods and Services Tax 
Goods and services tax usually plays a major part in the tax structure of developing 
countries. The reason is very simple that goods and services tax is easier to impose 
than income taxes. For collecting goods and services tax, fewer points of tax 
collection are needed and taxation is concentrated on products either at the very first 
stage of domestic manufacture or at various stages of production. In developed 
countries, goods and services tax may be imposed as either a retail sales tax on 
consumption or a value added tax of the consumption type by exempting capital 
goods from the base. Where both options are available, the choice between them is a 
matter of administrative convenience since the covered tax base and the burden 
distribution will be the same. However, in developing countries, the retail option is 
usually not available because the retail sector tends to be small, informal, and 
unstable. The consequences are that sales cannot be determined accurately and 
enforcement at the retail level is difficult. Therefore, most of developing countries 
choose to go toward the value added approach since it is more feasible in practice. As 
a result of its relative simplicity, developing countries usually implement domestic tax 
reform by introducing the value added tax (VAT). However, it is usually found that 
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many important sectors in developing countries, including wholesale and service 
sectors, have been left out of the VAT structure. In addition, the VAT credit 
mechanism is still very restrictive, especially when it comes to provide tax credit to 
for the capital goods. These problems greatly reduce the possibility of success when a 
country chooses to introducing tax reform by focusing on goods and services tax. 
5.2.2. Overview of Fiscal Profile 
The four countries’ fiscal operations for the period 1972 to 2006 are highlighted from 
Figures 5.1-5.4. All figures show that both government revenue and expenditure 
maintained consistent growth patterns. In Figure 5.1, the graph shows that Thailand 
suffered from a long-time deficit until 1988. Then, in the 1990s, revenue exceeded 
expenditure until 1997, the year of the Asian economic crisis. During the crisis, there 
was a drop in both revenue and expenditure, but a decrease was much larger for 
revenue. From 1997, expenditure started to exceed revenue in absolute terms. In 
addition, over the period 1991 to 2006, government revenue increased by 7.66% on 
average compared with an increase of 9.80% in expenditure. Revenue started to 
exceed expenditure again in 2003, although the gap between them was much lower 
than that in the early 1990s period. Likewise, Indonesia and Malaysia had a huge 
surplus in the second half of 1980s and the early 1990s. They also experienced a drop 
in both revenue and expenditure in the Asian crisis period. They were able to maintain 
a surplus from the second half of 1980s until now although the gap narrowed. By 
contrast, the Philippines suffered from a deficit for almost the whole period, though 
there was a little surplus during 1991-1996. From Figure 5.4, the deficit continued to 
2006. Obviously, the deficit is can be traced from the economic crisis which occurred 
in 1997. For most countries which have suffered the Asian financial crisis, including 
these four countries, it was transformed to a full-blown recession in the real economy 
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of production. In order for the government to stimulate the domestic economy and 
moderate economic recession, a large amount of government expenditure was utilized 
for many years after the recession. Figures 5.1-5.4 point out that all four countries 
need to boost revenue, especially for the Philippines, in order to prevent a fiscal 
deficit which may potentially cause a rise in public debt and other fiscal problems in 
the future. 
Figure 5.1: Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in Thailand, 1972 to 2006 
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Figure 5.2: Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in Indonesia, 1972 to 2006 
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Figure 5.3: Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in Malaysia, 1972 to 2006 
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Figure 5.4: Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures in the Philippines, 1972 to 2006 
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In order to raise revenue, finance the deficit, and obtain a balanced budget, the 
government may set many fiscal targets; one of those measures is to mobilize tax 
revenue, since, in general, the major instrument of the government to raise revenue is 
taxation. Figures 5.5-5.8 show the proportion of tax revenue in total revenue. All 
figures point out that taxation is the main source of revenue for all countries in our 
research since it contributes approximately 90% of total revenue for Thailand (Figure 
5.5), 80% for Indonesia (Figure 5.6), 70% for Malaysia (Figure 5.7), and 90% for 
Philippines (Figure 5.8), while the share of non-tax revenue accounted for a small 
proportion in their total revenue over the period of review. Again, tax revenue shows 
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tax accounted for only 8% of total tax revenue and ranked the least important among 
major taxes in the country. Considering other taxes, goods and services tax ranked the 
most important tax revenue source for Thailand. It accounted for approximately 50% 
over the review period. Unlike the theory, goods and services tax does not show any 
increasing trend to mitigate the loss of international trade tax over the liberalization 
period. Instead, corporate income tax has risen since the late 1980s and become the 
second most important tax in 2006. In 2006, corporate income tax accounted for more 
than 30% of total tax revenue. Although the loss of international trade tax in Thailand 
seems to be successfully mitigated, there are some concerns since corporate income 
tax base is not as wide as the goods and services tax base. This may cause a problem 
in raising revenue in the longer term.    
Figure 5.9: Trends of Thailand’s Major Taxes 
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For Indonesia (Figure 5.10), the international trade tax was about 20% of total tax 
revenue in 1972 and has declined over the period. It accounted for approximately only 
6% of total tax revenue in 2006. Like Thailand, the international trade tax was found 
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to be the least important tax source at the end of the period. Considering other taxes, 
corporate income tax was considered to be the most important tax revenue source for 
Indonesia during 1970s and 1980s since it accounted for over 50% of total tax 
revenue on average. However, corporate income tax dropped rapidly in 1993 and the 
revenue loss from corporate income tax was compensated by the rise of personal 
income tax. In 2006, corporate income tax accounted for only about 8% of total tax 
revenue, while personal income tax accounted for almost 40% of total tax revenue, 
ranked the second most important tax revenue source for the country. In line with the 
theory, goods and services tax shows an upward trend over the period of study. In 
2006, it comprised almost 50% of total tax revenue and was the most important 
source of tax revenue for the country. 
Figure 5.10: Trends of Indonesia’s Major Taxes 
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For Malaysia (Figure 5.11), the international trade tax shows a very obvious 
downward trend over the period. In 1972, it is the most important tax revenue source 
of the country by accounting for almost 40% of total tax revenue. However, its 
proportion in total tax revenue dropped to approximately only 8% in 2006. At the end 
of the study period, corporate income tax seems to play an important role for 
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government revenue since it made up approximately 50% of total tax revenue. The 
goods and services tax does not show any increasing trend over the period as it 
accounted for about 30%, ranked the second most important tax revenue. 
Figure 5.11: Trends of Malaysia’s Major Taxes 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 
For Philippines (Figure 5.12), although international trade tax dropped rapidly after 
the country joined AFTA, tax revenue from this source is still important for the 
country since it was over 20% of total tax revenue in 2006, almost equal to the 
proportion of corporate income tax and ranked the second most important tax revenue 
source for the country. Although personal and corporate income taxes show an 
upward trend, they grew very slowly, compared with other countries. The goods and 
services tax does not seem to help mitigate the loss of international trade tax revenue 
since it does not increase over time. From this fact, the Philippines may encounter a 
severe problem if liberalization causes a significant reduction in international trade 
tax revenue because there is no other taxes can help mitigate the loss. 
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Figure 5.12: Trends of Philippines’s Major Taxes 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 
From Figure 5.13 to Figure 5.16, Thailand’s data of tax revenues and per capita GDP 
are plotted on the graph to demonstrate the relationship between them. Figure 5.13 
shows that reliance on revenue from international trade tax is inversely related to the 
country’s income levels. This fact is in line with the result in previous chapter. When 
GDP is low, the country lacks administrative capacity, which reduces the efficiency of 
tax collection. Government finds that it is difficult to tax the transaction of the 
informal and subsistence sectors, which accounts for a large share in the country’s 
economy. Additionally, the influence of powerful lobbies makes some sectors off-
limits to the tax authorities. As a result, the domestic tax base is narrow and the 
government tries to meet its fiscal need by placing high rates on easily taxable sectors, 
and one of those is on international trade (Kubota, 2000). However, as the country 
grows, it relies less on the international trade tax and depends more on other domestic 
taxes. While there is a decreasing trend in international trade tax against the income 
level over the review period, taxes on income and profits increase with the level of 
income. Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show that taxes on income and profits are 
positively associated with the country’s income level. From these two figures, it 
203 
 
seems that Thailand has tried to recover the loss of international trade tax by 
collecting more income tax and profit tax, especially corporate income tax. However, 
tax on goods and services does not show a clear relationship with the change in 
income level. Figure 5.16 demonstrates that as the income changes, the goods and 
services tax still remains at around 50% of total tax revenue and shows no increasing 
trend as income increases. 
Figure 5.13: Thailand’s reliance on international trade tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
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Figure 5.14: Thailand’s reliance on personal income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figure 5.15: Thailand’s reliance on corporate income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6Re
ve
nu
e 
fr
om
 C
or
po
ra
te
 In
co
m
e 
Ta
x
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 T
ot
al
 T
ax
 
Re
ve
nu
e)
Log real per capita GDP
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Figure 5.16: Thailand’s reliance on goods and services tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figures 5.17-5.20 show the reliance of Indonesia’s major taxes on its income level. 
Like the case of Thailand, Figure 5.17 shows that international trade tax is inversely 
related to the country’s income level. As a country’s income grows, personal income 
tax gradually increases, although it jumps up in later years when GDP reaches a high 
level (Figure 5.18).  However, unlike that of Thailand, corporate income tax does not 
seem to mitigate the loss of international trade tax since it does not grow with the 
country’s income (Figure 5.19). Still, there is a good sign for Indonesia since the 
graph in Figure 5.20 shows that goods and services tax grows along with the 
country’s income level. This implies that what really happens in practice is in line 
with what the principle that loss of international trade tax revenue could be offset by 
higher domestic consumption tax revenue. There is a chance to substitute domestic 
consumption tax for international trade tax while maintaining government revenue for 
Indonesia.  
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Figure 5.17: Indonesia’s reliance on international trade tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figure 5.18: Indonesia’s reliance on personal income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
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Figure 5.19: Indonesia’s reliance on corporate income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figure 5.20: Indonesia’s reliance on goods and services tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figures 5.21-5.24 show the relationship of Malaysia’s major taxes and its income 
level. As shown by Figure 5.21, international trade tax is, again, negatively related to 
the country’s income level. For Malaysia, Figures 5.22 and 5.23 show that personal 
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and corporate income taxes are positively associated with GDP and Malaysia seems to 
depend on these income taxes as a strategy to substitute these revenue sources from 
international trade tax. The goods and services tax, on the other hand, do not respond 
to the growth of GDP, though the proportion in total tax revenue is about two fold 
higher than the proportion of personal income tax in total tax revenue (Figure 5.22). 
Figure 5.21: Malaysia’s reliance on international trade tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
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Figure 5.22: Malaysia’s reliance on personal income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figure 5.23: Malaysia’s reliance on corporate income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
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Figure 5.24: Malaysia’s reliance on goods and services tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7Re
ve
nu
e 
fr
om
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 
Ta
x
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 T
ot
al
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
)
Log real per capita GDP
 
Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figures 5.25-5.28 present the reliance of Philippines’s major taxes on its income 
level. Similar to other three countries, international trade tax is inversely related to the 
income level, as shown in Figure 5.25. However, as presented by Figures 5.26 and 
5.28, personal income and goods and services taxes do not increase as income 
increases. The only major tax of Philippines that grows with its GDP is corporate 
income tax (Figure 5.27). This may raise concerns of how the Philippines’s 
government will coordinate tariff and tax reform while maintaining government 
revenue. 
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Figure 5.25: Philippines’s reliance on international trade tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figure 5.26: Philippines’s reliance on personal income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
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Figure 5.27: Philippines’s reliance on corporate income tax measured against income 
levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
Figure 5.28: Philippines’s reliance on goods and services tax measured against 
income levels, 1972-2006 
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Source: IMF the Government Finance Statistics (GFS); December, 2008 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); December 2008 
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5.2.3. Summary of Fiscal Policies 
This section provides direction of fiscal policies and identifies policy changes under 
the implementation of tax reform following trade liberalization in each of the four 
countries. Generally, in performing domestic tax reform, the government expects an 
improvement in the quality of the tax structure by emphasizing the country’s tax 
potential in order to establish fiscal sustainability and increase the level of the 
country’s tax competence both for the transition period of trade liberalization and in 
the long term. In offsetting the revenue loss from trade liberalization, domestic tax 
reform increases the opportunity to raise national revenue without increasing rates by 
either increasing the capacity of tax administration, or expanding tax bases or both. 
The reason is that, particularly for less developed and developing countries, there is 
still room for improvement since the utilization of both tax administration and tax 
bases are far from up to capacity. Therefore, this section is dedicated to discuss fiscal 
policies in each of the four countries implemented in line with domestic tax reform 
which is undertaken in the period of trade liberalization (the period of joining AFTA, 
in particular) in order to investigate how the selected countries have attempted to 
achieve the objective of revenue loss mitigation. 
5.2.3.1. Thailand’s Tax Reform 
Since the first Economic and Social Development Plan was introduced in 1961 in 
order to promote industrial development and pursue an import substitution strategy, 
the tax structure has been simultaneously adjusted and fine-tuned to enhance 
effectiveness and efficiency of tax administration. However, from the 1960s to 1980s, 
there was no major change in the country’s tax framework. It was not until the early 
1990s that the government started thoroughly to review its tax system. The 1990s was 
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a period of substantial development and there was a dramatic change in global trend. 
There was a large increase in international trade, investment, and factor mobility. 
Trade policies have been changed from import substitution to export orientation and 
protectionism has been gradually reduced. More social and economic cooperation has 
been established in the region such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) which are mainly aimed to spur trade 
liberalization in the Asian region. In order to integrate Thailand into the world 
economy, a trade liberalization policy has been adopted and thus tax reform policies 
have been used to mitigate the potential revenue loss from tariff reduction and to 
enhance the productivity of the tax system as a whole. 
Since the early 1990s, Thailand has implemented economic reform in various areas 
including public, financial, and fiscal sectors. As part of overall fiscal reform, the 
Thai government has implemented major domestic tax reforms, marked by the 
introduction of the value added tax (VAT) and other tax reform measures starting in 
1992. The rationale of domestic tax reform is twofold. Firstly, tax reform is a part of 
changes in tax structure to offset any revenue loss from tariff reduction. By this 
means, the Thai government has attempted to substitute revenue sources from tariffs 
and custom duties to income and consumption taxes, reducing the dependency on 
international trade tax and focusing to generate more revenue from domestic tax 
bases. Secondly, tax reform is implemented to increase the efficiency in revenue 
generation in a reasonably non-distorting, equitable, and sustainable manner. 
The major composition of government revenue comprises personal income tax, 
corporate income tax, value added tax, import duties, and excise tax. In Thailand, tax 
revenue is collected through three departments, namely the Revenue Department, the 
Excise Department, and the Custom Department. These three departments work under 
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the authority of the Ministry of Finance. The Revenue Department is responsible for 
the collection of personal income tax, corporate income tax, value added tax, special 
business tax, petroleum tax. The Excise Department is responsible for the collection 
of tobacco tax, liquor tax, automobile tax, and other selected excise tax. The Custom 
Department is responsible for the collection of import and export duties. Among the 
three departments, the Revenue Department is the most important tax collection 
department since the revenue collected by this department comprises approximately 
70% of total tax revenue. 
Major tax reforms which have been undertaken since the 1990s focus not only on 
import duties, income taxes, and consumption tax, but also on tax administration. 
Detail of the reform are given below. 
Comprehensive Reform of the Custom Tariff Structure 
In Thailand, custom duties are levied on both imports and selected exports. Duties are 
levied on either a specific or an ad valorem basis depending on which one is higher. 
In 1985, Thailand’s average tariff rate was over than 40%, with the highest rate being 
for passenger cars in which the rate is over than 80%. However, as the country joined 
free trade agreement as AFTA and trade liberalization programme provided by the 
WTO, tariff rates have recently been reduced to the target range of three rates in 
accordance with the production processes. The target rates are 1% for raw materials 
and inputs which are not locally produced, 5% for semi-finished products, and 10% 
for finished products, products requiring extra protection, and luxury goods. Although 
the reform package has not yet been completed for all products, a number of products 
in most categories have already adjusted to the new rates. Remaining items are such 
as petrochemical products in which their tariffs rate will be reduced in line with the 
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three rate framework in 2010. Recently, as a result of the custom tariff reform, the 
average tariff rate was reduced to only 10% in 2007. 
Comprehensive Reform of Personal Income Tax Structure 
In the past, personal income tax rates were set at a relatively high level up to 55% on 
average. During the reform period, there was a steady reduction in the rate and now it 
is imposed at progressive rates of between 5 and 37% on net income. Not only have 
the rates been changed, but expenses and allowances that can be deducted from 
assessable income have also been reviewed. The major change in deduction categories 
is on standard expenses which have been increased to 40% but not exceeding 60,000 
Baht. There is also an increase in tax allowances of several types, after deducting 
expenses. For example, personal allowance, spouse allowance, and parent allowance 
have been increased to 30,000 Baht each. The child allowance has been increased to 
15,000 Baht whereas the child’s education allowance has been increased to 2,000 
Baht. The amount of these allowances has been wider in order to help the middle class 
population since the average wage and salary in Thailand (and most of developing 
countries) is relatively low comparing with other developed nations. Recently, the 
Thai government has promoted private savings by granting allowances for a 
providence fund or pension fund and retirement mutual fund of 300,000 Baht or not 
exceeding 15% of net income. As a result of these acts, personal income tax base is 
automatically lowered. 
Comprehensive Reform of Corporate Income Tax Structure 
Similarly, the average corporate income tax rate went to 50% in the past. Since then, 
the corporate income tax rates have been lowered in order to induce more investment 
and create a greater incentive for domestically economic activities. The reduction in 
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the corporate income tax rate is in line with the global trend for lowering tax rates. 
Currently, corporate income tax is set at 30% on net profit for all types of businesses. 
However, further reduced rates are also applied depending on the type of businesses. 
These reduced rates have been recently used as policy instruments to promote certain 
sectors such as Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and listed companies. These 
acts, on one hand, automatically reduce the collection by lowering the tax rate, but on 
the other hand, may help improve the corporate income tax base by including more 
businesses into the tax structure. 
Comprehensive Reform of Goods and Services Tax Structure 
One of the most important tax reforms in recent Thai history is the introduction of the 
value added tax (VAT) in 1992 as a replacement for the business tax. After the VAT 
was implemented, products that were liable for higher tax amount under the business 
tax such as electrical appliances, automobiles, perfume and cosmetics were taxed at 
the normal VAT rate and higher excise tax, leaving the tax burden remains 
unchanged. The VAT is a tax on total consumption expenditure in which the burden is 
purely on consumers. The VAT is charged at a single rate of 7%. 
Comprehensive Reform of Tax Administration 
Together with the reform in the structure of taxation, the tax administration has also 
been substantial improved during the 1990s. The most important reform is the 
introduction of online processing and the use of web base technology. In the past, the 
process of tax collection was time consuming. By introducing information and 
communication technologies, the working process has been largely shortened. The tax 
database, data processing system, tax supervision system, and supporting system have 
also been improved. These actions help improving up-to-date taxpayer information, 
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enhancing voluntary compliance, lowering debt delinquency, increasing taxpayer’s 
cooperation, and consequently increasing the amount of tax collection. 
5.2.3.2. Malaysia’s Tax Reform 
Recently, the Malaysian government has faced the real challenge to assure its fiscal 
sustainability due to the decline of revenue from tariff reduction. At the same time, 
the government has attempted to lessen the budget reliance on international trade tax 
and to depend more on domestic taxes. Besides increasing the efficiency of 
expenditure, on the revenue side, the Malaysian government has no other choice but 
effectively to mobilize domestic taxes because they have a great potential to be the 
main source of government funding. Although there are many way to mobilize tax 
revenue, including increasing tax rates, expanding tax bases, and improving tax 
administration, the Malaysian government tends to choose to increase national 
revenue by the process of tax reform without having to increase tax rates. The major 
objectives for the reform in Malaysia’s tax system are to simplify the tax system, to 
modernize the tax administration, to introduce various incentives to promote 
investment, to introduce tax reliefs to reduce the tax burden of the lower income 
group, to improve the investment climate, to promote domestic consumption, to foster 
a caring society, and to enhance R&D and skill training. 
Unlike many other countries which adopted the reform package that provides major 
tax changes in the tax reform, Malaysia has also taken the incremental approach 
which consists of a series of small steps of tax changes. The reform was undertaken 
gradually and easy to manage by the tax authorities as well as to be withdrawn if 
unpopular. However, the most notable tax reform of Malaysia’s tax system is the 
introduction of the self-assessment system done in 1992. At that time, the Malaysian 
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government found that there is an opportunity to mitigate the loss of tariff revenue by 
increasing capacity in personal income tax. The government has also realized that 
there should have a better system for tax administration to deal with the increasing 
number of taxpayers without a proportionate increase in the number of staff of tax 
authorities. Self assessment is not a new tax but it is a system in which tax payers 
must determine their own tax liabilities and make a payment accordingly. Along with 
the self assessment system, there is an enhancement in ICT capabilities in order to 
capture and update tax payers’ information and to improve audit and investigation 
management. 
5.2.3.3. Indonesia’s Tax Reform 
Tax revenue is a main source of income for Indonesia. The country’s tax system is 
based on personal income tax and value added tax system. The main difference that 
distinguishes Indonesia’s tax system from the others is its relatively small dependence 
on international trade tax over time. With limited dependence on international trade 
tax, trade reform under trade liberalization regime has only a moderate impact on 
government revenue. However, what seems to be a serious problem is the potential of 
corporate income tax collection, especially once oil and gas revenues have been 
removed. Since the 1980s, the proportion of oil and natural gas tax revenues has 
gradually decreased from almost 80% to approximately only 10% in corporate income 
tax. Since then, corporate income tax has experienced a substantial decrease and thus 
a reform is needed to improve the efficiency of corporate income tax collection.  
Therefore, the need to implement tax reform in Indonesia is not only raised from trade 
liberalization perspective, but also from a business competitiveness perspective. 
Therefore, the Indonesian government has set two main objectives for reforming the 
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country’s tax structure. With a more integrated world economy, Indonesia has to walk 
into the process of trade liberalization, both in regional and world trade. Tax reform 
must be done to mitigate the loss in tariff revenue, which used to be one of the main 
sources of the country’s revenue. Tax reform must also help improve the investment 
climate in order to attract more investors, both domestic and foreign ones, to put their 
portfolio in the country. 
Reform of Personal Income Tax 
Personal income tax in Indonesia is subject to a five-bracket progressive rate, ranging 
between 5% and 35%. Most of individual taxpayers are permanent workers and pay 
their tax by wage withholding. Only a few proportions of taxpayers pay their income 
tax by self assessment. Since the potential of the personal income tax system has been 
great for decades, there was no significant personal income tax reform during the 
1990s. However, there is an improvement in computer system over time to investigate 
and assess individual taxpayers. 
Comprehensive Reform of Corporate Income Tax 
Except for the decrease once gas and oil revenues are removed from its structure, the 
amount of revenue collected from the corporate income tax is relatively low compared 
with other taxes. The very low collection is mainly due to Indonesia’s corporate 
structure in which over 90% of Indonesian industry corporate is dominated by small 
and medium enterprises where most of them are not legal entity and hence are not tax 
registration companies. In addition, most of these businesses are retailers and 
agricultural businesses which have a high tendency of tax evasion. The possibility of a 
tax base expansion, although very difficult, is necessary since these small and medium 
enterprises largely dominate the corporate structure and make a great contribution to 
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Indonesian GDP. The reform is aimed to include these companies into the corporate 
income tax base but the expected time frame to collect majority of revenue from these 
sources is in the medium term.  
Comprehensive Reform of the VAT 
In Indonesia, VAT is imposed with a single rate at 10% and is levied on a broad base 
of goods and services. After implementation of tax reform in the early 1990s, various 
tax policy measures related to VAT have been changed to improve the revenue 
productivity of VAT including the reduction of VAT exemptions, the removal of the 
zero rate VAT except for exports, the abolishment of the exemption on government-
borne VAT on certain goods, and the collection on most food products except basic 
goods consumed by the poor and certain strategic goods including agriculture. The 
government has also strengthened the VAT structure by expanding the base to, for 
example, mining and hotels. A substantial improvement in tax administration, 
particularly by introducing new technologies, was also achieved in the 1990s period. 
5.2.3.4. Philippines’s Tax Reform 
In the past, the Philippines tax system was not very strong and buoyant. The 
inefficiency of the overall tax structure forced the country to be highly dependent on 
such international trade tax as import tariffs. As a result of the absence of tax 
productivity, many infrastructures were not constructed, public utilities deteriorated, 
and health services remained inadequate. Although the Philippines’ government has 
privatized its assets and borrowed heavily to finance the budget deficit, these 
measures have provided only a temporary solution in the short and medium terms but 
could not guaranteed the long-term fiscal stability for the country. Together with 
globalization and the upward trend of free trade around the world, Philippines has 
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automatically been forced to reduced its high dependency on international trade tax. 
Thus, in order to maintain its fiscal position and to create a productive and consistent 
tax structure, comprehensive tax and tariff reforms were introduced in March 1992, in 
line with the AFTA membership. 
As goods and services tax is the highest performer among all tax types, the 
Philippines’ government has focused tax reform on personal and corporate income 
taxes. In implementing income tax reform, the Philippines’ government has aimed to 
generate more tax revenue by simplifying the tax system in order to encourage greater 
compliance from taxpayers, including those in the underground economy, removing 
areas of discretion which provides avenues for tax avoidance and abuse, broadening 
the tax base by investigating undeclared revenues and hidden taxpayers, improving 
the taxation of the hard-to-tax income, reducing exemptions to enhance the amount of 
revenue, and strengthening the enforcement of laws. The most significant reform in 
the personal income tax structure is the use of residence instead of citizenship as a 
basis for taxation. In order to solve the problem of tax avoidance, tax brackets have 
been broadened so that additional wages or earnings would be subject to the same tax 
rate and not to a higher marginal tax rate. On the other hand, in order to raise 
corporate income tax revenue, the Philippines government needs to push more SMEs 
into the tax structure. In order to achieve this goal, the corporate tax rate has been 
gradually reduced. The Philippines government has also broadened the base of the tax 
system by instituting control on deductible expenses which are often subject to the 
discretion of the taxpayer and tax examiner. Such discretion can potentially lead to 
abuses and tax avoidance practices which finally result in the leakages and loopholes 
in the corporate income tax system. 
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5.3. General Review: Buoyancy and Elasticity of Tax Revenue and Empirical 
works on Revenue Productivity of the Tax System 
In order for a government to plan properly how to mitigate the loss in trade tax 
revenues by substituting trade taxes to other domestic taxes, it is important to be able 
to estimate tax buoyancy, built-in tax elasticity, and the impact of discretionary 
changes on tax revenues. In fact, the estimation of the responsiveness of tax revenues 
has long been a central empirical issue in applied public economics. The concepts of 
tax buoyancy and tax elasticity are very important in the study of modern taxation 
(Mansfield, 1972). Tax buoyancy and tax elasticity are usually used to measure tax 
productivity. They measure the responsiveness of tax yield to changes in national 
income. In general, changes in tax revenues are caused by automatic responses of tax 
yield through national income changes and discretionary changes. Discretionary 
changes are normally legislative actions done by the government such as the 
imposition of new taxes, revision of existing tax rates, expansion of tax bases, 
modification of tax amnesties, and enforcement of new measures. By concepts, tax 
buoyancy measures the relationship between historical tax revenue and national 
income in terms of proportional increase in tax revenue following a one percent 
change in national income. On the other hand, tax elasticity measures relationship 
between tax revenue at a constant tax structure and national income. If there is no 
change in tax parameters (i.e., tax rates, tax base) during the reference period, 
buoyancy will be same as elasticity. In other words, elasticity of tax is the rate of 
proportionate change in the tax revenue due to change in national income while tax 
buoyancy is the composite of the change in tax revenue due to change in national 
income and discretionary tax changes. 
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However, the estimation of tax elasticity has suffered from a specification bias which 
results from the unavailability of data. Ehdaie (1990) states that the lack of “an 
observable quantitative variable” which is capable of reflecting all changes in an 
individual (or overall) tax system, has a great impact on the accuracy of the 
estimation. Because such necessary data as the effective tax rates and the changing 
composition and growth of tax base are usually not available in most countries, the 
need for a method for adjusting the historical tax series for discretionary changes has 
arisen. Until recently, there are two widely used adjustment methods in the literature; 
which are the proportional adjustment method and the dummy variable method. Both 
methods will be described in the following topics. 
Proportional Adjustment Method 
The proportional Adjustment (PA) Method is used to eliminate the discretionary 
effects from the revenue series. This method is usually attributed to many sequential 
studies including Prest (1962), Mansfield (1972), Bahl (1972), and Chelliah and 
Chand (1974). Based on the procedure proposed by Mansfield (1972), the 
proportional adjustment method for computing tax elasticity involves a three-step 
process. First, a preliminary series of adjusted tax yields is obtained by subtracting the 
budgetary estimates of the effects of discretionary tax changes from the actual tax 
yield, that is, 
,t t t tT T D= −  (5.1) 
where;  
,t tT  is the adjusted or cleaned tax yield in the t
th year 
tT  is the actual tax revenue yield in the t
th year 
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tD  is the budget estimate of the yield arising out of discretionary tax changes in the t
th 
year  
Second, this preliminary series ( ) is further adjusted to exclude the continuing 
impact of each discretionary change on all future years’ tax yields by multiplying by 
the ratio of the previous year’s adjusted figure to the actual tax receipt. It can be 
shown that this procedure involves a factor sequence, each element of which 
represents the effect of the automatic component of tax changes in earlier years.  
These two steps constitute the ‘data cleaning’ process, that is, 
,t tT
1 1,1
1
2 2
1
2
3 3
2
1
,
1
( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) tt t
t
T T
TT T
T
TT T
T
TT T
T
−
−
′ =
⎡ ⎤′′ = ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤′′ = ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤′′ = ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
M
,2
,3
t
 
Through sequential substitution, it can be shown that the above formula can be 
rewritten in terms of  and  as; tT s tD s
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which is Mansfield core equation for proportional adjustment data cleaning. 
Third, the resulting series of ‘cleaned’ tax yields is then regressed on some measure of 
the tax base to obtain the necessary elasticity values. 
However, using the proportional adjustment method is likely to cause bias in the 
estimation. The essential weakness of the proportional adjustment method lies in the 
data cleaning procedure.  It is asserted that this procedure yields a series which is 
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systematically biased, and will therefore lead to biased elasticity estimates. Thus, the 
proportional adjustment method, as commonly used, will almost always yield biased 
estimates of the tax elasticity.37 
For example on empirical study done when estimating the tax elasticity by using 
proportional adjustment approach, Mansfield (1972) estimates tax buoyancy and tax 
elasticity of Paraguay’s tax system from 1962 to 1970 to analyze the growth of 
revenue. In his study, tax buoyancy and tax elasticity of Paraguay’s tax system are 
calculated to be 1.69 and 1.14, respectively. Both coefficients for buoyancy and 
elasticity are also estimated and compared for major taxes including income tax, 
wealth taxes, and import taxes. Then, tax elasticities are decomposed into tax-to-base 
elasticities and base-to-income elasticities in order to compare the growth rates. From 
the results, he concludes that discretionary changes in the country’s tax system 
primarily lead to a substantial increase in the tax ratio over the period of study. The 
improvement of tax-to-base elasticities is necessary for the country to obtain more tax 
yield. A more recent study, Muriithi and Moyi (2003), analyzed the productivity of 
Kenya’s overall tax system and its major taxes, including direct taxes, import duties, 
excise duties, and sale tax and VAT, after the tax structure was modernized in 1986. 
In general, it is assumed that the tax yield or productivity should be improved after a 
country’s tax system is reformed. Taking the analysis over the period 1973 to 1999, 
the study estimates before- and after-reform buoyancy and elasticity, and then 
compared the flexibility. They conclude that tax reform improves the response of tax 
revenue to both the automatic changes in GDP and the discretionary tax measures, 
and thus the tax reform in Kenya has a positive impact on both overall tax revenue 
and individual tax types. Ayoki, Obwona, and Ogwapus (2005) investigated the link 
                                                            
37 See Feldstein (1972) for example. 
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between tax reforms and revenue mobilization in Uganda, which took place in the 
year 1996, over the period 1988 to 2003 by applying the concept of tax elasticity and 
tax buoyancy to measure the responsiveness of tax revenue to changes in income and 
excluding the effects of discretionary changes using proportional adjustment method. 
They conclude that tax reforms have a different impact on individual taxes. The 
reforms have a positive impact on both direct taxes and VAT/sales tax. The reforms 
have a bigger impact on direct taxes on indirect taxes. However, similar to the result 
of Muriithi and Moyi (2003), they find that overall tax structure in Uganda is 
inelastic. The responses of overall tax revenues are affected by inefficiency of 
revenue administration, exemption, tax evasion, and inelastic tax bases. 
Dummy Variable Method 
The dummy variable approach involves using a dummy variable to represent each 
discretionary change. The dummy variable technique was first developed by Singer 
(1968) to estimate the income elasticity of the state income tax revenue by 
introducing a dummy to capture exogenous tax policy changes. Based on Singer 
(1968) and Choudhry (1979), this method applies dummy variables to adjust for 
discretionary revenue effects and estimate the tax elasticity. They use a dummy 
variable as a proxy for each discretionary change which occurs during the period 
under study and then construct a single-equation econometric model to estimate tax 
elasticity as follow; 
  (5.3) 0 1 2
1
ln ln
n
t t i
i
T Y Dβ β β
=
= + + +∑ i tU
where; 
tT  is tax revenue in the t
th year 
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tY  is GDP in aggregate level in the t
th year 
iD  is a dummy variable used as a proxy for the i
th discretionary change occurring 
during the period under the study 
1β  is tax elasticity at the aggregate level. The coefficient measures the percentage 
change in tax revenue resulting from the endogenous change in the tax base caused by 
a one percent change in GDP 
The sign means that if there is more than one discretionary change taking place 
during the period, the equation will be generalized to include additional dummy 
variables. However, the use of dummy variables to capture discretionary changes in 
tax rates and tax structures may be inappropriate if discretionary tax changes have 
been made frequently in the past. If discretionary changes occur too often, the 
estimation will confront the problem of insufficient observations. In addition, this will 
lead to an excessive reduction in the degrees of freedom and cause a problem for the 
efficiency of the estimators. 
∑
The study of the impact of trade liberalization on tax revenues is often related to the 
use of dummy variable technique. Recent empirical studies on trade liberalization 
applying tax buoyancy and tax elasticity concepts and using dummy variable as a 
proxy for liberalization have highlighted the effect of trade liberalization on tax 
revenue mobilization. A number of attempts have been made to test whether trade 
liberalization has a negative impact on tax collection, especially trade taxes, since it is 
believed that reducing trade barriers, particularly by reducing or eliminating tariffs, is 
a major cause of substantial reduction in trade tax revenues. However, the results are 
somewhat mix. For example, Chipeta (1998) evaluates the impact of tax reform as a 
result of trade liberalization in 1980 on Malawi’s tax structure during 1970 to 1993. 
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The study investigates whether tax reform increases the yield of the tax system. From 
the results, he concluded that tax yield is not buoyant in both pre and post reform. It 
means that liberalization does not improve the yield of the tax system. Changing other 
discretionary measures, such as raising tax rates, imposing new taxes, or extending 
existing taxes to new activities, may also not improve the buoyancy of the tax system. 
In addition, the analysis of the components of tax elasticities shows that the tax base is 
very rigid after the reform, which can be implied that the tax base has grown less 
rapidly than GDP. Moreover, Malawi suffers from many other problems, such as tax 
evasion, tax exemption, tax allowance, corruption, and underground economy. This 
results in the more difficulty in raising the country’s tax revenue. Matlanyane and 
Harmse (2002) evaluate the implications of trade liberalization on international trade 
tax revenue by taking the case of the South African economy over 1974 to 2000. They 
use the standard method to calculate tax buoyancy and employ a dummy variable 
method to calculate the effect of trade liberalization, involving using a dummy 
variable as a proxy for liberalization and regressing trade tax revenue on a 
liberalization dummy using single equation ordinary least square. Additionally, 
imports as a percentage of GDP, exchange rate, and the average tariff rate are also 
included in the equation. They conclude that trade tax revenue in South Africa is 
highly productive. In addition, the tariff reform dummy variable is significantly 
different from zero. This implies that liberalization policies in South Africa have been 
able to increase trade tax revenue. More recent work, Suliman (2005) estimates tax 
buoyancy and tax elasticity of the Sudanese tax system for the period 1970 to 2002 by 
placing the question on whether trade liberalization, which takes places in 1992, has 
an impact on revenue mobilization. The results show that the Sudanese tax system is 
not buoyant or elastic. The comparison of the performance of the tax system before 
230 
 
and after trade liberalization shows that the buoyancy of import taxes was improved 
after reform, while the conclusions for all other major taxes cannot be drawn because 
their estimated values of both coefficients and constants move in the opposite 
direction. In addition, comparison of buoyancy and elasticity over the sample period 
indicates that the various discretionary changes improved revenue mobilization from 
import tax yield. Considering the impact of trade liberalization on tax yield in nominal 
term, the coefficient on the liberalization dummy is only significant for personal 
income tax with a negative impact. However, the coefficients of the liberalization 
dummy, as well as the slope dummy, are significant for almost all taxes when 
regressing taxes in real term. This implies that inflation has a considerable effect on 
the growth of Sudanese tax revenues. Brafu-Insaidoo and Obeng (2008) estimate 
import tax revenue productivity regarding the quantitative effect of import 
liberalization on tariff revenue in Ghana over the period 1966 to 2003. The results 
show that tariff revenue in Ghana is neither buoyant nor elastic, there is even an 
increase in tariff revenue as a result of exchange rate depreciation after trade is 
liberalized. The study also finds that import liberalization has a negative impact on 
tariff revenue. The decomposition analysis shows that the degree of responsiveness of 
the import tax to change in its tax base declines during the liberalization period, 
compared with the pre-liberalization period. The decomposition analysis also points 
that the reduction in the official average tariff rate results in the loss of tariff revenue 
over the period of liberalization. 
Other Data Adjustment Methods 
Since a complete adjustment of historical tax revenue series is not possible in any of 
the methods, many authors have tried to apply different techniques to estimate the 
built-in elasticity of a tax system. Bilquees (2004) examines the buoyancy and 
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elasticity of the tax system in Pakistan over the period 1974-75 to 2002-03 by using 
the Divisia Index Approach. By applying the vector autoregressive (VAR) technique 
to estimate buoyancy and elasticity, he finds that both buoyancy and elasticity of 
Pakistan’s overall tax system are less than unity, which these results confirm the 
existence of continued exemptions, allowances, and loopholes for evasion. By using 
the decomposition technique, the results suggest that broadening tax bases of indirect 
taxes is required in order to increase tax revenues. 
5.4. Framework of the Study 
5.4.1. Methodology and the Regression Models 
In the previous section, we discuss the tax performance estimation technique to be 
used in this study along with methods of removing the effect of discretionary changes 
in the tax system. Although there is a number of methodologies for revenue 
estimation and tax modelling, Ahmed (1994) suggests that the conditional approach 
using buoyancy and elasticity is the most widely used and practicable approach. This 
approach has proved to be useful and used by the IMF for evaluating performance and 
forecasting the revenue of its member countries. Furthermore, Manasen (1981) and 
Gamboa (2002) confirm that among tax performance evaluating and revenue 
forecasting methodologies, the tax buoyancy and tax elasticity approach using the 
regression procedure gives a better fit where the errors of estimation are minimized. 
Thus, for purposes of this study, the tax buoyancy and tax elasticity approach is used 
to estimate tax performance and the productivity of tax system in Thailand for the 
period 1972-2006 relative to 3 other countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines, 
which are founding members of ASEAN and originally signed the AFTA agreement 
in 1992. These four countries used in this study not only are the original members 
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which formed ASEAN and the AFTA agreement, but they also have a comparable 
level of economic development as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power 
parity (ppp) terms.38 Chelliah (1971) suggests that in order for the policymakers to 
decide the level of taxation, they often make a comparison of their country’s tax 
performance with that of other countries at similar stage of development. The 
advantage of considering countries which have a similar stage of development is that 
it gives a better and correct picture when relative productivity is compared. Thus, we 
use ppp adjusted GDP per capita to compare the level of development of these four 
ASEAN countries since it provides a better index of living standard than in US dollar 
term. From GDP data, we found that ppp adjusted GDP per capita of these four 
countries are quite close to each other. Then, we can conclude that the four countries 
used in our study have similar economic characteristics, although there might be some 
geographical and socio-political differences. 
Tax revenue may change due to a variety of factors, for example, changes in income, 
changes in the efficiency of tax assessment and tax collection, and changes in tax 
rates and tax base. In evaluating the productivity of a tax system, two measures are 
usually considered. These are the buoyancy and the income elasticity of tax revenue. 
While the latter measures the changes in tax revenue as a result of the changes in 
income, the former measures the changes in tax revenue because of the changes not 
only in income but also other discretionary changes in tax policy. 
                                                            
38  In  choosing  the  sample,  this  study  considers  the  availability of data  and GDP per  capita ppp  as 
estimated by World Bank, World Development  Indicators  (2008).   Although, at  the  time AFTA was 
originally  signed,  ASEAN  had  six  members,  including  Brunei,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines, 
Singapore,  and  Thailand,  two  members,  namely,  Brunei  and  Singapore  are  restricted  by  the 
availability of data so we exclude them from our research. Although AFTA agreement now covers 10 
ASEAN countries, this study does not include the four latecomers which compose of Vietnam (joined 
in 1995), Laos and Myanmar (joined in 1997), and Cambodia (joined in 1999). This is because though 
these four  latecomers were required to sign the AFTA agreement  in order to  join ASEAN, they were 
given longer time frames in which to meet AFTA's tariff reduction obligations.    
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Osoro (1995) indicates that tax buoyancy can be estimated by the following equation; 
T Y βα ε=  (5.4) 
where T  is total tax revenue, Y  is income (e.g. GDP), and ε  is the error term. A log-
transform of equation (5.4) enables us to derive the buoyancy coefficient. This can be 
represented as; 
ˆˆln ln lntT t tYα β= + +ε  (5.5) 
where βˆ  provides an estimate of tax buoyancy. It measures the change in total tax 
revenue due to a change in GDP and the effect of discretionary changes in tax policy 
in percentage terms. This standard measure of revenue productivity expresses the tax 
flow in terms of GDP.  
Next, in order to estimate the built-in tax elasticity, the historical revenue data need to 
be adjusted to exclude the effect of discretionary tax changes from tax revenue data. 
The two common methods adopted to remove the effect of discretionary changes in 
tax system, including the proportional adjustment method and the dummy variable 
method, were discussed in an earlier section. Although there is no complete 
adjustment of historical revenue series for any of the methods, the proportional 
adjustment requires use of budget estimates of tax yields resulting from discretionary 
changes in which such data are not available since the data on discretionary revenues 
provided by government are normally incomplete. Not only the difficulty in obtaining 
budget estimates, but there also is the question for the reliability of these data since 
the calculation of these data is based on different models and methods for each 
country. Alternatively, the dummy variable method does not require the use of such 
difficult to obtain data as budget estimates. This method is considerably easy to use 
since all that is needed is a dummy variable to represent important discretionary 
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changes in the tax system for each year when a policy shift occurred. The dummy 
variable method is relatively simple to use because the proportional adjustment 
method is found to be hard to clean the tax data series of the impact of changes to the 
tax system. Since it is difficult to quantify the effects of any discretionary changes, 
due to non-availability of the relevant data, the dummy variable technique is 
considered to be useful. The only disadvantage of the dummy variable method is that 
it cannot be used properly when discretionary tax changes are quite frequent in the 
past. However, in the case of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines, there 
have not been any frequent changes in discretionary tax measures over the study 
period. Therefore, we choose to estimate tax elasticity by applying the dummy 
variable technique as a method of adjustment. 
Thus, in order to adjust the impact of trade liberalization on tax revenue, the dummy 
variable technique suggested by Singer (1968) has been introduced for the exercise. 
By using this technique, we introduce a dummy variable into equation (5.5) and it 
takes value 1 for each year after each country joined the AFTA agreement in 1992, 
which is the only major tax change for each country. The resulting model is; 
1 2
ˆ ˆˆln ln lnt tT Y i tDα β β= + + +ε
tD LogY⋅
 (5.6) 
where  is dummy variable accounting for the AFTA agreement introduced in 1992. iD
Trade liberalization may also have an impact on GDP. Thus, in this study, we 
introduce a slope dummy variable into equation (5.6). To derive the slope dummy 
function, we introduce ( ), equal to the product of GDP and AFTA dummy. 
The coefficient of ( ) measures the discontinuous effect of changes in 
i
i tD LogY⋅
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income and trade liberalization. Hence, the final model which includes both the 
intercept and slope dummy variables can be represented as follow; 
1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆˆln ln ln ( ln )t t i i t tT Y D D Yα β β β ε= + + + ⋅ +  (5.7) 
Where; 
tT  is tax revenue 
tY  is Gross Domestic Product (Typically in the empirical studies, the GDP (income) is 
taken as base) 
iD  is dummy variable ( for pre AFTA period and 0D = 1D =  for the post-AFTA 
period) 
( lni tD Y⋅ )  is an interaction term included to allow for a change in the slope of the tax 
revenue function over the period of trade liberalization 
αˆ  is the intercept during the pre-AFTA period ( 0D = ) 
2βˆ  is the differential intercept during the post-AFTA period ( 1D = ) 
If the regression coefficient of the dummy variable, 2βˆ , is significantly positive then 
the average tax revenue goes up; If it is significantly negative, then the average tax 
revenue goes down during the post-AFTA period. 
1ˆβ  is the regression coefficient or the magnitude of tax elasticity during the pre-AFTA 
period ( ):  0D = 1ˆ 0β >
3βˆ  is the differential coefficient or the magnitude of differential tax elasticity during 
the post-AFTA period ( ). It allows a shift (an upward / a downward) in tax 
elasticity during the post-AFTA period when 
1D =
1D = , 3βˆ  may take any value. The 
statistical significance of 3βˆ  demonstrate the presence of difference between the 
magnitude of the tax elasticity during the post-AFTA period and the magnitude of tax 
elasticity during the pre-AFTA period. 
1ˆ
ˆ
3β β±
1ˆ
ˆ
 is the magnitude of tax elasticity during the post-AFTA period ( ). If 1D =
3β β±  is more or less than 1ˆβ  then there will be an upward or a downward shift in 
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the degree of tax elasticity during post AFTA period; If 1ˆ ˆ3β β±  is equal to 1ˆβ  then the 
magnitude of tax elasticity remains the same in pre- and post-AFTA periods, implying 
the absence of shift. 
After defining the model for tax buoyancy and tax elasticity, we then perform time 
series analysis by regressing equations over different period, detailed as follows; 
1) In order to compare tax buoyancy and tax elasticity, we regress equation (5.5) 
and equation (5.7) over the 1972-2006 period to obtain indices of tax 
buoyancy and tax elasticity, respectively. Buoyancy greater than elasticity 
means that the discretionary tax measures improve revenue mobilization of 
tax, while buoyancy less than elasticity implies that revenue mobilization 
worsens as a result of the introduction of the discretionary tax measures. 
2) In order to compare the performance of the tax system and each individual tax 
handle before and after joining the AFTA agreement, we regress equation 
(5.5) over two periods; 1972-1991 and 1992-2006. If the estimate of tax 
buoyancy over the period 1972-1991 is lower than that of the period 1992-
2006, it can be implied that tax performance increases after the country joined 
AFTA member. If tax buoyancy obtained from the 1972-1991 period is higher 
than that obtained from the 1992-2006 period, it can be implied that tax 
productivity is worse after the country liberalized its trade to ASEAN 
countries. 
In addition, the analysis is extended to assess the tax performance of both direct and 
indirect taxes and therefore, in order to obtain tax buoyancy (tax-to-income) and tax 
elasticity of each tax category, four other models are estimated with the same 
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specification for the four categories of taxes.39 Therefore, equation (5.5) and (5.7) will 
be applied for both total tax revenue and each individual tax handle. The major 
revenue components to be considered are: 
1) International Trade Tax 
2) Personal Income Tax 
3) Corporate Income Tax 
4) Goods and Services Tax 
The regression of total tax revenue and its disaggregated sources will be applied to 
Thailand and 3 other ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Philippines, for comparison purpose. 
To consider further trends in the individual tax source, we decompose tax buoyancy to 
obtain the buoyancy of tax revenue with respect to its tax base and the buoyancy of 
tax base with respect to income. This can be expressed as following; 
i i i i
ii i
T T B BY
Y T B T Y B
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡Δ Δ Δ× = × ⋅ ×⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢Δ Δ Δ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ i
Y ⎤⎥⎦
 (5.8) 
where  is tax revenue from the individual ith tax and iT iB  is the base of the individual 
ith tax. 
The decomposition of buoyancy into tax-to-base and base-to-income is very useful for 
policy analysis since it tells us which component of growth that is amenable to policy 
manipulation. Indraratna (1991) suggests that decomposing tax buoyancy is beneficial 
since the government will be able to identify factors which are responsible for rapid or 
lagged revenue growth. Generally, factors which affect the tax-to-base buoyancy, 
such as tax rates, exemptions, and improvement in tax administration are within the 
                                                            
39 Direct taxes include personal income and corporate income taxes, while indirect taxes include 
goods and services tax and international trade tax. 
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control of tax administration or fiscal authorities and therefore making this measure 
important for policy purposes. On the other hand, the base-to-income buoyancy 
reveals the structure of economy changes with economic growth, which is beyond the 
scope of tax authorities’ control. The decomposition of buoyancy will be conducted 
for both the combined period (1972-2006) and pre- and post-AFTA periods (1972-
1991 and 1992-2006, respectively). 
For total tax revenue, this study considers GDP as the tax base since Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam (1997) suggest that the use of GDP as an determinant for tax revenue 
is more appropriate than the use of GNP because the former includes non-resident 
income earned locally and excludes income received from abroad by residents, while 
the latter excludes non-resident income earned locally but includes income received 
from abroad by residents. Since, in general, local income of non-residents is taxed 
while remittances from abroad are not, thus GDP produces a more accurate measure 
of the tax base for total tax revenue. 
In the decomposition step, we use different tax bases for each tax category, depending 
on how each individual tax is levied. Typically, personal income tax is often levied 
(with some deduction permitted) on the total income of the taxable person, generally 
including income from employment (personal earnings or wages), income from 
business, income from basic agriculture or forestry, income from rents and royalties, 
and income from interest, dividends, capital gains, and other income. Personal income 
tax is usually collected on a pay-as-you-earn basis and it can be collected at a 
progressive, proportional or regressive rates. On the other hand, corporate income tax 
is a generally levied on net profit of a juristic company or partnership at the end of an 
accounting period. The term “juristic company or partnership” means a limited 
company, limited partnership or registered partnership and includes any joint venture, 
239 
 
any trading or profit-seeking activity carried on by any revenue producing business. 
The corporate income tax base is the net profit, normally known as net income, net 
earnings, and bottom line is ascertained by subtracting all allowed deductible 
expenses from total sales in an accounting period. The allowed deductible expenses 
are subjected to conditions commonly found in corporate income tax laws of most 
countries. Considering two indirect taxes, first, goods and services tax is generally 
referred to a value added tax (VAT), single business tax, or turnover tax. It is 
considered to be the broadest-based tax relative to other individual tax handles since it 
is levied on nearly all supplies of goods and services. Next, the international trade tax, 
generally includes import and export tariffs. It is usually charged on the movement of 
goods into and out of the country. Generally, duties are levied on an ad valorem basis. 
In certain cases, however, both ad valorem and specific rates are given and the tariff 
that gives the most revenue will apply. 
However, because the legal base of each tax handle is not known with precision, we 
use the following proxies as bases for each major revenue source. First, merchandise 
trade as a share of GDP will be used as a proxy for the international trade tax. Second, 
compensation of employees will be used as a proxy base for personal income tax. 
Third, the share of industry in GDP will be used as a proxy for corporate income tax 
since business profit data are difficult to obtain and most of agriculture-based firms 
either pay very low tax or are exempted from corporate income tax. Last, household 
final consumption expenditure will be taken as a proxy base for the consumption tax. 
The first and very important step in time series analysis is to test the data for 
stationarity. Each variable in the regression model must be stationary since Granger 
and Newbold (1974) and Phillips (1986) point out that the regression results may be 
spurious or nonsense if the estimated variables are non-stationary. Thus, for research 
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using time series data, stationarity is vital. For this reason, we have to run the 
regression with stationary variables, I(0). If a variable is stationary, or it does not have 
unit root, in level, it is said to be integrated of order zero; I(0). However, if we 
observe that the order of integration for each series is different, thus we have to 
transform (i.e. differencing) the variable until stationary. For example, if a variable is 
not stationary in levels but stationary in its first differenced form, it is said to be 
integrated of order one; I(1). If the variables are found to be integrated of order one, 
I(1) process, then we run the regression with the first differenced of the variables. In 
this study, the presence of a unit root in a time series will be tested by using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979 and 1981) and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests before 
estimating the coefficients of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity. 
5.4.2. Variables, Data and Sources 
In this study, we estimate the tax buoyancy and tax elasticity of four ASEAN 
countries by using annual data covering the period from 1972 to 2006. The choice of 
sample size is mainly determined by the availability of data. Both tax buoyancy and 
tax elasticity are measured in real terms in which we have to adjust tax revenue, GDP, 
and other related data for inflation before running the regressions. This is because the 
use of nominal measures would cause the estimate of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity 
to be biased towards 1. The real measures of revenue productivity will be obtained by 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a deflator. The data set consists of the 
following items: 
1. Total tax revenue, international trade tax revenue, personal income tax 
revenue, corporate income tax revenue, and goods and services tax revenue – 
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Unit: US Dollars; Source: IMF, Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 
December 2008. 
2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – Unit:  constant 2000 US Dollars; Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), December 2008. 
3. Merchandise Trade as a share of GDP - the sum of merchandise exports and 
imports divided by the value of GDP; Unit: Percentage of GDP; Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), December 2008. 
4. Compensation of employees – Compensation of employees consists of all 
payments in cash to employees in return for services rendered, and 
government contributions to social insurance schemes such as social security 
and pensions that provide benefits to employees (the sum of wages, salaries, 
and employers’ social contribution); Unit: US Dollars; Source: National 
Authorities, International Labour Organization, National Central Banks, 
National Statistics, and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 
December 2008. 
5. The share of industry in GDP – Unit: Percentage of GDP; Source: The Penn 
World Table (PWT Version 6.2), World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI), December 2008. 
6. Household final consumption expenditure - (formerly known as private 
consumption) the market value of all goods and services, including durable 
products (such as cars, washing machines, and home computers), purchased 
by households. Unit:  constant 2000 US Dollars; Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), December 2008. 
7. AFTA dummy variable - The dummy variable takes value of 1 since 1992, 
when these four countries found the AFTA agreement, and 0 otherwise. 
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5.5. Empirical Results 
In this part, we will estimate the buoyancy and elasticity of the overall tax revenue 
and individual tax handles. We will provide both before- and after-liberalization as 
well as combined period for buoyancy estimates. In addition, the decomposed tax-to-
base and base-to-income estimates are presented in order to investigate the 
responsiveness of tax base and tax administration. 
Test of Stationarity 
In estimating the productivity of tax system and each individual tax handle, the first 
and very important step is to ascertain the stationarity of the variables under study. 
Stationarity is an important concept in time series econometrics since the standard 
regression model makes assumptions which regard the stationarity of the variables 
and the error term. Therefore, our preliminary task in the estimation procedure is to 
check for the stationarity of variables by testing for the order of integration. In 
general, we might need to difference a time series d times in order to induce 
stationarity and the series is called integrated of order d and is denoted by I(d). In this 
study, we employ standard unit root tests by applying two asymptotically equivalent 
tests: the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. Our 
observed time series include total tax revenue (TTR), international trade tax revenue 
(ITT), personal income tax revenue (PIT), corporate income tax revenue (CIT), goods 
and services tax revenue (GST), gross domestic product (GDP), merchandise trade 
(MER), compensation of employees (LAB), the share of industry in GDP (IND), and 
household final consumption expenditure (CONS). All variables have been converted 
to natural logarithms. The results of the ADF and PP tests with constant and trend for 
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Thailand are presented from Table 5.1. The test results for other three ASEAN 
countries are provided in Appendix 5A. 
Table 5.1: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Thailand) 
THAILAND 
Variable ADF PP 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
TTR -1.36 -1.71 -4.79 -4.73 -1.40 -1.98 -4.80 -4.75 
ITT -2.26 -2.09 -4.35 -4.39 -1.81 -1.59 -4.29 -4.33 
PIT -1.30 -1.62 -6.12 -6.19 -1.30 -1.66 -6.12 -6.21 
CIT -1.16 -2.95 -3.12 -4.02 -1.43 -2.29 -3.05 -3.94 
GST -1.43 -1.93 -5.99 -5.95 -1.42 -2.04 -5.99 -5.95 
GDP -0.99 -1.65 -3.16 -3.61 -1.49 -1.14 -3.20 -3.61 
MER -0.30 -2.37 -5.61 -5.54 -0.29 -2.35 -5.61 -5.53 
LAB -1.54 -2.29 -6.02 -6.20 -1.72 -2.29 -6.02 -6.20 
IND -0.77 -2.32 -6.88 -6.79 -0.44 -2.31 -7.16 -7.23 
CONS -0.93 -1.96 -3.55 -3.57 -1.23 -1.55 -3.61 -3.57 
 Note: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test assumes that the series follows an AR(p) process and adding 
p lagged difference terms of the dependent variable to the right-hand side of the test regression: 
y
y
 
1 1 1 2 2 . . .t t t t t p t pd y y x d y d y d y tα δ β β β υ− − −′= + + + + + +−  
The test reported is a t-ratio which it is used to test the null hypothesis that the variable employed in the study has a 
unit root. 95% critical values are -2.93 (for the case without trend) and -3.51 (for the case with trend). 
 The Phillips-Perron (PP) test modifies the t-ratio of the α coefficient so that serial correlation does not 
affect asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. The PP test is based on the statistic: 
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Testing the same null hypothesis that the series are not stationary, 95% critical values are also the same as those 
for ADF test. 
Source; Eviews 6  
The results of ADF and PP tests from Table 5.1 and presented in Appendix 5A 
indicate that each variable is nonstationary in level but they are all found to be 
stationary in their first differences. From the results we conclude that all variables 
used for Thailand and other three ASEAN countries are integrated of order 1. Then, 
the cointegration test using the two-step estimation suggested by Engle and Granger is 
employed. The cointegration results are provided in Appendix 5D, which it is found 
that these variables are cointegrated, suggesting that there is a constant long-run linear 
relationship among them. With this conclusion, we then use ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) to estimate equation 5.5 and 5.7 in order to obtain tax buoyancy and tax 
elasticity. 
The Estimation of Tax Buoyancy and Tax Elasticity 
After the time series log variables are found stationary in first difference, I(1) and it is 
also found that variables under study are cointegrated, next, this study utilizes a time 
series regression approach, by fitting a log regression model presented in equation 5.5 
and 5.7 to estimate tax buoyancy and tax elasticity for total tax, international trade 
tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, and goods and services tax revenues. 
Estimates of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity have been derived using the Cochrane-
Orcutt iterative procedure, which corrects the problem of autocorrelation. We also 
perform various diagnostic tests and these tests uniformly suggest that, in all case, our 
results do not suffer from problems of non-normality, serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity, and mis-specification. The following sections provide the 
estimates of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity for the combined period, as well as tax 
buoyancy divided into pre- and post-AFTA periods. In addition, the decomposition of 
tax buoyancy (tax-to-base and base-to-income) over the combined and pre- and post-
AFTA periods is provided in later section for further analysis. Full regression results 
are provided in Appendix 5B and Appendix 5C. 
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Table 5.2: Tax Buoyancy and Tax Elasticity Estimates; Combined Period (1972-
2006) 
Country Tax Category Tax 
Buoyancy 
Tax 
Elasticity 
Dummy Slope 
Dummy 
Difference in 
Coefficient 
Thailand Total Tax 
Revenue 
1.44 1.73 12.72 -0.51 -0.29 
International 
Trade Tax 
0.77 1.34 25.00 -1.00 -0.57 
Personal 
Income Tax 
1.69 2.21 29.20 -1.16 -0.52 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
2.11 1.89 -18.32 0.72 0.22 
Goods and 
Services Tax 
0.71 0.94 11.72 -0.47 -0.23 
Indonesia Total Tax 
Revenue 
0.86 0.65 1.45 0.57 0.21 
International 
Trade Tax 
-1.21 -1.74 -20.85 0.82 0.53 
Personal 
Income Tax 
0.82 0.12 -66.84 2.62 0.70 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
-2.37 -0.87 91.97 -3.60 -1.50 
Goods and 
Services Tax 
2.74 2.04 -25.13 0.98 0.70 
Malaysia Total Tax 
Revenue 
0.60 0.85 14.20 -0.57 -0.25 
International 
Trade Tax 
-0.36 0.33 29.73 -1.21 -0.69 
Personal 
Income Tax 
0.87 0.91 4.02 -0.16 -0.04 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
0.74 0.58 -2.82 0.12 0.16 
Goods and 
Services Tax 
0.83 1.08 18.65 -0.75 -0.25 
Philippines Total Tax 
Revenue 
1.76 1.41 -25.20 1.03 0.35 
International 
Trade Tax 
1.64 2.18 44.89 -1.81 -0.54 
Personal 
Income Tax 
1.93 0.39 -52.67 2.13 1.54 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
2.60 2.86 30.58 -1.21 -0.26 
Goods and 
Services Tax 
1.31 1.62 18.57 -0.74 -0.31 
 
The measures of buoyancy and elasticity of the whole tax system and of its major 
components are obtained by the estimated regression coefficients and are presented in 
Table 5.2. As seen the buoyancy of Thailand’s total tax revenue is estimated at 1.44, 
which is well above unity. This means that the tax system yields a 1.44% change in 
tax revenue for every 1% change in GDP, implying that the tax structure in Thailand 
is buoyant. A number of other observations can be made on the basis of the figures in 
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Table 5.2. First, taxes on personal income and corporate income are generally 
buoyant, while taxes on goods and services and international trade are not. Clearly, 
the overall buoyancy of the tax system is a consequence of the buoyant income and 
profit taxes, especially for corporate income tax with the buoyancy estimated at 2.11. 
However, the low buoyancy of international trade tax adversely affects the overall 
buoyancy of the total tax. A comparison of the tax handles reveals that corporate 
income tax has the highest buoyancy coefficient, while the goods and services tax has 
the lowest. The estimated coefficients also imply that tax on international trade is not 
buoyant, with the buoyancy calculated at only 0.77. The low buoyancy on 
international trade tax, in some parts, might be due to its own nature; in principle, it 
does not grow along with the economic growth. In other parts, it might be due to tax 
evasion, tax exemptions, corruption in tax administration, and the presence of the 
underground economy. However, the major concern is on the inflexibility of the 
goods and services tax, where the buoyancy is less than unity, only 0.71. In principle, 
the goods and services tax is a broad-based tax which the government usually uses to 
raise revenue. The strictness of the goods and services tax implies that the Thai 
government may encounter problems in raising revenue to mitigate the fiscal deficit 
or to mitigate the loss of international trade tax. 
Next, by comparing Thailand’s tax buoyancy with that of other countries, it is found 
that tax systems of Thailand and Philippines are flexible, while tax systems of 
Indonesia and Malaysia are inflexible. Among our sample countries, the Philippines 
tax system is the most buoyant but the Malaysian tax system is the most rigid. For 
Philippines, the estimates of tax buoyancy are buoyant for all tax categories. Like 
Thailand, the buoyancy of the Philippines tax system is a consequence of income and 
profit taxes, with the highest buoyancy for corporate income tax. By contrast, for the 
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Malaysian tax system, the estimated coefficients show that tax buoyancies are 
inflexible for all major tax handles. Especially for its international trade tax, it is 
found that the sign of the estimated coefficient is negative, implying that the revenue 
from international trade decreases as Malaysia’s economy grows. Other taxes which 
are found to be negatively related to income are international trade tax and corporate 
income tax of Indonesia. 
Then, we compare the estimates of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity. The comparison 
method is very important because it reveals the revenue impact of discretionary 
policy. The elasticity approach is used to adjust for the effect of trade liberalization 
after joining AFTA on the productivity of tax system and each tax revenue source. 
Considering the estimates of the elasticities of total tax revenue and major taxes 
calculated by using the dummy variable approach developed by Singer (1968), the 
overall elasticity is 1.73, showing that Thailand’s overall tax system is elastic. The 
results in Table 5.2 indicate that overall tax buoyancy is less than the tax elasticity, 
implying that the revenue mobilization of Thailand is worse as a result of becoming 
an AFTA member. For each major category of Thailand’s tax, elasticity exceeds 
buoyancy in all cases, except for corporate income tax, which implies that trade 
liberalization by joining AFTA is associated with the decline in revenue productivity 
of almost all taxes. Only corporate income tax is improved after the liberalization 
period. This can also be seen by considering the estimated coefficient on the dummy 
and slope dummy. The liberalization dummy and the slope shift dummy are 
significant for both the overall and individual taxes with different sign and magnitude, 
which strongly suggests that the tax-income regressions for the two time periods, 
before and after trade liberalization, are different. From the results present in Table 
5.2, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement leads to a negative change in the slope of the 
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total tax-income regression, meaning that Thailand’s total tax revenue is less elastic in 
the post-AFTA period. The estimated coefficient of the slope dummy, showing the 
value equal to -0.51, implies that Thailand’s total tax elasticity has declined from 1.73 
in the pre-AFTA period to only 1.22 in the post-AFTA period. International trade, 
personal income, and goods and services taxes show the same pattern as total tax 
revenue. Their slope dummy are -1.00, -1.16, and -0.47, meaning that tax elasticity of 
these tax handles have decreased in the post-AFTA period from 1.34, 2.21, and 0.94 
to 0.34, 1.05, and 0.47, respectively. Only corporate tax elasticity has increased from 
1.89 to 2.61 during the post-AFTA period. The results imply that, after Thailand 
signed AFTA, although the overall tax system of Thailand is still elastic, the elasticity 
of the tax system deteriorated, in which international trade tax and goods and services 
tax have turned out to be very inelastic. 
Considering tax elasticities of the other three ASEAN countries, the other country 
where revenue mobilization worsened during the post-AFTA period is Malaysia, with 
total tax buoyancy less than total tax elasticity. Total tax elasticity decreases from 
0.85 to only 0.28, which is very inelastic. Like Thailand, the inelasticity of Malaysia’s 
total tax revenue results from the fall of international trade tax, personal income tax, 
and goods and services tax during the post-AFTA period. However, unlike Thailand, 
there is not much improvement in the elasticity of corporate income tax during the 
post-AFTA period, and hence makes Malaysia’s tax system as a whole very rigid. By 
contrast, total tax buoyancies of Indonesia and Philippines exceed their total tax 
elasticities. As seen in the table, the difference between the estimated coefficients of 
the overall buoyancy and elasticity are positive, suggesting that the growth in tax 
revenue of these two countries is accounted for by discretionary policy rather 
automatic changes. This implies that the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement improves 
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revenue mobilization of the tax system of these countries. The slope dummy of total 
tax revenue of Indonesia is equal to 0.57, implying that the elasticity of Indonesia’s 
tax system has improved from 0.65 during pre-AFTA period to 1.22 during post-
AFTA period, which changes the whole system from inelastic to elastic. Although 
there is a considerable decline in the elasticity of corporate income tax during the 
post-AFTA period, there is also a substantial increase in the elasticity of personal 
income tax and an increase in the elasticity of international trade tax and goods and 
services tax which are more than enough to offset the fall in the elasticity of corporate 
income tax, and thus results in a higher elasticity for Indonesia’s whole tax system. 
Likewise, the slope dummy of total tax revenue of the Philippines is equal to 1.03, 
suggesting that the elasticity of Philippines’s tax system has improved from 1.41 
during pre-AFTA period to 2.44 during post-AFTA period, changing the whole tax 
system from fairly elastic to very elastic. However, when consider the individual tax 
handle, it is found that an improvement in total tax elasticity is a result of an 
improvement in elasticity only for personal income tax. For the Philippines, personal 
income tax elasticity improves from 0.39, which is very inelastic during the pre-
AFTA period, to 2.52 which is very elastic during the post-AFTA period. The 
elasticities of international trade tax (2.18), corporate income tax (2.86), and goods 
and services tax (1.62) have reduced during the post-AFTA period to 0.37, 1.65, and 
0.88, respectively. 
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Table 5.3: Tax Buoyancy Estimates; Pre- and Post-AFTA Period 
Country Tax Category Overall Tax Buoyancy 
Pre-AFTA 
Tax Buoyancy 
Post-AFTA 
Tax Buoyancy 
Thailand 
Total Tax Revenue 1.44 1.83 1.77 
International Trade 
Tax 0.77 1.57 0.79 
Personal Income Tax 1.69 1.36 1.05 
Corporate Income Tax 2.11 2.22 4.14 
Goods and Services 
Tax 0.71 0.97 0.71 
Indonesia 
Total Tax Revenue 0.86 0.68 1.44 
International Trade 
Tax -1.21 -1.24 1.33 
Personal Income Tax 0.82 0.30 5.08 
Corporate Income Tax -2.37 -0.90 -6.00 
Goods and Services 
Tax 2.74 0.31 3.84 
Malaysia 
Total Tax Revenue 0.60 0.79 0.42 
International Trade 
Tax -0.36 0.39 -1.28 
Personal Income Tax 0.87 0.91 0.72 
Corporate Income Tax 0.74 0.46 0.87 
Goods and Services 
Tax 0.83 1.02 0.24 
Philippines 
Total Tax Revenue 1.76 0.66 2.32 
International Trade 
Tax 1.64 1.91 0.47 
Personal Income Tax 1.93 1.40 1.94 
Corporate Income Tax 2.60 2.66 1.35 
Goods and Services 
Tax 1.31 1.57 0.50 
 
In order to compare the performance of the tax system before and after trade is 
liberalized, estimated tax buoyancy for different taxes over 1972-1991 and 1992-2006 
are reported in Table 5.3. All estimated coefficients are significant, giving us a firm 
comment on the changes of buoyancies. The results are all in line with the comparison 
between buoyancy and elasticity and the analysis of elasticity presented in the 
previous table. As seen, the overall tax buoyancy of Thailand shows a little decrease 
of approximately 6% after liberalization. The table reveals that the estimated values of 
coefficients of the major tax handles move in the opposite directions. The only tax 
handle that has an increase in performance is in the case of corporate income tax. On 
the other hand, the performance of the other three major tax handles, including 
international trade tax, personal income tax and goods and services tax, seems to 
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decline in the period of liberalization. It is notable that the rigidity of the international 
trade tax and goods and services tax is a result of the decline in their performance 
during the post-AFTA period. Malaysia is the other country in our sample which 
shows a decline in tax performance during the post-AFTA period. The difference of 
buoyancy between pre- and post-AFTA period suggests that the performance of 
Malaysia’s overall tax system drops about 37% in the second half that Malaysia 
entered into AFTA. Like Thailand, corporate income tax is the only source that shows 
an increase in performance during the post-AFTA period. However, the other three 
major taxes shows a decrease in performance during the post-AFTA period and thus 
results in a drop in its overall tax performance over the whole period. It is important 
to note that the negative relationship between international trade tax and income is 
mainly due the change in the post-AFTA period, that the buoyancy changes from 
positively inflexible value to fairly flexible but negative value. 
Indonesia and Philippines show an improvement in overall tax performance during 
the post-AFTA period. Both countries firstly suffer from the rigidity in the tax system 
during the first half (the buoyancies are accounted for 0.68 for Indonesia and 0.66 for 
Philippines in the pre-AFTA period), but their performance has been substantially 
improved during the second half (1.44 for Indonesia and 2.32 for Philippines). 
However, there is a big difference between these two countries, that is, Indonesia still 
suffers from the rigidity of total tax revenue, though gaining benefit from 
performance improvement in the post-AFTA period, while the Philippines tax system 
is very buoyant. The reason why Indonesia’s tax system is still not buoyant is mainly 
due to the continually reduction in the performance of corporate income tax, 
especially in the post-AFTA period. For Philippines, an improvement in overall tax 
performance is only due to an improvement in personal income tax. Although other 
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tax handles experience a decline of tax performance, it seems that an improvement in 
personal income tax performance overwhelms a decline in other tax handles’ 
performance, and hence results in an improvement of overall tax performance.  
Table 5.4: Decomposition of Tax Buoyancy 
Country Tax Category 
Overall Pre-AFTA Post-AFTA 
Tax 
Buoyancy 
Tax-
to-
Base 
Base-
to-
Income 
Tax 
Buoyancy 
Tax-
to-
Base 
Base-
to-
Income 
Tax 
Buoyancy 
Tax-
to-
Base 
Base-
to-
Income 
Thailand 
International 
Trade 
Tax 
0.77 0.64 0.61 1.57 1.78 0.43 0.79 -0.83 1.41 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
1.69 0.54 1.29 1.36 0.30 1.34 1.05 0.96 1.01 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
2.11 3.34 0.27 2.22 1.53 0.29 4.14 3.72 0.26 
Goods and 
Services 
Tax 
0.71 0.80 0.87 0.97 0.20 0.97 0.71 1.83 0.81 
Indonesia 
International 
Trade 
Tax 
-1.21 -0.95 0.21 -1.24 -1.30 0.08 1.33 0.15 2.11 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
0.82 0.80 2.10 0.30 0.92 0.78 5.08 0.85 3.17 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
-2.37 -2.47 0.16 -0.90 -2.05 0.10 -6.00 -3.78 0.28 
Goods and 
Services 
Tax 
2.74 1.50 2.08 0.31 0.37 1.06 3.84 2.12 2.61 
Malaysia 
International 
Trade 
Tax 
-0.36 -0.68 0.53 0.39 0.41 1.23 -1.28 -1.11 0.43 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
0.87 0.55 0.37 0.91 1.62 0.40 0.72 0.60 1.48 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
0.74 0.77 1.70 0.46 0.66 0.67 0.87 0.96 1.87 
Goods and 
Services 
Tax 
0.83 0.92 0.88 1.02 1.14 0.88 0.24 0.26 1.21 
Philippines 
International 
Trade 
Tax 
1.64 1.89 1.01 1.91 2.08 1.01 0.47 0.62 0.93 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
1.93 1.65 1.35 1.40 1.50 1.05 1.94 1.80 1.31 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
2.60 2.51 0.51 2.66 2.25 1.51 1.35 2.58 0.41 
Goods and 
Services 
Tax 
1.31 1.23 1.33 1.57 1.32 1.40 0.50 0.51 0.72 
 
The decomposed buoyancies can be used to investigate the sources of loopholes in 
revenue leakages. Table 5.4 gives a decomposition of tax-to-income buoyancy into its 
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constituent parts (i.e., tax-to-base and base-to-income). It is evident that the buoyancy 
of the Thailand tax system is mainly due to the high tax-to-base buoyancy of 
corporate income tax, especially in the post-AFTA period. The higher-than-unity 
value of tax-to-base index suggests that there is a large improvement in the 
administration of collection of this tax. However, it is notable that base-to-income 
estimates of corporate income tax are quite low, indicating that tax bases for corporate 
income taxes are quite rigid in both pre- and post-AFTA periods. This indicates that 
trade liberalization does not result in a large expansion of the bases of this tax handle, 
that it does not play any role in increasing corporate profit, stimulating investment, 
and setting up of new businesses. 
On the other hand, the estimate of base-to-income for personal income tax is quite 
high, implying that the personal income tax base responds favourably to changes in 
income. Unfortunately, the growth in personal income tax revenue lags behind the 
growth in its base. This partly results in the less responsiveness of total tax revenue to 
changes in GDP than the level that it should be. 
For the international trade tax, the low values of tax-to-base and base-to-income 
buoyancies probably signify not only both tax evasion and inefficient tax 
administration but also the impact of trade liberalization. In the pre-AFTA period, the 
value of tax-to-base buoyancy of international trade tax is very high while the value of 
base-to-income buoyancy is very low, implying that during this period Thailand 
successfully raised revenue from this tax source because of the nature of this tax. It 
was easy to collect and the rate was set at very high levels, and was not due to the 
level of international trade. However, in the post-AFTA period, the value of tax-to-
base buoyancy turns out to be very negative while the value of base-to-income 
buoyancy is very buoyant, implying that, in this period trade liberalization results in a 
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substantial increase in the volume of international trade but the effect of the reduction 
in the tariff rate overwhelms the effect of an increase in international trade, and hence 
results in the reduction in international trade tax revenue. This finding may be 
explained by the following factors. First, the pre-liberalization period is characterized 
by a narrow base of international trade tax. It is not until the 1990s that exports and, 
especially, imports expand considerably with the growth of GDP. Second, there are 
weaknesses in international trade tax administration since the tax system, information 
management, skills of tax authorities are poor during this period. Third, the 
inefficiency of tax system contributes to loopholes for tax evasion and corruption. 
For the goods and services tax, which also has the value of tax-to-base and base-to-
income estimates lower than unity, the reported values probably signifies tax evasion 
and inefficient tax administration in the period that the country imposed business tax. 
The results show tax-to-base estimates of the goods and services tax substantially 
improves in the liberalization period, which is the same period that the country 
changes the collection from business tax to value added tax. However, the decline of 
base-to-income buoyancy from 0.97 to 0.81 reflects a low growth of private 
consumption, the proxy base of this tax. The contraction of the consumption tax base 
with respect to GDP implies that the country must be cautious in proceeding tax 
policy and any policy related since the consumption tax base is the widest base 
compared with other bases. In fact, both theory and experience in practice suggest that 
the country should improve the revenue collection from goods and services tax to 
mitigate the loss in international trade tax revenue. The rigid consumption tax base 
may further cause the problem in revenue substitution. 
Overall, for Thailand, trade liberalization improves the base-to-income buoyancy of 
only international trade tax (from 0.43 to 1.41), but deteriorates the base-to-income 
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buoyancy of the other three major taxes; personal income tax (from 1.34 to 1.01), 
corporate income tax (from 0.29 to 0.26), and goods and services tax (from 0.97 to 
0.81). This indicates that trade liberalization, by joining AFTA, impacts on total tax 
bases and seems to worsen total tax revenue. It causes the expansion of the 
international trade tax base, it lowers the responsiveness of both direct and indirect 
domestic tax bases, especially for the goods and services tax base which is the widest 
tax base of the country. However, tax-to-base indexes of almost all tax handles, 
except that of international trade tax, increase in the liberalization period, which 
suggests that the post-AFTA tax structure is generally more flexible. This reflects the 
improvement of tax administration of the country. The values of tax-to-base indexes 
of personal income tax, corporate income tax and goods and services tax in the post-
liberalization period, which are equal to and higher than unity, suggest revenue 
leakage is no longer a major problem of these taxes. For income and profit taxes, it 
can be attributed to the improvement in tax administration, tax investigation, and 
accounting audit. For goods and services tax, it can be attributed to the relative 
effectiveness of tax reforms in the goods and services tax, which it does not only 
make the tax system simpler but also reduce avenues for evasion and corruption. The 
major reform includes the introduction of VAT, which the new tax reduces the 
exemptions and shifts the system away from multiple business tax rates to single VAT 
rate. The improvement in the performance of tax collection relative to the expansion 
of the tax base is an important issue deriving from the results since it implies that 
there is a success in tax reform after trade liberalization. However, since the desired 
goal of tax reform is to make both the whole tax structure and the individual tax 
handles more buoyant, the more rigidity of tax bases after trade is liberalized are the 
major concern for the government but it is beyond the control of the tax authorities. 
256 
 
Considering its three neighbouring countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines, it 
is found that the reasons that make each country’s tax system rigid or flexible are 
different. First, considering Indonesia, the rigidity of Indonesia’s tax system is mainly 
due to the reduction in its corporate income tax collection. The negative sign of tax-
to-base coefficients means that, as the industry sector grows, Indonesia collects less 
revenue from this tax. This is because Indonesia has continually cut its corporate 
income tax rate in order to spur its investment and growth, especially after the 
monetary crisis in 1997 which the country has experienced significant economic 
instability. However, it seems that the loss of corporate income tax revenue is more 
than covered by an increase of two tax sources, personal income and goods and 
services taxes. For personal income tax, the success of revenue mobilization is mainly 
due to the high buoyancy of base-to-income, especially in the post-AFTA period. 
Base-to-income buoyancy of personal income tax substantially increases from only 
0.78 to 3.17, implying that as Indonesia’s economy grows, more and more taxable 
persons are included in the tax bracket as a result of substantial increase in wage and 
salary level. For goods and services tax, both tax-to-base and base-to-income 
buoyancies considerably increase in the post-AFTA period. This suggests that both 
tax administration and tax base of goods and services tax have been largely improved 
after the country entered into AFTA. The international trade tax has also experienced 
an increase of both tax-to-base and base-to-income during the post-AFTA period, 
implying that there is an improvement in the performance of tax authorities and 
improvement in the level of imports and exports. This is a good sign for the country’s 
tax reform since, in the liberalization period, there is no significant decrease in 
international trade tax because both the tax base and tax authorities seem to have 
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improved. Furthermore, the tax base and the ability to collect the goods and services 
tax, which is the broadest-based tax, have also been improved. 
For Malaysia, it is found that corporate income tax is the only tax source that has 
experienced an increase in tax buoyancy during the post-AFTA period. An 
improvement of buoyancy of corporate income tax results from an increase in both 
tax-to-base and base-to-income, especially the latter. The decline in tax buoyancy of 
the international trade tax is rooted from the decrease in both tax-to-base and base-to-
income buoyancies, which indicates that not only AFTA may cause a reduction in 
international trade tax collection via the reduction and elimination of a tariff, but 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement may also not have any impact in increasing the level 
of international trade. On the other hand, the decline in tax buoyancy of personal 
income and goods and services taxes comes only from the decrease in tax-to-base 
buoyancy, suggesting that tax reform in the post-AFTA period may not be successful 
in Malaysia since tax authorities do not show any sign of improvement regarding to 
an expansion of tax bases. 
Last, for Philippines, it is found that personal income tax is the only tax source that 
has experienced an increase in tax buoyancy during the post-AFTA period, resulting 
from an improvement in both tax-to-base and base-to-income. Corporate income tax 
has experienced a little increase in tax-to-base buoyancy but a substantial decline in 
base-to-income buoyancy, and hence results in the decline in corporate income tax 
buoyancy during the liberalization period. This indicates that there is a contraction of 
the corporate income tax base during the liberalization period. On the other hand, the 
international trade tax and the goods and services tax have experienced a decline in 
both tax-to-base and base-to-income buoyancies during the post-AFTA period. 
Although the reduction of international trade tax revenue is an acceptable outcome of 
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AFTA, the decline of the level of trade is not an expected consequence. In addition, 
the decline in tax-to-base and base-to-income buoyancies of goods and services tax 
also indicates the failure of tax reform during the post-AFTA period. 
5.6. Conclusion 
Thailand and three neighbouring countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Philippines, have developed regional cooperation among Southeast Asian countries by 
founding ASEAN which aims to accelerate economic growth, economic stability, and 
other social progress among its members. In order to reach the aim of regional 
economic development, ASEAN members have established the ASEAN FREE Trade 
Area (AFTA) in 1992, which is an agreement concerning the elimination of trade 
impediments. Since then, these member countries have liberalized its trade system 
and have made significant progress towards a more open trade regime through the 
reduction and elimination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers and through the 
simplification of the tax system by conducting domestic tax reform. In principle, trade 
liberalization may potentially have an impact on tax revenues both on tax productivity 
and tax bases. Generally, trade liberalization is accompanied with tax reform and one 
of the major objectives of tax reform is to increase tax productivity. Thus, in general, 
trade liberalization should be associated with an increase in the country’s tax 
productivity. Trade liberalization may also have an impact on the country’s tax bases 
in many different ways. For example, trade liberalization usually results in an increase 
in the country’s international trade volume, which is the tax base for international 
trade tax. But trade liberalization itself is related to the reduction and elimination of 
trade barriers, including tariffs, which directly reduces international trade tax revenue. 
This leads to an ambiguity in the changes in trade tax revenue after liberalization. In 
addition, other domestic tax bases may be affected by open trade regime. For instance, 
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trade liberalization, which is associated with an increase in the volume of trade, may 
lead to a rise in corporate profit of exporting and importing companies which is an 
important base for corporate income tax. It may also link with an expansion in the 
consumption tax base since, in principle, trade liberalization may not only be related 
to an increase in international trade, but it may also be related to an increase in 
domestic trade by an increase in import volume. Trade liberalization may also have a 
role in stimulating employment, especially for businesses in the international trade 
sector, and hence drive up wages and salaries and consequently improve the personal 
income tax base. Thus, in this chapter, we have investigated the impact of trade 
liberalization, specifically AFTA, on revenue mobilization and tax productivity of 
Thailand compared to those of three other ASEAN nations over the period 1972 to 
2006 by applying the concept of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity. 
Our results reveal that the tax system of Thailand and Philippines as a whole are 
buoyant and elastic, while the tax system of Indonesia and Malaysia are not. The 
buoyancy of Thailand’s and the Philippines tax system is mainly due to the high 
buoyancy of corporate income taxes. By contrast, the rigidity of Indonesia tax system 
is primarily caused by the inflexibility of the corporate income tax, while the rigidity 
of Malaysia’s tax system is rooted in the inflexibility of all tax handles. Tax buoyancy 
of pre- and post-AFTA indicates that Thailand and Malaysia have experienced a 
decline in tax performance, whereas Indonesia and Philippines have experienced an 
increase in tax performance during the liberalization period. The results are in line 
with the analysis of tax elasticity which suggests that revenue mobilization of 
Thailand and Malaysia is worse, while revenue mobilization of Indonesia and 
Philippines has improved as a result of ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
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Considering the decomposed buoyancies, it appears that the high buoyancy of 
Thailand’s tax system is particularly due to the high tax-to-base buoyancy of 
corporate income tax, especially in the post-AFTA period. However, Thailand has 
experienced a decline in base-to-income buoyancy during the post-AFTA period. An 
increase in tax-to-base buoyancy can be inferred that the performance of corporate 
income tax collection has been substantially improved. This is because recently both 
countries have concentrated more on large companies that have a high potential in 
paying large amount of tax, i.e. by setting up a large tax office which primarily 
focuses on auditing these large businesses. However, a decline in base-to-income 
buoyancy can be inferred that trade liberalization may be harmful to the ability to 
make a profit of domestic companies. The results show that the Philippines seems to 
follow the similar pattern that the high overall tax buoyancy resulted from an increase 
in tax-to-base buoyancy of corporate income tax, though its base-to-income buoyancy 
is very rigid in the liberalization period. 
For Thailand, the other tax handle that is buoyant over the whole period of the study 
is personal income tax, although the personal income tax buoyancy faces a small 
decline during the post-AFTA period. The comparison of the decomposed buoyancies 
of taxes to their respective bases and the bases to income indicates that an increase in 
buoyancy of personal income tax is a contribution of an improvement in tax 
administration and tax collection rather than an expansion of its base in the post-
liberalization period. This is because in the past decade, there is a large improvement 
in the technology system that helps both tax authorities to calculate easily individual 
income tax withholding and employers to withhold the correct amount from their 
employees. This technology advance is particularly helpful since it correctly 
withholds tax at source, and hence substantially reduces tax evasion. The other 
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country used in our study which shows an increase in the performance of personal 
income tax collection is Philippines. However, the big difference between Thailand 
and Philippines is that, for Philippines, there is no signal of personal income tax base 
erosion during the post-AFTA period since there is an increase in both tax-to-base and 
base-to-income personal income tax buoyancies after Philippines’s trade is 
liberalized. 
Two other individual tax handles which are not buoyant over the whole period of 
study are the international trade tax and the goods and services tax. For the 
international trade tax, the rigidity of this tax handle is mainly due to a substantial 
decline in tax buoyancy in the liberalization period. The decline in tax buoyancy in 
the post-AFTA period is as result of a large decline in tax-to-base buoyancy, not from 
base-to-income buoyancy since the results show that there is a large increase in the 
international trade tax base during this period. This suggests that the effect of tariff 
reduction and the reduction in other related trade tax rates overwhelms an increase in 
trade volume, and hence results in the reduction of international trade tax revenue. 
The other two countries which have experienced a decline in the international trade 
tax buoyancy are Malaysia and Philippines. Unlike Thailand, these two countries have 
experienced a decrease in both tax-to-base and base-to-income, suggesting that these 
countries may encounter a fall in trade volume as a result of trade liberalization. 
Indonesia seems to be the only country which has experienced an increase in 
international trade tax buoyancy. An increase in buoyancy of this tax handle results 
from an increase in both tax-to-base and base-to-income, suggesting that trade 
liberalization for Indonesia does not only have a positive impact on its trade volume, 
but also has advantage on revenue productivity of this tax handle. 
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The rigidity of the goods and services tax is mainly due to a low tax-to-base buoyancy 
in the pre-AFTA period and low base-to-income in the post-AFTA period. Although 
tax buoyancy of the goods and services tax is quite rigid over the whole period, the 
results show that this tax handle has a significant improvement in tax administration 
and tax collection as its tax-to-base index substantially increases in the post-
liberalization period. This is mainly due to the VAT introduction in the context of 
domestic tax reform as a result of liberalization. The introduction of VAT as a 
replacement for the business tax makes the tax system simpler and reduces avenues 
for evasion and corruption since it reduces the exemptions and shifts the system away 
from multiple business tax rates to a single VAT rate. However, it is worth noting that 
for the goods and services tax with base-to-income buoyancy lower than unity and 
decreasing considerably from the pre-AFTA period, this indicates a low growth of 
private consumption and tax authorities have very few options for improving 
coefficients since the growth of this tax base is a macroeconomic problem outside the 
control of tax authority. The government must be very careful in proceeding with its 
macroeconomic policy because the contraction of the goods and services tax base 
might cause the problem of revenue mobilization in the future. In addition, for 
Thailand, the results suggest that the revenue mitigation policy by replacing tax 
sources from international trade tax to broad-base goods and services tax is not very 
successful. There are two other countries that seem to be faced with a similar 
problem, Malaysia and Philippines. Indonesia seems to be the only country which is 
successful in domestic tax reform since it does not have a negative impact on in 
international trade tax revenue, but it also receives more revenue from goods and 
services tax since both the tax base and tax administration of this tax handle are 
improved in the post-AFTA period. 
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Appendix 5A: Tests for Stationarity 
Table 5A1: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Indonesia) 
INDONESIA 
Variable ADF PP 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
TTR -0.90 -2.80 -5.14 -5.04 -1.09 -2.83 -5.12 -5.05 
ITT -0.97 -2.20 -6.03 -5.96 -0.99 -2.43 -6.02 -5.95 
PIT -2.29 -3.02 -4.30 -4.24 -1.85 -2.40 -4.31 -4.26 
CIT 0.08 -2.64 -6.66 -7.49 0.20 -2.60 -6.63 -7.71 
GST -2.03 -201 -4.98 -4.89 -2.18 -2.16 -4.94 -4.86 
GDP -2.28 -1.16 -4.09 -4.33 -2.28 -1.30 -4.10 -4.35 
MER -2.64 -3.41 -6.66 -6.56 -2.61 -3.46 -7.56 -7.40 
LAB -1.57 -2.27 -5.70 -5.75 -1.57 -2.34 -5.70 -5.75 
IND -2.16 -2.84 -6.62 -6.28 -2.27 -2.87 -5.24 -5.38 
CONS -1.86 -1.73 -5.65 -6.08 -1.93 -1.71 -5.65 -6.08 
 
Table 5A2: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Malaysia) 
MALAYSIA 
Variable ADF PP 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
TTR -1.81 -2.90 -4.02 -3.95 -2.55 -2.90 -3.88 -3.75 
ITT -2.20 -2.92 -5.24 -5.29 -2.36 -2.92 -5.24 -5.27 
PIT -1.95 -3.26 -5.05 -5.01 -1.99 -3.07 -5.01 -4.96 
CIT -2.48 -2.86 -4.93 -5.10 -2.48 -2.86 -4.93 -5.10 
GST -1.28 -2.68 -4.28 -4.21 -1.86 -2.24 -4.67 -4.75 
GDP -1.32 -1.65 -4.94 -4.93 -1.28 -1.92 -4.92 -4.93 
MER -1.31 -2.34 -5.10 -5.08 -1.34 -2.20 -5.21 -5.16 
LAB -1.71 -2.62 -6.11 -6.09 -1.84 -2.87 -6.49 -6.66 
IND -0.96 -2.84 -5.19 -5.02 -1.86 -2.82 -5.51 -5.61 
CONS -0.30 -2.41 -4.48 -4.40 -0.51 -2.51 -3.62 -3.51 
 
Table 5A3: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (Philippines) 
PHILIPPINES 
Variable ADF PP 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
No trend With 
trend 
TTR -2.47 -3.08 -4.08 -3.95 -1.56 -2.50 -4.08 -3.95 
ITT -1.23 -2.18 -4.94 -4.84 -1.30 -2.45 -4.93 -4.82 
PIT -1.42 -1.42 -3.87 -3.81 -1.89 -1.94 -3.90 -3.84 
CIT -2.48 -2.94 -6.17 -6.02 -1.78 -2.33 -6.26 -6.16 
GST -1.01 -2.12 -4.13 -4.07 -1.28 -2.38 -4.12 -4.07 
GDP -0.38 -2.40 -3.48 -3.61 -0.62 -2.12 -3.24 -4.13 
MER -0.73 -1.38 -4.67 -4.61 -0.80 -1.56 -4.65 -4.58 
LAB -1.71 -0.70 -5.46 -6.00 -1.71 -0.69 -5.48 -6.00 
IND -0.70 -2.48 -4.48 -4.54 -0.98 -2.50 -4.46 -4.52 
CONS 0.36 -1.57 -3.80 -3.75 0.01 -1.93 -3.73 -4.45 
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Appendix 5B: Regression Results – Tax Buoyancy and Tax Elasticity 
Tables below present the full regression results of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity 
computed by the authors using Eviews econometric software. Overall tax system 
(TTR) composes of four major taxes including international trade tax (ITT), personal 
income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), and goods and services tax (GST). 
Figures in parentheses [ ] below coefficient estimates are t values. R2 represents the 
coefficient of determination. SER is the standard error of the regression. DW 
represents the Durbin-Watson statistic, used to test the autocorrelation in the 
residuals. JBNORM is the Jarque-Bera statistic for testing normality.  The null 
hypothesis is that errors are normally distributed. Serial LM is the Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the test is that 
there is no serial correlation in the residuals. ARCH is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis is that there 
is no heteroscedasticity. RESET is Regression Specification Error Test, proposed by 
Ramsey (1969) for testing functional form misspecification. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no misspecification. 
Tax Buoyancy; Combined Period (1972-2006) 
Table 5B1: Thailand Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 2.09 
[3.74] 
0.77 
[0.26] 
0.92 0.20 1.72 1.95 F(1,30); 
0.38 
F(1,31); 
0.01 
F(1,30); 
0.86 
PIT -21.41 
[-6.75] 
1.69 
[13.31] 
0.98 0.17 2.24 0.49 F(1,30); 
0.36 
F(1,31); 
0.08 
F(1,30); 
0.46 
CIT -31.55 
[-12.05] 
2.11 
[19.96] 
0.99 0.15 1.91 0.30 F(1,30); 
0.11 
F(1,30); 
0.13 
F(1,28); 
0.69 
GST 5.10 
[2.14] 
0.71 
[7.32] 
0.92 0.14 2.17 0.56 F(1,30); 
0.25 
F(1,31); 
0.07 
F(1,30); 
0.19 
TTR -12.95 
[-4.48] 
1.44 
[12.47] 
0.98 0.14 2.23 0.03 F(1,30); 
0.46 
F(1,31); 
0.04 
F(1,30); 
0.16 
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Table 5B2: Indonesia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 52.43 
[6.09] 
-1.21 
[-3.56] 
0.91 0.27 2.03 0.23 F(2,27); 
1.36 
F(1,30); 
1.04 
F(1,28); 
1.62 
PIT 12.35 
[2.73] 
0.82 
[2.41] 
0.73 0.40 2.12 0.88 F(2,27); 
2.26 
F(1,30); 
0.39 
F(1,28); 
0.78 
CIT 84.11 
[4.83] 
-2.37 
[-3.48] 
0.89 0.41 2.26 1.02 F(2,29); 
0.38 
F(1,31); 
0.08 
F(1,30); 
1.30 
GST -50.66 
[-2.55] 
2.74 
[2.24] 
0.64 0.23 2.05  F(2,29); 
2.21 
F(1,31); 
0.02 
F(1,30); 
0.62 
TTR 10.84 
[2.18] 
0.86 
[4.40] 
0.91 0.20 1.92 2.74 F(2,29); 
0.31 
F(1,31); 
0.02 
F(2,29); 
0.11 
 
Table 5B3: Malaysia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 30.42 
[5.39] 
-0.36 
[-2.85] 
0.74 0.20 1.69 1.32 F(2,29); 
0.49 
F(1,31); 
0.13 
F(1,30); 
1.11 
PIT -3.88 
[-13.96] 
0.87 
[7.76] 
0.95 0.14 1.88 2.10 F(2,29); 
0.22 
F(1,31); 
1.16 
F(2,29); 
0.22 
CIT 4.14 
[2.24] 
0.74 
[3.79] 
0.94 0.16 2.01 0.50 F(2,29); 
0.17 
F(1,31); 
2.02 
F(2,29); 
0.36 
GST 1.47 
[3.53] 
0.83 
[8.46] 
0.96 0.12 1.94 0.87 F(2,27); 
0.64 
F(1,30); 
0.43 
F(1,28); 
0.32 
TTR 8.44 
[2.72] 
0.60 
[4.78] 
0.93 0.12 2.03 0.52 F(2,27); 
0.04 
F(1,30); 
1.21 
F(2,27); 
0.42 
 
Table 5B4: Philippines Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-
2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -20.93 
[-3.21] 
1.64 
[3.34] 
0.84 0.24 2.03 0.84 F(2,29); 
0.25 
F(1,31); 
0.30 
F(1,30); 
0.44 
PIT -27.28 
[-2.80] 
1.93 
[3.21] 
0.96 0.19 2.06 0.93 F(2,27); 
0.19 
F(1,30); 
0.01 
F(1,28); 
0.63 
CIT -43.71 
[-5.98] 
2.60 
[8.89] 
0.93 0.23 2.07 0.71 F(2,27); 
0.71 
F(1,30); 
0.96 
F(1,28); 
0.23 
GST -10.91 
[-2.43] 
1.31 
[0.38] 
0.93 0.16 1.88 0.52 F(2,27); 
0.34 
F(1,30); 
0.15 
F(1,28); 
0.79 
TTR 14.11 
[6.02] 
1.76 
[2.73] 
0.95 0.16 1.95 1.10 F(2,27); 
1.22 
F(1,30); 
0.12 
F(1,28); 
2.68 
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Tax Elasticity 
Table 5B5: Thailand Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-2006 
 Constan
t 
Elasticit
y 
Dumm
y 
Slope 
dumm
y 
R2 SE
R 
D
W 
JBNOR
M 
Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -11.83 
[-2.49] 
1.34 
[3.41] 
25.00 
[3.41] 
-1.00 
[-3.07] 
0.9
3 
0.2
0 
1.6
5 
1.22 F(2,27)
; 
1.07 
F(1,31)
; 
0.15 
F(1,28)
; 
0.33 
PIT -34.17 
[-10.28] 
2.21 
[16.32] 
29.20 
[2.55] 
-1.16 
[-2.57] 
0.9
8 
0.1
6 
2.0
7 
0.40 F(2,27)
; 
0.82 
F(1,31)
; 
7.49 
F(1,28)
; 
1.24 
CIT -26.17 
[-3.01] 
1.89 
[5.37] 
-18.32 
[-2.85] 
0.72 
[2.87] 
0.9
9 
0.1
6 
1.8
2 
0.26 F(2,27)
; 
0.32 
F(1,31)
; 
0.25 
F(1,28)
; 
0.64 
GS
T 
-16.62 
[-6.22] 
0.94 
[8.63] 
11.72 
[2.33] 
-0.47 
[-2.65] 
0.9
3 
0.1
4 
2.0
3 
0.44 F(2,27)
; 
0.17 
F(1,31)
; 
0.19 
F(1,28)
; 
0.31 
TT
R 
-20.17 
[-5.15] 
1.73 
[11.01] 
12.72 
[2.24] 
-0.51 
[-2.10] 
0.9
8 
0.1
4 
2.0
8 
1.36 F(2,27)
; 
0.26 
F(1,31)
; 
0.04 
F(1,28)
; 
0.67 
 
Table 5B6: Indonesia Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-2006 
 Constan
t 
Elasticit
y 
Dumm
y 
Slope 
dumm
y 
R2 SE
R 
D
W 
JBNOR
M 
Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 65.96 
[3.05] 
-1.74 
[-2.02] 
-20.85 
[-4.81] 
0.82 
[2.05] 
0.9
1 
0.2
8 
1.6
4 
0.21 F(2,27)
; 
2.11 
F(1,31)
; 
0.32 
F(1,28)
; 
1.57 
PIT 18.54 
[3.59] 
0.12 
[2.01] 
-66.84 
[-2.19] 
2.62 
[2.40] 
0.7
1 
0.4
2 
1.6
4 
0.89 F(2,27)
; 
1.20 
F(1,31)
; 
0.02 
F(1,28)
; 
1.98 
CIT 46.37 
[4.45] 
-0.87 
[-2.09] 
91.97 
[2.35] 
-3.60 
[-2.36] 
0.8
9 
0.4
1 
2.2
3 
1.13 F(2,27)
; 
0.51 
F(1,31)
; 
0.02 
F(1,28)
; 
2.77 
GS
T 
-34.47 
[-2.58] 
2.04 
[3.23] 
-25.13 
[-2.43] 
0.98 
[2.05] 
0.6
4 
0.2
3 
2.0
0 
1.90 F(2,27)
; 
1.79 
F(1,31)
; 
0.01 
F(1,28)
; 
0.83 
TT
R 
6.98 
[3.37] 
0.65 
[2.04] 
1.45 
[2.18] 
0.57 
[2.96] 
0.9
1 
0.2
1 
1.9
9 
3.28 F(2,27)
; 
0.58 
F(1,31)
; 
0.05 
F(2,27)
; 
0.46 
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Table 5B7: Malaysia Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-2006 
 Constan
t 
Elasticit
y 
Dumm
y 
Slope 
dumm
y 
R2 SE
R 
D
W 
JBNOR
M 
Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 13.82 
[2.36] 
0.33 
[3.79] 
29.73 
[2.25] 
-1.21 
[-2.16] 
0.7
6 
0.2
0 
2.0
0 
0.79 F(2,25)
; 
0.28 
F(1,30)
; 
0.01 
F(1,26)
; 
0.63 
PIT -1.33 
[-2.53] 
0.91 
[4.23] 
4.02 
[4.65] 
-0.16 
[-4.58] 
0.9
5 
0.1
5 
1.8
5 
1.82 F(2,27)
; 
0.22 
F(1,31)
; 
1.14 
F(2,27)
; 
0.21 
CIT 7.98 
[2.64] 
0.58 
[3.81] 
-2.82 
[-2.69] 
0.12 
[3.89] 
0.9
4 
0.1
6 
2.0
3 
0.42 F(2,27)
; 
0.43 
F(1,31)
; 
2.06 
F(1,28)
; 
0.06 
GS
T 
-4.61 
[-3.53] 
1.08 
[8.53] 
18.65 
[3.50] 
-0.75 
[-3.49] 
0.9
6 
0.1
1 
2.0
5 
0.53 F(2,25)
; 
0.26 
F(1,30)
; 
4.01 
F(1,26)
; 
1.01 
TT
R 
2.44 
[4.01] 
0.85 
[3.40] 
14.20 
[2.10] 
-0.57 
[-2.93] 
0.9
4 
0.1
2 
2.0
3 
2.90 F(2,25)
; 
0.07 
F(1,30)
; 
0.76 
F(1,26)
; 
0.06 
 
Table 5B8: Philippines Tax Elasticity of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-2006 
 Constan
t 
Elasticit
y 
Dumm
y 
Slope 
dumm
y 
R2 SE
R 
D
W 
JBNOR
M 
Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -32.85 
[-3.03] 
2.18 
[2.12] 
44.89 
[2.52] 
-1.81 
[-5.75] 
0.8
4 
0.2
4 
2.1
0 
0.42 F(2,27)
; 
0.23 
F(1,31)
; 
1.90 
F(1,28)
; 
0.46 
PIT 10.46 
[2.56] 
0.39 
[6.33] 
-52.67 
[-3.10] 
2.13 
[2.38] 
0.9
6 
0.1
9 
2.1
4 
0.65 F(2,25)
; 
1.01 
F(1,30)
; 
0.01 
F(1,26)
; 
1.31 
CIT -43.01 
[-5.27] 
2.86 
[8.58] 
30.58 
[2.62] 
-1.21 
[-2.56] 
0.9
5 
0.2
0 
2.0
7 
0.01 F(2,25)
; 
0.83 
F(1,30)
; 
001 
F(1,26)
; 
1.72 
GS
T 
-18.67 
[-4.68] 
1.62 
[5.46] 
18.57 
[4.68] 
-0.74 
[-4.62] 
0.9
4 
0.1
6 
1.9
3 
0.30 F(2,25)
; 
0.06 
F(1,30)
; 
0.54 
F(1,26)
; 
0.09 
TT
R 
12.14 
[2.71] 
1.41 
[3.62] 
-25.20 
[-2.76] 
1.03 
[2.71] 
0.9
6 
0.1
6 
1.9
5 
0.55 F(2,25)
; 
0.87 
F(1,30)
; 
0.43 
F(1,26)
; 
1.60 
 
Buoyancy; Pre-AFTA (1972-1991) 
Table 5B9: Thailand Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-1991 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -17.60 
[-6.00] 
1.57 
[13.22] 
0.95 0.15 1.99 1.84 F(2,24); 
0.35 
F(1,16); 
0.01 
F(1,15); 
0.60 
PIT -12.42 
[-2.61] 
1.36 
[4.43] 
0.99 0.10 2.00 0.34 F(2,14); 
0.52 
F(1,16); 
1.35 
F(1,15); 
0.34 
CIT -34.18 
[-8.30] 
2.22 
[13.18] 
0.98 0.12 1.60 0.81 F(2,12); 
0.54 
F(1,15); 
1.57 
F(1,13); 
1.53 
GST -1.45 
[-2.42] 
0.97 
[23.42] 
0.97 0.07 1.92 1.35 F(2,14); 
0.05 
F(1,16); 
1.56 
F(1,15); 
0.42 
TTR -22.67 
[-10.63] 
1.83 
[21.38] 
0.98 0.10 2.21 1.28 F(2,14); 
0.73 
F(1,16); 
1.73 
F(1,15); 
0.37 
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Table 5B10: Indonesia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-
1991 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 53.45 
[7.18] 
-1.24 
[-4.14] 
0.79 0.26 1.81 0.99 F(2,14); 
0.26 
F(1,16); 
0.06 
F(1,15); 
0.30 
PIT 14.23 
[3.27] 
0.30 
[1.69] 
0.25 0.19 1.79 0.35 F(2,14); 
0.04 
F(1,16); 
0.15 
F(1,15); 
0.03 
CIT 47.16 
[4.79] 
-0.90 
[-2.29] 
0.61 0.29 1.99 0.82 F(2,14); 
0.01 
F(1,16); 
0.24 
F(1,15); 
0.05 
GST 15.42 
[4.10] 
0.31 
[2.09] 
0.35 0.17 1.76 0.94 F(2,14); 
2.80 
F(1,16); 
3.14 
F(1,15); 
0.23 
TTR 6.22 
[7.43] 
0.68 
[2.06] 
0.88 0.22 2.07 3.65 F(2,14); 
0.09 
F(1,16); 
0.11 
F(2,14); 
0.29 
 
Table 5B11: Malaysia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-1991 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 12.30 
[2.37] 
0.39 
[2.44] 
0.56 0.19 1.99 0.49 F(2,12); 
0.04 
F(1,15); 
0.05 
F(1,13); 
0.19 
PIT -1.21 
[-2.15] 
0.91 
[3.94] 
0.91 0.13 2.03 0.56 F(2,14); 
0.73 
F(1,16); 
0.81 
F(2,14); 
0.38 
CIT 10.85 
[3.13] 
0.46 
[8.38] 
0.90 0.18 1.97 0.23 F(2,14); 
0.32 
F(1,16); 
1.10 
F(2,14); 
1.30 
GST -3.19 
[-2.88] 
1.02 
[7.95] 
0.93 0.10 2.00 0.31 F(2,12); 
0.94 
F(1,15); 
1.45 
F(1,13); 
0.35 
TTR 3.94 
[2.07] 
0.79 
[2.78] 
0.90 0.12 1.99 0.54 F(2,12); 
0.05 
F(1,15); 
1.48 
F(1,13); 
0.02 
 
Table 5B12: Philippines Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1972-
1991 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -25.52 
[-4.95] 
1.91 
[4.34] 
0.74 0.27 2.43 1.32 F(2,14); 
0.66 
F(1,16); 
2.53 
F(1,15); 
0.51 
PIT 38.71 
[3.33] 
1.40 
[4.87] 
0.85 0.20 1.95 0.26 F(2,12); 
0.14 
F(1,15); 
0.03 
F(1,13); 
0.55 
CIT -45.56 
[-5.75] 
2.66 
[8.23] 
0.79 0.20 2.03 1.05 F(2,12); 
0.43 
F(1,15); 
0.36 
F(1,13); 
1.04 
GST -17.43 
[-3.20] 
1.57 
[3.59] 
0.89 0.17 1.98 0.83 F(2,12); 
0.01 
F(1,15); 
0.23 
F(2,12); 
0.15 
TTR 6.61 
[2.17] 
0.66 
[2.83] 
0.51 0.16 1.96 0.59 F(2,9); 
0.84 
F(1,12); 
0.44 
F(1,10); 
0.68 
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Buoyancy; Post-AFTA (1992-2006) 
Table 5B13: Thailand Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1992-2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -50.80 
[-2.41] 
0.79 
[4.99] 
0.71 0.21 2.43 1.81 F(2,10); 
0.93 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,11); 
3.01 
PIT -4.98 
[-2.71] 
1.05 
[3.03] 
0.44 0.20 1.97 0.48 F(2,10); 
0.06 
F(1,12); 
0.68 
F(1,11); 
0.15 
CIT -83.89 
[-2.78] 
4.14 
[3.56] 
0.88 0.16 2.37 0.33 F(2,10); 
1.53 
F(1,12); 
0.02 
F(1,11); 
1.11 
GST 4.96 
[2.40] 
0.71 
[8.47] 
0.88 0.16 2.38 0.74 F(2,10); 
2.59 
F(1,12); 
0.11 
F(1,11); 
0.71 
TTR -21.42 
[-2.91] 
1.77 
[2.15] 
0.62 0.19 2.40 1.44 F(2,10); 
0.34 
F(1,12); 
0.09 
F(1,11); 
0.95 
 
Table 5B14: Indonesia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1992-
2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 14.04 
[2.37] 
1.33 
[2.19] 
0.86 0.26 1.87 1.40 F(2,10); 
2.72 
F(1,12); 
0.48 
F(1,11); 
0.83 
PIT -10.95 
[-3.22] 
5.08 
[2.07] 
0.59 0.58 1.95 0.13 F(2,10); 
0.04 
F(1,12); 
0.62 
F(1,11); 
0.14 
CIT 177.91 
[6.89] 
-6.00 
[-6.00] 
0.79 0.53 2.03 1.00 F(2,10); 
0.01 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,11); 
0.20 
GST -77.85 
[-3.70] 
3.84 
[4.87] 
0.81 0.24 1.96 0.49 F(2,10); 
0.67 
F(1,12); 
0.27 
F(1,11); 
2.92 
TTR 13.34 
[2.33] 
1.44 
[0.65] 
0.49 0.20 1.81 0.89 F(2,10); 
1.87 
F(1,12); 
0.02 
F(1,11); 
0.11 
 
Table 5B15: Malaysia Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1992-2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -64.28 
[-2.10] 
-1.28 
[-4.64] 
0.89 0.16 2.13 3.76 F(2,9); 
0.55 
F(1,12); 
0.23 
F(1,10); 
2.42 
PIT 3.48 
[2.44] 
0.72 
[2.30] 
0.61 0.17 1.64 3.36 F(2,10); 
0.41 
F(1,12); 
0.89 
F(1,11); 
0.51 
CIT 0.82 
[2.30] 
0.87 
[3.94] 
0.69 0.15 1.90 0.83 F(2,10); 
0.04 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,11); 
0.07 
GST 16.17 
[4.03] 
0.24 
[4.13] 
0.67 0.12 2.11 0.51 F(2,9); 
0.81 
F(1,12); 
1.76 
F(1,10); 
1.93 
TTR 17.90 
[3.21] 
0.42 
[3.48] 
0.68 0.12 2.25 1.55 F(2,9); 
0.43 
F(1,12); 
0.13 
F(1,10); 
0.87 
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Table 5B16: Philippines Tax Buoyancy of Major Taxes and the Tax System; 1992-
2006 
 Constant Buoyancy R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 33.57 
[2.05] 
0.47 
[3.02] 
0.85 0.19 1.83 2.94 F(2,9); 
1.28 
F(1,12); 
0.49 
F(1,10); 
2.34 
PIT -6.11 
[-2.57] 
1.94 
[4.71] 
0.75 0.15 2.18 1.27 F(2,10); 
0.23 
F(1,12); 
0.05 
F(1,11); 
0.50 
CIT -12.27 
[-2.24] 
1.35 
[3.23] 
0.66 0.20 1.84 0.22 F(2,9); 
0.01 
F(1,12); 
2.48 
F(1,10); 
0.07 
GST 9.47 
[2.88] 
0.50 
[2.16] 
0.42 0.16 1.75 1.09 F(2,9); 
0.85 
F(1,12); 
1.51 
F(1,10); 
0.89 
TTR -34.93 
[-2.50] 
2.32 
[4.06] 
0.86 0.16 1.82 0.47 F(2,12); 
0.58 
F(1,15); 
0.01 
F(1,13); 
0.85 
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Appendix 5C: Regression Results – The Decomposition of Tax Buoyancy 
Tables below present the full regression results of the decomposition of tax buoyancy 
computed by the authors using Eviews econometric software. The decomposition is 
done for all four major taxes including international trade tax (ITT), personal income 
tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), and goods and services tax (GST). 
Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is used as a proxy base for international trade 
tax. Compensation of employees is used as a proxy base for personal income tax. The 
share of industry in GDP is used as a proxy base for corporate income tax. Household 
final consumption expenditure is used as a proxy base for consumption tax. Figures in 
parentheses [ ] below coefficient estimates are t values. R2 represents the coefficient 
of determination. SER is the standard error of the regression. DW represents the 
Durbin-Watson statistic, used to test the autocorrelation in the residuals. JBNORM is 
the Jarque-Bera statistic for testing normality.  The null hypothesis is that errors are 
normally distributed. Serial LM is the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for 
serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no serial correlation in 
the residuals. ARCH is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity. RESET is 
Regression Specification Error Test, proposed by Ramsey (1969) for testing 
functional form misspecification. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
misspecification. 
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The Decomposition of Tax Buoyancy; Combined Period (1972-2006) 
Table 5C1: Thailand – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 18.84 
[12.98] 
0.64 
[2.52] 
0.92 0.21 1.59 0.52 F(2,29); 
0.78 
F(1,31); 
0.12 
F(1,30); 
0.99 
PIT 10.23 
[2.58] 
0.54 
[2.06] 
0.99 0.15 1.91 0.32 F(2,29); 
0.03 
F(1,31); 
0.01 
F(2,29); 
0.81 
CIT -5.11 
[-2.79] 
3.34 
[6.63] 
0.97 0.23 1.86 0.14 F(2,25); 
1.47 
F(1,29); 
0.16 
F(1,26); 
2.72 
GST -3.11 
[-2.70] 
0.80 
[7.08] 
0.92 0.14 2.20 0.53 F(2,29); 
0.31 
F(1,31); 
0.14 
F(1,30); 
0.26 
 
Table 5C2: Thailand – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -11.04 
[-2.77] 
0.61 
[3.89] 
0.96 0.08 1.81 0.66 F(2,29); 
0.21 
F(1,31); 
1.02 
F(1,30); 
0.32 
PIT 15.42 
[3.87] 
1.29 
[8.06] 
0.54 0.16 1.92 0.39 F(2,29); 
0.04 
F(1,31); 
0.23 
F(1,30); 
0.07 
CIT -3.29 
[-16.16] 
0.27 
[34.03] 
0.99 0.02 2.05 1.48 F(2,29); 
0.22 
F(1,31); 
0.71 
F(1,30); 
0.49 
GST 2.70 
[5.41] 
0.87 
[44.64] 
0.99 0.02 1.91 1.35 F(2,29); 
2.18 
F(1,31); 
0.30 
F(1,30); 
0.52 
 
Table 5C3: Indonesia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 19.94 
[13.01] 
-0.95 
[-25.54] 
0.91 0.27 1.86 0.18 F(2,29); 
0.58 
F(1,31); 
0.54 
F(1,30); 
0.68 
PIT 6.02 
[2.35] 
0.80 
[2.94] 
0.73 0.39 1.90 0.71 F(2,29); 
0.07 
F(1,31); 
0.23 
F(1,30); 
0.08 
CIT 19.55 
[2.27] 
-2.47 
[-2.49] 
0.89 0.40 2.09 0.38 F(2,29); 
0.51 
F(1,31); 
0.41 
F(1,30); 
0.98 
GST -15.02 
[-3.25] 
1.50 
[8.05] 
0.95 0.23 1.75 021 F(2,29); 
0.38 
F(1,31); 
0.01 
F(1,30); 
1.24 
 
Table 5C4: Indonesia – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -1.42 
[-2.76] 
0.21 
[3.01] 
0.55 0.15 1.87 0.14 F(2,29); 
0.30 
F(1,31); 
0.04 
F(1,30); 
0.34 
PIT -35.44 
[-2.65] 
2.10 
[3.40] 
0.94 0.28 2.32 0.82 F(2,29); 
1.87 
F(1,31); 
0.04 
F(1,30); 
0.56 
CIT -3.74 
[-4.03] 
0.16 
[4.44] 
0.86 0.05 1.93 0.38 F(2,29); 
0.04 
F(1,31); 
1.07 
F(1,30); 
0.41 
GST -2.61 
[-2.96] 
2.08 
[4.15] 
0.99 0.06 1.78 0.23 F(2,29); 
0.23 
F(1,31); 
0.13 
F(1,30); 
0.50 
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Table 5C5: Malaysia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 17.99 
[4.92] 
-0.68 
[-6.95] 
0.74 0.20 2.05 0.72 F(2,27); 
0.23 
F(1,30); 
0.60 
F(1,28); 
0.46 
PIT 9.57 
[3.65] 
0.55 
[4.37] 
0.95 0.13 2.27 0.14 F(2,29); 
0.49 
F(1,31); 
0.27 
F(1,30); 
0.32 
CIT 19.85 
[7.21] 
0.77 
[2.60] 
0.94 0.16 1.96 0.16 F(2,29); 
0.01 
F(1,31); 
0.43 
F(1,30); 
0.56 
GST -11.29 
[-4.22] 
0.92 
[8.24] 
0.96 0.11 1.90 0.51 F(2,27); 
0.79 
F(1,30); 
1.23 
F(1,28); 
0.41 
 
Table 5C6: Malaysia – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -8.43 
[-7.63] 
0.53 
[12.05] 
0.97 0.07 1.81 0.32 F(2,27); 
0.01 
F(1,30); 
0.49 
F(2,27); 
0.10 
PIT 13.28 
[8.45] 
0.37 
[5.63] 
0.84 0.14 2.18 0.64 F(2,29); 
0.31 
F(1,31); 
2.49 
F(1,30); 
0.47 
CIT -4.36 
[-5.36] 
1.70 
[5.15] 
0.93 0.03 1.73 0.57 F(2,29); 
0.14 
F(1,31); 
1.82 
F(1,30); 
0.57 
GST 2.11 
[3.90] 
0.88 
[4.04] 
0.99 0.03 1.95 0.30 F(2,27); 
0.22 
F(1,30); 
0.09 
F(1,28); 
0.91 
 
Table 5C7: Philippines – Tax-to-Base; 1972-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 24.00 
[10.84] 
1.89 
[3.55] 
0.84 0.25 2.00 0.55 F(2,27); 
0.37 
F(1,30); 
0.36 
F(1,28); 
0.96 
PIT 7.80 
[2.55] 
1.65 
[5.76] 
0.96 0.17 1.95 1.67 F(2,27); 
0.18 
F(1,30); 
0.34 
F(1,28); 
0.63 
CIT -30.71 
[-7.79] 
2.51 
[2.21] 
0.94 0.21 2.21 0.42 F(2,27); 
1.48 
F(1,30); 
0.03 
F(1.28); 
0.38 
GST -8.56 
[-2.84] 
1.23 
[4.32] 
0.93 0.16 1.98 0.67 F(2,27); 
0.55 
F(1,30); 
0.10 
F(1,28); 
0.95 
 
Table 5C8: Philippines – Base-to-Income; 1972-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -21.03 
[-2.60] 
1.01 
[2.27] 
0.96 0.09 1.98 1.61 F(2,27); 
0.25 
F(1,30); 
0.36 
F(2,27); 
0.89 
PIT -12.62 
[-3.30] 
1.35 
[2.57] 
0.96 0.16 1.99 0.12 F(2,27); 
0.36 
F(1,30); 
0.22 
F(1,28); 
0.35 
CIT -9.45 
[-7.05] 
0.51 
[5.15] 
0.95 0.02 1.94 0.49 F(2,27); 
1.67 
F(1,30); 
0.03 
F(1,28); 
0.53 
GST -1.87 
[-2.73] 
1.33 
[2.19] 
0.99 0.01 2.32 0.43 F(2,27); 
2.02 
F(1,30); 
0.21 
F(1,28); 
0.55 
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The Decomposition of Tax Buoyancy; Pre-AFTA (1972-1991) 
Table 5C9: Thailand – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 14.64 
[10.41] 
1.78 
[6.09] 
0.97 0.11 2.37 0.67 F(2,14); 
1.40 
F(1,16); 
0.30 
F(1,15); 
1.50 
PIT 3.39 
[3.87] 
0.30 
[2.08] 
0.99 0.11 1.99 0.41 F(2,12); 
0.07 
F(1,15); 
0.74 
F(1,13); 
0.91 
CIT 6.46 
[2.45] 
1.53 
[8.74] 
0.97 0.16 1.89 1.26 F(2,12); 
0.04 
F(1,15); 
0.97 
F(1,13); 
14.52 
GST -6.55 
[-5.02] 
0.20 
[5.92] 
0.97 0.07 1.92 0.31 F(2,14); 
0.07 
F(1,16); 
1.84 
F(1,15); 
0.36 
 
Table 5C10: Thailand – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -6.70 
[-2.56] 
0.43 
[4.06] 
0.84 0.08 1.83 0.68 F(2,12); 
0.04 
F(1,15); 
0.27 
F(1,13); 
1.19 
PIT 14.27 
[2.93] 
1.34 
[6.92] 
0.57 0.13 1.65 0.55 F(2,14); 
0.31 
F(1,16); 
0.01 
F(1,15); 
0.57 
CIT -3.69 
[-9.28] 
0.29 
[18.10] 
0.96 0.02 2.17 1.18 F(2,14); 
0.23 
F(1,16); 
0.43 
F(1,15); 
0.94 
GST 2.73 
[6.20] 
0.97 
[17.23] 
0.99 0.01 1.89 0.16 F(2,10); 
1.44 
F(1,12); 
0.93 
F(1,11); 
1.62 
 
Table 5C11: Indonesia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 17.11 
[7.88] 
-1.30 
[-2.15] 
0.80 0.25 2.05 1.21 F(2,14); 
0.11 
F(1,16); 
0.06 
F(1,15); 
0.84 
PIT 41.64 
[11.92] 
0.92 
[6.29] 
0.85 0.29 1.88 0.45 F(2,14); 
0.41 
F(1,16); 
1.70 
F(1,15); 
0.45 
CIT 14.51 
[3.67] 
-2.05 
[-2.52] 
0.67 0.27 2.33 0.55 F(2,14); 
0.92 
F(1,16); 
0.14 
F(1,15); 
1.52 
GST -11.99 
[-2.73] 
0.37 
[8.58] 
0.92 0.22 1.94 1.45 F(2,14); 
0.58 
F(1,16); 
1.55 
F(1,15); 
0.72 
 
Table 5C12: Indonesia – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 1.53 
[2.48] 
0.08 
[2.34] 
0.33 0.09 1.76 0.47 F(2,10); 
0.80 
F(1,14); 
0.49 
F(1,11); 
0.82 
PIT 68.32 
[18.04] 
0.78 
[11.66] 
0.96 0.15 2.08 1.89 F(2,14); 
0.42 
F(1,16); 
0.82 
F(1,15); 
2.35 
CIT -3.09 
[-2.23] 
0.10 
[2.16] 
0.69 0.06 2.07 0.38 F(2,14); 
0.25 
F(1,16); 
0.88 
F(1,15); 
0.32 
GST -2.25 
[-3.10] 
1.06 
[9.74] 
0.97 0.08 1.81 0.44 F(2,14); 
0.08 
F(1,16); 
0.01 
F(1,15); 
0.14 
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Table 5C13: Malaysia – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 17.50 
[6.12] 
0.41 
[2.83] 
0.70 0.17 1.52 1.81 F(2,14); 
0.53 
F(1,16); 
0.23 
F(1,15); 
1.35 
PIT -15.23 
[-2.50] 
1.62 
[5.92] 
0.91 0.13 1.83 0.34 F(2,14); 
0.13 
F(1,16); 
0.01 
F(1,15); 
0.22 
CIT 14.57 
[3.61] 
0.66 
[3.38] 
0.88 0.17 1.92 1.23 F(2,12); 
1.17 
F(1,15); 
0.75 
F(1,13); 
0.32 
GST -5.33 
[-2.71] 
1.14 
[13.68] 
0.95 0.09 1.93 0.73 F(2,12); 
0.20 
F(1,15); 
0.06 
F(2,12); 
0.24 
 
Table 5C14: Malaysia – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -25.67 
[-3.91] 
1.23 
[4.77] 
0.90 0.06 1.58 0.66 F(2,12); 
0.46 
F(1,15); 
0.98 
F(1,13); 
2.21 
PIT 12.55 
[4.24] 
0.40 
[3.26] 
0.93 0.07 1.95 0.74 F(2,14); 
1.93 
F(1,16); 
0.04 
F(2,14); 
0.91 
CIT 15.48 
[2.09] 
0.67 
[2.78] 
0.85 0.04 2.00 0.30 F(2,14); 
0.40 
F(1,16); 
2.65 
F(1,15); 
0.43 
GST 2.32 
[2.38] 
0.88 
[21.60] 
0.98 0.37 2.06 0.17 F(2,12); 
0.32 
F(1,15); 
0.13 
F(1,13); 
0.01 
 
Table 5C15: Philippines – Tax-to-Base; 1972-1991 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 13.48 
[2.31] 
2.08 
[3.53] 
0.80 0.26 1.90 0.55 F(2,12); 
0.26 
F(1,15); 
0.33 
F(1,13); 
0.73 
PIT 9.53 
[3.01] 
1.50 
[4.38] 
0.86 0.19 1.89 1.12 F(2,12); 
0.02 
F(1,15); 
0.28 
F(1,13); 
1.11 
CIT -31.83 
[-4.26] 
2.25 
[2.19] 
0.78 0.21 1.87 0.65 F(2,12); 
0.01 
F(1,15); 
0.35 
F(1,13); 
0.32 
GST -10.64 
[-5.59] 
1.32 
[2.72] 
0.89 0.17 2.08 1.05 F(2,12); 
0.06 
F(1,15); 
0.12 
F(1,13); 
0.01 
 
Table 5C16: Philippines – Base-to-Income; 1972-1991 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -1.46 
[-3.64] 
1.01 
[3.54] 
0.55 0.08 1.75 0.50 F(2,12); 
0.36 
F(1,15); 
0.86 
F(1,13); 
0.90 
PIT -18.21 
[-5.25] 
1.05 
[3.52] 
0.96 0.17 1.88 1.27 F(2,12); 
0.13 
F(1,15); 
0.11 
F(1,13); 
0.62 
CIT -3.15 
[-3.77] 
1.51 
[10.61] 
0.91 0.02 1.85 0.67 F(2,12); 
0.28 
F(1,15); 
0.45 
F(1,13); 
1.37 
GST -1.61 
[-8.18] 
1.40 
[2.60] 
0.99 0.01 2.13 1.22 F(2,12); 
1.26 
F(1,15); 
0.29 
F(1,13); 
0.32 
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The Decomposition of Tax Buoyancy; Post-AFTA (1992-2006) 
Table 5C17: Thailand – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 25.50 
[15.41] 
-0.83 
[-2.23] 
0.72 0.21 2.18 2.66 F(2,9); 
0.32 
F(1,12); 
1.01 
F(1,10); 
0.42 
PIT 6.52 
[2.03] 
0.96 
[6.77] 
0.74 0.15 1.98 0.61 F(2,9); 
2.05 
F(1,12); 
0.39 
F(1,10); 
1.42 
CIT 8.45 
[2.23] 
3.72 
[2.04] 
0.81 0.21 2.05 0.58 F(2,9); 
0.39 
F(1,12); 
0.33 
F(1,10); 
1.66 
GST -3.01 
[-15.46] 
1.83 
[2.30] 
0.50 0.19 2.28 0.94 F(2,9); 
1.15 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,10); 
1.86 
 
Table 5C18: Thailand – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 20.61 
[2.47] 
1.41 
[7.54] 
0.93 0.07 2.29 0.28 F(2,10); 
2.56 
F(1,12); 
0.69 
F(1,11); 
1.31 
PIT 20.98 
[3.25] 
1.01 
[2.28] 
0.39 0.19 2.29 0.11 F(2,10); 
2.01 
F(1,12); 
0.09 
F(1,11); 
1.80 
CIT -2.85 
[-2.58] 
0.26 
[5.97] 
0.87 0.02 1.67 0.28 F(2,10); 
0.44 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,11); 
0.28 
GST 4.26 
[12.54] 
0.81 
[5.81] 
0.98 0.01 1.85 1.00 F(2,14); 
4.06 
F(1,16); 
1.40 
F(1,15); 
0.16 
 
Table 5C19: Indonesia – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 20.36 
[14.89] 
0.15 
[4.17] 
0.86 0.27 2.08 0.56 F(2,9); 
0.87 
F(1,12); 
0.54 
F(1,10); 
0.56 
PIT 3.83 
[2.23] 
0.85 
[3.15] 
0.65 0.54 1.71 1.45 F(2,10); 
0.18 
F(1,12); 
0.50 
F(1,11); 
0.15 
CIT 36.79 
[3.27] 
-3.78 
[-4.17] 
0.47 0.47 1.98 0.93 F(2,10); 
0.05 
F(1,12); 
0.22 
F(1,11); 
0.03 
GST -3.58 
[-5.65] 
2.12 
[4.96] 
0.65 0.27 1.56 1.98 F(2,10); 
0.33 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,11); 
0.92 
 
Table 5C20: Indonesia – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 58.98 
[2.30] 
2.11 
[3.67] 
0.46 0.18 2.06 0.38 F(2,9); 
0.19 
F(1,12); 
0.34 
F(1,10); 
0.45 
PIT -61.18 
[-2.82] 
3.17 
[3.73] 
0.77 0.36 2.24 0.11 F(2,10); 
1.64 
F(1,12); 
0.61 
F(1,11); 
1.71 
CIT -3.52 
[-2.28] 
0.28 
[2.88] 
0.73 0.03 1.86 0.27 F(2,9); 
0.27 
F(1,12); 
0.71 
F(1,10); 
0.23 
GST 9.66 
[7.79] 
2.61 
[2.50] 
0.99 0.02 1.84 0.30 F(2,10); 
0.63 
F(1,12); 
0.25 
F(1,11); 
1.11 
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Table 5C21: Malaysia – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 26.98 
[5.09] 
-1.11 
[-10.81] 
0.83 0.19 1.90 0.14 F(2,9); 
0.36 
F(1,12); 
0.05 
F(1,10); 
2.25 
PIT 8.21 
[2.39] 
0.60 
[3.89] 
0.79 0.12 2.29 0.21 F(2,10); 
1.12 
F(1,12); 
0.45 
F(1,11); 
3.19 
CIT 34.30 
[2.24] 
0.96 
[3.27] 
0.72 0.15 2.02 0.05 F(2,9); 
0.16 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,10); 
2.13 
GST 16.06 
[4.35] 
0.26 
[2.70] 
0.68 0.12 2.15 0.40 F(2,9); 
0.99 
F(1,12); 
2.39 
F(1,10); 
2.14 
 
Table 5C22: Malaysia – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT -5.76 
[-3.24] 
0.43 
[6.14] 
0.76 0.06 1.56 0.56 F(2,9); 
0.58 
F(1,12); 
0.32 
F(1,10); 
0.37 
PIT -13.19 
[-2.09] 
1.48 
[3.19] 
0.29 0.19 2.03 0.12 F(2,9); 
0.44 
F(1,12); 
0.40 
F(1,10); 
1.05 
CIT -5.24 
[-4.46] 
1.87 
[3.45] 
0.92 0.03 2.18 0.20 F(2,9); 
0.89 
F(1,12); 
0.77 
F(1,10); 
0.50 
GST -6.16 
[-3.38] 
1.21 
[16.77] 
0.99 0.02 1.91 0.88 F(2,9); 
0.47 
F(1,12); 
0.06 
F(1,10); 
1.37 
 
Table 5C23: Philippines – Tax-to-Base; 1992-2006 
 Constant Tax-to-
Base 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 31.71 
[9.09] 
0.62 
[8.45] 
0.92 0.14 1.87 0.38 F(2,9); 
0.38 
F(1,12); 
0.10 
F(1,10); 
2.72 
PIT 12.56 
[2.16] 
1.80 
[5.05] 
0.75 0.16 1.86 1.10 F(2,9); 
0.19 
F(1,12); 
0.09 
F(1,10); 
0.34 
CIT -30.89 
[-4.06] 
2.58 
[2.22] 
0.58 0.22 1.80 0.57 F(2,9); 
0.10 
F(1,12); 
0.01 
F(1,10); 
0.21 
GST 9.32 
[2.03] 
0.51 
[2.62] 
0.42 0.16 1.77 1.27 F(2,9); 
0.85 
F(1,12); 
1.40 
F(1,10); 
0.97 
 
Table 5C24: Philippines – Base-to-Income; 1992-2006 
 Constant Base-to-
Income 
R2 SER DW JBNORM Serial 
LM 
ARCH RESET 
ITT 14.82 
[2.05] 
0.93 
[2.90] 
0.92 0.08 2.18 0.78 F(2,9); 
4.01 
F(1,12); 
0.25 
F(1,10); 
1.30 
PIT -30.13 
[-6.14] 
1.31 
[6.70] 
0.93 0.14 1.99 0.77 F(2,9); 
0.12 
F(1,12); 
0.34 
F(1,10); 
0.26 
CIT -3.69 
[-3.66] 
0.41 
[10.27] 
0.97 0.02 2.29 1.16 F(2,9); 
0.84 
F(1,12); 
1.29 
F(1,10); 
1.54 
GST -8.83 
[-3.97] 
0.72 
[3.44] 
0.99 0.01 2.35 0.33 F(2,9); 
2.00 
F(1,12); 
1.32 
F(1,10); 
1.12 
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Appendix 5D: Cointegration Test – Tax Buoyancy and Tax Elasticity 
Tables below present the cointegration test for variable used to calculate tax buoyancy 
and tax elasticity computed by the authors using Eviews econometric software. In this 
study, the Engle-Granger (EG) approach is applied to test for cointegration. The 
concept of the EG approach is that if cointegration genuinely exists between 
variables, the error term should remain roughly constant over time, i.e. it should be 
stationary. However, if the error term is tending to increase over time, this implies 
that the variables are not cointegrated. There are two steps in performing the EG 
cointegration test. After it is found that all variables in all countries are I(1) in the 
stationary test using ADF and PP approaches, the first step here is to run a standard 
OLS regression on the variables. The residuals obtained from the first step will be 
used to test for unit root by using the ADF and PP procedure. If a unit root does not 
exist, the residuals are stationary and we can conclude that the variables under 
investigation are cointegrated, and therefore buoyancy, elasticity, and decomposition 
results are meaningful. 
Figures in parentheses [ ] below coefficient estimates are t values. The residual tests 
using both ADF and PP methods report a t-ratio which is used to test the null 
hypothesis that the residual has a unit root. 
Cointegration test for variables used for computing tax buoyancy; Combined 
period (1972-2006) 
For combined period (1972-2006), the critical values for both the ADF and the PP 
tests are as follows; 90% critical value is -1.61, 95% critical value is -1.95, and 99% 
critical value is -2.64.  
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Table 5D1: Thailand 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT 2.09 
[3.74] 
0.77 
[0.26] 
-4.92 -4.92 
lnPIT -21.41 
[-6.75] 
1.69 
[13.31] 
-7.56 -7.59 
lnCIT -31.55 
[-12.05] 
2.11 
[19.96] 
-5.64 -5.64 
lnGST 5.10 
[2.14] 
0.71 
[7.32] 
-6.20 -6.18 
lnTTR -12.95 
[-4.48] 
1.44 
[12.47] 
-6.53 -6.47 
 
Table 5D2: Indonesia 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT 52.43 
[6.09] 
-1.21 
[-3.56] 
-5.73 -5.76 
lnPIT 12.35 
[2.73] 
0.82 
[2.41] 
-5.93 -5.93 
lnCIT 84.11 
[4.83] 
-2.37 
[-3.48] 
-6.49 -6.44 
lnGST -50.66 
[-2.55] 
2.74 
[2.24] 
-5.83 -6.10 
lnTTR 10.84 
[2.18] 
0.86 
[4.40] 
-5.54 -5.55 
 
Table 5D3: Malaysia 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT 30.42 
[5.39] 
-0.36 
[-2.85] 
-4.78 -4.78 
lnPIT -3.88 
[-13.96] 
0.87 
[7.76] 
-5.45 -5.46 
lnCIT 4.14 
[2.24] 
0.74 
[3.79] 
-6.16 -6.17 
lnGST 1.47 
[3.53] 
0.83 
[8.46] 
-5.58 -5.58 
lnTTR 8.44 
[2.72] 
0.60 
[4.78] 
-5.55 -5.57 
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Table 5D4: Philippines 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT -20.93 
[-3.21] 
1.64 
[3.34] 
-5.74 -5.74 
lnPIT -27.28 
[-2.80] 
1.93 
[3.21] 
-5.73 -5.74 
lnCIT -43.71 
[-5.98] 
2.60 
[8.89] 
-6.04 -6.02 
lnGST -10.91 
[-2.43] 
1.31 
[0.38] 
-5.27 -5.27 
lnTTR 14.11 
[6.02] 
1.76 
[2.73] 
-5.68 -5.70 
 
Cointegration test for variables used for computing tax elasticity 
D is a dummy variable for trade liberalization by joining AFTA. It takes value 1 
between 1992 and 2006, and 0 elsewhere. 
D*LogGDP is a slope dummy. 
The critical values for both the ADF and the PP tests are as follows; 90% critical 
value is -1.61, 95% critical value is -1.95, and 99% critical value is -2.64.  
Table 5D5: Thailand 
 
C lnGDP D D*lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT -11.83 
[-2.49] 
1.34 
[3.41] 
25.00 
[3.41] 
-1.00 
[-3.07] 
-4.76 -4.77 
lnPIT -34.17 
[-10.28] 
2.21 
[16.32] 
29.20 
[2.55] 
-1.16 
[-2.57] 
-6.19 -6.18 
lnCIT -26.17 
[-3.01] 
1.89 
[5.37] 
-18.32 
[-2.85] 
0.72 
[2.87] 
-3.88 -3.88 
lnGST -16.62 
[-6.22] 
0.94 
[8.63] 
11.72 
[2.33] 
-0.47 
[-2.65] 
-5.77 -5.78 
lnTTR -20.17 
[-5.15] 
1.73 
[11.01] 
12.72 
[2.24] 
-0.51 
[-2.10] 
-6.03 -6.03 
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Table 5D6: Indonesia 
 
C lnGDP D D*lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT 65.96 
[3.05] 
-1.74 
[-2.02] 
-20.85 
[-4.81] 
0.82 
[2.05] 
-4.83 -4.88 
lnPIT 18.54 
[3.59] 
0.12 
[2.01] 
-66.84 
[-2.19] 
2.62 
[2.40] 
-4.63 -4.63 
lnCIT 46.37 
[4.45] 
-0.87 
[-2.09] 
91.97 
[2.35] 
-3.60 
[-2.36] 
-6.36 -6.32 
lnGST -34.47 
[-2.58] 
2.04 
[3.23] 
-25.13 
[-2.43] 
0.98 
[2.05] 
-5.60 -5.64 
lnTTR 6.98 
[3.37] 
0.65 
[2.04] 
1.45 
[2.18] 
0.57 
[2.96] 
-5.66 -5.66 
 
Table 5D7: Malaysia 
 
C lnGDP D D*lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT 13.82 
[2.36] 
0.33 
[3.79] 
29.73 
[2.25] 
-1.21 
[-2.16] 
-5.62 -5.63 
lnPIT -1.33 
[-2.53] 
0.91 
[4.23] 
4.02 
[4.65] 
-0.16 
[-4.58] 
-5.35 -5.34 
lnCIT 7.98 
[2.64] 
0.58 
[3.81] 
-2.82 
[-2.69] 
0.12 
[3.89] 
-6.23 -6.26 
lnGST -4.61 
[-3.53] 
1.08 
[8.53] 
18.65 
[3.50] 
-0.75 
[-3.49] 
-5.80 -5.80 
lnTTR 2.44 
[4.01] 
0.85 
[3.40] 
14.20 
[2.10] 
-0.57 
[-2.93] 
-5.67 -5.67 
 
Table 5D8: Philippines 
 
C lnGDP D D*lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP 
lnITT -32.85 
[-3.03] 
2.18 
[2.12] 
44.89 
[2.52] 
-1.81 
[-5.75] 
-5.98 -5.98 
lnPIT 10.46 
[2.56] 
0.39 
[6.33] 
-52.67 
[-3.10] 
2.13 
[2.38] 
-6.01 -6.00 
lnCIT -43.01 
[-5.27] 
2.86 
[8.58] 
30.58 
[2.62] 
-1.21 
[-2.56] 
-5.90 -5.90 
lnGST -18.67 
[-4.68] 
1.62 
[5.46] 
18.57 
[4.68] 
-0.74 
[-4.62] 
-5.38 -5.35 
lnTTR 12.14 
[2.71] 
1.41 
[3.62] 
-25.20 
[-2.76] 
1.03 
[2.71] 
-5.52 -5.55 
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Cointegration test for variables used for computing tax buoyancy; Pre- and Post-
AFTA periods 
For Pre-AFTA period (1972-1991), the critical values for both the ADF and the PP 
tests are as follows; 90% critical value is -1.61, 95% critical value is -1.96, and 99% 
critical value is -2.70. 
For Post-AFTA period (1992-2006), the critical values for both the ADF and the PP 
tests are as follows; 90% critical value is -1.60, 95% critical value is -1.97, and 99% 
critical value is -2.74. 
Table 5D9: Thailand 
 Pre-AFTA (1972-1991) Post-AFTA (1992-2006) 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT -17.60 
[-6.00] 
1.57 
[13.22] 
-4.46 -4.44 -50.80 
[-2.41] 
0.79 
[4.99] 
-4.53 -4.53 
lnPIT -12.42 
[-2.61] 
1.36 
[4.43] 
-4.59 -4.64 -4.98 
[-2.71] 
1.05 
[3.03] 
-3.57 -3.57 
lnCIT -34.18 
[-8.30] 
2.22 
[13.18] 
-3.60 -3.65 -83.89 
[-2.78] 
4.14 
[3.56] 
-4.46 -4.51 
lnGST -1.45 
[-2.42] 
0.97 
[23.42] 
-4.00 -4.00 4.96 
[2.40] 
0.71 
[8.47] 
-4.16 -4.17 
lnTTR -22.67 
[-10.63] 
1.83 
[21.38] 
-5.36 -5.36 -21.42 
[-2.91] 
1.77 
[2.15] 
-4.46 -4.46 
 
Table 5D10: Indonesia 
 Pre-AFTA (1972-1991) Post-AFTA (1992-2006) 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 53.45 
[7.18] 
-1.24 
[-4.14] 
-3.90 -3.90 14.04 
[2.37] 
1.33 
[2.19] 
-2.81 -2.87 
lnPIT 14.23 
[3.27] 
0.30 
[1.69] 
-3.65 -3.66 -10.95 
[-3.22] 
5.08 
[2.07] 
-3.54 -3.54 
lnCIT 47.16 
[4.79] 
-0.90 
[-2.29] 
-4.27 -4.27 177.91 
[6.89] 
-6.00 
[-6.00] 
-3.68 -3.68 
lnGST 15.42 
[4.10] 
0.31 
[2.09] 
-4.13 -4.23 -77.85 
[-3.70] 
3.84 
[4.87] 
-3.46 -3.46 
lnTTR 6.22 
[7.43] 
0.68 
[2.06] 
-4.39 -4.39 13.34 
[2.33] 
1.44 
[0.65] 
-3.36 -3.36 
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Table 5D11: Malaysia 
 Pre-AFTA (1972-1991) Post-AFTA (1992-2006) 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 12.30 
[2.37] 
0.39 
[2.44] 
-4.11 -4.11 -64.28 
[-2.10] 
-1.28 
[-4.64] 
-4.03 -4.06 
lnPIT -1.21 
[-2.15] 
0.91 
[3.94] 
-4.38 -4.51 3.48 
[2.44] 
0.72 
[2.30] 
-2.98 -2.99 
lnCIT 10.85 
[3.13] 
0.46 
[8.38] 
-4.52 -4.53 0.82 
[2.30] 
0.87 
[3.94] 
-3.57 -3.57 
lnGST -3.19 
[-2.88] 
1.02 
[7.95] 
-4.10 -4.10 16.17 
[4.03] 
0.24 
[4.13] 
-3.85 -3.87 
lnTTR 3.94 
[2.07] 
0.79 
[2.78] 
-3.87 -3.87 17.90 
[3.21] 
0.42 
[3.48] 
-3.96 -3.96 
 
Table 5D12: Philippines 
 Pre-AFTA (1972-1991) Post-AFTA (1992-2006) 
 
C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT -25.52 
[-4.95] 
1.91 
[4.34] 
-5.18 -5.17 33.57 
[2.05] 
0.47 
[3.02] 
-3.30 -3.22 
lnPIT 38.71 
[3.33] 
1.40 
[4.87] 
-4.03 -4.03 -6.11 
[-2.57] 
1.94 
[4.71] 
-3.58 -3.59 
lnCIT -45.56 
[-5.75] 
2.66 
[8.23] 
-4.19 -4.19 -12.27 
[-2.24] 
1.35 
[3.23] 
-3.31 -3.31 
lnGST -17.43 
[-3.20] 
1.57 
[3.59] 
-3.96 -3.96 9.47 
[2.88] 
0.50 
[2.16] 
-3.12 -3.13 
lnTTR 6.61 
[2.17] 
0.66 
[2.83] 
-3.65 -3.72 -34.93 
[-2.50] 
2.32 
[4.06] 
-3.55 -3.56 
 
Cointegration test for variables used for the Decomposition of tax buoyancy; 
Combined period (1972-2006) 
For combined period (1972-2006), the critical values for both the ADF and the PP 
tests are as follows; 90% critical value is -1.61, 95% critical value is -1.95, and 99% 
critical value is -2.64. 
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Table 5D13: Thailand 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 18.84 
[12.98] 
0.64 
[2.52] 
-4.60 -4.60 lnMER -11.04 
[-2.77] 
0.61 
[3.89] 
-5.15 -5.14 
lnPIT 10.23 
[2.58] 
0.54 
[2.06] 
-5.61 -5.61 lnLAB 15.42 
[3.87] 
1.29 
[8.06] 
-5.55 -5.56 
lnCIT -5.11 
[-2.79] 
3.34 
[6.63] 
-5.17 -5.17 lnIND -3.29 
[-16.16] 
0.27 
[34.03] 
-4.48 -4.49 
lnGST -3.11 
[-2.70] 
0.80 
[7.08] 
-6.30 -6.27 lnCONS 2.70 
[5.41] 
0.87 
[44.64] 
-5.42 -5.42 
 
Table 5D14: Indonesia 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 19.94 
[13.01] 
-0.95 
[-25.54] 
-5.65 -5.65 lnMER -1.42 
[-2.76] 
0.21 
[3.01] 
-5.33 -5.33 
lnPIT 6.02 
[2.35] 
0.80 
[2.94] 
-5.39 -5.39 lnLAB -35.44 
[-2.65] 
2.10 
[3.40] 
-6.67 -6.69 
lnCIT 19.55 
[2.27] 
-2.47 
[-2.49] 
-8.78 -8.83 lnIND -3.74 
[-4.03] 
0.16 
[4.44] 
-5.94 -5.94 
lnGST -15.02 
[-3.25] 
1.50 
[8.05] 
-5.01 -4.99 lnCONS -2.61 
[-2.96] 
2.08 
[4.15] 
-5.27 -5.28 
 
Table 5D15: Malaysia 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 17.99 
[4.92] 
-0.68 
[-6.95] 
-5.84 -5.84 lnMER -8.43 
[-7.63] 
0.53 
[12.05] 
-6.12 -6.12 
lnPIT 9.57 
[3.65] 
0.55 
[4.37] 
-6.57 -6.61 lnLAB 13.28 
[8.45] 
0.37 
[5.63] 
-6.35 -6.35 
lnCIT 19.85 
[7.21] 
0.77 
[2.60] 
-5.64 -5.64 lnIND -4.36 
[-5.36] 
1.70 
[5.15] 
-5.71 -5.71 
lnGST -11.29 
[-4.22] 
0.92 
[8.24] 
-5.46 -5.46 lnCONS 2.11 
[3.90] 
0.88 
[4.04] 
-5.45 -5.45 
 
Table 5D16: Philippines 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 24.00 
[10.84] 
1.89 
[3.55] 
-6.41 -6.41 lnMER -21.03 
[-2.60] 
1.01 
[2.27] 
-6.50 -6.48 
lnPIT 7.80 
[2.55] 
1.65 
[5.76] 
-5.45 -5.46 lnLAB -12.62 
[-3.30] 
1.35 
[2.57] 
-5.54 -5.54 
lnCIT -30.71 
[-7.79] 
2.51 
[2.21] 
-6.61 -6.58 lnIND -9.45 
[-7.05] 
0.51 
[5.15] 
-5.55 -5.57 
lnGST -8.56 
[-2.84] 
1.23 
[4.32] 
-5.52 -5.52 lnCONS -1.87 
[-2.73] 
1.33 
[2.19] 
-6.12 -6.15 
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Cointegration test for variables used for the Decomposition of tax buoyancy; 
Pre-AFTA period (1972-1991) 
For Pre-AFTA period (1972-1991), the critical values for both the ADF and the PP 
tests are as follows; 90% critical value is -1.61, 95% critical value is -1.96, and 99% 
critical value is -2.70. 
Table 5D17: Thailand 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 14.64 
[10.41] 
1.78 
[6.09] 
-5.02 -5.01 lnMER -6.70 
[-2.56] 
0.43 
[4.06] 
-4.54 -4.48 
lnPIT 3.39 
[3.87] 
0.30 
[2.08] 
-3.99 -3.99 lnLAB 14.27 
[2.93] 
1.34 
[6.92] 
-3.64 -3.64 
lnCIT 6.46 
[2.45] 
1.53 
[8.74] 
-4.60 -4.52 lnIND -3.69 
[-9.28] 
0.29 
[18.10] 
-4.57 -4.57 
lnGST -6.55 
[-5.02] 
0.20 
[5.92] 
-3.95 -3.96 lnCONS 2.73 
[6.20] 
0.97 
[17.23] 
-4.59 -5.00 
 
Table 5D18: Indonesia 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 17.11 
[7.88] 
-1.30 
[-2.15] 
-4.51 -4.51 lnMER 1.53 
[2.48] 
0.08 
[2.34] 
-3.48 -3.46 
lnPIT 41.64 
[11.92] 
0.92 
[6.29] 
-4.06 -4.05 lnLAB 68.32 
[18.04] 
0.78 
[11.66] 
-4.39 -4.39 
lnCIT 14.51 
[3.67] 
-2.05 
[-2.52] 
-5.13 -5.13 lnIND -3.09 
[-2.23] 
0.10 
[2.16] 
-4.97 -4.97 
lnGST -11.99 
[-2.73] 
0.37 
[8.58] 
-4.02 -4.02 lnCONS -2.25 
[-3.10] 
1.06 
[9.74] 
-3.95 -3.95 
 
Table 5D19: Malaysia 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
Ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 17.50 
[6.12] 
0.41 
[2.83] 
-3.35 -3.35 lnMER -25.67 
[-3.91] 
1.23 
[4.77] 
-5.82 -5.84 
lnPIT -15.23 
[-2.50] 
1.62 
[5.92] 
-3.84 -3.84 lnLAB 12.55 
[4.24] 
0.40 
[3.26] 
-4.22 -4.26 
lnCIT 14.57 
[3.61] 
0.66 
[3.38] 
-4.17 -4.18 lnIND 15.48 
[2.09] 
0.67 
[2.78] 
-5.79 -5.74 
lnGST -5.33 
[-2.71] 
1.14 
[13.68] 
-4.04 -4.04 lnCONS 2.32 
[2.38] 
0.88 
[21.60] 
-4.13 -4.13 
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Table 5D20: Philippines 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 13.48 
[2.31] 
2.08 
[3.53] 
-3.81 -3.81 lnMER -1.46 
[-3.64] 
1.01 
[3.54] 
-4.21 -4.21 
lnPIT 9.53 
[3.01] 
1.50 
[4.38] 
-3.79 -3.79 lnLAB -18.21 
[-5.25] 
1.05 
[3.52] 
-3.78 -3.78 
lnCIT -31.83 
[-4.26] 
2.25 
[2.19] 
-3.82 -3.82 lnIND -3.15 
[-3.77] 
1.51 
[10.61] 
-3.82 -3.84 
lnGST -10.64 
[-5.59] 
1.32 
[2.72] 
-4.16 -4.16 lnCONS -1.61 
[-8.18] 
1.40 
[2.60] 
-4.54 -4.51 
 
Cointegration test for variables used for the Decomposition of tax buoyancy; 
Post-AFTA period (1992-2006) 
For Post-AFTA period (1992-2006), the critical values for both the ADF and the PP 
tests are as follows; 90% critical value is -1.60, 95% critical value is -1.97, and 99% 
critical value is -2.74. 
Table 5D21: Thailand 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 25.50 
[15.41] 
-0.83 
[-2.23] 
-4.12 -4.10 lnMER 20.61 
[2.47] 
1.41 
[7.54] 
-4.63 -4.68 
lnPIT 6.52 
[2.03] 
0.96 
[6.77] 
-4.24 -4.29 lnLAB 20.98 
[3.25] 
1.01 
[2.28] 
-4.61 -4.61 
lnCIT 8.45 
[2.23] 
3.72 
[2.04] 
-3.75 -3.75 lnIND -2.85 
[-2.58] 
0.26 
[5.97] 
-3.41 -3.44 
lnGST -3.01 
[-15.46] 
1.83 
[2.30] 
-4.21 -4.23 lnCONS 4.26 
[12.54] 
0.81 
[5.81] 
-4.41 -4.48 
 
Table 5D22: Indonesia 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 20.36 
[14.89] 
0.15 
[4.17] 
-2.83 -2.82 lnMER 58.98 
[2.30] 
2.11 
[3.67] 
-3.73 -3.75 
lnPIT 3.83 
[2.23] 
0.85 
[3.15] 
-3.98 -3.92 lnLAB -61.18 
[-2.82] 
3.17 
[3.73] 
-4.34 -4.28 
lnCIT 36.79 
[3.27] 
-3.78 
[-4.17] 
-4.17 -4.15 lnIND -3.52 
[-2.28] 
0.28 
[2.88] 
-3.60 -3.60 
lnGST -3.58 
[-5.65] 
2.12 
[4.96] 
-2.94 -2.91 lnCONS 9.66 
[7.79] 
2.61 
[2.50] 
-5.91 -5.89 
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Table 5D23: Malaysia 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
Ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 26.98 
[5.09] 
-1.11 
[-10.81] 
-3.44 -3.43 lnMER -5.76 
[-3.24] 
0.43 
[6.14] 
-3.15 -3.15 
lnPIT 8.21 
[2.39] 
0.60 
[3.89] 
-4.49 -4.49 lnLAB -13.19 
[-2.09] 
1.48 
[3.19] 
-3.58 -3.58 
lnCIT 34.30 
[2.24] 
0.96 
[3.27] 
-3.66 -3.66 lnIND -5.24 
[-4.46] 
1.87 
[3.45] 
-4.09 -4.11 
lnGST 16.06 
[4.35] 
0.26 
[2.70] 
-3.94 -3.97 lnCONS -6.16 
[-3.38] 
1.21 
[16.77] 
-3.45 -3.44 
 
Table 5D24: Philippines 
Tax 
Tax-to-Base 
Base 
Base-to-Income 
C 
ln of 
Tax 
Base 
Unit Root Test 
for Residual C lnGDP 
Unit Root Test for 
Residual 
ADF PP ADF PP 
lnITT 31.71 
[9.09] 
0.62 
[8.45] 
-3.85 -3.85 lnMER 14.82 
[2.05] 
0.93 
[2.90] 
-4.81 -4.86 
lnPIT 12.56 
[2.16] 
1.80 
[5.05] 
-3.36 -3.36 lnLAB -30.13 
[-6.14] 
1.31 
[6.70] 
-3.59 -3.59 
lnCIT -30.89 
[-4.06] 
2.58 
[2.22] 
-3.23 -3.23 lnIND -3.69 
[-3.66] 
0.41 
[10.27] 
-4.17 -4.17 
lnGST 9.32 
[2.03] 
0.51 
[2.62] 
-3.17 -3.18 lnCONS -8.83 
[-3.97] 
0.72 
[3.44] 
-4.53 -4.47 
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6.1. Summary and Conclusions 
As a growth strategy, trade liberalization has been encouraged by most countries 
around the world for over two decades. It has also been formally introduced into 
Thailand when it became an AFTA member in 1992 and a WTO member in 1995. 
This thesis has examined the relationships between the special features of trade 
liberalization and revenue performance of countries with different levels of 
development. The study has also provided in-depth analysis of how trade 
liberalization affects trade and tax productivity of Thailand at the aggregate level. 
This concluding chapter highlights the main results found in this thesis, offers some 
general conclusions, draws policy implications, and suggests some areas for future 
research. 
6.1.1. Qualifications 
Before we summarize the main findings of this thesis, it is important to clarify its 
boundaries and specify some qualifications. In the estimation of the short-run and 
long-run elasticities by using Thailand’s import and export demand functions 
(Chapter 3), relative import and export prices, which are used for calculating import 
and export price elasticities, are based on unit-value indices. The use of these unit-
value indices are subject to well-recognized bias. Since unit-value indices are derived 
from customs data, which measure the change in price or volume of an aggregate over 
different items, or items of different quality, changes in the mix of the heterogeneous 
items mainly cause bias in unit-value indices. The bias is also caused by the poor 
quality of recorded data on quantities. As mentioned in many previous studies, such 
bias possibly lowers the estimates of import and export price elasticities. 
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In examining the effect of trade liberalization on taxation of countries with different 
level of development (Chapter 4), a new measure of trade liberalization has been 
introduced by applying the summation of the number of agreements which country 
entries into force. However, types of agreements may take many forms such as 
custom unions, preferential arrangement, service agreement, and free trade agreement. 
Effects on taxation may vary greatly in detail of liberalization, and hence the 
conclusion of those results should be considered with care that all types of trade 
liberalization are not harmful to taxation since they differ in their detail. 
In investigating the responsiveness of the tax system (Chapter 5), non-availability of 
required data have limited the extent of the analysis performed, especially for the 
quality of tax-related data and data for discretionary and non-discretionary tax 
changes. Also, the ability to assess accurately the productivity of some tax sources 
requires more reliable tax base data, i.e. data on company profits.   
Another concern is on the use of a partial equilibrium analysis. A partial equilibrium 
approach has been adopted in all chapters in order to investigate trade and tax 
performance under a liberalization policy. Therefore, some aspects of interactions 
between government policy toward trade liberalization and trade and tax reactions, as 
well as revenue consequences, may not be fully captured in our models. 
6.1.2. The Main Findings 
Since this study aims to investigate whether trade liberalization has a dual impact on 
the trade balance and fiscal balance, Chapter 3 starts by proposing import and export 
demand functions to assess empirically the major determinants of imports and exports 
of Thailand, as an example of a developing country. Then, the study adds 
liberalization factors to the classical formulation of the import and export demand 
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functions in order to ascertain the impact of trade liberalization on the volume of 
imports and exports in both short run and long run. From the results, we have found 
that the aggregate import volume is cointegrated with Thailand’s GDP, Thailand’s 
relative import price, and Thailand’s average tariff rate, while the aggregate export 
volume is cointegrated with world’s GDP, Thailand’s relative export price, and 
world’s average tariff rate. Thus, a long-run equilibrium relationship could be 
established among variables of our interest. Results of the estimated dynamic 
specification of the functions also present their short-run relationship. In the 
estimation of coefficients, it is found that, for Thailand’s imports, Thailand’s import 
demand is largely explained by domestic GDP. As domestic income increases, 
Thailand imports expand more than proportionately. The short-run income elasticity 
is much larger than the long-run elasticity, suggesting that income change has a 
potentially comtemporaneous effect on change in the volume of imports. However, 
prices seem to have very little effect on imports. The price elasticity does not appear 
to be significant in the short run, though it is significant in the long run but the 
estimated value is a rather low. The result that prices seem to have very little effect on 
imports reflects the nature of the import pattern in the country. Thailand is highly 
dependent on the imports of raw materials, intermediate goods, and capital goods such 
as mineral and metal products, chemicals and plastic materials, electronic parts, and 
industrial machinery, industrial tools and parts, which are required in most of the 
production processes (also the production for exports), rather than consumer goods 
and a substitution for domestic production. 
For Thailand’s exports, the result seems to be very similar since Thailand’s export 
demand is largely dependent on world GDP, rather than on relative export price. 
However, the long-run income elasticity of demand for exports is quite high, while 
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the short-run income elasticity of demand for exports is rather low, suggesting that the 
income impact seems to be larger in the long run than in the short run. The result that 
the impact of change in domestic GDP on imports seems to overwhelm the impact of 
change in the world’s GDP on exports in the short run, raises concern about the 
problem in trade balance in the short run.  
The impact of trade liberalization on trade volume is also analyzed by introducing two 
measures of liberalization; average tariff rates and trade liberalization dummy. 
Considering average tariff rates, for import demand, it is found that the effect of a 
change in Thailand’s average tariff rates on the volume of imports is negative, with 
the short-run elasticity being a little larger than that in the long run. By contrast, 
although the effect of change in World’s average tariff rates on the volume of exports 
is also found to be negative, the impact is much larger in the long-run. In addition, the 
impact of the reduction of average tariff rates is much higher on export demand than 
on import demand. This suggests that the reduction of overall average tariff rates 
(including those of Thailand) seems to increase both imports and exports, with the 
impact on exports larger than on imports. Thus, it can be inferred that trade 
liberalization by tariff reduction is beneficial for Thailand. However, the coefficient 
on the trade liberalization dummy appears to be insignificant for both import and 
export demands. 
These results indicate that, for Thailand, trade liberalization does not lead to the 
deterioration in the trade balance. Instead, it helps improve Thailand’s export 
performance. Although trade liberalization in the form of tariff reduction is associated 
with an increase in imports, it leads to the expansion of exports in higher proportion. 
However, a trade deficit may still occur in the short run and it will lead to further 
current account problems. This is because of the very high short-run income elasticity 
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of demand for imports. For Thailand, the short-term trade deficit is hard to avoid since 
the problem is rooted in its trade structure rather than from its trade policies. 
However, in the long run, Thailand is likely to gain more from freer trade, partly as a 
contribution from the liberalization policy. The problem of trade balance, and thus 
current account problem, should also be improved in longer term. 
Although trade liberalization is not found to be associated with the problem of the 
trade deficit, the problem of fiscal deficit may still persist since it is widely accepted 
that trade liberalization potentially leads to a substantial reduction of tariff revenue. A 
reduction of the tariff, even though it may be partially offset by an increase in the 
volume of trade transaction, often leads to a loss in the country’s tax revenue and 
consequently threatens the fiscal balance. In order to deal with the fiscal imbalance 
problem, governments have to implement domestic tax reform at the same time as 
trade is liberalized. Fiscal reform is normally done by raising the revenues from 
domestic taxes, especially the broad-based consumption tax, to mitigate the highly 
possible loss of international trade tax, as a result of such liberalization as tariffs 
reduction. However, fiscal reform is not always successful, especially for most of the 
less developed and developing countries. While tax structures of developed 
economies are very similar to a certain extent, tax structures of less developed and 
developing economies vary widely. The restrictions of these countries may be due to 
the low level of economic and social development, the political instability, the 
constrained institutional capacities, and the limitation of a country’s geography. Fiscal 
problem is worsened if trade liberalization has passed any negative impact on to tax 
revenues. Therefore, Chapter 4 is dedicated to examine the effect of trade 
liberalization on both international trade and domestic taxes, by applying tax effort 
model and employing a two-way fixed effect approach. Besides the study of a full 
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sample of 134 countries, the study categorizes countries into four groups; low income, 
lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high income countries, depending 
on their level of income. In the full sample, the results indicate that the level of 
economic development is the most important determinant of overall tax revenues. It 
appears that when countries grow, they tend to lower their dependency on such an 
easy-to-collect tax as international trade tax and collect more revenues from more 
complicated domestic taxes. The results are in line with many other studies.40 High 
income countries tend to have a relatively high level of development and thus, are 
usually associated with higher capacity of taxpayers to pay taxes as well as a greater 
capacity of governments to collect taxes. High income countries also tend to have a 
higher degree of monetization of the economy and better tax administration. As a 
consequence, high income countries tend to have higher capacity to collect revenues 
from hard-to-collect or complicated taxes such as the goods and services tax and 
corporate income tax. By contrast, low and middle income countries normally lack 
capacity of tax administration, which finally results in the high dependence on easy-
to-collect tax such as international trade tax. 
In order to investigate the impact of trade liberalization, Chapter 4 introduces three 
different measures of trade liberalization including openness, average tariff rates and 
the number of free trade agreements. Considering trade openness, the results show 
that the degree of international trade has significantly affected all major taxes in low 
and middle income countries. The results suggest that an increase in total tax revenues 
as a result of an increase in the proportion of international trade in GDP strongly 
supports the hypothesis that tax revenues of low income and most of middle income 
countries have a high dependency on trading with other nations. The more these 
                                                            
40 See Agbeyegbe et al. (2004) for example 
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countries open themselves to trade with the world, the more the benefits they have for 
taxation. For countries at every level of development, openness is found to be 
positively related to international trade and goods and services taxes. Openness 
possibly is a stimulus to higher volumes of trade between countries and consequently 
increases international trade tax receipts at the current level of tariff rate. The 
contribution of trade openness toward goods and services tax is possibly by spurring 
flows of goods within the country. The results also show that openness to 
international trade helps stimulate the collection of personal income taxes in low and 
middle income countries, possibly by stimulating growth which in turn, increasing 
employment and the wage level. It is notable that while trade openness increases 
revenues from each tax in very similar proportion for low and lower-middle income 
countries, it increases revenue from corporate income tax for upper-middle and high 
income countries in an outstanding proportion. This result suggests that openness may 
be linked with higher corporate profits. It is possible that firms in developed 
economies have a higher capability to make profits from international trade than firms 
in less developed and developing countries. Although overall results suggest that trade 
openness has a contribution to taxation in all countries, the degree of its benefit is still 
dependent upon the country’s level of economic development and economic structure. 
Considering the second measure of trade liberalization, average tariff rates, this 
measure is introduced into our analysis in order to investigate the impact of tariff 
reduction on international trade tax since it is suggested that the initial tariff levels, 
their coverage, and the extent to which they are reduced, play a significant role in 
determining the impact on international trade tax revenue. If the initial tariff rates are 
high, tariff reduction may lead to an increase in international trade tax revenue. This 
effect can be illustrated by a Laffer curve, which demonstrates the relationship 
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between international trade tax revenue and tariff rates. When the initial tariff rate is 
prohibitively high, trade volumes are likely to be severely limited and international 
trade tax revenue will be very low. Reducing a tariff will decrease an incentive of tax 
evasion and will lead to a substantial increase in trade volumes. These combination 
effects will more than compensate the lower tariff rates and hence result in higher 
tariff revenue. However, a further reduction to a tariff lower than the revenue 
maximizing rate will result in the loss of international trade tax revenue since the 
increase in trade volumes will not be large enough to offset the lower tariffs. The 
results show that there exists a Laffer effect on international trade tax in low and 
middle income countries. The revenue-maximizing tariff rate of international trade 
taxation of low income countries is estimated to be approximately 43% while, from 
average tariff rates data, the peak was at 44.2% in 1983 and 43.2% in 1991. Thus, it is 
clear that the effective rate of tariff has already been reduced below this rate in all low 
income countries. A potential Laffer effect also exists for the international trade tax in 
middle income countries and the revenue-maximizing rate is estimated to be 25%. 
However, the highest average tariff rate of middle income countries was 32% in 1983, 
and thus again, the revenue-maximizing rate is higher than the actual rate. Since the 
actual tariffs are below the revenue-maximizing rate for both low income and middle 
income countries, the results illustrate that a further reduction of tariff levels could 
actually decrease international trade tax revenue in these countries. This implies that 
trade liberalization in the form of tariff reduction is considerably harmful to countries 
where international trade tax is accounted for a high proportion of their tax revenues. 
The results suggest that the reduction of average tariff rates in high income countries 
does not have a significant impact on their international trade tax, though Laffer effect 
possibly occurs. 
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The last measure of trade liberalization included in the study of Chapter 4 is the 
summation of the number of agreements which a country has in force. Types of 
agreements include custom unions, preferential arrangement, service agreement, and 
free trade agreement. The results show that trade liberalization in the form of free 
trade agreements is associated with the decrease in the international trade tax revenue 
in all countries, especially those with low and middle income. It is also found that the 
impact of trade liberalization in the form of free trade agreements on domestic taxes 
differs according to the level of economic development. While free trade agreements 
have a strong negative impact on all kind of domestic taxes in low and middle income 
countries, they seem to have a contribution to domestic taxation in high income 
countries. The results raise issues concerning agreements which are signed between 
developed and less developed countries. Generally, many less developed countries are 
afraid of joining any agreement with developed countries because most parts of their 
economic sector are not well prepared for freer and higher competition, while 
developed countries, which usually initiate such agreements, are believed to have a 
higher ability to take advantages from those agreements. However, many less 
developed and developing countries are usually forced by developed countries to sign 
trade agreement even though such an agreement is disadvantageous, in exchange for 
avoiding non-trade barriers used by developed countries (e.g. environmental concerns 
or intellectual properties). The fear of trade liberalization in less developed and 
developing countries is in line with evidence and studies which suggest that freer 
trade may potentially lead to the fall in domestic corporate profits, job losses, or even 
business shutdown. The negative impact of FTAs on domestic tax revenues may or 
may not result from evidence suggested above. However, the results from Chapter 4 
do suggest that the problem of domestic taxation to be faced in taking forward free 
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trade agreements in low and middle income countries is a real one. By contrast, most 
FTAs give privilege and opportunities for developed economies to enter new markets 
in less developed countries, and hence leading to higher profit for companies, 
especially those related to international trade, in developed countries. From the 
results, it can be concluded that trade liberalization in terms of the number of 
agreements which a country signs may be harmful to taxation in less developed and 
developing countries but may be beneficial to taxation in developed countries. 
The results from Chapter 4 suggest that tax reform in less developed and developing 
countries recommended by economic theory and international experience by moving 
away from international trade taxation and compensating the loss of international 
trade tax by utilizing other domestic sources, such as income and consumption taxes, 
may be inapplicable since their domestic taxes may also severely suffer from trade 
liberalization, not to mention the difficulties in improving domestic tax administration 
which requires reorganizing along functional lines, modernizing procedures, 
computerizing systems, and training people. However, domestic tax reform is still 
necessary since it is one of a few instruments for raising revenues to mitigate the loss 
of an international trade tax. Generally, tax reform is implemented at the same time as 
trade liberalization as an important mechanism for raising tax yield because a 
government realizes that the loss of revenue from an international trade tax may 
potentially cause further fiscal problems. Tax reform always includes restructuring a 
country’s tax system, for example, by strengthening tax administration, establishing 
tax monitoring units, improving audit practices, and computerizing tax system. 
Following these reforms, improving tax administration could reduce tax evasion and 
consequently enhance fiscal revenue. In general, tax productivity should be improved 
after the country reformed its tax system. However, trade liberalization makes the 
299 
 
consequences of the reform of the overall tax system ambiguous since it has various 
impacts on a country’s tax bases. Chapter 5 applies the concept of tax buoyancy and 
tax elasticity in order to evaluate the ability of country’s tax system to mobilize its 
revenue since the performance of the tax system crucially depends on tax bases and 
tax administration. 
In Chapter 5, tax buoyancy and tax elasticity are used as measures of revenue 
productivity of the tax system to determine whether the responsiveness of tax 
revenues is high or low in Thailand relative to three other founding countries of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines). All of these 
countries are categorized as developing countries or middle income countries so the 
negative impact of trade liberalization found in previous chapters may exist, and the 
impact on their revenue performance is worth investigated. The aim of Chapter 5 is to 
estimate tax buoyancy and tax elasticity of Thailand’s tax system, compared to those 
of its three neighbouring countries. The evaluation is done to measure the response of 
the tax system to trade liberalization by AFTA in 1992. Tax buoyancy and elasticity 
are estimated in order to address the question of whether Thailand’s major trade 
liberalization by becoming an AFTA member results in the enhancement of the 
flexibility of the tax system. Tax buoyancy is also decomposed to obtain the buoyancy 
of tax revenue with respect to its tax base and the buoyancy of tax base with respect to 
income. The decomposition of buoyancy into tax-to-base and base-to-income is very 
useful for policy analysis since it tells us which component of growth that is amenable 
to policy manipulation. It also tells us which components of the tax structure have 
been the most responsive or most rigid and which parts of tax system should be 
improved. 
300 
 
The results reveal that the tax system of Thailand and Philippines as a whole is 
buoyant and elastic, while the tax system of Indonesia and Malaysia is not. The 
buoyancy of Thailand’s and the Philippines tax system is mainly due to the high 
buoyancy of corporate income taxes. By contrast, the rigidity of Indonesia’s tax 
system is primarily caused by the inflexibility of corporate income tax, while the 
rigidity of Malaysia’s tax system is due to the inflexibility of all tax sources. Tax 
buoyancy of pre- and post-AFTA indicates that Thailand and Malaysia have 
experienced a decline in tax performance, whereas Indonesia and the Philippines have 
experienced an increase in tax performance during the liberalization period. The 
analysis of tax buoyancy of pre- and post-AFTA period are in line with the analysis of 
tax elasticity. 
Considering Thailand’s tax system, the decomposition of tax buoyancy shows that the 
high buoyancy of its tax system is particularly due to the high tax-to-base buoyancy of 
corporate income tax, especially in the post-AFTA period. An increase in tax-to-base 
buoyancy can be inferred that the performance of corporate income tax collection has 
been substantially improved. This is because recently Thailand concentrated more on 
large companies that have high a potential to pay a large amount of tax, i.e. by setting 
up a large tax office which primarily focuses on auditing these large businesses. 
However, Thailand has experienced a decline in base-to-income buoyancy during the 
post-AFTA period. A decline in base-to-income buoyancy can be inferred that trade 
liberalization may harm the ability of domestic companies to make a profit. This 
result is in line with that presented in previous chapters where trade liberalization may 
deteriorate the corporate tax base of low and middle income countries. Fortunately, in 
the case of Thailand, corporate tax administration has been largely improved so it 
does not result in the decline of corporate tax revenue. 
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Similarly, an increase in buoyancy of personal income tax is a contribution to an 
improvement in tax administration and tax collection rather than an expansion of its 
base in the post-liberalization period. This is because in the past decade, there is a 
large improvement in the technology system that help both tax authorities to calculate 
easily individual income tax and employers to withhold the correct amount from their 
employees. This technology advance is particularly helpful since it correctly 
withholds tax at source, and hence substantially reduces tax evasion. Like corporate 
income tax, the result shows that base-to-income buoyancy of a personal income tax 
faces a decline during post-liberalization period, suggesting that Thailand’s trade 
liberalization may be associated with such negative impacts on the personal income 
tax base as job losses, unemployment, or wage cut. This result is also in line with the 
result presented in the previous chapter that there is possibility that trade liberalization 
will be harmful to personal income tax in less developed and developing countries. 
The results show that the international trade tax is not buoyant over the whole period 
of study. The rigidity of this tax source is mainly due to a substantial decline in tax 
buoyancy in the liberalization period. The decline in tax buoyancy in the post-AFTA 
period is a result of a large decline in tax-to-base buoyancy, not from base-to-income 
buoyancy since the results show that there is a large increase in international trade tax 
base during this period. The result is in line with the study in Chapter 3 which shows 
that trade liberalization helps stimulate the trade performance of Thailand. It leads to 
an increase in both imports and exports, though not at the same proportion. This result 
suggests that the effect of tariff reduction and the reduction in other related trade tax 
rates overwhelms an increase in trade volume, and hence results in the reduction of 
international trade tax revenue. 
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The results also show that the goods and services tax is not buoyant in both the pre- 
and post-liberalization period. The rigidity of the goods and services tax is mainly due 
to low tax-to-base buoyancy in the pre-AFTA period and low base-to-income in the 
post-AFTA period. Although tax buoyancy of the goods and services tax is quite rigid 
over the whole period of study, the results show that this tax source has a significant 
improvement in tax administration and tax collection as its tax-to-base index 
substantially increases in the post-liberalization period. This is mainly due to VAT 
introduction in the context of domestic tax reform as a result of liberalization. The 
introduction of VAT as a replacement for a business tax makes the tax system simpler 
and reduces avenues for evasion and corruption since it reduces the exemptions and 
shifts the system away from multiple business tax rates to a single VAT rate. 
However, it is found that base-to-income buoyancy of goods and services tax is lower 
than unity and decreasing considerably from the pre-AFTA period. Referring to the 
results from previous chapters, trade liberalization may be harmful to the goods and 
services tax in low and middle income countries. In the case of Thailand, trade 
liberalization may be related to the deterioration of goods and services tax base since 
the lower value of base-to-income buoyancy points in this direction. This may be due 
to slower growth of private consumption during post-liberalization period. However, 
the certain effect of trade liberalization on the goods and services tax base is 
somewhat complicated and further analysis is needed to indicate its precise impact.  
In conclusion, in the case of Thailand, it is found that although tax administration has 
been improved for all individual taxes, most of the tax bases have deteriorated during 
the post-liberalization period. As a consequence, overall tax revenue cannot be raised 
to the expected level. However, the deterioration in many domestic tax bases is 
beyond the control of tax authorities. Tax authorities have very few options for 
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improving tax bases since this is a macroeconomic problem outside the control of tax 
authority. The results give a warning to the government that it must be very careful in 
proceeding macroeconomic policy because the contraction of the domestic tax bases 
causes the failure in revenue substitution from international trade tax to domestic 
taxes and also causes further problem in revenue mobilization in the future. 
The main contribution of this thesis to the literature is quite significant in three 
aspects. First, it represents an attempt to explore the relationship between the current 
policy towards trade liberalization and trade and revenue performance. It contributes 
to the growing literature not only by considering trade effects of trade liberalization, 
but also by providing empirical analysis of tax revenue effects, in which trade 
liberalization may have a different impact when implemented on countries with 
different level of development. In addition, it contributes to the study of tax revenue 
productivity as a result of tax reform which is implemented in cooperation with trade 
liberalization policy. 
Second, this study is the first attempt to examine the relationship between imports, 
exports, income, relative prices, and average tariff rates in Thailand by using import 
and export demand functions within the cointegration and the ECM framework. This 
study provides important insights on how trade liberalization affects trade 
performance of a developing economy. 
Third, buoyancy and elasticity concepts are initially employed for Thailand’s tax 
system, since it is crucial to investigate the productivity of the overall tax system 
before and after trade is liberalized in order to detect changes in revenue productivity 
and examine which parts of the tax system have experienced an improvement or 
rigidity as a consequence of trade liberalization. The findings from the study generate 
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important policy implications which do not appear from the analysis using other 
approaches. 
6.2. Clarifications and Conclusions Derived from the Econometrics 
6.2.1. The Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Tariff Structure of Thailand 
As in other developing countries, Thailand has implemented both tariff and 
quantitative restrictions as trade policy instruments, but historically, there has been 
greater reliance on tariffs rather than quantitative restrictions. However, Thailand has 
made significant progress in trade liberalization over the past three decades. Since the 
1980s, the Thai Government has been significantly shifting its trade policy in order to 
promote more efficient industrial development, reduce protectionism and improve the 
overall tariff structure. Part of Thailand’s structural adjustment has been progression 
of import tariff adjustments, aimed at reductions in compliance with ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles. As a result, 
Thailand does not prohibit imports in any category and continues to liberalize its trade 
accordingly. 
Tariff restructuring has received renewed emphasis as an essential part of overall 
economic reforms aimed at strengthening efficiency and competitiveness. From 1985 
to 1995, import custom duty rates have been changed several times in line with 
economic considerations and government policy. Before 1 January 1995, the tariff for 
imported goods was relatively high using up to 39 rates from 0-100 percent with an 
average percentage of 31.15. On 1 January 1995, the government reduced import 
tariff rates to only 6 bands (excluding motor vehicles) as follows; 
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- 0 percent: exempted duty goods, including instruments and appliances used in 
dental, medical, surgical or veterinary sciences 
- 1 percent: raw materials 
- 5 percent: primary and fundamental products 
- 10 percent: secondary products 
- 20 percent: finished products 
- 30 percent: special protection products 
In mid-1997, the reform process was temporarily interrupted by the financial crisis. 
Tariffs on a number of luxury imports were temporarily raised in 1997 to increase tax 
revenue in order to meet the budget surplus of one percent of GDP agreed to with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in late 1997. Table 6.1 provides selected items 
that had tariff rate cuts between 2002 and 2005 according to the magnitude of the 
cuts. Changes in tariff rates between 2006 and 2008 are minor, compared to the 2005 
tariff structure. All in all, over the past three decades, there have been significant 
reductions in nominal tariff rates. Currently, the average import tariff rates is 
approximately 10 percent in 2009. 
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Table 6.1: Average Tariff of Top 10 Items Under Tariff Restructuring in Thailand, 
2002 - 2005  
 Average Tariff Rates Tariff 
Difference 
2000 -2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Rubber 23.3 23.3 15.0 8.6 14.7 
Glass and 
Glassware 18.0 10.1 10.1 10.1 7.9 
Knitted 
Fabrics 20.0 20.0 12.5 5.0 15.0 
Base Metals 9.4 3.2 2.5 2.5 6.9 
Woven 
Fabrics, Lace, 
etc. 
20.0 20.0 13.2 6.1 13.9 
Man-Made 
Staple Fibre 15.9 15.9 9.4 4.8 11.1 
Wadding 
Yarns 17.7 17.7 11.4 6.1 11.5 
Cotton 
Miscellaneous 15.5 15.5 9.2 4.8 10.7 
Silk 14.9 14.9 8.9 5.1 9.8 
Metals 19.1 13.6 13.6 10.1 9.0 
Source: The Custom Department, Minister of Finance. 
At the sectoral level, industries producing intermediate goods (such as chemicals, 
fertilizer, construction material, and metal products) have relatively low rate of tariff 
protection. By contrast, final-goods producing sectors (such as food and drinks, 
pharmaceuticals, and garments), with the exception of non-electrical machinery and 
electrical machinery and equipment, have relatively high rates of protection. In 
addition, tariff rates are generally higher for manufacturing, compared with 
agriculture and other primary product sectors. This is indicated in Table 6.2 by the 
fact that the average applied tariff rates (without the various exemptions) for the 
manufacturing sector were higher than those for the overall economy between 1980 
and 2003. This is consistent with patterns observed in other developing countries and 
reflects the belief in industrialization as the path to economic growth. 
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Table 6.2: Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection in Thailand 1908-2003 (percent) 
 Rates of Protection 
1980 1985 2002 2003 
NRP ERP NRP ERP NRP ERP NRP ERP 
Process Foods 34.4 58.1 30.9 135.2 22.7 37.4 20.3 32.4 
Textile 
Products 41.0 74.5 27.8 118.4 18.9 36.4 18.6 36.2 
Leather and 
Footwear 
Products 
54.1 87.8 26.8 152.7 18.8 20.8 18.5 23.8 
Wood 
Products 31.6 65.4 28.2 62.0 13.7 26.6 13.5 26.9 
Paper and 
Pulp 24.0 20.4 17.8 53.5 14.4 47.8 10.5 32.2 
Chemical and 
Petroleum 
Products 
32.8 43.0 21.4 44.5 9.4 16.7 8.4 14.2 
Rubber 
Products 29.1 42.1 26.8 42.0 23.2 58.5 23.2 58.8 
Other Non-
Metal 
Products 
36.7 72.1 23.0 108.5 15.0 32.8 10.0 19.3 
Metal 
Products 25.2 35.6 16.6 70.9 13.2 25.1 10.7 20.0 
Machinery 22.4 27.1 14.3 29.3 6.2 -0.5 6.2 0.9 
Consumer 
Goods and 
Motor 
Vehicles 
31.2 48.4 19.7 45.6 11.4 18.8 10.6 19.8 
Total 
Manufacturing 32.9 51.7 23.8 78.4 16.4 27.8 15.4 24.4 
Note: NRP = Nominal Rates of Protection, ERP = Effective Rates of Protection 
Source: The Custom Department, Minister of Finance. 
As a consequence of the cascading tariff structure, nominal protection does not 
provide a precise picture of protection in a particular industry. Since the protection of 
a domestic industry depends not only on the tariff rate on its competitive import, but 
also on the tariffs paid on its intermediate inputs, the concept of effective rates of 
protection have been proposed because it depends not only on the tariff rate 
applicable to that sector, but also on tariffs of all other sectors which provide 
production input (intermediate and capital goods) to that sector. 
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From Table 6.2, a broad comparison provides useful information in understanding the 
evolution of the protection structure in Thailand. Two major inferences can be drawn. 
First, from 1980 to 2003, the estimates of effective rates of protection presented a 
downward trend in all industries. The average ERP in the manufacturing fell from 
51.7% in 1980 to 27.8% and 24.4% in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Second, the 
pattern of ERP estimates across industries did not change significantly between 1980 
and 2003. As a consequence of the cascading tariff structure, ERP estimates for 
finished goods such as agro-processing products, textiles, and leather products are 
likely to be higher than those for intermediate products (e.g. chemical and petroleum 
products, machinery, and metal products). Generally, in Thailand, protection tends to 
be granted to industries that have high level of industry concentration and are 
experiencing increased import competition. The relatively open foreign investment 
policy regime in Thailand means that the government is more responsive to requests 
made by foreign investors, including requests for tariff cuts. The decision to grant 
protection to Thai industries is justified by the ability of industries to generate 
employment and income to the country. 
6.2.2. The Composition of Thailand GDP 
From 2000, Thailand’s economy has grown steadily by approximately 8 percent. 
There is a wide base for growth, with each sector contributing to the development of 
the country. Starting from an agrarian economy, Thailand has gradually changed for 
industrialization which strengthens its industry sector, while the boom in the tourism 
industry since the past decade has strengthened the service sector. Nowadays, 
manufacturing and tourism are the two largest contributors to GDP. 
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Agriculture has been the traditional backbone of the country, since Thailand is ranked 
among the top five producers of food in the world. It is also the world’s largest 
supplier of rice and flowers, particularly orchids, which it exports mainly to Japan and 
Europe. In addition, it is the world’s largest producer of rubber and continues to be 
the leading exporter of tapioca and frozen shrimp. Despite its output, the agricultural 
sector is on the decline, and is slowly being overtaken by the industry and service 
sectors in terms of contribution to GDP. As shown in Table 6.3, in 2008, agricultural 
sector was accounted for only 11.64 percent of GDP, whereas non-agricultural sectors 
were accounted for 88.36 percent of GDP. 
With the re-orientation of production from import substitution to export promotion, 
the country has been driven toward industrialization and the manufacturing industry 
has grown steadily until it exceeded agriculture in terms of contribution to GDP. The 
country’s first step into manufacturing was food processing, which effectively built on 
its strong agricultural sector. Nowadays, it is the world’s largest exporter of canned 
pineapple, canned tuna, computer and computer appliances, and electrical parts. 
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Table 6.3: Thailand GDP by Sector, 2000 - 2008 (percent) 
 Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Agriculture 9.02 9.13 9.43 10.41 10.31 10.33 10.74 10.68 11.64 
Agriculture, 
Hunting and 
Forestry 
6.63 6.97 7.46 8.56 8.66 8.79 9.29 9.48 10.48 
Fishing 2.39 2.16 1.97 1.85 1.65 1.54 1.45 1.20 1.17 
Non-Agriculture 90.98 90.87 90.57 89.59 89.69 89.67 89.26 89.32 88.36 
Mining and 
Quarrying 2.37 2.46 2.49 2.61 2.70 3.14 3.28 3.27 3.47 
Manufacturing 33.59 33.43 33.69 34.84 34.45 34.70 35.10 35.57 34.93 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply 2.97 3.25 3.22 3.23 3.25 3.11 3.05 2.91 2.89 
Construction 3.06 3.01 3.04 2.95 3.00 3.05 3.00 2.92 2.87 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 17.22 16.68 15.89 15.01 14.96 14.65 14.18 14.23 14.14 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 5.59 5.63 5.68 5.06 5.15 4.89 4.93 4.89 4.82 
Transport, 
Storage and 
Communications 
8.04 8.32 8.24 7.73 7.59 7.32 7.24 7.34 7.09 
Financial 
Intermediation 2.96 2.95 3.12 3.42 3.60 3.69 3.62 3.62 3.86 
Real Estate, 
Renting and 
Business 
Activities 
3.29 3.19 3.15 3.01 2.90 2.80 2.67 2.52 2.39 
Public 
Administration 
and Defence 
4.29 4.33 4.49 4.43 4.56 4.59 4.47 4.38 4.41 
Education 3.99 3.94 3.88 3.74 3.84 3.96 4.04 4.23 4.16 
Health and Social 
Work 1.96 2.04 1.98 1.81 1.80 1.91 1.92 1.92 1.87 
Other 
Community, 
Social and 
Personal Service 
Activities 
1.50 1.50 1.56 1.63 1.77 1.74 1.65 1.40 1.36 
Private 
Households with 
Employed 
Persons 
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
The country’s service sector is experiencing steady growth, with the boom in the 
tourism industry. The table below shows that expenditure by tourists has risen 
steadily. As a percentage of GDP, in 2008, tourism is accounted for approximately 10 
percent of the GDP, with over 14 million international tourists and over 3 million 
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domestic tourists for the year, spending an average of 5,000 Baht per person per day. 
There is no doubt that tourism is a significant contributor to the Thailand economy. 
From Table 6.4, the revenue from tourism shows a continually increasing trend. The 
total revenue from tourism the revenue has risen from 495,788 million Baht in 2000, 
and hit 867,700 million Baht in 2008. This amount is almost equal to 50 percent of the 
country’s total exports. 
Table 6.4: Revenue from Tourism, 2000 – 2008 
Year 
International Domestic Total 
Million 
(Baht) 
Change 
(%) 
Million 
(Baht) 
Change 
(%) 
Million 
(Baht) 
Change 
(%) 
2000 285,272 12.75 210,516 3.61 495,788 8.68 
2001 299,047 4.83 223,732 6.28 522,779 5.44 
2002 323,484 8.17 235,337 5.19 558,821 6.89 
2003 309,269 -4.39 289,987 23.22 599,256 7.24 
2004 384,360 24.28 317,225 9.39 701,585 17.08 
2005 367,380 -4.42 334,717 5.51 702,097 0.07 
2006 482,319 31.29 322,534 -3.64 804,853 14.64 
2007 500,013 3.67 337,893 4.76 837,906 4.11 
2008 515,822 3.16 351,878 4.14 867,700 3.56 
Source: Tourism Authority of Thailand 
Although actual tax receipts from the tourism could not be obtained, it is assumed by 
the Revenue Department that, currently, 20 percent of all tourism receipts is collected 
in taxes (both consumption tax and income taxes paid by tourism sector workers). By 
using this assumption, tourism has made a great contribution to total tax revenue in 
more recent years. Despite high receipts from tourism, this sector has a relatively low 
contribution on consumption tax revenue. Like many other countries, Thailand allows 
tourists to claim back the VAT that is paid on goods that are bought in the country. 
Table 6.5 presents that although Thailand has experienced an increase in the VAT, 
theVAT refund has increased in higher percentage. In addition, the amount of refund 
in recent years is showing an increasing trend. In 2000, it was accounted for 
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approximately 31%, while it was 37% in 2008. The high proportion of tax refund 
finally results in a low consumption tax receipt. This gives a warning to the 
government that overall tax structure may be significantly affected if the amount of 
tax refund continues to increase. 
Table 6.5: Tax on Consumption and Tax Refund, 2000 – 2008 
Year 
Value Added Tax Tax Refund 
Millions of 
Baht Change (%) 
Millions of 
Baht Change (%) 
2000 139,167 4.26 43910 2.17 
2001 126,803 -8.88 40,113 -8.65 
2002 147,228 16.11 49,926 24.46 
2003 150,457 2.19 51,046 2.24 
2004 154,682 2.81 53,947 5.68 
2005 159,395 3.05 56,008 3.82 
2006 163,188 2.38 58,163 3.85 
2007 168,911 3.51 60,147 3.41 
2008 170,895 1.17 63,283 5.21 
Source: The Revenue Department, Minister of Finance 
6.2.3. The Problem Associated With Quantifying the Impact of Trade 
Liberalization on Tax Revenues 
The difficulties in quantifying the impact of trade liberalization on taxation and 
government revenues arise because the effects depend significantly on the form of 
liberalization and the circumstances under which it occurs. Consider first the impact 
of trade liberalization on tariff revenue; although trade liberalization is presumed to 
reduce trade tax revenues, the impact is in fact ambiguous. This is because the impact 
depends crucially on the nature of a country’s trade barriers and its strategy of trade 
reform. Since Thailand has applied a mixed strategy in order to mitigate any negative 
impact of trade liberalization, many institution and policy variables are related with 
liberalization. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to separate the impact of those factors in 
order to obtain a “pure” impact of trade liberalization. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
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assess the size and direction of the impact of trade liberalization on government 
revenues because custom duty and international trade tax rates have continually 
declined prior to its accession to AFTA and the WTO, and continued to decrease 
afterwards. This is also happened during Asian financial crisis, with a depreciating 
currency, in which expectations were driving importers to change their purchasing 
decisions, and thus the volume of imports in aggregate. 
Indirect effects are more difficult to assess. There is also an issue that trade 
liberalization may have indirect and interactive effects on domestic tax revenues. 
Trade liberalization can interact with the domestic tax system indirectly through the 
impact on the macroeconomic environment and economic growth. If trade 
liberalization is linked to higher rate of economic growth, it will lead to both a better 
static allocation of resources and to a higher rate of output growth. This consequently 
leads to expansion of tax bases and also the expansion of revenue potential. However, 
if trade liberalization is associated with job losses, shrink in corporate profits, and 
contraction in consumption of domestic goods, the revenue consequences will be 
different. The analysis of the impact on tax revenue of trade liberalization needs a 
more complicated structural model and a tool such as computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model in order to give a more accurate picture of the consequence of trade 
liberalization. 
In addition, trade liberalization may have various forms such as bilateral agreement, 
regional agreement or multilateral agreement. Each form of liberalization varies 
greatly in its detail. The difference in details of liberalization, as a result, leads to an 
ambiguous outcome on taxation and government revenue. Thus, this raises the 
question of how precisely it is to assess the impact of the “whole process” of 
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liberalization. To be more specific, one should consider on the effect of each 
agreement. 
6.2.4. The Issue of Income Distribution and Profitability of Corporations in 
Thailand 
Although there are expected gains from trade liberalization for the economy in 
various aspects, one of the critical questions is whether trade liberalization leads to 
disproportionate increased in income, especially for the poor. Economists expect that 
trade liberalization will help developing countries reduce poverty. Trade liberalization 
is expected to increase demand for goods produced by developing countries’ poor and 
low-skilled workers, leading to higher wages for unskilled workers and improving 
poverty. Trade liberalization is also expected to raise the prices of the agricultural 
products produced by the poor and to reduce prices of goods that the poor consume. If 
opening up to trade is associated with higher growth, it may be associated with a 
decline in poverty as well. However, in some developing countries including 
Thailand, economic growth seems to be followed by a widening income gap between 
the poor and the rich, and between skilled and unskilled workers. It seems to have the 
positive association between rising income inequality and high economic growth over 
time. While the GDP grew at an average rate of 5% in the 1980s and 1990s, income 
inequality increased steadily during the same period. For Thailand, the role of 
agricultural sector has a great influence on the country’s income distribution. 
Recently, while the share of the agricultural sector in GDP has decreased, the labour 
force in the agricultural sector is still accounted for more than half of the total labour 
force in the country. However, income level in the agricultural sector is lower than 
that of other sectors. Moreover, income level is very volatile because farm prices and 
harvest directly affect the value of agricultural output. This fact is in line with the 
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result presented in Chapter 5 that there is no significant expansion of personal income 
tax base. The high income inequality and relatively low level of income in agricultural 
sector explains why personal income tax base in Thailand is quite rigid.  
Another interesting issue is the association between trade liberalization and corporate 
profits. For Thailand, trade liberalization appears to have a significant effect on 
profitability. Declining import tariffs are associated with falling profits as firms are 
subject to increasing import competition. This effect is strongest for the firms with the 
highest levels of import competition. Export-oriented industries do not seem to benefit 
from declining export tariffs, since the rates are very low, as a result of export-
oriented policy that was introduced in 1980s. As a consequence, corporate income tax 
base is quite rigid in post-liberalization period. Fortunately, there has been a lot 
improvement in the country’s tax administration, i.e. improvement in the technology 
system that helps tax authorities to monitor and audit firms’ profits more accurately. 
The improvement is particularly aimed at the collection from large businesses. This is 
because large companies normally have a high potential in paying large amount of 
tax. There is also the set up of a large tax office which primarily focuses on auditing 
these large businesses. All of these help maintain corporate income tax receipt at a 
high level, even though its tax base is experiencing a large contraction. 
6.3. Policy Implications 
When jointly considered, the three main chapters of this thesis bear important policy 
implications. In general, a country will agree to reduce or eliminate its trade barriers 
when it reaches agreement that other trading partners will also reduce or eliminate 
their trade barriers. That is, in order to implement a trade liberalization policy, a 
country must ensure that the loss from opening its market is overwhelmed by the gain 
316 
 
from freer trade. The results in Chapter 3, by suggesting that trade liberalization by 
means of tariff reduction has a significant impact on Thailand’s trade volume, provide 
empirical underpinnings for the increased interest of the government in pursuing trade 
liberalization. Since the results in the chapter show that the impact of the world’s 
tariff reduction on exports is much higher than the impact of Thailand’s tariff 
reduction on its imports, this implies that, in order to promote exports, the government 
should support the proliferation of global trade liberalization, especially in terms of 
tariff reduction. The strategy to promote world free trade has been obviously followed 
as it can be seen that Thailand has supported Mr.Supachai Panitchpakdi, a former 
deputy prime minister and minister of commerce of Thailand, who played a vital role 
in promoting trade liberalization in the Southeast Asia region through what has 
become the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), to be elected as a Director General of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and he took office from 2002 to 2005. At present, 
he has taken office of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) as a Secretary-General of UNCTAD and continued his work on free trade 
policy. However, the results in Chapter 3 show that Thailand’s international trade 
structure is highly dependent on the imports of raw materials, intermediate goods, and 
capital goods which are required in most of the production process, particularly 
production for exports. In order to prevent a trade deficit or other negative impacts 
caused by world economic fluctuation, the government should strengthen its domestic 
economy, especially manufacturing sector. 
Freer trade does not only seem to be beneficial when considering trade performance 
perspective, but it may also help improving the performance if considering the 
revenue perspective. The main results from Chapter 4 imply that Thailand’s overall 
taxation will benefit from an increase in the proportion of trade to GDP. Therefore, 
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creating a favorable environment and infrastructure with a stable trade policy and 
effective trade regulation is a significant task facing most of low and middle income 
countries, including Thailand. However, trade liberalization varies widely in its forms 
and details. As also shown by the results in Chapter 4, trade liberalization in terms of 
the number of free trade agreements may be harmful to taxation of less developed and 
developing countries. This result warns the governments, particularly for those of less 
developed and developing countries, when negotiating any trade agreement with 
developed countries, to be very careful in details of each agreement. 
Since the results in Chapter 5 reveal that many tax bases of Thailand’s domestic tax 
sources deteriorated after trade is liberalized, the government should implement 
policies to alleviate the pain which these tax bases suffer in order to improve revenue 
productivity and prevent political issues since liberalization policy is also induced by 
the government. 
6.4. Option for Further Study 
In this study, we have found that there are a number of directions which could be 
explored in future research. First, there is still room to examine the impact of trade 
liberalization on trade performance by applying import and export demand functions 
using disaggregated data. The disaggregated import and export demand models will 
provide a more complete picture of how trade liberalization affects trade at the sector 
level. The disaggregated model can be used by Thai policy makers to draw more 
accurate liberalization policies on specific sectors.  
Second, individual tax sources may be affected by a range of factors that are not 
captured by the variables used in traditional tax effort model. Recently, many 
observers have drawn the conclusion that changes in tax revenues are caused by 
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intangible factors. Therefore, other explanatory variables, particularly structural 
variables, such as institutional variables, and other policy variables should also be 
included into the model in further study. When data are available, we would like to 
test how these variables affect countries’ tax revenues. By including institutional and 
policy factors, we will be able to perform an in-depth examination of how institutions 
and policies affect the pattern of taxation. This is of importance since institutions are 
closely related to liberalization policy. 
Third, although the tax administration of Thailand is likely to be substantially 
improved after trade is liberalized, tax evasion associated with the underground 
economy is still a major problem facing tax administration in Thailand and many 
other less developed and developing countries. In many cases, tax reform induced by 
trade liberalization does not play a significant role in solving the evaded tax problem 
and the black market activities since it is found that the underground economy 
remains sizable and growing. Further research which includes checking of tax 
evasion, tax compliance, and black market activities will help improve accountability 
of tax authorities. 
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